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The literature on the history of Polish Jews between 1944 and 1948 portrays this 
period as a time of transition between the end of the war and emigration to the West or to 
Israel. The narrative is that as Jewish survivors returned after liberation, the local 
population “welcomed” them with antisemitism and violence. As a result, rebuilding 
Jewish life in Poland was impossible and emigration was inevitable. The titles like Le 
Massacre des Survivants: En Pologne après l'Holocauste, 1945-1947 (The Massacre of 
Survivors) and Żydzi w Polsce po II Wojnie Światowej: Akcja Kalumni i Zabójstw (Jews 
in Poland after the Second World War: Operation of Slanders and Murders) reflect this 
understanding of postwar Polish Jewish history.
1
 Even the works that deal with issues 
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other than antisemitism, like Natalia Aleksiun’s study of Zionism in postwar Poland, 
stress violence and emigration as the defining factors of postwar Jewish experience.
2
 
The most notable example of this approach is the recently published Fear: 
Antisemitism in Poland after Auschwitz. An Essay in Historical Interpretation, in which 
Jan Tomasz Gross seeks to explain anti-Jewish violence in postwar Poland, in general, 
and the Kielce pogrom, in particular.
3
 In his attempt to pinpoint the main cause, Gross 
shifts attention from the power of stereotypes to the power of “everyday experience,” like 
the fear of losing property. He shows that tangible individual interests were the central 
incentive for anti-Jewish violence. Although seemingly reductionist in its emphasis on a 
single cause, Gross’ argument is a powerful intervention into the field. Gross succeeded 
to prompt a rethinking of postwar antisemitism and gave rise to another nationwide 
debate in Poland. Yet, as original as his book is, it remains within the limits of the 
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described historiography. It perpetuates the understanding of postwar Jewish history in 
Poland as the story of antisemitism and emigration. 
This dissertation is a response to such an understanding of the postwar history of 
Jews in Poland. While I appreciate the significance of violence, I believe that focusing on 
antisemitism alone not only diverts scholarly attention from other aspects of Jewish 
experience, but also distorts the overall picture of postwar conditions. Thus I suggest 
shifting the focus. In the following chapters, I seek to show this historical moment not as 
a short, harsh prelude to an inevitable emigration, but rather as a time of complex Jewish 
encounters with state and society in which the exodus was not presupposed. By “complex 
encounters” I mean the broad range of experiences generated through the interactions 
between Jews and non-Jews on the street and in the public office. These experiences 
included travelling back home, struggling to repossess property and retaining citizenship, 
rebuilding normal lives by marrying, having children, finding a job, engaging in political 
and cultural life, and finally, yes, experiencing violence – an enormously important but 
not necessarily defining mark of ethnic interaction. 
I suggest thinking of these experiences as a part of the postwar social, political, 
and cultural environment, and not just as a manifestation of inevitable, timeless Jewish 
victimization. Such an approach will firmly ground the analysis in a historical context, 
and thus illuminate the nuances and subtleties of ethnic coexistence. Consequently, I will 
present a narrative in which Jews are full-fledged historical actors and active participants 
in interethnic relations and not merely inert objects of somebody else’s will. Thus, I will 
not solely describe non-Jewish attitudes toward Jews. Rather, I will seek to explain the 
attitudes and behavior of Jews and non-Jews toward each other in a historically specific 
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setting. Similarly, writing on anti-Jewish violence should not preclude presenting Jews as 
active participants in the events, rather than just the helpless objects of aggression. 
To illuminate these issues, I will investigate everyday lives in 1944-48. It is not 
my intention, however, to present a story of private life. Instead, I wish to set the stage 
for an analysis of the borderline between the private and the public, and possibly there, in 
the middle ground, pin down the most illuminating moments of ethnic relations, the 
analysis of which will allow me to describe and explain a multifaceted profile of ethnic 
interaction in its broadest social and cultural dimensions. I define the “middle ground” as 
a space where politics and private lives intersect. To better understand the concept of 
“borderline,” I will pay particular attention to the interaction between contemporary state 
policies and the attitudes and behavior of different population groups toward each other.  
This dual relationship – to society and state – is central to my thesis. For example, 
I discuss the return as a process of adjustment not only to persistent antisemitism on the 
street, but above all to the radically transformed social and political conditions. The 
governments formulated new requirements for entry into their national communities by 
changing the criteria for citizenship. I explore how this change affected the position of 
Jewish returnees in the two states and societies. I also examine the everyday communal 
and personal experiences of returning Jews in the context of their relationships with non-
Jews and strive to present these relationships as complex and fluid encounters affected by 
the state-revised categories of inclusion and exclusion. In short, by focusing on this dual 
relationship, I investigate the limits of belonging to society and state in Eastern Europe 
after the Holocaust.  
 5 
To offer this new perspective and to gain a more comprehensive understanding of 
postwar Jewish history in Poland, I turned to comparative study with Slovakia. While 
aware of the difficulty that a comparative work presents, I nevertheless strongly believe 
in its analytical value. I agree with Todd M. Endelman and Maud Mandel, who argue that  
 
[C]omparing Jewish communities across time and/or space or comparing Jews 
with non-Jews in the same place or in different national context “transcends the 
borders of Jewish historiography” both by revealing what is “individual, specific, 




Comparing two specific national contexts highlights the more general trends in the 
dynamics of interaction among ethnic groups after crisis. The comparative analysis 
provides a framework for understanding what mechanisms generate similar phenomena 
in divergent political, social, and cultural milieus.  
For comparison, I chose Poland and Slovakia, because, in the preliminary stages 
of my research, I noticed that pogroms and other antisemitic incidents – attacks in streets 
and on trains, among others – occurred mainly in these two countries, more than 
elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Yet, both countries had significantly different historical 
backgrounds, ethnic compositions, and political frameworks. I found this context to be a 
particularly interesting comparative vantage point. On the one hand, the distinctiveness of 
the Polish and Slovak settings and, on the other hand, the similarity in the dynamics of 
local events, the patterns of behavior, and the frequency of the incidents, provided a 
perfect laboratory for analysis of the general and the particular in ethnic interaction.  
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In the most general terms, the majority of Poles and Slovaks adhered to 
Catholicism, had been exposed to fascist propaganda for five years of the war (although 
to varying degrees), were troubled by postwar economic problems, and were eventually 
taken over by the Soviets. The Warszawa and the Slovak uprisings of August 1944 both 
evoked Polish and Slovak nationalism and caused tremendous bloodshed. The subsequent 
repression of the two uprisings led not only to great human losses but also extensive 
material destruction. In this respect, Poland and Slovakia suffered more than the Czech 
lands, which sustained relatively minor damage. 
What marked the major distinction between the two histories was the wartime 
relationship with the Third Reich. Although, to a large degree, the fascist Slovak State 
was a Nazi puppet, nonetheless it enjoyed enough autonomy to shape its own domestic 
policies, including the treatment of the Jews. In wartime Poland, the power framework 
was radically different. The Polish government was in exile and the country was under 
total Nazi occupation. Except for the resistance movement, there was no source of Polish 
authority which could affect Jewish policies in the country.  
After the war, relations with the Soviet Union also distinguished the two states. 
Soviet pressure guided domestic politics in Poland more than in Czechoslovakia. From 
the first conference in Teheran in 1943, through the Warszawa uprising, and the 
subsequent imposition of governments, the Kremlin openly pushed towards gaining full 
control over Polish domestic and foreign affairs. Being one of Stalin’s top priorities, the 
Polish state remained under constant surveillance from Moscow. The NKVD and the Red 
Army served as tools in the process of subjugating and intimidating the Polish political 
elite and ordinary citizens. The constant Soviet military presence in Poland greatly 
 7 
affected the dynamics of political and social life by instilling fear and hopelessness in 
society. In Czechoslovakia, on the other hand, weaker Soviet influence and the early exit 
of the Red Army in December 1945 created an environment in which the domestic 
centers of authority enjoyed a greater level of autonomy.  
Moreover, differences in the historical relationship with Russia or the Soviet 
Union distinguished Polish and Czechoslovak attitudes toward the eastern power. Polish 
leaders had been traditionally russophobic, while the Czechoslovak president, Edvard 
Beneš, voluntarily signed a treaty of friendship with the USSR during the war. These 
disparate attitudes to the Soviet Union shaped the general psychological framework and 
political discourse in the two countries. On the one hand, in Poland, the common attitude 
combined a fear of the USSR with the will to resist the Soviets. On the other hand, in 
Czechoslovakia, the positive attitude to the USSR reflected people’s hope for a better 
future in alliance with the friendly Soviet Union. Regardless of the varying attitudes, both 
societies ended up tragically disillusioned by the beginning of 1948; in apathy and 
hopelessness (Poland) and shock and disappointment (Czechoslovakia).  
A much more pronounced opposition to the Soviet Union translated into civil war 
in Poland in 1945-48, not paralleled in Czechoslovakia. Forest warfare affected not only 
the village communities and the regions where the military operations occurred but also 
the entire society, which constantly heard of, witnessed, or was personally affected by the 
bloodshed. Ongoing violence in Poland had also profound consequences for Polish Jews. 
Fear for life was omnipresent among Jews in central and eastern Poland between the 
beginning of 1945 and the summer of 1946. In contrast, the absence of civil war in 
Slovakia calmed Slovak Jews. Only the inhabitants of northeastern territories experienced 
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some perils of civil war when Ukrainian militants (Banderovcy) crossed the northern 
borders with Poland in 1947. 
During the Polish civil war, Jews were targeted not only as Jews but also as 
“Soviet stooges” and Judeo-Bolsheviks. The disparate attitudes to the Soviet Union 
determined the ways in which Jews were perceived in the two countries. Accusations 
against Jews for collaboration with communists were much more common in Poland than 
Slovakia. Slovaks cared less about the alleged Bolshevism of Jews than about Jewish 
“magyarization” of the Slovak nation. The Slovak public historically identified Jews as 
agents of “magyarism,” accusing the Jews of “magyarizing” the country. Thus, postwar 
antisemitism in Poland and Slovakia can not be understood outside anti-Soviet and anti-
Hungarian sentiments respectively. Investing the idea of a Jew with threatening features 
of a respective enemy posed a particular threat to security of Jewish communities in the 
two countries.  
An important distinction also stemmed from varying classification of Jews. The 
Slovak government, unlike its Polish counterpart, did not recognize Jews as a distinct 
minority, thus opening the door for flexible categorization and treatment of Jews. As a 
result, Jews were legally classified as Slovaks, Czechs, Magyars, and Germans, mainly in 
accordance with language and with disregard of other criteria of ethnicity. I speculate that 
there were two main reasons for this. First, language had been a traditional marker of 
nationality in Czechoslovakia even before the war when the government used language as 
the criterion of nationality in censuses. Second, the Slovak government had to cope with 
the wartime legacy of the Slovak State that it replaced. The government walked a fine 
line between political continuity and discontinuity. It had to consider the interests of 
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those who “legally” profited from the policies of the wartime regime while positioning 
itself as an anti-fascist, democratic government. Singling out Jews as “special victims of 
the war” would disturb this balance. The postwar Polish government had no such legacy 
to cope with, and thus found it politically unproblematic to emphasize Jewish 
particularity, condemn the wartime persecution of Jews, and pledge the restoration of 
Jewish life.  
In my opinion, the nature of wartime collaboration with the Nazi regime had a 
paramount impact on popular attitudes towards the Jews after the war in the two 
countries. In Slovakia, the Slovak authorities, not external forces, implemented the anti-
Jewish laws, whereas in Poland the Nazi regime alone had the power to enact such laws. 
Those Slovaks who participated in the persecution of Jews had the sanction of the quasi-
independent Slovak State, and thus acted “legally.” Those Poles who participated in the 
persecution of Jews lacked such sanction, collaborating with the occupier. I speculate that 
this wartime dynamics caused more guilt in Poland than in Slovakia, and thus more 
hatred toward the Jewish returnees. The absence of death camps in the physical and 
mental landscape of Slovakia and their strong presence in the lives of Poles, who 
witnessed genocide “in their backyards,” only added to the growing sense of guilt.
5
 
 The examination of these sentiments is among the most methodologically 
challenging tasks in this project; how to assess which attitudes were typical in the two 
countries and which were not? Probability is one method: if of sixty-five available 
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testimonies, sixty overlap in their representation of a phenomenon, the phenomenon was 
probably common. However, memoirs – playgrounds of memory – are extremely 
problematic as representative voices in a historical analysis. While I use extensively 
published and unpublished testimonies, I am fully aware of the challenge they present. 
The authors of published memoirs, for example, constitute a particular group of the most 
articulate, the best educated, and ultimately the most successful Holocaust survivors. 
Recorded (unpublished) testimonies represent a broader demographic range of survivors 
who had been selected for interviews regardless of their postwar life choices. 
Notwithstanding these differences, all memoirs from the war and its aftermath are 
necessarily shaped by life experiences which followed the described events.  
That said, personal testimonies reveal more than they obscure. First, personal 
testimonies highlight the most common threads of daily experience. Having read dozens 
of personal accounts collected in the archives in Poland and the United States, I was able 
to identify numerous recurrent images and representations, which seemed to signify 
common elements of the immediate postwar experience.
6
 An examination of the most 
representative and insightful testimonies illuminates general trends in the postwar return 
of Jewish survivors to Poland and Slovakia. Second, placing personal accounts at the core 
of a narrative gives a voice to ordinary people. Bringing these voices back restores their 
historical agency and hence makes room for a historical narrative which recognizes the 
potency of individual experience in a representation of the past. Finally, cautiously 
employed individual representations can provide insights into the larger historical 
processes. For the period after liberation, returnees’ accounts expose features of ethnic 
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dynamics – its contingencies and changeability – otherwise lost in historical data. Initial 
requests for aid, the first encounters with neighbors, and negotiations of one’s place in a 
community – these experiences are illegible without memoirs.  
Apart from published and unpublished memoirs and testimonies, I base my 
analysis on an extensive collection of primary sources from archives in Poland, Slovakia, 
the United States, Israel, and the Czech Republic. These sources include records of the 
central and local administration in Poland and Slovakia, files of central and local Jewish 
communities and organizations, the press, and reports of American Jewish relief 
organizations, among others. In addition, my work is firmly grounded in the secondary 
sources at the intersection of several bodies of literature, including the history of Polish-
Jewish and Slovak-Jewish relations in the twentieth century, the history of antisemitism, 
and the postwar history of Eastern Europe.  
I also base my analysis in theoretical work on ethnicity. Although the concept of 
nation dominates the vocabulary of my primary sources and the modern nation-state 
constitutes the context of the described events, I do not use it as a category organizing my 
analysis. National concepts are not the most suitable to describe the web of mutual 
relations and the perceptions of self and others since they rarely acknowledge the 
flexibility of identities. Jeremy King’s definition of ethnicity as “a web of vague and 
multivalent relationships, as a seemingly permanent but actually plastic set of social 
attributes, and as a populist and thus modern mode of political cognition” better fits my 
conceptual framework.
7
 His approach creates space for all shades of identity rather than 
the mere conception of Jews and non-Jews as mutually exclusive. Contingent and fluid 
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identity is a useful category of historical analysis particularly when applied to periods 
following total destruction. When war (or a similar catastrophe) materially and 
emotionally shatters old structures, survivors have to rebuild not only their shelters but 
also their sense of self. 
This dissertation is arranged thematically since the entire story covers only three 
years and chronology seems of secondary importance. The story begins in the summer of 
1944 during the Soviet liberation of eastern Poland and ends at the end of 1948. I chose 
1948 as the end date because in Poland and Slovakia this year brought the final 
establishment of the communist regime and hence the end of the transition stage. The 
ultimate installation of the regime stabilized structures previously in flux, final 
consolidation of central power and its security forces, radicalization of official ideology, 
and intimidation in the public sphere. This radical shift in politics after 1948 generated 
concerns, motivations, and fears of a different character than those in the pre-1948 
period. Therefore, a historical study of post-1948 Polish and Slovak societies requires 
different analytical categories than a pre-1948 investigation. 
Chapter 2 offers a general historical context in comparative perspective. Chapter 3 
describes Soviet liberation of the two countries, the survivors’ first days of freedom, the 
journey home, and the ultimate failure of homecoming. Chapter 4 describes problems in 
the implementation of Jewish property restitution and its critical role in shaping Jewish 
and non-Jewish relations after the war. Chapter 5 offers a comparative narrative of anti-
Jewish violence in Poland and Slovakia in a broader social and political context. Chapter 
6 discusses the revised definitions of citizenship and new criteria of inclusion and 
exclusion and traces their consequences for the position of Jews in both societies. Chapter 
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7 describes the return to normality involving building families, finding jobs, and 





 CHAPTER 2   
OUTLINE OF HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
 
In this chapter, I will present a brief outline of the histories of Jews in Poland and 
Slovakia before 1945. I will also introduce the social and political processes which 
affected ethnic dynamics in the two countries after 1945. The postwar history of Jews and 
their relations with non-Jewish populations unfolded against a backdrop of social and 
political transformation on international and domestic levels. The events on the Polish 
and Slovak streets are incomprehensible outside this context. The context, however, was 
not predetermined by the international power struggle and the ultimate Soviet conquest as 
older historical texts claimed.
1
 Indeed, in hindsight, from the perspective of 1948, the 
first three years after the war seemed like a gloomy road toward inevitable Soviet rule. 
But that was not entirely true. Between 1945 and 1947, nobody was certain of what the 
future might bring. While some hoped for a national road to socialism, others prayed for 
a Third World War. Everywhere, in Poland and Czechoslovakia, there was a lot of 
excitement and hope surrounding the rebuilding efforts. Thousands of Jews would not 
have remained in these countries if not for that hope of rebuilding their lives there. They 
anticipated the opening of new possibilities in new social and political conditions.
2
 
                                                 
1
 As Hayden V. White said, all histories follow one of four universal plot lines – tragedy, comedy, romance, 
or satire. The history of postwar Poland is a tragic story. Hayden V. White, Metahistory: The Historical 
Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins U. P., 1973). 
2
 For these remarks, I am thankful to Brian Porter-Szűcs. 
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As recent historiography showed, these were not merely the illusions of the naive. 
For example, Padraic Kenney demonstrated that workers were still organizing and going 
on strikes in the first years after the war.
3
 Public demonstrations for social and political 
causes were still possible. John Connelly found that universities were still engaging in 
scholarship that diverged from official Party lines.
4
 Between 1945 and 1947, the press 
remained relatively free, with a plurality of titles from Catholic to communist. In 1947, 
the Episcopate succeeded in publishing its own set of principles for the new constitution, 
which envisioned Catholicism as a state religion.
5
 Tygodnik Powszechny (Universal 
Weekly) included relatively open debates about basic political issues even in 
1948. Despite the unleashing of terror, the arrests, and the crackdown on the military 
underground, Soviet norms did not yet dominate public life. In short, the main point of 
this chapter and this study is to demonstrate that the situation in 1945-48 was not one of 




Unlike Slovaks, Poles had their own polity for more than 700 years, until 1795 
when the final partition of Poland occurred. In the sixteenth century, after forging a 
commonwealth with Lithuania (Rzeczpospolita Obojga Narodów), Poland became one of 
the largest and most influential powers in contemporary Europe. The Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth was also one of the most ethnically diverse places at the time. At the 
beginning of the seventeenth century, only four million out of ten million residents of 
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Rzeczpospolita were Polish. The rest were Byelorussians, Germans, Gypsies, Jews, 
Lithuanians, Ukrainians, and others. The ethnic heterogeneity of the Commonwealth and 
the literary production on the subject generated the myth of Rzeczpospolita as a polity of 
peaceful ethnic coexistence, religious toleration, and effective democracy. Although 
based on murky grounds (only ten percent of the population participated in the Polish-
Lithuanian “democracy” and ethnic relations were anything but idyllic during the 
Chmielnicki massacres), the myth became one of the cornerstones of the Polish national 
self-image and set high ideals of ethnic tolerance for the future. The end of 
Rzeczpospolita marked the beginning of more than 120 years of statelessness and struggle 
for independence.  
Since 1795, the governments of Russia, Austria, and Prussia (Germany) were to 
determine the policies of Poland for the entire nineteenth century. As a result, when 
Poland regained independence in the fall of 1918, the newly established Second Republic 
was composed of three dissimilar parts with different political, social, economic, and 
cultural backgrounds. When the pianist Ignacy Jan Paderewski became prime minister 
and formed a new government in January 1919, one of his first challenges was a legacy 
of the partitions and the need to unify the country. Divergent transportation systems, 
educational structures, economic infrastructures, and currencies, not to mention legal 
systems, had to be unified. The ethnic composition of the state was yet another disuniting 
factor.
6
 In the eastern – formerly Russian – partition, the majority of peasants were 
Byelorussian or Ukrainian, landlords were mostly Polish, while the urban population was 
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Jewish. In the southeast, in Galicia – formerly Austro-Hungarian – ethnic divisions were 
similar to the Russian partition although peasants were predominantly Polish. Finally, in 
the western – formerly German – territories, the majority of peasants were Polish while 
the urban population was German and Jewish. Poles, Ukrainians, and Byelorussians made 
up rural populations whereas Jews and Germans (especially in the west) concentrated in 
urban areas. In this respect, Poland’s ethnic and residential composition was similar to 
that of Slovakia. 
Although tempered in the subsequent decades, differences generated during the 
partitions remained crucial in determining regional particularities throughout the 
twentieth century. For example, nineteenth century minority politics in Germany, Russia, 
and Austria permanently affected ethnic relations in Silesia (former Germany), in 
Mazowsze (former Russia), and Galicia (former Austria). In Germany, for instance, a 
highly centralized power prioritized efforts to unify all German provinces. In order to 
successfully merge the Polish-speaking peripheries with the German center, the 
government introduced extreme assimilationist measures, including the germanization of 
the Polish minority. The Polish resistance helped to preserve national culture but also 
generated extreme forms of Polish nationalism. Mostly assimilated German Jews were 
caught up in the middle of the German-Polish national conflict, being identified as 
German oppressors.  
In today’s Mazowsze – the former Russian partition – ethnic dynamics developed 
similar to Silesia. Although initially Russia was willing to grant Poles special privileges, 
soon russification efforts intensified and, by the mid-nineteenth century, Russia withdrew 
all prerogatives. Like in Germany, Russian discriminatory politics led to the rise of Polish 
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nationalism and military initiative. However, in contrast to German Jews, Jews in the 
Russian partition were never confused with the Russian oppression due to a low level of 
assimilation. Rather, the Jewish participation in the Polish uprisings against Russia 
bridged the gap between Jews and non-Jews if only temporarily. In a long run, the 
ambivalent position of Jews as “others” remained intact.  
The Habsburg Empire was neither strongly centralized nor ethnically 
homogenous. Instead, it was a multinational polity which refrained from enforcement of 
homogeneity and granted power to a few privileged national groups. Although less 
privileged than Austrians and Hungarians, Poles enjoyed considerable autonomy 
including the right to use the Polish language and to maintain a system of Polish schools 
in Galicia. As a result, local Polish nationalism never reached the intensity of its 
counterparts in the Russian and German territories, slowing down the coming of modern 
antisemitism to the region. It should be noted, however, that political nationalistic 
agitation against Jews was not completely absent from the area.
7
  
The Jewish population in interwar Poland was the second largest in Europe (after 
Russia). Three million Polish Jews – residing predominantly in the urban areas – 
constituted ten percent of the total population of the country. In 1931 eighty percent of all 
Jews in central Poland (Congress Poland) and seventy-five percent of all Jews in Galicia 
lived in towns, mainly shtetlekh. In the eastern Polish borderlands, sixty-one percent of 
Jews lived in towns.
8
 In the cities of Warszawa, Łódź, L’viv, Kraków, Vilnius, and 
Lublin – Jews constituted approximately thirty percent of the total population. In eastern 
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towns like Grodno, Brześć on Bug, Równe, Łuck, or Pińsk the percentages were even 
higher, reaching fifty to sixty percent of the total population. As for their occupational 
profile, the overwhelming majority of Polish Jews derived their income from commerce 
or industry. In 1921, forty-one percent of Polish Jews were employed in commerce and 
insurance, thirty-four percent in industry and mines, six percent in agriculture, and five 
percent in the liberal professions.
9
 These numbers did not change drastically until the late 
1930s, when the government introduced anti-Jewish legislation limiting access to certain 
professions including medicine and law.
10
 
Although overwhelmingly urban, Polish Jewry was hardly uniform. The Jews of 
the Russian partition from central Poland, the Jews from the Polish borderlands (Kresy), 
from the old Habsburg Empire (Galicia), and from the formerly German occupied 
territories were all products of radically different political and social environments. In the 
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former Russian part, where fifty percent of all Polish Jews lived, the overwhelming 
majority was poor and orthodox (including Hassidim) while the minority was wealthy 
and acculturated. Further to the east, in the Polish borderlands, there were even fewer 
acculturated Jews, more likely russified than polonized. Overall, the Yiddish language 
dominated on the Jewish street in Kresy and Russian Haskalah and Jewish socialism 
captured people’s minds. In the late 1930s, Zionism became one of the strongest political 
movements in the region. In the west, in the former German partition, the majority of 
Jews were highly assimilated into the German language and culture. Finally, in the 
former Austro-Hungarian part of Poland, where economic misery and lack of 
industrialization joined Franz Joseph’s tradition of tolerance, modern Haskalah and 
traditional Hassidism competed for followers. Haskalah was particularly prolific, giving 
an impetus to the politics of assimilation and to Jewish nationalism.  
Facing the ethnic, social, and political diversity of interwar Poland, the two main 
personalities of the time, Józef Piłsudski and Roman Dmowski, proposed their own 
visions of an “ideal Poland”; visions which competed against each other to define Polish 
ethnic politics for years to come. Marshal of the Polish Legions Józef Piłsudski returned 
to Poland in 1918 as a hero of the Great War. In his views on geopolitics, Russia was the 
primary enemy of Poland. Consequently, Poland needed a buffer zone in the east to 
protect the Polish heartland from Russian imperialism. Creation of a Polish-Lithuanian-
Ukrainian federation would serve this purpose. In Piłsudski’s vision, the federation would 
guarantee equality to all its citizens regardless of nationality. In his twenties, Piłsudski 
had been a socialist, but he later, in his own words, “alighted from the socialist tram-car 
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at the stop marked nationalism.”
11
 Nevertheless socialist ideals greatly influenced his 
nationalism, which never became xenophobic or exclusive.  
Roman Dmowski, on the other hand, had envisioned Poland based on ethnic 
exclusivity. Brian Porter-Szűcs, in his work on modernity and nationalism, convincingly 
demonstrated how Dmowski and his followers came to create the exclusionary 
boundaries around the imagined nation and, hence, developed an ideology of hatred.
12
 By 
the 1920s, Dmowski had no doubts that Poland should be solely “for Poles.” In 
inflammatory, nationalistic rhetoric, he called for action against Jews and Germans as the 
primary enemies of the Polish nation. They needed to be fought against with all possible 
means, including economic boycotts and pressure to emigrate.
13
 Dmowski and his 
movement (Endecja) came to symbolize antisemitism in interwar Poland.
14 
 
Neither Piłsudski nor Dmowski could control the outbreak of ethnic violence 
immediately after the First World War. Major pogroms erupted in the eastern borderlands 
– in today’s western Ukraine and Lithuania. The first pogrom occurred in L’viv in 
November 1918, when Poles and Ukrainians fought over rights to the city. Another major 
riot took place in Vilnius in 1919, when the city was subject to Polish, Lithuanian, and 
Byelorussian claims. In both cases, Jews were caught in the line of fire, viewed as 
potential traitors by each side. Also, in Pińsk, Lida, and numerous other small towns of 
Galicia, anti-Jewish sentiments exploded. The situation worsened in 1920, during the 
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Polish-Russian war, when Poles identified Jews with Bolsheviks and thus the “natural” 
enemies of the Polish cause. 
Overall, the 1920s was an era of ruptures and dramas. The decade commenced 
with ethnic violence in the borderlands, the war against Bolshevik Russia, and the 
assassination of Poland’s first elected president, Gabriel Narutowicz, by a nationalist 
extremist. Economic crisis followed political instability. In May 1923 inflation reached a 
new high: one US dollar bought six million Polish złoty.
15
 Social unrest and workers’ 
strikes further destabilized the political scene. Constant shifts of power, the absence of a 
strong coalition, and the governments’ dependency on swing-votes contributed to the 
inability of executive power to resolve pressing economic and social problems.  
In 1926, Marshal Piłsudski staged a coup d'état, which became one of the most 
controversial moves in his career and one of the most dramatic moments in Polish 
interwar history. In the short run, the coup had positive effects on the economy and ethnic 
policies. Among the new initiatives, the government guaranteed equal treatment to all 
ethnic minorities and abandoned tactics to polonize them. However, in the long run, the 
change proved to be temporary and superficial at best. Like in the rest of Europe, the 
Great Depression brought an overall deterioration of the economy and political stability 
in Poland in the 1930s. When Piłsudski – the only guarantor of relative political stability 
– died in 1935, conditions deteriorated dramatically. The extreme right-wing nationalist 
groups took over politics in the capital and on the street. Dmowski’s idea of “Poland for 
the Poles” triumphed and Jew-baiting became a daily reality. The government officially 
approved economic boycotts and actively encouraged Jews to emigrate. Anti-Jewish 
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violence erupted in dozens of Polish towns and villages including Przytyk, Mińsk 
Mazowiecki, and Brześć on Bug.16  
Despite these handicaps, Polish Jews remained the most culturally diverse and 
religiously dynamic Jewish community in interwar Europe until the Second World War 
when the Nazi regime entirely wiped out this world. In search of Lebensraum, Nazi 
Germans invaded Poland on September 1, 1939. After a month of regular war, the Polish 
Army surrendered and total occupation of the country began. In contrast to Slovakia, 
Hitler had never considered Poland as a potential satellite or puppet state with its own 
servile government. As early as October 1939, it was clear that the Germans would rule 
the country with an iron hand. The executions of members of the Polish intelligentsia 
started the process.  
At the same time (late fall 1939) the Nazis introduced laws against Jews: the 
expropriation, the order to wear a Star of David, the ban on residing or working in certain 
districts, and the prohibition of relations with non-Jews.
17
 In 1940, in each town, the 
Jewish community councils were obliged to gather a particular quota of its residents for 
daily slave labor in the streets or industry. Meanwhile, the Nazi regime gradually 
confined Jews to ghettos established all over Poland. Soon, any contact with the outside 
world was forbidden and crossing borders of a ghetto meant immediate death. In the late 
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fall of 1941, Nazis began experimenting with truck-engine gas killings in the forests of 
eastern Poland, in Chełmno. In March 1942, the first transports of Jews were sent to 
Bełżec death camp and, soon after, the program of mass killings operated at full capacity. 
Between spring 1942 and fall 1944, in the death camps of Bełżec, Birkenau, Chełmno, 
Majdanek, Sobibór, and Treblinka, Germans gassed and burnt millions of European Jews. 
When Russian troops liberated the camps in Poland in January 1945, the total number of 
Jewish victims of the Second World War was thought to be millions.
18
  
As the German occupation of Poland unfolded, Stalin initiated a series of 
determined and ultimately successful efforts to establish a dependable government in 
Poland. Only a completely loyal Polish state could guarantee the establishment of a 
secure Soviet western border and a buffer zone against capitalistic Western Europe after 
the war. By the beginning of 1943, Stalin had activated Polish Communists to help him 
create faits accomplis in Polish politics. In February 1943 he authorized the creation of 
the Union of Polish Patriots (Związek Patriotów Polskich, ZPP), which was to play the 
role of a Soviet-backed government in occupied Poland. In April 1943 the USSR severed 
diplomatic relations with the Polish government-in-exile after the Polish administration 
accused the Soviets of the Katyń massacre.19 At the end of 1943, at a conference in 
Teheran, Stalin and Churchill agreed on the future borders of Poland − the Curzon line on 
the east and the Oder-Neisse line on the west.
20
 For Poland, this solution meant the 
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surrender of vast eastern territories (including the cities of Vilnius and L’viv) to the 
USSR and the acquisition of Silesia and Pomerania from Germany in return.  
The events of 1943 gave impetus to the forming of a Soviet-backed government 
in occupied Poland. At the beginning of 1944, preparations for the creation of the Polish 
National Committee (Polski Komitet Narodowy, PKN) – the base for the future 
government – were under way in Moscow when Stalin and the Polish Communists 
realized the need to widen the political spectrum of the new administration. Stalin and his 
comrades foresaw that a solely communist-based government – created on the back of the 
Red Army – would provoke enormous opposition and constant interference. For this 
reason, the work on the PKN continued with the participation of the wider spectrum 
including the communist-friendly Socialists, Democrats, and Agrarians. By late June 
1944, “It was obvious that the Communists were preparing to take power in Poland.”
21
 
Finally, in July 1944, when the Red Army entered today’s eastern Poland, the Soviet-
backed Polish government − the Polish Committee of National Liberation (Polski 
Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego, PKWN) − was established.  
The PKWN − also known as the Lublin Committee (after the location of its first 
headquarters) − was organized in Moscow and fully controlled by the Soviet military.  
 
The creation of the PKWN fundamentally changed Poland’s situation. From that 
moment Stalin would no longer speak of the reconstruction of the government-in-
exile in London but of expanding the PKWN by including politicians overseas 
and in Poland. The political structure created at that time, with minor 
modifications that did not undermine its foundations, was maintained over the 
next decades. Those foundations were the Communist Party’s monopoly of power 




                                                 
21
 Krystyna Kersten, The Establishment of Communist Rule in Poland, 1943-1948, trans. John Micgiel and 
Michael H. Bernhard (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 61.  
22
 Ibid., 64-65. 
 26 
 
The Soviets ensured that the Communists dominated the PKWN, without having a 
majority, by holding the three crucial departments of public security, education, and 
information and propaganda. Edward Osóbka-Morawski from the Polish Socialist Party 
(Polska Partia Socjalistyczna, PPS) became prime minister.
23
 
Facing a gradual Soviet advance toward a complete takeover in occupied Poland, 
the leadership of the political and military underground, most notably the Home Army 
(Armia Krajowa, AK), made the decision to launch an anti-German uprising in 
Warszawa.
24
 The uprising was supposed to create a situation in which Polish 
underground authorities could seize power in Warszawa before the Russians entered the 
city. In other words, the AK started the uprising as a final act of desperation aimed at 
hindering Soviet domination. The Warszawa uprising broke out on August 1, 1944 and 
ended two months later on October 2, 1944. Insufficient human and military resources of 
the underground, combined with the treachery of the Soviet military, led to the final 
disaster. When the AK fought the final battles against the Germans in the late summer of 
1944, the Russian troops halted all military operations so that the Germans would not 
have to fight on two fronts and could use all their resources against Poles. The total 
surrender to the Germans ended the struggle, which ultimately caused over 200,000 
deaths and the total destruction of the city of Warszawa. As a result of the annihilation of 
the military resistance and the subsequent repression of the AK, anti-Soviet opposition in 
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Poland was dramatically weakened. However, there were still political forces in the 
country which were determined to hamper the Soviet establishment of authority in 
Poland. Stanisław Mikołajczyk, the leader of the Polish Peasants’ Party (Polskie 
Stronnictwo Ludowe, PSL), was the most prominent example.
25
 
Mikołajczyk was still in London when he became a major negotiator of Polish 
affairs in the international arena. As prime minister of the government-in-exile between 
July 1943 and November 1944, Mikołajczyk traveled to Moscow, London, and 
Washington on numerous occasions to negotiate, among other matters, the composition 
of the future Polish government. However, negotiations with Washington or London had 
their limits since neither of the political centers was willing to challenge Soviet policy 
toward Poland. Both Great Britain and the United States needed the cooperation of the 
USSR to realize their own political aims. Also, Roosevelt rightly believed that the Soviet 
dominance of Eastern Europe was a fait accompli and nothing could be done except 
ameliorate its consequences.  
At the conference held in Yalta in February 1945, Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin 
declared their readiness to establish diplomatic relations with Poland as soon as “the new 
Polish provisional government of national unity” was democratically elected.
26
 The 
signatories also agreed to approve the Curzon line as the eastern frontier of Poland. 
Taken at face value, the Yalta agreement seemed beneficial to Poland. It stated the need 
for a reorganization of the present provisional government “on a broader democratic basis 
with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad” and 
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pledged to create a new administration with the holding of “free and unfettered elections 
as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot.”
27
 However, the 
formulation of terms left much space for interpretations, thus allowing the Soviets to 
manipulate it. 
In January 1945 the new provisional government (Rząd Tymczasowy RP) took 
over as the central executive in Poland after the PKWN. This government lasted until 
June 1945 when the Provisional Government of National Unity (Tymczasowy Rząd 
Jedności Narodowej, TRJN) was formed in the final negotiations in Moscow. 
Theoretically, in accordance with the Yalta agreement, the new administration was to be 
organized on “a broader democratic basis” with participation of all legal political parties 
in Poland. In practice, however, “a broader democratic basis” meant the inclusion of 
representatives of the Polish Peasants’ Party (PSL) alone.
28
 Osóbka-Morawski retained 
his post as prime minister in the new government. Mikołajczyk accepted the position of 
second deputy prime minister although originally he was supposed to head the 
administration. Overall, out of twenty-two ministers in the government, fourteen were 
Communists and former members of the Lublin Committee. The remaining eight 
members were either Socialists (who slowly gravitated toward the communist left, 
particularly after their most respected leaders were forced into exile), or members of the 
SD and SL, and thus too powerless to matter. The formation of the Provisional 
Government of National Unity closed the period of dual centers of power, in Poland and 
abroad. The government-in-exile ceased to have any factual meaning. 




 In addition to the already present members of the PKWN: Polish Workers’ Party (PPR), Polish Socialist 
Party (PPS), Democratic Party (SD), and Peasant Party (SL). 
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In this new polity, the majority of the population was ethnically Polish.
29
 The pre-
war mosaic of nationalities ended due to several factors at play during and shortly after 
the war. First, as I described earlier, out of a vibrant community of more than three 
million Jews, only about 200,000 survived the genocide and returned to Poland. Second, 
the postwar shift of borders left the majority of Lithuanians, Byelorussians, and 
Ukrainians outside of the new Polish eastern frontier. Finally, the new Polish 
administration implemented national policies which academic literature on the subject 
termed “ethnic cleansing.”
30
 In an effort to settle interethnic conflicts, the government 
forced the homogenization of society through expulsions and “resettlements” of “non-
Poles” while pressuring ethnic Poles (for example, in the Soviet Union) to return to 
Poland. By and large, millions were relocated “voluntarily, by force, or under pressure” 
from their original place of residence after 1945.  
The postwar fate of the German and Ukrainian minorities – the two largest 
minorities within the new Polish borders – was the most symptomatic. The treatment of 
Germans in Poland immediately after the war resembled that in other Eastern European 
countries. The principles in regard to the Germans were laid out at the Berlin (Potsdam) 
Conference in the summer of 1945, 
 
The Three Governments, having considered the question in all its aspects, 
recognize that the transfer to Germany of German populations, or elements 
thereof, remaining in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, will have to be 
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undertaken. They agree that any transfers that take place should be effected in an 




In the final weeks of the war alone, five million Germans left in panic the newly annexed 
territories of western and northern Poland, fearing the advance of the Soviet military and 
subsequent reprisals of the local population.
32
 In June 1945 the Polish Army conducted a 
ruthless operation of immediate “resettlement” of approximately 200,000 Germans from 
the Polish-German borderlands.
33
 The organized mass transfer of the remaining Polish 
Germans began in February 1946 and lasted until November 1947. Between February 
and June 1946, more than 700,000 Germans were forced out of the Polish territories 
(200,000 people in June 1946 alone). In the second half of 1946, another 700,000 
Germans were transferred to the Soviet zone. Joseph B. Schechtman cited a total of 1.6 
million Germans expelled from Poland in 1946 alone. In 1947, a total of 500,000 
Germans were forced to leave the country.
34
  
Similar policies were implemented against Ukrainians between 1944 and 1948. 
The resettlement started in the fall of 1944 in accordance with the agreement between 
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Poland, Soviet Byelorussia, and Ukraine.
35
 Despite resistance, approximately 360,000 
Ukrainians were evacuated from Poland to the Soviet Ukraine between November 1944 
and August 1945. By the end of 1946, the total of deported Ukrainians and Lemkos – 
“people classified as Ukrainians” – reached 480,000.
36
 At the same time, approximately 
700,000 people classified as Poles – Catholics and speakers of the Polish language – were 
forced to move to Poland.
37
 In 1947, the Polish government organized Operation Vistula 
(Akcja Wisła) to remove the remaining Ukrainians from southeastern Poland (estimated 
at about 200,000).
38
 Between April and July 1947, about 140,000 Ukrainians and Lemkos 
were brutally evicted from their homes in the provinces of Lublin, Rzeszów, Przemyśl, 
and Nowy Sącz and forced to move to the newly annexed territories in northern and 
western Poland. Vibrant multiethnic communities in the borderlands of Poland came to 
an end. 
“Cleansing” southeastern Poland of Ukrainians aimed, in particular, at the 
ultimate destruction of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (Ukrayins’ka Povstans’ka Armiya, 
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 The activity of the UPA in the eastern regions of Poland exacerbated long lasting 
Polish-Ukrainian animosities and led to a particularly destructive civil war between Poles 
and Ukrainians in the years 1943 and 1947. Beginning in March and April 1943, the UPA 
targeted Polish civilians in order to “cleanse” the region of the Polish-speaking Catholic 
population, appropriate their land, and take power. The murder of approximately 35,000 
to 80,000 Poles in Volhynia (today’s western Ukraine) in the summer of 1943, carried out 




 By mid 1943, violence targeting the Catholic population spread from Volhynia to 
Eastern Galicia (today’s Polish-Ukrainian borderland), and further west to Lublin, 
Zamość, Przemyśl, and Rzeszów (provinces in eastern Poland). As early as the beginning 
of 1943, the action of the UPA drew a reaction from the AK, leading to a guerilla war 
with thousands of casualties on both sides in military and civilian ranks. To further 
complicate the matter, the Nazis used the Polish-Ukrainian conflict for their own 
resettlement plans in the area beginning in 1943. In 1944 the situation turned even more 
complex as the Red Army advanced toward the west. After a short truce, caused by the 
progress of the Soviet military through the southeastern provinces of Poland, the Polish-
Ukrainian confrontation continued. So did massacres of local Ukrainians in retaliation for 
Ukrainian crimes against the Polish population.  
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After the liberation of 1945, Polish-Ukrainian fighting did not subside. Regardless 
of ideological differences, the armed Polish underground (and the Polish Army) remained 
determined to settle scores with the UPA and Ukrainian civilians. Although shattered by 
the Warszawa uprising and the repression that followed, the armed underground did not 
dissolve but rather went deeper underground, continuing the fight not only against the 
UPA but, above all, against the Soviets. The AK became the dominant Polish resistance 
movement under German occupation. It officially disbanded in January 1945 but some of 
its units moved to the forests and continued guerilla warfare against the Soviet presence 
in Poland. The second leading underground organization was the National Armed Forces 
(Narodowe Siły Zbrojne, NSZ), created in 1942 as a part of the military resistance 
movement.
41
 In contrast to the AK, the NSZ considered the USSR the primary enemy as 
early as the beginning of 1943 (since the battle of Stalingrad). In fall 1944, facing a 
hopeless political situation, the leadership of the NSZ resolved to disband the troops. 
However, the units refused to dissolve and moved the warfare against the Soviets into the 
forests.  
The AK and NSZ members who “went into the forests” did so for a number of 
reasons. Some were ideologically driven; militantly anticommunist, they aimed to 
reestablish the government-in-exile as the official government of Poland. Some were 
escaping from NKVD pacification actions and night arrests or from forced conscription.
42
 
Stefan Korboński wrote in his dispatch to London,  
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We cannot control the spontaneous movements to the woods. The reason: on one 
side mass arrests and conscription into the army, and on the other – the mystical 
faith of the people, that the period we have lived through is transitional, that soon 
there will be a truly independent Poland. The youth want to wait that period out in 




Finally, there were those who simply found it difficult to make the transition to a 
“normal” existence or considered guerilla warfare their way of life and a means for 
personal profit. In any case, after liberation, the armed underground was scattered, 
unstructured, uncontrolled, and highly demoralized. By and large, about 35,000 partisans 
took to the marshes or the forests to fight the Soviets.
44
   
 In spring 1945, as repression of the partisan units intensified, so did the NSZ’s 
campaign against the Security Office (Urząd Bezpieczeństwa, UB), the Citizens’ Militia 
(Milicja Obywatelska, MO), and the PPR. In May 1945 tensions increased dramatically, 
causing the exile leaders and the Polish underground to issue a number of calming 
appeals.
45
 Their appeals proved futile and the official government in Poland resolved to 
reestablish internal order with its own methods. In anticipation of the void caused by the 
withdrawal of the Soviet NKVD from Poland, the government formed special military 
units – the Internal Security Corps (Korpus Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego, KBW). The 
KBW and the three infantry divisions deployed in Warszawa, Lublin, Białystok, and 
Rzeszów (mainly eastern Poland) took on the task of “handling” the insurgency.
46
 
Pacification of the countryside and gradual destruction of the forest units began. In June 
and July 1945, in the Lublin province alone, the Third Infantry Division carried out more 
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than seventy operations in 300 localities.
47
 The most intense battles took place in the east 
but were not limited to this region: all over the country, partisans clashed with communist 
security forces and political police. Police repression, including pacification actions in the 
forests, increased in the winter of 1945/46 and spring of 1946, when whole villages were 
burnt. The fights lasted with lesser or greater intensity until 1948. 
At the time, the government had 250,000 soldiers and militiamen to fight the 
underground.
48
 The losses on both sides reflected the intensity of the violence. According 
to the official estimates (published by the Institute for the Party History of the Polish 
United Workers Party in 1970), more than 6,000 state officials and supporters alone, 
“whose deaths at the hands of illegal organizations could be confirmed,” were killed 
between September 1944 and December 1946.
49
 Between fall 1944 and spring 1945, “the 
NKVD arrested 61,729 Poles in the military behind Soviet lines on grounds of having 
belonged to hostile organizations. Of those, only 10,751 remained in camps in Poland, 
but over 50,000 were transported to the Soviet Union.”
50
 In the first months of 1946 
alone, the NKVD reported that 1,400 people loyal to the regime were killed in almost 
2,000 attacks organized by the opposition.
51
  
Among the victims of civil war, there were also Jewish survivors. In principle, 
armed guerilla units were to target state officials and Soviet and Polish soldiers. 
However, many victims of the warfare happened to be accidental. Some of the attacks 
had nothing to do with political struggle. In December 1945, in the Poznań, Łódź, and 
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Kraków districts the population was terrified of “bands,” which attacked and robbed 
random residents. In January 1946, the Italian ambassador to Poland, Eugenio Reale, said 
that “common and political banditry” was the major issue in Poland.
52
 Lawlessness was 
widespread, so was access to weaponry. Polish Jews fell victims to this violence not only 
as “random citizens” but also as a targeted ethnic group. The NSZ was particularly 
notorious for hunting Jews. The NSZ subscribed to a highly nationalistic and exclusivist 
vision of “Poland for the Poles”; they also believed that Jews were disloyal to Poland 
having ties with Bolshevism. 
The belief in Judeo-communism (żydokomuna) – the idea that Jews were 
traditionally prone to this political ideology – was a common motif in public discourse in 
the late 1940s.
53
 Interestingly, some Polish Jews shared the belief that “the number of 
Jewish officials is entirely out of proportion with the size of the Jewish population.”
54
 In 
May 1949, a JOINT correspondent in Poland pondered the relationship between Jews and 
the government in Poland, 
 
The question of why the Government is so lenient toward the Jews should also be 
answered. It is easy to answer that question. In a country where at least eighty 
percent of the population is against the Government and the ruling party, it is 
good to know that it can rely, at least on some part of the population, which wants 
to cooperate with the Government…. The Government knows that the Jews may 
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be black-marketing, dealing in hard currency, illegally leaving Poland, etc., but 






According to the estimates of the communist members of the Central Committee of 
Polish Jews (Centralny Komitet Żydów w Polsce, CKŻP) in January 1947, 5,500 Jews 
were members of the Communist Party (PPR) which apparently amounted to a hundred 
percent increase during the second half of 1946.56 In Lower Silesia, according to the 
estimates of the communist members of the CKŻP, there were 745 Jews in the police 
reserves ORMO in the region in January 1947.
57 
Considering that ORMO consisted of 




Krystyna Kersten cited a note from President Bierut on the numbers of workers in 
the political police in November 1945. According to the note, out of approximately 
25,600 employees of the Security Office (Urząd Bezpieczeństwa, UB), 438 or 1.7 percent 
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 Of 500 employees in posts of authority in the UB, sixty-seven, or thirteen 
percent, were Jews. The note did not specify the criteria according to which the 
Jewishness of the employees had been determined. More recently, another Polish 
historian, Andrzej Paczkowski, verified these numbers based on biographical notes of the 
447 employees in managerial positions in the UB between 1944 and 1956.
60
 In the years 
1944-45, almost twenty-five percent of the employees answered “Jewish” (żydowska) to 
the question of “nationality” (narodowość).61 After 1945, the average percentage of Jews 
in the UB workforce was thirty. These data did not consider regional disproportions. In 
November 1945 the Jewish population of 100,000 made up only a miniscule percentage 
in a country of twenty-four million. Twenty-five or thirty percent in the higher echelons 
of the secret service was indeed an overrepresentation. However, in absolute numbers, 
the total “Jewish participation” was entirely negligible. As Kersten concluded, the myth 
of Judeo-communism was precisely that: a myth. 
Waves of violence against the underground (and the Jews) usually coincided with 
major political events like the referendum and the elections. By winter 1945, the 
Communists had already decided to postpone the “free and unfettered” elections 
promised in the Yalta agreement. The decision stemmed from the PPR’s conviction that 
if the elections were conducted in the beginning of 1946, they would be the losers. The 
Polish Communists were aware that they lacked legitimacy and popular support. Their 
potential constituency in Poland could not be compared with, for example, 
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Czechoslovakia, where they could count on actually winning the general elections. In 
contrast, considering the strength of the PSL, Mikołajczyk had good reason to push for 
the elections. In January 1946 the PSL was the largest political organization in Poland. 
Mikołajczyk himself was extremely popular too; upon his return from exile in June, 
crowds welcomed him enthusiastically in Kraków, Warszawa, Poznań, and elsewhere.  
To delay the elections, to find a pretext to combat Mikołajczyk and the PSL, and 
to estimate how much support they could get, the Communists proposed the idea of a 
referendum, approved by the PSL. To get people to vote, the Communists asked 
questions on the least controversial or ambiguous issues, “Do you favor the abolition of 
the Senate? Do you want the adoption in the future Constitution of the economic system 
carried out by means of land reform and nationalization of basic national industries with 
the preservation of statutory rights for private initiative? Do you want the adoption of the 
western border of the Polish state on the Baltic Sea, the Oder and Neisse River?”
62
 In 
1946 politicians imagined that a great segment of society not only approved of but also 
expected far-reaching social and economic transformation, including agricultural reform. 
Also, considering the loss of the prewar eastern regions of Poland, not many were 
expected to disapprove of the western acquisitions. Hence only the first question – the 
abolition of the Senate – could provide potential ground for a political battle.  
A month before voting, the PSL decided on the responses “no” to the question on 
the abolition of the Senate and “yes” to the remaining two. Soon after, both parties 
unleashed an intense crusade to get people to vote; for the Communists “three times yes” 
(trzy razy tak) and for the PSL – one time “no.” Governmental propaganda reached an 
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unprecedented scale. Psychological intimidation, physical abuse, and constant harassment 
of PSL members were part of the campaign. On Sunday, June 30, 1946, more than eighty 
percent of eligible voters went to the polls. According to the official results, seventy 
percent voted “yes” and thirty percent voted “no” to the “Senate question.” However, no 
one doubted that the PPR falsified the results. For example, in Kraków where the PSL 
safeguarded the voting, eighty-four percent voted “no” to the first question, fifty-nine 




Four days after the referendum, on July 4, 1946, the anti-Jewish pogrom in Kielce 
broke out which claimed the lives of forty-two Jewish survivors. The Kielce pogrom 
became the central event in the narrative of postwar antisemitism in Poland. Polish 
scholars like Kersten and Szaynok suggested that the proximity in time between the 
referendum and the pogrom was not accidental.
64
 They speculated that the power center 
may have been interested in inciting anti-Jewish violence to divert international attention 
from the falsification of the referendum results. More recently, Jan T. Gross rejected this 
interpretation as purely circumstantial and of limited value to the understanding of the 
social dynamics at the root of the pogrom.
65
 Due to a lack of sufficient evidence, the 
question of whether there was governmental “provocation” behind the Kielce pogrom 
must remain open. Yet, it is fair to say that the referendum campaign and the atmosphere 
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of heightened anxiety, fear, and anti-communist (thus anti-Jewish) anger made the 
pogrom more likely.   
The referendum also made it clear that the great majority of the population 
opposed the current administration and that only repression and falsification could keep 
the Communists in power. A fair ballot box was no longer an option. Yet, Mikołajczyk 
remained determined to continue the political and legal fight. The referendum seemed to 
have proved his point that the PSL would certainly win the elections. The Communists, 
however, resolved to eliminate the PSL before the elections of January 1947. The 
election campaign was accompanied by scenes of brutal intimidation and repression, 
aiming to instill fear in society. Coercion became the primary method of the Communists 
and their allies. The PSL became the primary target of intimidation, raids on its 
headquarters, and arrests of its members.
66
 In such atmosphere, the elections on January 
19, 1947, became a farce which left Mikołajczyk and the PSL no illusion about a fair vote 
or hope of victory. According to the official results, the Democratic Bloc won eighty 
percent of the total vote while the PSL managed to secure only ten percent.
67
 In the newly 
elected parliament, the communists took 394 seats while the PSL won twenty-eight seats.  
The final defeat of the PSL and the general apathy in society created the 
circumstances in which the Communists could seriously consider a complete takeover of 
power. In February 1947, the parliament elected as president of the Polish Republic 
Bolesław Bierut, a devoted Soviet-style communist. Józef Cyrankiewicz – a trusted 
socialist – became prime minister in the newly formed government. On February 19, the 
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parliament approved changes in the March Constitution from 1921, which now 
functioned until 1952 when the Stalinist law was fully introduced. Although guerilla 
warfare continued in the forests and political resistance was not entirely muted, it became 
clear that only another world war would change the course of events in Poland. 
Governmental agencies and the secret police subjected Mikołajczyk and his followers to 
brutal intimidation. In October 1947, having been informed about his planned arrest, 
Mikołajczyk escaped from Poland and went into exile in Great Britain and then in the 
United States. Mikołajczyk’s escape and the destruction of the PSL marked the end of 
legal resistance in Poland.  
Meanwhile, the sovietization process – adoption of Soviet-like institutions, laws, 
customs, traditions, and the way of life, both on a national and local level – was only 
partially introduced and did not take effect on a large scale until the early 1950s. In the 
late 1940s, the Polish Communists still believed (as the Czechoslovak Communists did) 
in a national road to socialism. But, in contrast to their counterparts in other countries, in 
Poland, the Communists avoided confrontation with the small and middle peasantry by 
abandoning the collectivization of farming. Also, the Catholic Church enjoyed relative 
peace. Although the Communist Party treated the Catholic hierarchy cautiously and, by 
the end of 1947, had increased its attacks on the clergy, the church maintained its 
property as well as the right to teach religion in the schools until the early 1950s.  
The year 1948 brought the final solidification of Communist power all over 
Eastern Europe. Mergers of the Socialist with the Communist parties – which usually 
marked the final stage of the full takeover of power – took place in Romania in February, 
and in Hungary and Czechoslovakia in June 1948. In Poland, the Socialists (PPS) 
 43 
surrendered under pressure from the Communists in the beginning of the year. During the 
following purges, almost 82,000 PPS members were expelled from the party, including 
many outstanding activists like Bolesław Drobner in Kraków. At the Unification 
Congress in December 1948, the Communists announced a union with the PPS and the 
Jewish Socialists, and the creation of the Polish United Workers’ Party (Polska 
Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza, PZPR). The new political body dedicated itself to 
Marxist-Leninist principles and was to retain a power monopoly for the next forty years. 
The first secretary general of the PZPR, Bolesław Bierut, was also the president of 




Slovakia did not have independent statehood until the twentieth century. The only 
autonomous Slovak polity can be traced to the ninth century – the Principality of Nitra in 
the Great Moravian Empire. After the collapse of the Moravian Empire in the early tenth 
century, Slovakia became a part of the Kingdom of Hungary and remained a part of the 
Hungarian territory until the end of the First World War in 1918. When the Hungarian 
Kingdom was ruled by the Habsburg dynasty, Bratislava became an important political 
center. Slovakia’s political standing deteriorated in 1867 when the Austrian Monarchy 
and the Kingdom of Hungary signed the Compromise (Ausgleich). By granting Magyars 
status equal to the Austrian government based in Vienna, the Compromise undermined 
the Slovak position of power. While the Slovaks had never been politically equal to 
Magyars, now the discrepancy was much more marked. A deterioration of Magyar-
Slovak relations became inevitable.  
 44 
As in any national struggle, the main points of contention were education and 
language. In 1867, when the Habsburgs made Magyar an official language, the Slovaks 
were left with little leverage to oppose the pressures of magyarization. Before 1867, as 
Owen V. Johnson pointed out, Slovak as a cultural and national language grew slowly but 
steadily, culminating in the founding of three Slovak high schools and Matica slovenská 
in the 1860s.
68
 After the Ausgleich, Hungarian authorities closed these institutions, 
eliminated Slovak from all schools, and introduced Hungarian as the compulsory 
language of education. Despite these efforts, magyarization policies, which were imposed 
with intensity on the Slovak-Hungarian borders, turned out to be only partially 
successful. Many Slovak graduates ended up as “unfinished Magyars” with fluent Slovak 
and resentment against Hungarians.
69
 What the cultural anti-Slovak policy did succeed in 
was to exacerbate long-lasting Slovak-Hungarian tensions over Magyar political 
dominance. Also, paradoxically, the magyarization efforts became an incentive for both 
Slovak intellectual circles and the Hungarian government to publish more in the Slovak 
language. Since most of the existing Slovak publications (journals) had a liberal stance, 
the government became interested in using the Slovak language as a vehicle for 
disseminating conservative ideas. Consequently, before World War I, Slovak journalism 
blossomed and the number of periodicals grew steadily every year.
70
 In short, in the 
Slovak-Hungarian struggle both sides had goals to pursue: the Hungarian authorities 
fought to enforce political and cultural domination over the Slovak region while the 
Slovak intelligentsia attempted to build a nation based on national language and national 
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education. The Hungarians succeeded in the short run, holding on to their dominance 
until World War I; the Slovaks succeeded in the long run by creating a Slovak nation. 
Slovak Jews were the losers alone. 
In 1880, according to the Hungarian census, in Slovakia, only one percent of the 
population was Jewish, while sixty-three percent was Slovak, twenty-three percent 
Hungarian, nine percent German, and almost three percent Ruthenian.
71
 Magyars and 
Germans resided in towns and a few cities. For example, in Bratislava, sixty-five percent 
of the population was German, more than fifteen percent Hungarian, another fifteen 
percent Slovak, and three percent of the classified as “others” (this category included 
Jews).
72
 Slovaks were by and large a rural population.  
According to the 1910 census, 62.6 percent of the Slovak population worked in 
agriculture, forestry, and fishing, 18.4 percent in industry, 3.2 percent in communication 






and transportation, 4.8 percent in commerce, and 4.4 percent in liberal professions.
73
 This 
occupational and residential pattern, in which Slovaks were a rural population and 
Germans and Magyars the urban class, not only reflected actual social divisions in 
Slovakia but also set the tone for discourse on minorities and their place in Slovak 
society. When, in the nineteenth century, the Slovak intelligentsia attempted to define 
Slovaks in new, national terms, one of the first clichés they attacked was the notion that 
Slovaks were “natural” peasants and thus incapable of self-determination as a nation. 
Hence, the struggle against Magyars, Jews, and Germans – urban populations – became a 
part of the Slovak nation building. Antisemitism and antimagyarism were the most 
visible manifestations of the process. 
Although, according to the census, the Jewish population was small – one to three 
percent – in fact the number of Jews was greater. The reason for this was that Hungarian 
Jews in Slovakia tended to identify themselves as Hungarians or Hungarian language 
                                                 
73
 Ibid., 28. 
























speakers, not as Jews. In Johnson’s opinion, prior to 1918 “the Jew usually identified 
himself as a German, or to an increasingly greater degree, a Hungarian.”
74
 For example, 
in 1910, of 140,000 Jews in Slovakia – “Jews” being defined as people who professed the 
Jewish faith – 76,000 entered Magyar as their nationality, 58,000 German, 5,000 Czech 
or Slovak, 270 Ruthenian, and 320 other nationalities. These numbers changed gradually 
in the interwar period as more and more Jews spoke Slovak or Czech instead of Magyar 
or German. Nevertheless, by 1918, the majority of the Slovak middle and upper class 
consisted of Magyars or Magyar speaking Jews. In the censuses conducted in interwar 
Czechoslovakia, language was listed as the criterion for determination of ethnicity. In the 
late 1920s, debates started on what "Jewishness" meant and on the role of language as a 
marker of nationality. In the end, the government ruled that “Jews may list their 
nationality as Jewish (without regard to mother tongue)."
75
 In the census of 1930, the 
decline in the number of Magyars indicated that more Jews identified themselves as 
Jewish or Slovak instead of Magyar. Yet, the prevailing determination of ethnicity based 
on mother tongue and the classification of many Slovak Jews as Magyars in interwar 
Czechoslovakia proved critical for the history of Jews after the Second World War. 
The collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918 ended almost 300 years of 
Habsburg and Hungarian domination of Slovakia. In October1918, the Czech 
bureaucracy replaced the Habsburg authority, marking the beginning of the Czechoslovak 
Republic. The idea of the Czechoslovak or Czecho-Slovak state was an intellectual 
product of the beginning of the twentieth century and the First World War. One of the 
greatest proponents of czechoslovakism – the ideology claiming that Czechs and Slovaks 
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were one Czechoslovak nation – was Tomáš Masaryk, the future president of 
Czechoslovakia. Partly as a result of Masaryk’s political activity, in May 1918 Czech and 
Slovak exile organizations signed the Pittsburgh Declaration in favor of a new Czecho-
Slovak state – a union of the two nations. In October that year, the National Council 
proclaimed itself the provisional government of the Czechoslovak Republic. By the end 
of the month, the Czech police entered Slovakia to create a Czech presence there. On 
October 30, in Turčanský Svätý Martin, a group of pro-Czechoslovak Slovak intellectuals 
declared Slovakia’s secession from Hungary and unification with the Czechoslovak 
Republic. Slovakia retained restricted autonomy within the federation.  
Like every minority, Slovakia’s Jews – 2.3 percent of the total but ten percent of 
Bratislava’s population – had to adjust to the terms of the newly created federation.
76
 As 
early as 1918, Slovak Jews began to organize themselves politically by setting up the 
central Jewish council in Piešťany as well as a chain of local committees around the 
country. During the Congress of the Jewish National Council in Prague (January 1919), 
the Czech and Slovak Jewish leaders laid the foundation for the formation of the Jewish 
Party of Czechoslovakia (Židovská strana). However, despite enthusiasm, Czech and 
Slovak Jews had no political leverage during the first few years of the republic. The 
Jewish Party did not win any seats in the parliament elections of 1920. Similar to post-
WWI Poland, antisemitism became a public concern. In October 1920 anti-Jewish riots 
occurred in western Slovakia; in Piešťany, Nové Mesto nad Váhom, Žilina, and 
elsewhere. The pogroms must have shaken the community, for the chairman of the 
Jewish Party requested President Masaryk himself to intervene.   
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Times changed for Jewish politics in 1923 when the Jewish Party obtained seven 
seats (out of 201) in municipal elections. Although the foundation of the first fascist 
paramilitary organization in Slovakia, the Home Defense (Rodobrana), diminished this 
success, the mid 1920s still marked the beginning of political stability and economic 
prosperity for the Czechoslovak Republic and the Jewish minority.
77
 The prosperity 
enhanced Jewish social, political, and cultural life until the Great Depression in 1929. In 
the 1930s, economic hardship and the radicalization of political life slowed, if not halted, 
the advance in the minorities’ status in Slovakia. Antisemitic rhetoric again came to the 
fore as a part of public discourse. Particularly vocal on “the Jewish question” was the 
extremist Hlinka Slovak People’s Party (Hlinkova slovenská ľudová strana, HSĽS).78 In 
1935, the signing of the Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty prompted the HSĽS to invoke the 
slogan of "Judeo-Bolshevism," alleging a Jewish-communist threat. In general, HSĽS’s 
antisemitism intensified proportionally to the rise of the Nazis in Germany during the 
1930s. Although its leader, Andriej Hlinka, declared that “…the Slovak People's Party 
was not inimical to the Jews, but ‘only struggles against those who aim to undermine that 
world upon which the Jewish faith, too, rests,’” the HSĽS’s actions belied his words.79 
Participation of the HSĽS’s Youth Movement in anti-Jewish demonstrations in Bratislava 
in April 1936 and HSĽS’ subsequent proposals to transfer Slovak and Subcarpathian 
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While the events of 1936 were alarming, what came later directly led to the end of 
the Czechoslovak state. When the Nazis were just forty kilometers from Bratislava after 
the annexation of Austria, they made territorial demands on the Czechoslovak 
government concerning the western regions (Sudetenland), which were densely populated 
by Germans. After concerted British and French political pressure to accept Hitler’s 
demands, Czechoslovakia finally consented. In September 1938, President Beneš signed 
the Munich Agreement, which ceded Sudetenland to Nazi Germany. After the 
humiliation of the Munich deal, President Beneš resigned and went into exile, soon 
replaced by Emil Hácha. As a consequence of this political crisis, a new Slovak 
government was formed which declared autonomy and reinstalled a hyphen in the 
republic’s name.
81
 On November 2, 1938, in the Vienna Arbitration, Hungary – with 
Hitler’s support – coerced Czecho-Slovakia to surrender the territories in southern 
Slovakia and southern Subcarpathian Ruthenia. Czechoslovakia retained the western 
Slovak towns of Bratislava and Nitra, while Hungary recovered the most disputed Slovak 
towns (populated in more than fifty percent by Hungarians): Košice, Uzhgorod, and 
Mukachevo. In the Arbitration, Slovakia lost twenty-one percent of its territory, twenty 
percent of its industry, and over thirty percent of its arable land. Slovakia’s sense of 
humiliation was complete.  
During the coming years, the Vienna Arbitration became a central bone of 
contention between Slovakia and Hungary. Uncertainty, confusion, and a sense of 
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betrayal – all fed Slovak hatred against the Magyars. This anger, however, was difficult 
to express since both countries were allied with the Third Reich. To channel their enmity, 
many Slovaks displaced their resentment to another group – Jews. In the popular 
imagination, Slovak Jews were seen as Magyars in the same way that Polish Jews were 
seen as Soviet Bolsheviks. Magyar-speaking Jews especially turned into a target of anti-
Magyar sentiment in Slovakia. Slovaks blamed them for territorial losses and for all real 
and imagined misfortunes bestowed by Hungary on the country. In this way, anti-
magyarism and antisemitism dovetailed allowing a transfer of one national antagonism to 
another.  
As Berlin’s grip over Slovakia tightened and the HSĽS gained almost exclusive 
power, the situation of Jews worsened. During one of the first meetings of the new 
Slovak government with Nazi representatives in October 1938, the Slovak Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Ferdinand Ďurčanský declared that the new Slovak leaders would treat 
the “Jewish problem” in Slovakia in a manner similar to that in Germany.
82
 Considering 
the total victory of the HSĽS in the elections in December 1938, Ďurčanský’s words had 
to be taken seriously. The newly established HSĽS’s militia, the Hlinka Guard (Hlinkova 
Garda, HG), and the police squadrons of the ethnic Germans attacked Jews on a regular 
basis,  
Anti-Jewish propaganda, previously disguised under nationalistic and demagogic 
slogans (although basically of economic nature), now openly demanded that 
property “stolen” by the Jews be returned to the people. Many Slovaks saw in 
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Anti-Jewish violence became worse in 1939.
84
 The Hungarian-born Jews were forced out 
of Slovakia to Hungary and when Hungarians did not admit them, “several hundred 
families, including small children, had to remain for weeks on the borderline between the 
two countries, inadequately clothed and without food."
85
  
On March 13, 1939, Hitler summoned Josef Tiso and told him to declare Slovak 
independence. On the next day, March 14, the Slovak Parliament declared the 
independent Slovak State, of which Josef Tiso became president. On March 15, German 
troops proceeded toward Prague to proclaim the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. 
Czecho-Slovakia was officially dead. Five months later, on September 1, the Second 
World War broke out. Although, to a great extent, Slovakia turned into a puppet state, it 
retained some autonomy. Its handling of “the Jewish question” can serve as the best 
example of this ambiguous position.  
In 1940, the Slovak government implemented the first anti-Jewish laws: Jews and 
Gypsies were gradually excluded from schools, the army, industry, commerce, and state 
institutions. Aryanization – the expropriation of Jewish property – was in full swing 
causing staggering impoverishment of the Jews. In early 1942, the Slovak ministry of the 
interior started to set up labor camps in Sereď, Nováky, and Vyhne Spa, among others.86 
On March 25 of the same year, the deportations of Slovak Jews to Auschwitz began. 
Later that year more deportations were organized. By October 1942, 57,000 people were 
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deported, more than half of the total Jewish population of Slovakia.
87
 Slovak historian 
Ivan Kamenec summarized his analysis of the Slovak deportations as follows, 
 
It is necessary to point at one important and surprisingly little known fact: the 
Slovak state was the only country in Europe, not directly occupied by Nazi 
Germany, which had deportations of Jewish citizens through their own power and 
administrative means and forces. Nothing can be changed by the fact of the 
satellite position of the Slovak state in relation to Germany and Nazi pressures on 




Nevertheless, Slovakia was also the only country that discontinued the deportations in 
fall 1942 and did not reactivate them despite constant Nazi pressures to do so. Why that 
happened is still not clear. Was the Slovak regime more “rational” than the Nazi regime? 
Did they realize that after deporting impoverished Jews, further deportations made no 
“practical” sense? The fact remained that thousands of Slovak Jews were spared and 
lived through the Slovak national uprising – the final act of the war in Slovakia.  
The Slovak uprising in the summer and fall of 1944 marked the final crisis of the 
Slovak fascist regime.
89
 Preparations for military action had started already in the fall of 
1943 when the Protestants, led by Jan Ursíny and Jozef Lettrich, joined forces with the 
Communists against the fascist government. In December 1943, both groups jointly 
established the Slovak National Council (Slovenská národna rada, SNR), which became 
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the highest legislative and executive power in the Slovak resistance movement. On 
August 29, 1944, the SNR launched the armed insurrection from Banská Bystrica (central 
Slovakia). Soon, partisan units took control of central Slovakia and mobilized about 
80,000 men.
90
 Although in October 1944, the uprising suffered defeat, some units 
continued guerilla action until liberation in April 1945, when the Slovak fascist regime 
was eventually overthrown. 
The uprising demonstrated the growing support for the Communists and their 
capacity to rally people. Meanwhile, the Kremlin, with the help of the Red Army’s 
presence, exerted more and more pressure on the political situation. In late 1944, despite 
the Czechoslovak-Soviet treaty of friendship (December 1943), Stalin annexed 
Subcarpathian Ukraine. After its loss, President Beneš, still in exile at the time, realized 
that concessions toward Stalin were inescapable. To retain influence over Czechoslovak 
political developments, the president granted formal approval for the formation of a new 
government in Prague. Through this act, Beneš rendered impossible the return of the 
Czechoslovak government-in-exile but ensured that the new administration in Prague 
would be obliged to respect his authority. In March 1945, Czech and Slovak 
representatives were invited to Moscow to negotiate composition of a new 
administration. After a week of heated discussions, the participants reached the final 
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The Košice Program established principles for the new republic, its foreign policy 
and interior affairs.
92
 The document’s authors stressed the ideal of a people’s democracy 
and friendship with the USSR as the principle doctrines of the new state. The program 
expressed gratitude and admiration for the Red Army, hailing its structure and efficiency 
and presenting it as a model for the reorganized Czechoslovak military. In foreign policy, 
it gave priority to a friendly and close relationship with the Soviet Union in military, 
political, economic, and cultural spheres. Good relationships with other countries of the 
region, Poland, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria, were also emphasized. It encouraged private 
enterprise but, at the same time, reinforced state control over the economy. Furthermore, 
the Košice Program made clear a need to confiscate property and funds that had belonged 
to “citizens of enemy states, especially Germany and Hungary; German and Hungarian 
citizens of the Czechoslovak Republic who were active in helping to destroy and occupy 
Czechoslovakia.”
93
 The program also included an article on setting up people’s 
retribution courts to judge war traitors and collaborators.
94
 Overall, “Košice” envisioned 
the Czechoslovak Republic as a socialist state characterized by dependency on the Soviet 
Union in foreign affairs, retribution against “enemies,” and growing state intervention in 
the economy. 
Soon after the Moscow negotiations, the National Front – the coordinating 
institution of all Czech and Slovak anti-fascist parties – formed a central administration. 
In the new Prague government (also known as Košicka vlada – the Košice government), 
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out of twenty-six ministers, thirteen were pro-communist, twelve non-communist, and 
one neutral.
95
 Klement Gottwald of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (Komunistická 
strana Československa, KSČ) became the prime minister. The Communists controlled the 
politically vital ministries of interior, defense, and information, in addition to the two less 
critical departments of agriculture and education. Not ready for elections and not willing 
to rally anti-communist sentiment around Beneš, the Communists stopped short of the 
takeover despite their strong political position. They considered the political system, 
regulated by the Košice Program, an optimal environment to implement revolutionary 
measures. In June 1945, Klement Gottwald, Zdenĕk Fierlinger (ČSS), and Petr Zenkl 
(ČNS) signed the so-called “social advance agreement” forming the basis for a new 
socialist coalition.
96
 The signatories correctly expected that the projected measures – land 
reform, nationalization, and the deprivation of Germans and Magyars of citizenship – 
would boost their popularity and garner the support of the majority of the population.  
The Košice Program regulated the Czech and Slovak coexistence in the republic. 
Although there was no mention of a federation in the program, the National Front agreed 
that Czechs and Slovaks were two separate nations sharing one state and enjoying rights 
to separate governmental structures. 
 
[The government] will end all old conflicts and, while recognizing Slovaks as an 
independent nation, the government will, from its first steps, make everything so 
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that in the Czechoslovak conditions the principle of “equal to equal” would be 
realized and the brotherhood between both nations effectively applied.
97
   
 
 
The Košice Program obliged the Prague central government to recognize the legal 
position of the Slovak national administration, the Slovak National Council (SNR) and 
the Board of Commissioners. The SNR became the primary legislative and executive 
institution of Slovakia after the war.
98
 Among its responsibilities was the appointment of 




While the Košice Program established a solid ground for recognition of the 
autonomy of the Slovak institutions, it did not resolve the prerogatives of the Slovak 
legislature and executive vis-à-vis their central counterparts in Prague. Ambiguity in this 
matter gave rise to a new chapter of political tensions between the SNR and the Prague 
administration. In April 1945, as a result of negotiations, the SNR and the central 
government agreed that, until the central legislature was elected, presidential decrees 
would have legislative power only in those Slovak matters that were relevant to the entire 
state.
100
 Presidential decrees could not be applied in Slovakia without prior consent and 
approval from the SNR.
101
 This arrangement confirmed the equality of Slovakia in the 
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Czechoslovak hierarchy of power and influence and ensured that Slovak autonomy was 
realized in practice until the elections to the legislature in May 1946. This had critical 
consequences for Slovak Jews. Since the SNR had the power not to implement any 
presidential decree, it would reject decrees favorable to Jewish interests. For example, 
Jewish restitution was slowed in Slovakia due to this political arrangement between 
Prague and Bratislava.   
Meanwhile, ordinary Czechs and Slovaks celebrated the end of the war. 
Immediately after the German withdrawal, euphoria and joy were common in the Czech 
lands. The population was happy, cheered and embraced one another for days on end. 
People turned to the future with hope. As Heda Margolius Kovály recalled in her memoir, 
“We tried to bury it [the war] quickly, the earth settled over it, and we turned our backs 
on it impatiently. After all, our real life was now beginning and what to make of it was up 
to us.”
102
 In Slovakia too, people welcomed the end of the war with joy and relief. 
However, Slovaks remained unsure about their future; more than their Czech neighbors. 
According to Michal Barnovský, three major factors shaped Slovak attitudes after the 
war. First, the Slovak national uprising, as opposed to the Czech battles, did not end the 
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Parliament (Dočasné národné zhromaždenie, DNZ), elected on October 28, 1945, was legislative power in 
the Czech lands while the SNR was the legislature in Slovakia. In April 1946, representatives of Prague and 
Bratislava met again to renegotiate mutual prerogatives. The participants signed the Second Prague 
Agreement (Druhá pražská dohoda), which limited Slovak power to anoint university professors, judges, 
and civil servants. The accords also coordinated the responsibilities of the Slovak and Prague executive; 
both had to present and discuss their proposals with their counterparts before submitting them to president 
or prime minister. On June 27, 1946, the National Front and the SNR signed the Third Prague Agreement 
(Tretia pražská dohoda), which further limited legislative and executive power of the Slovak 
representatives, and thus the Slovak autonomy. The Agreement enabled Prague to exert firm control over 
the legislative and executive proceedings of the SNR and the Board of Commissioners. None of Slovak 
legal proposals could be implemented without the formal consent of the Prague government. 
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 Instead, the terror continued after the uprising, leaving hundreds of victims 
behind. Second, the entire process of liberating Slovakia lasted almost nine months; much 
longer than in the Czech lands. In the context of the ongoing massacres, announcement of 
yet another draft meant a great strain on the nation. Third, the Slovak war losses doubled 
the Czech losses. Destruction of central Slovakia, for example, was extensive, whereas 
the Czech lands escaped major material damage during the war. All these aspects 
ultimately led to the general exhaustion of the population. Barnovský argued that in such 
conditions short-lived enthusiasm was hardly surprising. Additionally, and not 
insignificantly, the activity of the Soviet secret police in Slovakia in the final months of 
the war added to the general misery, “While Prague welcomed the Red Army with open 
arms and celebrated the victory, in Slovakia the relation toward the liberators was 
tarnished by accusations against NKVD members who had illegally sent thousands of 
people to the Soviet gulag.”
104
 
Czechs and Slovaks were also divided about the future. Unlike Czechs, Slovaks 
did not enthusiastically welcome the reestablishment of the Czechoslovak Republic. In a 
relatively short period of time, Slovaks had experienced two major upheavals that 
enflamed Slovak nationalism – the establishment of the autonomous Slovak State (March 
1939) and the national uprising (August 1944). Even though the Slovak State was a 
fascist regime, it fulfilled the nationalistic longings of a significant section of the Slovak 
population. Unsurprisingly, while Slovak nationalism was rising the concept of 
czechoslovakism was dying. The recreation of Czechoslovakia after the war engendered a 
sense of loss rather than of achievement since many Slovaks still remembered prewar 
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Prague centralism and the Czech superiority it conveyed. Dissatisfaction with the 
resurrection of the Czechoslovak Republic added to the general disappointment and 
fuelled apprehension about the future in Slovakia. Obviously, the most frustrated Slovaks 
were those who benefited from the war (for example, aryanizers) and now were 
threatened to lose all the profits. Also, the combatants had an acute sense of injustice by 
not being honored appropriately with either symbolic medals or social benefits. The 
farmers were not satisfied either since the land reform did not bring any of the anticipated 
benefits. Obviously, the German and Magyar minorities had no reason to sing the praises 
of the new regime either. 
The treatment of both minorities was a central issue in Slovak political life after 
the war. The Czechoslovak legislature made little or no distinction between Germans and 
Magyars in the matters of legal status and human rights.
105
 The Košice Program 
envisioned equally strong measures against the two minorities. Schechtman quoted 
Czechoslovak Minister of State (in-exile) Hubert Ripka, who said in November 1944,  
 
I am here speaking to our citizens who are of German (ethnic) nationality…but I 
should like to point out at the very outset that we take the same view of the 
question of the Magyar minority as well, which will be settled in accordance with 




In Košice, the National Front – applying a rule of collective guilt – agreed to strip the 
citizenship of, expropriate, and expel Germans and Hungarians who had moved to 
Czechoslovakia after the Munich agreement in September 1938. In May 1945, President 
Beneš publicly declared that, “the overwhelming majority of the Germans and 
Hungarians will have to leave our land. This is our final decision…Our people can no 
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longer live in the same country with Germans and Hungarians.”
107
 Between 1945 and 
1947, the administration succeeded in expelling approximately 2.5 million Germans from 
Czechoslovakia.
108
 After mass expulsions, about 200,000 Germans remained in the 
Czechoslovak Republic, of which 20,000 resided in Slovakia.  
Among Slovaks, the German question was less pressing than among Czechs. 
Until the war, the Slovaks had not experienced German expansionist policies to the extent 
that the Czechs had. Therefore, after the war anti-German resentment in Slovakia had not 
reached the heights of Czech antipathy toward Germans. In addition, the lack of common 
borders, and thus relatively small migration, kept both nations at a safe distance. By and 
large, it was the Magyar question that caught Slovak attention.  
Magyars and Slovaks were neighbors with a long and convoluted history of 
strained relations. The Vienna Arbitration of 1938 and the following Hungarian takeover 
of southern Slovakia dramatically exacerbated these already tense relations. Slovaks 
regarded the Hungarian occupation as a particularly vicious example of Magyar 
irredentism. Consequently, Magyars were seen as the primary enemy of the Slovak 
nation. Right after the war, Slovak political representatives considered retribution against 
Hungary as one of the most pressing issues of the day. In February 1945 the SNR 
formulated a stance toward Magyars. Hungarians who came to southern Slovakia during 
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the occupation were supposed to leave the country. Those Magyars who were born in 
Slovakia or had immigrated before the occupation of 1938 could retain their 
Czechoslovak citizenship if they proved their loyalty to the Slovak nation, the 
Czechoslovak Republic, and democracy. The National Front reiterated these terms two 
months later in the Košice Program. The central government in Prague and the Slovak 
representatives also demanded that “truly democratic” Magyars should cleanse (očistiť) 
the Magyar minority of fascist, anti-Slovak, and magyarizing “elements.” The authorities 
expected the slovakized Magyars to become a part (včleniť) of Slovak national life.109  
The expulsion of Hungarians from Slovakia was never fully realized since the 
western powers demanded the process be stopped. Facing international condemnation, 
Slovakia attempted to solve the problem differently. It attempted an exchange of citizens 
with Hungary, removal of Hungarians to the Czech borderlands, and “reslovakization” of 
those who remained (in practice, aggressive assimilation).
110
 By mid-July 1945, the 
Prague government had made up a plan to conduct bilateral negotiations with Hungary to 
facilitate the exchange; Slovaks would be transferred to Slovakia while Hungarians 
would be moved to Hungary. On February 27, 1946, the Agreement on Exchange of 
Population between Czechoslovakia and Hungary was signed. Under the terms of the 
agreement, only Slovaks and Czechs residing in Hungary would have the right to opt for 
the resettlement while “Hungarians in Slovakia were to be drafted for resettlement 
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regardless of whether or not the persons affected wished to be transferred.”
111
 The 
number of the expelled Hungarians was to balance the number of the “resettled” Slovaks. 
The discrepancy in numbers (120,000 Slovaks in Hungary vis-à-vis 650,000 Hungarians 
in Slovakia) inevitably led to conflicts over the execution of the agreement. Eventually, 
approximately 90,000 Slovaks registered for the transfer, giving the Czechoslovak 
government a free hand to expel an equal number of Hungarians (in addition to war 
criminals and others). Eventually, by the end of 1947, a total of 31,000 Magyars left 
Slovakia and approximately 33,000 Slovaks left Hungary.  
Facing the failure of the population exchange, the Czechoslovak government 
ordered the scattering of the remaining Magyars across Czechoslovakia, most notably to 
Sudetenland in the west of the country. The government carried out the dispersal under 
the provisions of presidential decree no. 88/1945 on the Mobilization of Manpower.
112
 
Ludvík Němec wrote that “this operation was, of course, designed to camouflage the 
compulsory internal resettlement for in some cases family members as well as workers 
were evacuated from their homes by force and the promise of receiving property as 
compensation in their new homes.”
113
 As a result of the operation, by the end of the 
spring of 1948, approximately 68,000 Magyars left the country, preferring escape to 
Hungary than the forced resettlement to the Czech lands. 
In the opinion of Kalman Janics, a Hungarian born in Slovakia, reslovakization 
was yet another policy of the Czechoslovak government to reduce the number of 
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Hungarians in the country by forced assimilation, having failed to do so through 
population exchange,  
“Re-slovakization” stood for a return to Slovak nationality of those who had been 
Slovaks at one time but, in the ethnic stirrings of the Carpathian Basin, either their 
ancestors or themselves had become Hungarian. Re-slovakization was supposed 
to have been voluntary, and even a matter of privilege. However, considering the 
methods employed it would be more accurate to describe it as forced assimilation. 
The Hungarian citizen was confronted with the choice: “Sign, or your life!” 
Signing meant civil rights, security, retention of belongings. Not signing meant 




Slovak historian Štefan Šutaj, on the other hand, interpreted it as a process by which the 
Czechoslovak government gave magyarized Slovaks the opportunity to “return” to their 
nationality.
115
 As Chairman of the Central Commission for Reslovakization (Ústredná 
reslovakizačná komisia v Bratislave) Mikuláš Huba stated at the opening session on July 
1, 1946, “The Czechoslovak government gives to magyarized Slovaks (pomaďarčeným 
Slovákom) an opportunity to return voluntarily to the Slovak nation. The Commission 
expects this to be a hard but fulfilling duty.”
116
 The Košice Program and presidential 
decree no. 33/1945 harmed those Slovaks who had become “victims” of magyarization 
long before the war. Šutaj argued that, at least originally, reslovakization was supposed to 
correct this situation. Ultimately, however, reslovakization became enforced 
slovakization – “an effort to fundamentally transform the national composition of 
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southern Slovakia by means of change of nationality,” and thus an attempt to solve the 
Magyar question in Slovakia.
117
 
Preparations for the campaign of reslovakization began in the spring of 1946, next 
to the population exchange program with Hungary. To initiate and implement the 
process, the commissioner of internal affairs in Bratislava established the Central 
Commission for Reslovakization.
118
 Before launching the process, the commissioners of 
internal affairs, education, and agriculture in Bratislava called upon teachers and clerks 
from district and city national committees, representatives of the Resettlement Bureau, 
and other members of the “politically and morally clean” intelligentsia (inteligentné 
osoby politycky a mravne bezúhonné) to organize and carry out the process.
119
 
Reslovakization was not limited to the issuance of certificates. Since the commissioner of 
education in Bratislava and the Slovak League were aware that many “reslovakized” 
people could barely speak Slovak, they established more than 500 language classes and 
courses in Slovak literature and culture that were attended by about 34,000 people in 
southern Slovakia.
120
 Similarly to the repolonization program, changes to the names of 
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towns, villages, and streets were introduced. The “reslovakized” were also pushed to 
“slovakize” (poslovenčiť) their names.121 
Despite these efforts, censuses from the 1950s and 1960s suggest that 
reslovakization was largely superficial and did not bring about the long-term ethnic 
transformation of southern Slovakia. In 1950, 355,000 persons declared Magyar 
nationality, ten years later the number rose to 519,000 and has remained stable until the 
present day. Those residents, who signed up for reslovakization, seem to have done so 
merely to protect their livelihood and residence in Slovakia, rarely treating the program 
as an actual means to “return to Slovakness.” Residents of southern Slovakia also 
continued to speak Magyar at home and on the street. The case of L. Tamáš who applied 
for cancellation of reslovakization in 1949 was not unique. In his letter to the 
administration, Tamáš wrote that “he was of Magyar nationality and had reslovakized 
only because he was promised equal rights with the rest of the citizens of Slovakia.”
122
 
None of these measures resolved Slovak-Hungarian tensions. On the contrary, the 
actions only further antagonized both peoples. No segment of the Slovak population was 
willing to oppose the anti-Magyar policies knowing that the government had already 
deprived the Magyar residents of their rights. The fight against anti-Magyar repressions 
seemed hopeless. Hence, Slovak Hungarians were left on their own with no legal or 
social instruments to protect their status. These circumstances caused an intense sense of 
victimization (krivda) among Hungarians as well as disappointment among Slovaks, who 
had expected a decisive solution to the Magyar question. This situation lasted until 1948 
when the government finally restored the rights of the Magyars in Czechoslovakia. 
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After a year of temporary political measures, the Czechoslovak government 
scheduled the first postwar parliamentary elections for May 26, 1946. Barnovský found 
that both non-communist and communist parties welcomed the elections with optimism, 
believing in eventual victory. On the one hand, after the communist defeats in Hungary 
and Austria, the non-communists expected a similar outcome in Czechoslovakia. On the 
other hand, the communists anticipated gaining approximately forty-one percent of the 
total votes despite the news from abroad.
123
 In Slovakia, both parties were less confident 
than their Czech counterparts about the final results. A failing economy, the resurgence 
of the ľudáki (advocates of the Tiso regime), and a general atmosphere of disappointment 
and uncertainty affected the election campaign. Of the four competing parties, the 
Democratic Party (Demokratická strana, DS) and the Slovak Communist Party 




Although the communists were less popular in Slovakia than in the Czech lands, 
they still had a considerable constituency. By the end of 1945, the KSS – led by Karol 
Šmidke – had 197,365 members and the support of more than thirty percent of the Slovak 
population.
125
 The May 1946 elections proved, however, that it was the DS that had the 
greatest support in Slovakia. By the end of 1945, the DS had 230,000 members, of whom 
more than fifty percent (120,000) were farmers. This strong agrarian base clearly defined 
the party’s priorities. Land reform, preservation of private property, free competition, and 
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partial nationalization constituted cornerstones of the DS program. The Democrats – led 
first by Ján Ursíny and, from July 1945, by Jozef Lettrich – labeled themselves the party 
of the political center, promoting “social progress” for all strata of the Slovak nation. 
Economic and social reforms, carried out in a Christian and non-socialist spirit, were to 
serve as vehicles for social advancement.  
During the first months after the war, the Communists and Democrats had a lot in 
common. Both parties had fought against Nazism and Slovak fascism; supported the anti-
German and pro-Russian coalition; promoted the democratization of public life; 
campaigned for the confiscation and redistribution of German and Hungarian property; 
and advocated the delegalization of Catholic radicalism. Both favored social and 
economic reforms and the reestablishment of the Czechoslovak Republic. However, with 
the struggle for votes, ideological and political conflict between the camps began. By the 
spring and summer of 1945, the first cracks in the friendship appeared when the DS and 
KSS espoused incompatible ideas about the scope of land reform, the nationalization 
process, and the strategy toward political Catholicism.
126
 In March 1946, the Catholic 
representatives and the DS’s leadership (the DS being mostly Protestant) signed an 
accord, known as the April Agreement, which aimed to clarify and improve Catholic-
Protestant relations in the DS.
127
 This agreement provided the Slovak Communists with 
new ammunition against the Democrats.  
From that time, the KSS repeatedly accused the DS of collaborating with radical 
Catholicism and former activists of the Tiso regime – not without reason. Undoubtedly, 
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in the Catholics’ view, the DS carried more attraction than the KSS. The DS underlined 
the centrality of Christian faith and the protection of Slovak “national rights.” According 
to Barnovský, about 5.4 percent of the applicants to DS’s membership belonged to the 
fascist Hlinka Party (HSĽS) before 1938 and this percentage rose to nineteen percent 
during the war. The DS was not a stranger to antisemitic rhetoric either. Its daily, Čas 
(Time), periodically published articles which targeted Jews as “trouble makers,” 
especially as far as restitution and the rights of partisans were concerned. Although 
individual politicians, like Lettrich, were on friendly terms with Jewish communal 
leaders, as a whole, the DS had a bad reputation among Slovak Jews.   
In the elections of May 1946, the Communists won thirty-eight percent of the 
total votes – forty percent in the Czech lands and thirty percent in Slovakia. The Slovak 
Democrats won fourteen percent of the total votes in Czechoslovakia and an impressive 
sixty-two percent of all votes in Slovakia.
128
 Although the government disenfranchised 
more than 250,000 potential voters by applying regulations against war collaborators, the 
results were nevertheless telling. In the Czech lands, the Communists won a plurality 
without use of coercion. In Slovakia, although the Communists lost, securing only half as 
many votes as the Democrats, they still won thirty percent of the votes and emerged as 
the second most powerful party in the region. These results go against the common 
assumption that the communists could win power only through the use of violence or 
trickery.  
Europeans – especially those who did not have direct relations with the Soviet 
Union – found communism particularly attractive after the Second World War. Socialism 
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seemed to have been the best alternative to the failed model of prewar capitalism. 
Communist ideology offered immediate solutions to the most urgent psychological and 
material concerns. In her memoir, Kovály provided a glimpse into the nature of those 
concerns, dissecting the needs and motivations that led people to support or even join the 
Czech Communist Party.
129
 She and her husband, Rudolf Margolius (executed after the 
show trials in 1952), became fervent supporters of the communists immediately after the 
war. While Rudolf rose in the communist hierarchy, eventually receiving a government 
post, Kovály listened and observed rather than actively participated in building the new 
system. She recalled that when the war ended and the celebrations died down, there was a 
void left; an intense expectation of something new – of change.
130
 The majority of the 
population had a sense that to date every social system had failed; capitalism had proved 
unsuccessful before the war while fascism had destroyed the last shreds of faith in social 
or political “progress.” People were overwhelmed by “sheer despair over human nature, 
which showed itself at its very worst after the war. Since it is impossible for men to give 
up on mankind, they blame the social order in which they live; they condemn the human 
condition.”
131
 In this mental landscape, only socialism or communism seemed to have the 
potential to “fill the void” and heal the social conditions. Communism promised total 
social transformation, “progress toward a better society,” and “happiness and prosperity 
for all.”
132
 Since the war left people filled with fear and helplessness, communist 
propaganda calmed those fears by offering simple answers to very complicated questions. 
Many, including Jews, believed that communism would indeed fulfill its promises and 
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bring brotherhood, equality, and the end of racial oppression. The rise in idealism and the 
belief in prioritizing the common good above individual needs reinforced this faith. Fear 
of Soviet domination that kept the majority of Poles away from the lure of communism 
did not work in Czechoslovakia. As Kovály noted, no one in Czechoslovakia doubted 
that they would be able “to run their own show” – the national road to socialism.
133
  
 The communist victory in May 1946 in the Czech lands confirmed their great 
popularity among Czechs and proved correct pre-electoral communist speculation. The 
results in Slovakia were more ambiguous. An unequal distribution of pro-communist 
votes and the DS’s impressive sixty percent in Slovakia forced the Czechoslovak 
Communists to address the issue of power sharing with non-communists in both regions. 
In the Czechoslovak system of proportional representation, the victory was supposed to 
grant the Democrats the majority in Slovak national political institutions and national 
committees. However, the Slovak Communists launched a vicious campaign 
undermining the DS’s victory, which forced the latter to struggle to secure any 
representation in the Slovak administration. This political fight began a new chapter of 
animosities and political tensions within Slovakia as well as between the Prague center 
and Slovak periphery. 
The clash between Prague’s push toward centralism and the Slovak effort to 
maintain broad autonomy found its most pronounced manifestation during the Tiso trial 
in spring 1947. The demonstrations of sympathy and demands to release Tiso from prison 
proved that czechoslovakism was not only dead among politicians but also on the so-
called “street.” The protests spread all over western Slovakia – in Piešťany, Nove Mesto 
nad Váhom, Chynorany, and elsewhere. In Piešťany, on March 19, approximately 1,500 
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people demonstrated; the police arrested about forty of them. In Nove Mesto and Váhom 
about 400 to 500 people took to the streets in protest. The police arrested twenty-three.
134
 
In a major demonstration in Bratislava on March 21, protesters pledged loyalty to the 
Tiso’s republic. In Piešťany, protesters demanded the release of Tiso and of all other 
priests currently in jail. The marchers chanted pro-Tiso slogans and demanded the 
establishment of people’s courts as the primary institution of justice in the people’s 
democracy. Each demonstration ended after the police and army intervened.
135
 Overall, 
the series of demonstrations showed that support for Tiso was still alive and the idea of 
an independent Slovak state was deeply rooted.
136
  
It should be noted that the pro-Tiso demonstrations unsettled the Jewish 
community in Slovakia. There was a sense of insecurity among Slovak Jews prompted by 
fears that the demonstrations would turn into anti-Jewish riots. Although no major riot 
against Jews occurred, the demonstrations did bring some of the nationalistic and 
antisemitic pro-Tiso groups into the daylight. Ľudácke podzemie – the radical 
underground – was a loose network of separatist organizations promoting the 
reestablishment of an independent Slovak state. Although the underground had no real 
power to affect the political landscape, the government constantly vilified it as the major 
security threat. Czech politicians, in particular, dramatized the potential danger 
simmering in Slovakia. In order to combat it, the ministry of the interior introduced 
special police measures against the alleged conspiracy. The so-called “unveiling of the 
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anti-state conspiracy” (odhalenie tzv. protištátneho sprisahania) began in September 
1947 with the arrests of more than 300 underground Slovak activists.
137
 Soon, the anti-
conspiracy action turned into a communist terror campaign against the Democrats. A 
series of trials against the most prominent DS politicians unsettled the Slovak political 
scene. The secret service – fulfilling the orders of Minister of the Interior Václav Nosek – 
fabricated evidence against the DS leaders, implicating them in an alleged plot against the 
republic. The KSS also organized demonstrations demanding that the DS cleanse its 
ranks of ludaks and other fascist “elements.”  
The entire propaganda campaign of fall 1947 aimed to discredit and intimidate the 
DS leadership, to split the party, to weaken their position in the Board of Commissioners, 
and to undermine political Catholicism and Slovak nationalism. Eventually, the 
Communists succeeded in engendering a sense of despair and hopelessness among the 
Democrats, as well as weakening their position in the Board. Although the fall crisis 
ended in political compromise, it greatly undermined DS morale and its position in the 
Slovak power structure. The crisis also served the Czechoslovak Communists as a pretext 
to initiate the use of terror, intimidation, and evidence fabrication as political tactics. Not 
without reason, Barnovský called the events of fall 1947 ”a general rehearsal” before the 
February takeover of 1948.
138
   
The political methods of the handling of the legal opposition were strikingly 
similar in Poland and Slovakia. The histories of the PSL in Poland and the DS in 
Slovakia offer an interesting case study in postwar communist policy toward legal 
opposition. In the two countries the opposition parties enjoyed governmental posts and 
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relative peace until spring 1946, when the first accusations were leveled at them. 
However, the major campaigns directed at discrediting the opposition did not take full 
effect until the fall of 1946 in Poland and a year later in Slovakia. In both cases, the 
Communists terrorized their political adversaries by arrests, headquarters’ searches, and 
constant harassment and abuse. Although the PSL in Poland and the DS in Slovakia 
actually secured the majority vote in a referendum and elections respectively, they had to 
surrender the benefits of their victory in the face of terror and, in the Polish case, the 
falsification of results. 
In Prague, between fall 1946 and summer 1947, there was relative tranquility: the 
political opposition was not censored and did not suffer any major restrictions. It was 
July 1947 that brought a major political crisis in Prague.
139
 In response to political and 
economic troubles, the Czech Communists established a department for the infiltration of 
the other parties, activated covert Communists in social organizations across 
Czechoslovakia, and employed the police apparatus to fight political adversaries. The 
latter in particular became the major bone of contention in the Czechoslovak political 
scene, eventually precipitating the final crisis. On February 12, 1948, ministers of the 
non-communist parties demanded that the communists stop dominating the provincial 
police. Minister Nosek refused to cooperate. The Communists activated their influences 
in trade unions and all other social associations and organizations. They set up local 
armed “action committees,” which were supposed to replace the local government 
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councils. On February 20, the Czech Communists formed the people’s militia of 15,000 
people calling those units a “spontaneous force.”  
In response to the unfolding situation, twelve non-communist ministers resigned 
in the hope that President Beneš would form a new government without the Communists. 
Beneš, however, decided to wait. On February 22, thousands of unionists – mainly 
communists – paraded in Prague, attacking the offices of the opposition parties and 
demonstrating for a communist takeover. The head of the army, General Ludvik 
Svoboda, committed his forces to support “the people.” Moscow concentrated the Red 
Army on the borders. On February 25, Beneš accepted Prime Minister Klement 
Gottwald’s proposals of a new, fully communist government. In June 1948 Beneš 
resigned and died soon after. Minister of Foreign Affairs Jan Masaryk’s dead body, found 
beneath the window of his office, marked the symbolic end of the old and the beginning 
of the new era.  
To sum up, these were the general historical, political, and social frameworks in 
which Polish and Slovak Jews negotiated their position in the two states and societies 
after the war. These were times of transitional chaos and uncertainty. Lack of law and 
order, legislative chaos, the formation of ah hoc administrative cadres, economic and 
political instability, extensive material damage of all infrastructure, shortage of housing, 
food, and so forth, made life after the war a struggle for day-to-day survival. At the same 
time, Poles, Slovaks, and Jews were bombarded, on a daily basis, by news of trials, 
retributions, and simple revenge. Constant migrations of millions of returnees, refugees, 
and expellees to and from villages, towns, cities, and countries added to the general 
instability of the period. These migrations contributed to the dismantling of larger social 
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networks, already disrupted by war. The following chapter will describe the return of 
Jewish survivors as a part of this process – plunging into the country of chaos in search of 










CHAPTER 3  
 
RETURN TO “NO HOME” (1944-46) 
 
 
The story presented in this chapter is the account of return of Jewish survivors to 
Poland and Slovakia after the Second World War between July 1944 and June 1946. 
Return is a useful category of historical analysis since it allows insight not only into large 
historical processes but also into their effects on individual human and ethnic 
experience.
1
 In the following narrative, Russian liberation, return migration, assessment 
and affect of war damages on society at large, and general postwar social conditions, all 
represent large historical processes whereas the personal testimonies embody individual 
experiences shaped in response to the surrounding social and political circumstances. The 
use of the return as an organizing concept will help me to establish a connection between 
these two spheres of human experience and, at the same time, to render the return a social 
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Although, de jure, the war ended only in May 1945, many residents of Poland and 
Slovakia began their return home as early as summer and fall 1944. Depending on the 
place of residence, hiding, or confinement, the local populations experienced the end of 
the war at various times between January 1944 and May 1945. As the Red Amy advanced 
from east to west across the country, residents of eastern Poland were free as early as the 
summer of 1944 while hundreds of thousands of others from territories further west had 
to wait almost a year longer, until April and May 1945. As a result, there is no one 
narrative of liberation but rather hundreds of thousands of stories, each one having its 
own dynamic and chronology. The stories presented in this chapter cover the period 
between July 1944 and June 1946, which roughly coincides with the liberation of Poland 
(the districts of Kraków, Lublin, and Kielce, among others) and Slovakia (the regions of 
Bratislava, Banská Bystrica, Nitra, and Prešov), as well as the repatriation of Polish Jews 
from the Soviet Union.  
On January 3, 1944, the Red Army crossed the eastern frontier of prewar Poland 
(near Sarny); Henryk Grynberg eloquently described their entry,   
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The Russians came down the pitted clay highroad that went through village after 
village of which only the chimneys remained. They came through villages of 
jutting chimneys, sounding the road with long poles. They came on horsedrawn 
wagons, gun carriages, and slow, heavy tanks. Their heads were shaved clean, 
their dirty forage caps shoved back rakishly. The wooden spoons they’d made 
themselves stuck out from the soft creased tops of their boots. When they halted, 
they pulled out those spoons and ate their soup and kasha with them, then wiped 
them on their pants and stuck them back in their boot tops again. They advanced 




On July 20-21, 1944, the Soviets crossed the river Bug (the present eastern border of 
Poland) and advanced to the west towards what constitutes present-day Poland. In July 
and August 1944, the Red Army liberated, among others, Lublin, Przemyśl, and Rzeszów 
– the major cities in southeastern Poland. After reaching the suburbs of Warszawa in the 
midst of the uprising in August 1944, the Army stopped to enable the Germans to carry 
out their final crackdown on the Polish underground and its military forces.
4
 In January 
1945, the Soviets resumed their advance westward liberating Kielce (January 15), 
Warszawa (January 17), and Kraków (January 19), among others. Throughout February 
and March, the Soviets entered most of the cities, towns, and villages in central and 
northern Poland. On May 6, 1945, the city of Wrocław capitulated – the final German 
bridgehead in Lower Silesia.
5
 The Nazi occupation of Poland was officially over. 
In Slovakia, the Red Army broke into the country in November 1944 during the 
final days of the Slovak national uprising. By December 1944, Romanian and Soviet 
troops had driven German troops out of southern Slovakia. On January 19, 1945, the Red 
Army, accompanied by the First Czechoslovak Army Corps, liberated eastern Slovakia 
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including the main cities of Prešov and Košice. Three months later, in March 1945, both 
armies took over the northwest and central regions including the city of Banská Bystrica. 
On April 1, 1945, the Soviet and Czechoslovak military entered Topoľčany and, three 
days later, Bratislava – today’s capital of Slovakia. The last days of April 1945, when the 
Soviets conquered the remaining western parts of Slovakia, marked the final demise of 
the Tiso regime. On May 7, 1945 (effective May 8), Nazi Germany capitulated and 
signed an unconditional surrender in Reims, France. On May 8, 1945, the Slovak 
government-in-exile capitulated to the US Army in Kremsmünster, Austria. The war was 
officially over. 
It is a commonly held belief that during and after the war the overwhelming 
majority of Polish society considered the Russians as bad if not worse than the Germans.
6
 
Sociologists investigating the formation of national stereotypes and prejudices in Poland 
today suggest that the Polish-Russian history and the collective memory it generated, can 
explain anti-Russian and anti-Soviet sentiment among Poles.
7
 The major historical events 
that shaped the vision of Russia as the enemy of contemporary Poles are the Soviet 
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occupation of eastern Poland in 1939, the Katyń massacre in 1940, the postwar takeover, 
and decades of Soviet political domination. All these events were experienced or learnt 
from the popular press, sermons, political speeches, and textbooks.
8
 The generation that 
came of age in the 1930s and 1940s based their conception of the Soviet Union on the 
partitions of Poland (which they did not experience) and the more recent Polish-Russian 
war of 1919-21 and the Soviet occupation of September 1939 (both experienced first-
hand). 
What remains unclear is how widespread these views were in the mid 1940s 
among various strata of society across the country. For example, how common among 
peasants in the Kraków district was the knowledge that the NKVD had murdered Polish 
officers in Katyń and how influential was this knowledge in shaping attitudes toward the 
Soviet liberators in 1944-45? Although this subject needs more research, I speculate that 
the most recent events involving the Soviet Union and the Russians were still in the 
process of being internalized by the general population at the time. Knowledge of the 
recent events and translation of that knowledge into resentment was by no means 
complete among Poles.
9
 The suffering at the hands of the Russians was still in the process 
of becoming the central lens for the perception of Russia and the potential threat it posed.  
Also, intensity of resentment depended on geographical location. In the eastern 
regions of Poland, for example, the Red Army could not count on warm welcome from 
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the overwhelming majority of Poles. For the most part, Poles in this area, having the 
Soviet occupation of the years 1939-41 fresh in their minds, perceived the Russian 
liberation as another military conquest. Noach Lasman, a young Polish Jew (born in 1914 
near Poznań), remembered that a desire for liberation by the western powers instead of 
the Soviets was common in the town of Łosice (eastern Poland) in the summer of 1944. 
Lasman recalled numerous conversations with local inhabitants who admitted that they 
had dreamt, unrealistically, of the western allies liberating the country.
10
  
The essays, written for the competition Opis mojej wsi (Description of my 
Village) by farmers from across Poland, in the spring and early summer of 1948, suggest 
that the further west the more relieved and welcoming the local population was.
11
 While 
farmers from the Lublin province appeared, by and large, skeptical (sometimes relieved 
but never enthusiastic) about the approaching Soviets, their counterparts from the 
provinces of Kielce and Kraków often described “enthusiastic” welcomes and general 
happiness accompanying the entry of Soviet soldiers.
12
 A farmer from the province of 
Kielce wrote, “The day of January 14, 1945, was the day of liberation for my village. 
Myself with a few neighbors, we welcomed with bread, salt and vodka the first Soviet 
tank that was bringing us freedom, liberty, and democracy.”
13
 Also, Lasman noted that 
the celebratory mood was particularly evident in western Poland, which had been 
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incorporated into the Reich in 1939. For example, in the Łódź area “the population 
received the Russians as liberators without any ‘but’ …they were choked with 
freedom.”
14
 Even though the link between geography and responses to the Red Army 
needs more research, it is safe to say that the liberators received welcomes that depended 
on the residents’ recent experiences. Those from the territories occupied by the Soviets in 
1939-41 had reason to be apprehensive of their liberators and thus restrained from 
“enthusiastic” celebration. In contrast, inhabitants of the central provinces (for example, 
Kraków and Kielce), having had no direct experience with the Russian occupation in the 
most recent past, had no such restrains.  
What was the Jewish position in this complex matrix of Polish-Russian relations 
at liberation between 1944 and 1945? After all, Jewish responses to the Soviet advance in 
September 1939 had far reaching consequences for Jewish safety in the eastern territories 
and greatly contributed to reinforcing the belief in an alleged Jewish inclination toward 
communism and loyalty to the Soviet Union (and thus disloyalty to Poland).
15
 During the 
liberation of 1944-45, the Jews again had the most to gain from the Germans being driven 
out. The question of who would chase them away was insignificant. Lasman recalled that 
for him and many other Jewish survivors, 
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[O]nly one question existed: when were the Germans going to be driven 
away from Poland. I had no preferences as to who should do that in 
accordance with the principle “Whoever is first is best.” I knew, of course, 
that the majority of the residents of Podlasie would want allies from the 
West and the London government; however, my colleagues and I could 




After five years of Nazi occupation and terror, the image of approaching liberators, no 
matter in what uniform, was intoxicating. Lasman recalled that  
 
[O]n August 1, 1944, ten days after the declaration of the July Manifesto, the Red 
Army liberated me. A handful of Jewish survivors welcomed the liberators with 
enthusiasm not because they were Russians and not because they carried some 





In this context, one may assume that the Soviet liberation of 1944-45 and the 
Jewish reaction to the Red Army further antagonized relations between Jews and non-
Jews, as in September 1939. However, I suggest that the behavior of Jewish survivors in 
1944-45 did not have any considerable impact and did not buttress the stereotype of a 
Jew-communist, even in the eastern territories of Poland. First, there were virtually no 
Jews left in the area and those who survived could hardly “celebrate” anything 
considering their physical and psychological condition. Their behavior was thus scarcely 
visible in the public sphere. In most cases, individual Jewish survivors emerged in silence 
from wells, forests, rooms behind walls and closets, basements, and attics, without the 
theatrical fanfare of liberation. The moment of liberation did not entail picturesque 
Jewish crowds throwing flowers on Russian soldiers. Instead, liberation took the form 
described by Wilhelm Dichter in his fictionalized autobiography Koń Pana Boga (God’s 
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 For months, nine-year-old Wilhelm and his family hid in a well, in the 
countryside near Borysław (present Ukraine) – the city they had lived in before the war. 
The following is a description of the moment of their liberation in the summer of 1944, 
 
Russians approached. By night, through cracks in stones, we saw the sky 
flaring up. The Earth roared and trembled so heavily that we were afraid 
of being covered up…. At noon Maks [a Pole who had hidden them in the 
well] ran up. “Come out!” he screamed. “The Russians have come.” “Ask 
him where they are,” mother whispered to Nusia [her sister]. “Where are 
they?” asked Nusia. “Everywhere.” We started to remove the stones. Maks 
pulled us up. A wet eye of the well, encircled by a stone shaft, looked 




Second, in the atmosphere of general relief no Jewish demonstration of joy could 
antagonize Poles at their liberation. After all, regardless of their feelings toward the 
Russians, Poles across the country were relieved at seeing the withdrawal of the Germans 
in 1944-45 even if effected by the USSR. As I showed before, residents of central and 
western Poland in particular, mindful of the extreme anti-Polish wartime policies, were as 
relieved by the Russian arrival as any Jewish survivor. Even in the eastern provinces of 
postwar Poland, where the population was more cautious about the potential political 
consequences of a Soviet liberation, the average Jewish response did not dramatically 
stand out. Therefore, I argue that the mode of Jewish reaction to the Soviet advance 
during the 1944-45 campaign, in contrast to September 1939, had little or no effect on 
future ethnic relations in Poland. Instead it was the prolonged presence of the Soviets and 
their military forces in the country that triggered a far-reaching social and political 
transformation of ethnic relations.  
                                                 
18
 Wilhelm Dichter, Koń Pana Boga (Kraków: Znak, 1996). 
19
 Ibid., 54. 
 86 
By considering Polish and Slovak interaction with Russians and the Soviet state, 
on both the individual and collective level, it is safe to say that in the late 1940s Poles 
were more prone to anti-Russian sentiment than Slovaks.
 
In Slovakia, the intellectual and 
discursive framework was overall less conducive to russophobia and hence to accusations 
of Jewish loyalty to the Soviet Union. The absence of previous Russian aggression, as 
well as their relative distance from the Soviet Union, left Slovaks mostly neutral toward it 
at the end of the war. For the Slovaks, it was Hungary that occupied a similar place in 
national rhetoric and sentiment as Russia did in Polish collective memory. A millennium 
of Hungarian domination of Slovakia, the Vienna Arbitration of 1938 allocating Slovak 
territories to Hungary, and finally the German crackdown on the Slovak national 
uprising, all contributed to general anti-Hungarian and anti-German sentiment. Hence, 
when the First Czechoslovak Army Corps joined the Soviet military in its advance 
through Czechoslovakia, the alliance did not stir controversy among Czechs and 
Slovaks.
20
 The opposite was true.  
Although it is difficult to estimate with certainty how the local population 
welcomed the liberating forces in Slovakia and the Czech lands, both armies seem to 
have been given a warm welcome much of the time. Josef Weiser, a young Slovak Jew 
(born in 1916 in a small village Pušovce in eastern Slovakia), a partisan in the Slovak 
national uprising, recalled the “enthusiastic” welcome given to the Red Army by the local 
population in Žakarovce (eastern Slovakia). Without a doubt exaggerated and colored by 
                                                 
20
 The First Czechoslovak Independent Field Battalion was organized in Buzuluk (the Ural Mountains in 
the Soviet Union) in 1942. In November 1943 it played a key role in the liberation of Kiev (Ukraine). In the 
fall of 1944, after the battle of Dukla Pass, the First Czechoslovak Army Corps entered Czechoslovakia. 
The Corps consisted of 16,000 soldiers: Czechs, Slovaks, Ruthenians, Jews, Soviets, and others. In 1942 
half the Battalion was Jewish. With months, the proportions changed to twenty-five percent of Jews in 
January 1943 and 5.8 percent in September 1943. See Michal Gelbić, 
http://www.czechpatriots.com/csmu/members.php (accessed June 23, 2008). 
 87 
his political sentiments, the following fragment nevertheless illustrates the mood in this 
particular village. Weiser described how on one morning the Red Army entered 
Žakarovce and a swarm (roj) of people came down to the village and “there has been 
already a gate of fame…they had their own band there and bread, bacon, and so forth. So 







Once liberated, Jewish survivors spent the first hours of freedom in pursuit of 
something to eat and wear and a place to sleep. Months, sometimes years, spent in 
concentration and death camps or literally under ground, in wells, holes, forests, and the 
like, left survivors not only psychologically damaged but also physically wrecked.
22
 Jews 
and non-Jews, who survived death, concentration, or labor camps, were all in terrible 
condition. A prisoner of Theresienstadt, a concentration camp in Terezín (the 
northwestern Czech Republic), remembered how just before the end of the war “all of 
[inmates] had temperatures. They had diarrhea when they ate even the smallest amount of 
food. They were covered with lice, and all of them were suspected to have typhoid.”
23
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Survivors of Auschwitz were in even worse shape.
24
 Pictures, taken by the Soviets on the 
day of liberation, show the Auschwitz inmates in a state of extreme emaciation; walking 
skeletons with flesh covering their bones. These people needed the essentials; to eat, to 
wash themselves, and to change out of their flea-infested rags. Excruciating hunger, a 
daily reality for almost six years of the war, now led people to eat anything they found or 
were offered.  
Cases of death from overeating were not uncommon right after liberation.
25
 After 
years of hunger, empty stomachs could not handle the sudden intake of heavy food. 
When well-intentioned benefactors fed survivors with too much food, it often ended in 
diarrhea at best and death at worst. In this respect, Russians turned out to be “safer” 
liberators than Americans. While the Russians could offer limited supplies like bread, 
canned meat, some tea, and cigarettes, Americans brought all sorts of delicacies including 
salami, cheese, and real coffee. Most of the time, however, it was not an excess but a 
shortage of food that was the problem for the survivors. Lasman, Halina Birenbaum, and 
other survivors had similar memories of constant, miserable, and futile attempts to 
appease hunger for weeks after the war.
26
  
Clean clothing and shelter were the other major concerns in the first few hours or 
days after liberation. The clothes of the survivors, who had hidden in forests or 
underground in wells or caves, were rotten, full of bugs, and moldy, in urgent need of 
replacement. Pasiaki (the striped clothing of prisoners in Nazi concentration camps) were 
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dirty and infested with lice and fleas. Water, soap, and a clean bed became the 
commodities most in demand. If the liberators were Soviet, hope for organized, 
institutional help was most often in vain. As a rule, Russian soldiers limited liberation to 
opening the gates of a camp and providing the proverbial bread and butter. They also 
made sure that most of the freed prisoners would go back to their homeland or hometown 
as soon as possible. Birenbaum recalled how after some time, equipped with “bread and 
meat,” Russians just ordered all inmates to set off for home.
27
 The overwhelming 
majority of survivors and camp inmates did not eat properly, wash, or change their 
clothes until they reached their hometown or a bigger city with ad hoc organized aid.  
Before that, they were left to their own resourcefulness in finding food, clothing, 
and shelter among the local population. Jews who survived outside camps relied 
completely on the good will of the local population in both Poland and Slovakia. 
Individuals who had rescued Jews by providing a hiding place for weeks and months of 
occupation most likely continued helping during the first days after liberation. For 
example, Chaim Weill’s rescuers in a small village near Banská Bystrica (central 
Slovakia) offered him and his family a house in which to stay and recuperate until they 
would find something more permanent. Russians liberated Weill in February 1945, when 
he was just thirteen years old. As a son of a religious family he was supposed to have 
celebrated his bar mitzvah a few weeks after liberation. The non-Jewish family that had 
saved them let the Weills stay a couple of months longer. They even made a small 
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celebration for Chaim’s bar mitzvah; they cooked ham – the most luxurious food they 
knew – which, obviously, Chaim’s family could not eat.
28
  
Needless to say, not all survivors were that fortunate. One’s postwar lot depended 
on the character and motives of the person on which he or she had relied for help. If 
money had been the prime motive, the rescued was most likely kicked out immediately 
after news of the end of the war had reached the household. Not unusually, the reason for 
the demand that they leave the premises was the owner’s fear of neighbors discovering 
that he or she helped a Jew. Michał Borwicz, director of the Provincial Jewish Historical 
Commission in Kraków, recalled how after mentioning local righteous gentiles by name, 
“many of those … came …with the accusation that by naming them we were exposing 
them to unpleasant situations and even revenge.”
29
 As Joanna Michlic accurately 
observed, this testimony illustrated the social isolation of rescuers and overall public 
disapproval for rescuing Jews during and immediately after the war.
30
 Testimonies of 
Polish Jewish survivors indicate that the overwhelming majority of them had negative 
experiences immediately after liberation when it came to obtaining help from non-Jews.  
Polish-Jewish relations during the Second World War became one of the most 
contested subjects of intensive research in America, Poland, and Israel during the last 
three decades.
31
 I agree with those scholars who have suggested that the most hostile 
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(open collaboration with Nazis, denunciations, and murders) and the most empathic 
attitudes (rescuing activities) were the least common and on the margins of “normal” 
social conduct.
32
 The majority, although witness to the unfolding genocide, remained 
passive, silent observers of their Jewish neighbors’ fate. However, this passivity meant 
that the average Pole refused when asked for bread or a place to stay overnight.   
For Slovak Jews, assessment of their state and their neighbors was even more 
problematic.
33
 The Slovak State, notorious for its antisemitic rhetoric and praxis, rounded 
up and transported Jews to death camps in Poland and labor camps in Slovakia during the 
first two years of the war. The same state, however, halted the deportations in 1942 and 
hence saved thousands of Slovak Jews from inevitable death in the gas chambers. The 
survivors found themselves protected by the very state that had launched a vicious 
campaign against them. Meanwhile, the conspicuous involvement of ordinary Slovaks 
(e.g., the regular Slovak police, among others) in genocidal practices turned into one of 
the most painful disappointments for Slovak Jews. In this respect, both Slovak and Polish 
Jewish survivors shared an aggravated sense of isolation and abandonment by their non-
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Jewish neighbors. In both Slovak and Polish Jewish survivors’ eyes, people who resided 
outside of ghetto walls, by and large, did nothing to help those inside. After liberation, 
when it was time for both sides to meet, it seemed that help did not come either. 
During the first hours and days after liberation, sharing bread or opening one’s 
stable for a night or two, even though in most cases no longer a matter of life and death, 
still bore immense consequences for the survivors’ mental composure and provided the 
basis for a future evaluation of attitudes toward Jews. Unfortunately, the available data do 
not reveal how many doors opened when survivors and former camp prisoners knocked 
to ask for food or clean clothes. Even though I am unable to assess the character of these 
first encounters, I argue that the very moment of knocking signified the beginning of a 
new process of remaking and renegotiating postwar ethnic relations. This process was in 




On the first few days after liberation, Jewish and non-Jewish camp inmates, 
Jewish survivors in hiding or refuge, and, among others, discharged soldiers, all departed 
toward their hometowns, hoping to find intact homes and living relatives. Alice Braun, a 
twenty-one-year-old Jewish woman from Michalovce in eastern Slovakia, set off on the 
road home because, as she said,  
 
I just did not want to stay there [in Nachod in Bohemia, where she was liberated]. 
I knew I had nothing at home. Because I imagined by the time what I saw that my 
parents could not be alive. But I went back home because I did not want to stay in 
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This hope, against all odds, to find someone alive was the single most powerful 
motivation to go back to the place where home had been before the war. 
Jewish survivors on their homebound journey represented only a small fraction of 
the masses of people in motion in postwar Eastern Europe.
35
 Between 1944 and 1946-47, 
movement within state boundaries as well as across frontiers was a daily reality. Both in 
Poland and Slovakia, domestic migration, interwoven with movement across state 
borders, became the dominant characteristic of the landscape. In 1945 alone, 
approximately 1,117,000 prewar Polish citizens returned home from camps in Germany 
and another 360,000 came from elsewhere in Europe.
36
 Kersten’s comment on Poland in 
the years 1944-48 as a country of people in motion can equally be applied to postwar 
Slovakia.
37
 In both countries, hundreds of thousands of Poles, Slovaks, Jews, Hungarians, 
Germans, and Ukrainians crossed the borders from the east, west, north, and south on a 
daily basis. Small and large columns of returnees from concentration and labor camps in 
Germany and Poland, from the Soviet gulag, or military service; repatriates, exiles, and 
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so-called displaced populations, marched through, making up the postwar East European 
landscape.  
As Kersten established, in the course of repatriation between 1945 and 1948, 
about 1.5 million prewar Polish citizens were repatriated to Poland from the territory of 
the Third Reich (including POWs and prisoners of labor and concentration camps).
38
 
Another staggering 1.2 million pre-1939 Polish (including Jews) citizens were officially 
“repatriated” to Poland from the eastern territories, now annexed by the Soviet Union.
39
 
Jerzy Kochanowski raised this number to 1.5 million after the inclusion of all repatriates 
from the prewar Polish eastern territories, Siberia, and Central Asia in the years 1944-
48.
40
 Overall, almost three million people returned to Poland from the Soviet Union and 
Germany as a result of forced repatriation as well as voluntary homebound movement.  
By the end of 1947, thousands of Czechoslovak citizens had also returned 
voluntarily (mainly from Germany) or had been forcefully transferred from the Soviet 
Union to Czechoslovakia. In June 1945, for example, Czechoslovakia signed a treaty 
with the Soviet Union that authorized the cession of its eastern province of the 
Subcarpathian Ukraine to the Soviets and agreed upon provisions for subsequent 
population transfers. Of the projected population exchange of 50,000, approximately 
27,000 Czechoslovak citizens were repatriated to Czechoslovakia by the end of 1947.
41
 
Overall, between 141,000 and 161,000 Czechoslovak pre-1938 citizens (including Jews) 
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returned to Czechoslovakia after the war.
42
 Finally, in addition to the repatriation of 
citizens from abroad, the Polish and Czechoslovak states carried out grand projects of 
demographic engineering (which I describe elsewhere), including forced relocations and 
large-scale “ethnic cleansing,” which resulted in setting the populace of both countries in 
constant motion.  
Among the returnees, Polish and Slovak Jews who survived the war in camps, 
countryside, monasteries, forests, and in the Soviet Union constituted a significant 
portion. According to Paul Glikson, at the beginning of January 1945, there were about 
10,000 Jews in newly liberated Poland.
43
 Until June 1945, about 61,000 Jews were 
registered in Poland, including 13,000 in active military service.
44
 In the provincial and 
district Jewish committees, the number of registered Jews reached 106,000 in January 
1946 and peaked at 240,000 six months later in June 1946.
45
 This sudden increase in 
numbers resulted from organized repatriation of Polish citizens from the Soviet Union in 
the first half of 1946. By 1948, a total of approximately 175,000 Jews repatriated from 
the USSR to Poland.
46
  
In Slovakia, the number of Jewish migrants was much smaller. As Robert Y. 
Büchler estimated, about 11,000 Jews survived the war in the territory of Slovakia.
47
 
Another 9,000 Slovak Jews returned or were repatriated from Hungary and from camps 
in Germany, among other places. Finally, approximately 10,000 Jews survived in the 
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Magyar occupied territories, which now returned to Slovakia. In summary, the peak of 
Jewish returnees in Slovakia reached about 33,000.
48
 
What was the journey back home like between the summers of 1944 and 1945, 
and in the first half of 1946, during the repatriation from the USSR? Between the 
summers of 1944 and 1945, Jewish returnees used all possible and scarce means of 
transportation to return home. Although the Allies and withdrawing Germans bombed 
much of the railroad structure, what remained was invaluable for returnees. Badly 
overcrowded and terribly slow due to frequent and lengthy stops, trains were nevertheless 
faster than walking. The Dichters’ train journey to Poland, a part of the repatriation from 
Ukraine, best illustrates the conditions of the railroad system in postwar Eastern Europe. 
Their trip began late at night one day in December 1944, after spending the entire day 
waiting for the train to fill up. From Drohobycz (present western Ukraine), they traveled 
through Sambor, Chyrów, Malhowice, Przemyśl, Radymno, Jarosław, and Przeworsk to 
Rzeszów (present southeastern Poland).
49
 The entire journey, more than 200 kilometers 
(124 miles), lasted three nights and three days. Stops lasting for hours; sleeping in a 
seated position with dozens of other people around; urinating outdoors at train stops (in 
the freezing cold); and the inevitable shrinking of food and water supplies, all contributed 
to obvious misery of the journey.  
The overwhelming majority of Jewish returnees had no money to buy a ticket and 
have a seat – a wooden bench. Those without a ticket were allowed to travel on top of the 
train or in open boxcars. For example, Joseph Kline’s trip from Prague to Budapest on a 
train roof in late spring 1945 was a typical train journey home of a penniless returnee,  
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So we all got on a train [on a roof] and we went to Budapest and on the 
same train we were all traveling with her [one of Kline’s traveling 
companions] husband together and we didn’t know that he was on the 
train. Because we were traveling [on a roof and the husband was 
inside]…Trains were so packed, there were no scheduled trains. You just 
stayed at the station, when a train came you got on it. You didn’t need any 
tickets; there were no conductors, there was nothing. There was total 




Similar stories of passengers “traveling on top of the wagons or hanging from the 
steps…” of overcrowded trains can be multiplied.
51
 They all testify to the general 
disorder of the post-liberation period. If, as Kersten suggested, official statistical data left 
two to three million migrants unregistered, we are left with the difficult of visualizing 
image of millions of people moving from one place to another on a daily basis across 
Eastern Europe. In such a context, the typical life experience in 1944-46 was located not 
in physical buildings but on roads, on trains, and in train stations. 
Some of Dichter’s most vivid memories from the beginning of the journey 
involved images of the train station surrounded by a cordon of soldiers supervising the 
repatriation process.
52
 Train stations, so often overlooked by historians, were fascinating 
places of human interaction after liberation. I argue that train stations were the focal 
spaces of human and ethnic relations immediately after the war. After all, it was there, in 
crowded stations, where people lived for days before departure and where they slept for 
nights, having no other place to go after arrival. It was there where survivors found news 
about relatives, often reuniting with loved ones after years of separation. It was there 
where aid institutions distributed supplies for returnees, repatriates, and deportees. 
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Finally, it was at the train stations that political organizations welcomed travelers with 
leaflets promoting their political and social programs. Lasman described how, after 
leaving the Polish Second Army in the summer of 1945, he found himself homeless and 
spent the first two nights in the train station in Łódź. There, he met a few Jewish boys 
who informed him where the Jewish committee was and suggested that, instead of going 
to the committee, he should rather go to the Zionist Ha-Shomer Ha-Tsair office.
53
 
Birenbaum also described the train station in Warszawa as a place of Zionist political 
agitation,  
 
Activists of various Zionist parties, representatives of kibbutzim, awaited 
the returnees in train stations where they agitated to join their parties. 
Shortly after their [the returnees’] leaving a train, they [the activists] told 
them, that no Jews survived, that everything was devastated and razed to 





Since a great section of the railroad system was destroyed, returnees could rarely 
make a complete journey by a single train. Most often the returnees combined all 
available means of transportation to get back home. They walked, hitchhiked, and took 
trains – whatever was available at the time. Joseph S. Kalina, a Slovak Jew from Prešov, 
started his journey home from relatively close, only a hundred miles away, near Banská 
Bystrica.
55
 “A hungry, lice-ridden, one hundred pound skeleton,” as he described himself, 
Kalina first walked until exhaustion. Then he stopped at the edge of the road and pointed 
his thumb eastward, 
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Some rides lasted only a few miles; others took me from one village to 
another. On foot, I begged for food, never coming up empty…When I 
came to a town that had train service anywhere east, I got on board and 
took it as far as it went… At the end of the line I started walking and 
hitchhiking again. The further east I went, away from the front, the fewer 
Russian vehicles there were. I hitched rides from farmers and townspeople 




Janet Rogowsky had a similar recollection of joining a small group of people riding in a 
cart drawn by two horses, “During the ten hour trip, we had to stop many times, to feed 




Some returnees walked the entire journey home. Peter Cukor, a nine-year-old 
Hungarian Jew, liberated by the Russians in Strasshof near Vienna, recalled traveling 
through Slovakia on the way home to Hungary,  
 
So here we [Peter, Peter’s mother, and two other members of his family] 
were, [after] years of the concentration camps, no food, no clothing, or 
anything like that. And we’re moving in opposite direction from two 
armies, you know, two armies are moving west, we are moving east and 
they already use … the food, and all the resources of the land and we are 
trying to survive over there. And it was terrible. First of all it was 
extremely traumatic to know that as we started walking back … like the 




Caught in the middle of fighting, Cukor’s mother became hysterical over the possibility 
of being killed after the war was over.
59
 Fortunately, Peter and his family escaped the 
battlefield safely. Eventually, it took them about two to three days to walk from Vienna 
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(Austria) to Bratislava (western Slovakia).
60
 They walked very slowly. Peter’s mother 
had to carry him most of the time since he was too sick and too weak to walk by himself. 
Peter recalled how, frail herself, she threw out a jar of jam because it was too much for 
her to carry. To get something to eat, they knocked on the door of Austrian farmhouses. 
As a rule, the local population never failed to share some food with them.  
Kalina also mentioned equally generous Slovak farmers who provided food to all 
travelers and returnees, “Farmers everywhere [in central Slovakia, between Banská 
Bystrica and Prešov], despite their circumstances, had great empathy for their displaced 
countrymen. A few villages even set up outdoor kitchens with produce available until 
dark.”
61
 Alice Braun’s account, however, differs from Kalina’s testimony,  
 
In Nachod, I was liberated by the Russian army but I did not see the 
Russian army because I was in private homes. You know the Czechs took 
us, Czechs were marvelous people. They were wonderful, wonderful 
people. The Czechs, not the Slovaks. The Slovaks were hateful and they 
are to this day… Czechs were marvelous, they fed us, they gave us 
clothing, everything. The moment we crossed the border with Slovakia 
this is what we got: “There is more of you coming back than you left!” … 




Both testimonies, as any personal account, are highly impressionistic. However, they 
should not be easily dismissed as unreliable sources. Although not credible enough to 
form evidence for sentiments among Slovaks after liberation, they testify to existing 
hopes and disillusionments among Jewish survivors at the time. On the one hand, Braun 
and others, having personally suffered antisemitism in Slovakia, translated this 
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experience into a general opinion on every ordinary Slovak. On the other hand, Kalina, 
who encountered kind and friendly gestures, were eager to think of their observations as 
true for the entire Slovak population.  
Kalina went even further in his narrative, claiming that among all returnees on the 
road, regardless of their ethnicity, there was “an esprit” – a common spirit, 
 
We had much in common: a shared national heritage, hunger, and 
suffering. War had driven most of them from their homes, dispersed their 
families, and destroyed loved ones and friends. Conversation was 
compassionate but not overly inquiring. Where are you from? Where did 
you end up? Where are you going? People had been through enough; they 




Leopold Marschak, a Polish journalist who came back to Lublin from Vilnius in 
December 1944, shared similar experiences. On the way from the airport (he and his wife 
traveled from the USSR by a small government plane), people stopped them to ask where 
they were coming from and to shake their hands.
64
 This actual or perceived common 
spirit among travelers was a significant and unique dimension of the immediate postwar 
experience. Although elusive and short-lived, the solidarity in suffering beyond ethnic 
boundaries seemed true to returnees on the road back home. People craved compassion 
after years of suffering and mistreatment; hence any gesture of sympathy was welcomed 
with gratitude. The impression of solidarity created a sense of belonging to a large group 
of people bonded by suffering and oblivious to ethnic differences. 
The following accounts, however, render this post-liberation solidarity illusory. 
For example, Kalina admitted that he avoided mentioning that he was a Jew because 
“who knew what antisemitic resentments existed among the refugees. Even had I not 
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been afraid to say I was a Jew, I still would have been reluctant to do so. Living as a 
second-class citizen for so long, my feeling of inferiority was ingrained.”
65
 Likewise, the 
Dichters did not “announce” their Jewishness to co-passengers on the train, fearing a 
negative reaction. Dichter recalled how during the trip new passengers greeted everyone 
with the Catholic “Praise the Lord!” Women sang religious hymns, prayed out loud, and 
said the rosary. Rarely did someone engage in a dialogue with co-travelers. Dichter 
remembered one woman from near Tarnopol telling a story of the UPA attacking her 
village, “They burnt everyone in the church – she said, returning to her rosary.”
66
 Amid 
similar stories and prayers, nobody bothered the Dichters.  
Kalina, the Dichters, and thousands of others were not harassed perhaps because 
they did not disclose their origins or perhaps because they did not “look” Jewish, or 
perhaps and simply because nobody cared as co-passengers were overwhelmed by their 
own discomfort and misery. However, their fear that, having known their background, the 
passengers would have had reacted differently was not just a matter of personal anxiety. 
In reality, trains in Poland were often the scenes of brutal attacks against Jewish 
passengers, especially in 1946.
67
 Murders on trains, known as akcja pociągowa (train 
operation), were instances of postwar violence in which, as the historian David Engel put 
it, “the primary criterion for selection was simply the fact of being Jewish.”
68
 Marked by 
unequal emaciation and fearful demeanor, dressed in rags or in striped prisoner clothes, 
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the majority of Jews remained the most visible returnees on the road regardless of their 
attempts to conceal their origin.  
Overall, although trains were particularly dangerous for returning Jews, open 
roads, trains, and forests remained unsafe for everyone. Everybody feared criminals at 
large as well as armed and drunken partisans; Jews feared armed nationalists (for 
example, the NSZ); and women feared Russian soldiers. Birenbaum recalled how, on the 
way to Warszawa, she and her companions occasionally got a lift from Russian soldiers 
who then forced them to perform public labor. By nights, girls never let each other stay 
alone, wary of assault or rape.
69
 Numerous testimonies repeat similar concerns about the 
nightly “activities” of Russian soldiers. Edith Farber recalled her trip to Bratislava as 
filled with fear of Soviet soldiers who raped women regardless of age.
70
 Farber noted that 
the way to survive was to find a man; if there was a man present, they would not touch a 
girl. Cukor recalled the following pattern on his way to Hungary through Slovakia, 
“When night came the Russians changed greatly. At night they got drunk, and the only 
thing they were interested in was sex and they did not care with whom.”
71
 Cukor 
remembered how he and his female companions always tried to find a haystack for a 
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Return to the Countryside 
 
The word return implies that by reentering one’s native country, city, town, or 
village a returnee is necessarily returning to something familiar. However, there was 
nothing more unfamiliar than the landscape returnees saw during their journey and upon 
arrival. The war left Poland and Slovakia materially destroyed and impoverished. Poland 
particularly suffered unsurpassed losses during the war. The early material devastation 
and human casualties were caused by the military operations of the September campaign 
of 1939. Suppression of the Warszawa ghetto uprising in April and May 1943 left whole 
quarters of Warszawa burnt and leveled to the ground. The years 1944-45 witnessed the 
climax (apart from the operation of the six death camps at their peak in 1942 and 1943) 
of human and material damage. German retaliation, after the Warszawa uprising of 1944, 
left thousands dead and the entire city in ruins. The Soviet advance at the turn of 1944 




Each region suffered damage proportional to the intensity and the scale of local 
military operations and dependent on the particular local political and military strategy. 
The most devastated was western Poland, where major cities, bridges, and roads were 
destroyed. Another major location of war damages was Warszawa and its countryside. 
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During two uprisings and the subsequent military operations, Warszawa lost more than 
seventy percent of its residential buildings and eighty percent of its total structure.
74
 In 
the eastern and southern regions of Poland, bridges, roads, and railroads were devastated; 
the cities were robbed of the most precious artifacts; and the quarters where Jewish 
ghettos had been established were burnt down or significantly ruined. Urban centers like 
Kraków, Rzeszów, Przemyśl, Kielce, and Lublin endured relatively less damage than the 
cities in central and western Poland.
75
 Kraków – the capital of the Nazi administration in 
occupied Poland – survived almost intact. Its damage was limited to the Jewish 
cemeteries, historic monuments, and bridges across the Vistula River.
76
  
Slovakia, a Nazi ally, escaped the damaging effects of direct military occupation, 
thus suffering less human and material losses than Poland. Most of the damage occurred 
during the years 1944-45 after the Slovak national uprising. Launched in August 1944, 
the uprising saw heavy fighting concentrated mostly in central Slovakia, near Banská 
Bystrica, and spreading toward the eastern regions. The counter-offensive and occupation 
ultimately led to considerable material damage and loss of human life. After the uprising, 
the Nazi Einsatzgruppen burnt entire villages in retaliation and on suspicion of 
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collaboration with partisans. Villages like Kremnička and Nemecká were entirely wiped 
out, losing 747 and 900 residents respectively.  
As the historian Eugen Steiner has put it, “most of the towns in Slovakia were 
badly damaged; …transport and industry completely disrupted,” widening the gap in 
economic potential between Slovakia and the Czech lands where “most of the towns, 
including Prague, and most of the industrial plants remained intact.”
77
 Although the 
communication and transportation systems suffered considerably in Czechoslovakia, in 
comparison to Poland the extent of the damage was relatively small.
78
 Considering that 
most of the damage to the railway tracks occurred in Slovakia, sparing the rest of the 
country, the railroad system was in better shape in the Czech lands.
79
 Finally, chemical 
works, oil refineries (most notably the oil refinery and storage facilities in Bratislava), 
textile industry, and heavy industry suffered severe damage from bombing or general 
dislocation and shortages of materials.
80
 Overall, Slovakia suffered considerably more 
damage than the Czech lands but relatively less than Poland.   
Material devastation filled the landscape of the two countries to which Jewish 
survivors returned. Only former residents of a few cities of Kraków, Rzeszów, and 
Przemyśl and villagers from regions that had escaped direct military operations – 
northern and southern Poland as well as western and eastern Slovakia – found their places 
almost intact. Most often, however, the survivors saw ruins upon their arrival. In totally 
devastated cities, like Warszawa, the chances of seeing a prewar apartment were almost 
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nonexistent. Moreover, even if the house was still standing, Jewish survivors were not let 
in or did not even bother to knock. As I describe in the next chapter, Jews in Poland and 
Slovakia could rarely repossess their prewar houses. In such cases, survivors usually left 
their hometowns after a few days. They slept over at an acquaintance's place or in an 
abandoned, empty house, or elsewhere, planning to go to a big city where Jewish 
committees organized shelters for homeless survivors. But before departure, survivors 
wanted to made sure that they looked for any other relatives who might have returned. 
Kalina found five members of his immediate family upon the return to his 
hometown Prešov.
81
 Although he failed to repossess his house, like thousands of other 
Polish and Slovak Jews, finding five members of his immediate family alive was rare in 
Slovakia and, even more so, in Poland. The following human landscape was more 
typical, 
 
… Three, almost whole, families survived; the rest were, in general, young 
orphaned people. Among the young, nobody had an occupation; the older had 
been tradesmen or craftsmen before the war… As far as plans for the future were 
concerned, everybody waited for the end of the war to get in touch with relatives 




Thirty Jews came back to Łosice, where Jews constituted sixty percent of the total 
population before the war … 
Death rates suggest that Polish and Slovak non-Jewish returnees could count on 
finding their families alive whereas Jewish survivors had less chance, if any, to find a 
surviving relative. In Poland, nine percent of Poles (2.5 million of approximately thirty-
one million) were killed while, of 3.4 million Jews living in Poland before the war, 2.8 
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million or eighty-five percent perished in the Holocaust.
83
 In most cases, the war did not 
completely destroy the immediate and extended families of non-Jews. Jewish families, on 
the other hand, were by and large completely shattered. Only every sixteenth Polish Jew 
– 200,000 out of more than three million – returned to his or her prewar hometown.  
In Slovakia, twenty-two percent (30,000 out of 137,000) of Jewish civilians came 
back after the liberation.
84
 Thus, statistically, Slovak Jews fared much better than their 
Polish counterparts. Although only twenty-two percent of Slovak Jews returned, their 
overall survival rate was much higher. Due to Slovak autonomy in domestic affairs, 
including handling “the Jewish question,” Jews were safer in Slovakia than in Nazi 
occupied Poland. About 69,000 or fifty-one percent of the Slovak Jewish population of 
1939 was killed in Nazi concentration and death camps.
85
 This percentage rises to 
seventy-eight percent, if the Jewish population from before 1938 is considered. After the 
Vienna Arbitration in November 1938 and subsequent Magyar annexation of southern 
Slovakia, 44,000 Jews found themselves outside of the country of origin. Another 5,000 
Slovak Jews emigrated between 1938 and 1940. As for war losses among non-Jewish 
Slovaks, out of the total non-Jewish population of 3.5 million in Slovakia in 1939, 
civilian and military deaths of non-Jews amounted to 41,000 or 1.2 percent of the total 
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 Overall, Slovakia suffered the loss of 118,000 or 3.3 percent of 
the total population. Those numbers, however, are relatively small when compared to 
total Polish and Polish-Jewish casualties reaching approximately six million or seventeen 
percent of the entire prewar population.
87
 
Although statistically more Jewish relatives had a chance to survive the war in 
Slovakia than in Poland, these calculations have limited relevance to the understanding of 
postwar human encounters. In both Poland and Slovakia, there were Jewish families in 
which no one survived. Indeed, very few nuclear families survived intact. No extended 
Jewish families made it through the war without tremendous losses. This realization that 
no loved ones survived was one of the most painful experiences of postwar return. Joy of 
liberation was replaced by an acute sense of loneliness and the awareness that there was 
nobody left waiting and no home to go back to. Lasman’s loneliness in June 1945 could 
be ascribed to many, particularly Jewish survivors in the moment of liberation: “I had no 
address in the world, nobody awaited me and I did not know well what to do with myself. 
For all this, tears streamed in a trickle down my face.”
88
 
In the absence of loved ones, the postwar homecoming was truly an impossible 
project.
89
 Kalina reflected the common longings of the majority of survivors when he 
said, “… I needed to be home with my family. I needed emotional nourishment just as 
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much as I required nourishment from food.”
90
 He needed home, understood in Witold 
Rybczyński’s terms, as “the healing response to all other places and peoples … [as] 
security, comfort, certainty.”
91
 For Jewish returnees to postwar Poland and Slovakia, 
home was a yardstick to evaluate their experience. While non-Jewish camp survivors and 
discharged soldiers had familial homes with mothers and fathers waiting for them, the 
overwhelming majority of Jewish survivors had no such home in which they could heal. 
With their houses taken over and families killed, Polish and Slovak Jews found 
themselves in a state of aggravated homelessness. The conspicuous absence of home in 
its most material (building) and figurative (family) sense became the greatest 
disappointment and disruption in the return of Polish and Slovak Jews. Consequently, this 
dual homelessness led to a trauma and a sense of displacement, which ultimately turned 
into the alienation of the Jewish returnees from their old hometowns and homelands.
92
  
 For some survivors, one way to cope with the death of loved ones was finding out 
how they had died. There was much talk about who did what to whom during the war, 
particularly in small villages and towns. Contrary to the common assumption that war 
activities were a taboo subject, available testimonies suggest that people were inclined to 
talk about their neighbors within the limits of their communities. Dichter, for example, 
remembered how after an emotional reunion and a nutritious dinner at his cousin’s in 
Borysław, the family talked for hours about who had survived and who had not, which 
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neighbor had betrayed and which had not.
93
 Also, Grynberg recalled that in Dobre people 
talked about killings of his family. Rumors circulated that “…somebody must have led 
the Germans to the dugout where [Grynberg’s] mother’s family had been hiding. Maybe 
some peasant, maybe a gamekeeper.”
94
 Grynberg’s mother had no intention to follow up 
on these stories. By then, she had already accepted her relatives’ deaths as something that 
had been bound to happen. What she could not come to terms with was her husband’s 
death. She knew that a local, not a German, killed her spouse four months before the end 
of the war. In this case, however, local residents were not willing to tell Mrs. Grynberg 
the truth. It was one thing to suggest vaguely that murder had been committed and 
another to betray one of their own. Fifty years after the Second World War, during a 
conversation with my grandmother on crimes committed in her village (Dębiany near 
Jędrzejów in Kielce province), she refused to tell me who had killed a small Jewish child 
in the village during the war. Everybody in the village knew who had committed this 
crime but nobody would reveal the “secret” to an outsider.   
In villages and small towns, where everybody knew almost everything about 
everybody, the return after liberation inevitably turned into constant renegotiations of the 
terms of communal coexistence. People knew how their neighbors had behaved during 
the war; who had collaborated with the Germans, who had gone into the forest, and who 
had helped or denounced Jews. After the war, villagers judged one another according to 
their communal hierarchy of values. For them, only collaboration with the Nazis was 
unacceptable and thus openly condemned. All other types of behavior, although often 
thought of as repulsive, remained within the limits of acceptability. Action or inaction 
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towards their Jewish neighbors belonged to that category. Villagers knew well that 
denouncing or killing Jews during the war was morally questionable if not repugnant. Yet 
they were willing to justify anti-Jewish wrongdoing in their community as a part of the 
inescapable costs of the war. After all, the Jews were doomed in this war and nothing 
could have been done to reverse their fate, especially when the death penalty and rules of 
collective responsibility were applied to those who dared to help.  
Despite this self-proclaimed absolution, inescapable guilt, on the one hand, and 
material gain from Jewish property, on the other, left villagers with a sense of unease in 
the presence of returning survivors.
95
 In my opinion this unease made peasants and 
townsmen ask the most painful, well-documented question in countless Jewish 
testimonies: “Are you alive? We thought the Germans killed all of you.” How much 
easier the return to normalcy would have been for an entire village if none of their Jewish 
residents had returned and nobody had asked difficult questions. The absence of the 
Jewish returnees would have spared their neighbors questions about what happened to a 
Jewish family member who had been hiding in the area and had not been killed by the 
Nazis; what happened to one’s house, farm, furniture, or money entrusted to a non-Jewish 
neighbor; and dozens of other concerns. But a handful of Jewish survivors returned and 
an entire community had to cope with the consequences of their past actions.   
A similar dynamic occurred in Slovak villages and towns; Poles were not the only 
ones who asked the notorious question, “Are you still alive?” Georg Keleti remembered 
that when he came back to his house in Spišská Nová Ves (Košice region in eastern 
Slovakia),  
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[O]pposite our house was the Slovak arizator [or aryanizer] Mr. Rizman, who 
together with Mr. Valášek, as Christians, took away one of the biggest fabric 
stores… Mr. Rizman lost his natural color and began shaking himself, asking me: 
‘How is it possible that you are here, Ďuri?’ They were thinking about what they 
knew happened in the death camps and thought all Jews were murdered by the 




I speculate, however, that the level of guilt in the Polish and Slovak populations 
regarding the Jews after the war differed due to the character of wartime collaboration. 
The Slovaks, who participated in the persecution of Jews, had the sanction of the quasi-
independent Slovak State, and thus acted “legally.” Those Poles, who participated in the 
persecution of Jews, lacked such sanction, and were collaborating with the occupier. I 
speculate that this wartime dynamic caused more guilt in Poland than in Slovakia, and 
thus more hatred toward the Jewish returnees. The absence of death camps in the physical 
and mental landscape of Slovakia and their strong presence in the lives of Poles, who 
witnessed genocide “in their own backyards,” only added to the sense of responsibility.
97
 
In Poland, these unresolved tensions only intensified the mutual distrust and fear 
immediately after liberation. In the most extreme cases, villagers sought resolution by 
“getting rid of” a survivor or threatening to do so unless he or she had left the area. 
Occasionally leaflets were published “ordering” Jews to leave town within a few days.
98
 
These tactics were especially effective with women and children, who had no means to 
protect themselves. I have not found evidence of similar behavior in Slovakia. True, non-
Jews often did not let returning Jews back into their houses but, by and large, Slovak 
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Jews succeeded in settling in smaller communities around Slovakia, mostly undisturbed. 
Besides the smaller guilt-fear factor, it was the absence of civil war that improved the 
physical safety of Slovak Jews.   
Immediately after the liberation of 1945, Poland and Slovakia equally suffered the 
ubiquitous presence of Red Army soldiers, guerilla groups, and militiamen, which made 
access to arms and guns dangerously easy. This availability further intensified the general 
sense of fear and insecurity. In particular, the vicinity of a forest – a major location of 
guerilla groups – had a great psychological effect on local residents. Both Jews and non-
Jews in Poland and Slovakia – regardless of their political allegiances – feared partisans 
as unpredictable and dangerous. Although politics played an important role in shaping the 
attitudes of the local inhabitants toward partisans, it could not eradicate their fear. People 
across ethnic and social lines were simply scared of the consequences of the omnipresent 
lawlessness and guns in the hands of young, often drunk partisans. Since villages and 
small towns – in comparison to big cities – were literally (and figuratively) closer to the 
forests, the general level of insecurity increased proportionally.  
Testimonies indicate that Jews were more scared of Polish partisans than of the 
militia and Soviet soldiers.
99
 Jewish survivors were especially frightened by the wartime 
antisemitic record of extreme nationalists and the general climate of the Polish 
underground. So they looked to the Soviet and the government forces for protection – a 
choice dictated by the absence of other viable alternatives. In fact, the communal and 
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individual sense of security among Jewish returnees often depended on the presence of 
the Russian military in the area. As discussed above, for Polish Jews the question “who 
will liberate us?” and, by the same token, “who will protect us after liberation?” was of 
secondary importance as long as the liberators and protectors did their job. Meanwhile, 
Russian soldiers, aware of anti-Soviet sentiment among Poles, were more inclined to 
socialize with the mainly neutral Jews. In any case, whoever maintained good relations 
with the Soviets not only enjoyed their armed protection but could also count on extra 
supplies of meat, fish, sugar, tea, and chocolate – luxuries in postwar Eastern Europe. 
Overall, however, the behavior of Red Army soldiers increased rather than decreased the 
general insecurity of the times and added to the perils of return. 
In contrast to Poland, Slovakia became a safer place as soon as the guerilla units 
dissolved. The use of weaponry and encounters with the uniformed stopped being a 
regular part of everyday life by early summer of 1945. Slovak Jews experienced the 
perils of civil war only in northeastern Slovakia, in 1947, when Ukrainian guerilla units 
(Banderovcy) crossed the border, escaping from Poland to Austria. Keleti remembered,  
 
We saw many Czechoslovak officers in field uniforms, and we heard distant 
shootings, like during the war…. During this escape, [Ukrainians] went through 
remote villages in Slovakia… They began to murder the few Jews who returned 




What was the exception for Slovak Jews was a daily reality for Polish Jews. The end of 
the war in Slovakia was indeed the end of the war for Slovak Jews. In Poland, the end of 
the war against the Nazis marked the beginning of the domestic war against the Soviets. 
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Weaponry combined with alcohol was particularly lethal to the security of the 
Polish street. But alcohol consumption was a huge social problem in both countries. The 
results of public opinion surveys, conducted in Czechoslovakia in 1946, indicate the 
extent of the problem and social anxiety surrounding this issue in the postwar period. 
Eighty-six percent of respondents answered “yes” to the question, “Do you think that the 
authorities should move against increasing [alcohol] drinking?”
101
 Only six percent 
disagreed and eight percent were not sure. Such overwhelming approval for state 
intervention into the matter not only pointed to a generally high reliance on the state but 
also proved alcoholism to be a significant disruptor of private and public life, serious 
enough to warrant state intervention. In almost every testimony from the two countries, 
there are accounts of excessive drinking of vodka.  
Stereotypically, Jews were sober while Poles (and Slovaks) were drunk 
throughout the centuries. Literary images of Jewish inn owners and Polish drunken 
peasants permeated the culture and became powerful “truths.” Consequently, drinking 
vodka turned into one of the most conspicuous ethnic markers in Poland defining Poles as 
naïve and romantic drunkards and Jews as sober and malicious inducers to drink. While 
before the war this stereotype of Jewish sobriety probably held true for the majority of 
Polish Jews, after the war it no longer did.
102
 Among the factors contributing to the 
spread of alcoholism was the traumatic experience of war and incapacity to handle the 
magnitude of personal loss. Alcohol made it easier to cope with past trauma; it offered 
moments of oblivion. It became an easy means to escape the past if only momentarily. 
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Jews were not an exception. Furthermore, the social composition of the surviving Jewish 
population was the prime factor contributing to the changing general image and actual 
habits among Jews. Survivors were mostly teenage or young to middle age; rather 
polonized and more secular than religious; and men rather than women, thus constituting 
a group statistically most prone to alcohol consumption. Moreover, thousands of the 
survivors had spent the war in the Soviet Union where alcohol played an important role 
in the social fabric of everyday life. The average Polish village was probably not more 
sober than a Russian one after the war. Under the German occupation, farmers across 
Poland undertook their own illicit distillation of alcohol, a practice which continued after 
the war.
103
 Consequently, a scene of Jews, Poles, and Russians drinking together (even 
sharing the same bottle) right after liberation in small towns or villages was neither 
surprising nor uncommon. An interesting question would be to what extent and how 
Jewishness, Polishness, and Russianness were expressed during those drinking bouts. Did 
intoxication render all ethnic lines obsolete and create true camaraderie beyond ethnicity? 
Or perhaps drunkenness only exacerbated the mutual distrust and sense of otherness? The 
culture of alcohol consumption in postwar Poland still awaits research. 
While drinking was one way to cope with the recent losses, talking about the dead 
was yet another means to mourn. Of course, reaction to one’s experiences and the mode 
of coping with the trauma was highly individual. Nevertheless, as I mentioned before, 
silencing the past was not common. Rather, the opposite was true: people did not attempt 
to escape from talking, recalling, and remembering what had just happened in their lives. 
Lasman, for example, recalled how eager the Jews from small towns and villages near 
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Siedlce were to tell their stories immediately after the war. Lasman even wanted to write 
all these testimonies down in order to bear witness,  
 
I met survivors, listened to their stories and I thought that these matters should be 
written down straight away. When we were in hiding we thought that one should 
bear witness about what had happened. We realized that we were few witnesses of 




These accounts run counter to the frequent historiographical claim that the Shoah 
remained a taboo subject for decades after the war.
105
 Indeed, there was no sustained 
public debate of the Shoah in the late 1940s in Poland and Slovakia when the process of 
incorporating these events into collective memory only began. However, the genocide of 
Jews was not completely silenced. Private conversations and public memorialization of 
the recent events in Poland and Slovakia prove that there was plenty of discussion on the 
subject in private and public sphere in the two countries immediately after the war.   
Whether expressing or silencing their emotions, most Jewish survivors did not 
feel “comfortable” in villages and small towns. Their discomfort not only stemmed from 
lack of physical safety, fear of their neighbors, and proximity to the forests. More 
importantly, it was homelessness, loneliness, stark visibility, and feelings of displacement 
that drove former Jewish village residents from their places of birth. In a village of a few 
hundred or even in a town of a few thousand, their past, their war experiences, their 
losses – in other words, everything that constituted their Jewishness – were on constant 
display. Although not inevitably confronted with hostility, Jewish returnees were still too 
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traumatized by the war to handle any confrontation, including the peaceful negotiation of 
communal belonging. Stripped of their families and homes they had little leverage to 
negotiate successfully their admittance to postwar communal-village life. Therefore, the 
overwhelming majority of Jewish survivors, in both Poland and Slovakia, moved out 
from their villages and small towns soon after their return from the war. Rarely did they 
move directly abroad. Rather, they first relocated to bigger urban centers, where they 
could expect more institutional help, physical security, and relative anonymity. 
 
Return to the City 
 
In a big city, Jewish survivors from the province did not need to constantly 
negotiate their belonging to a place. Big cities, like Kraków, Warszawa, and Łódź in 
Poland, and Bratislava and Košice in Slovakia, offered at least the perception of 
anonymity in a crowd and thus relative invisibility as a Jew. On a city street, Jewish 
survivors from villages and towns “disappeared” among thousands of other temporary 
urban residents on the move – refugees, repatriates, and returnees. Invisibility was not 
always psychologically helpful for Jewish survivors since it created the acute sense of 
loneliness. Birenbaum described her arrival in Warszawa as a lonely and gloomy 
experience,   
 
I stood again on a Warszawa street…No. I didn’t find anything here. None of my 
relatives. Crowd of unfamiliar Poles carried me like a little kernel, needed by no 
one in this reborn world. Where am I going to turn to? To whom? What did I 
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Anti-Jewish pogroms, haunting the urban centers of Kraków, Kielce, Rzeszów, 
Topoľčany, and Bratislava soon proved how illusory this “invisibility” was. Apart from 
the illusion of physical safety and anonymity, big cities offered Jewish survivors direct, 
tangible institutional support that small villages or towns could not match. When 
Birenbaum wandered around the city, random people told her about the Jewish 
committee in Warszawa, which registered returnees and offered the aid. So, having no 
other place to go, Birenbaum took the first steps toward the committee building at 60 
Sienna Street.  
By and large, it was Jewish organizations and committees in Poland and Slovakia 
and abroad, which offered material aid and psychological support for Holocaust 
survivors. The first such aid association, the Organizational Committee of Polish Jews in 
the USSR (Komitet Organizacyjny Żydów Polskich w ZSRR), was created in the Soviet 
Union as early as July 1944.
107
 The committee’s main purpose was to help all Polish Jews 
who were still in the USSR. Its members searched for survivors in Siberia and in the far 
north; supplied them with food and medication; and organized their return to Poland. A 
month later, on August 8, 1944, survivors within Poland could expect institutionalized 
help from the newly established Bureau for Matters Concerning Aid to the Jewish 
Population of Poland (Referat do Spraw Pomocy Ludności Żydowskiej) – an autonomous 
institution within the Polish government.
108
 Unfortunately, due to the overwhelming scale 
of destruction, subsequent chaos, and a shortage of basic supplies, the bureau and the 
central authorities were able to provide little help. In response, local self-aid committees 
mushroomed in urban centers across the country. These Jewish committees served as 
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contact places (survivors posted their information in committee buildings to find 
relatives), supplied Jewish returnees with urgently needed clothes, food, and medicines 
and, in the long run, eased further adaptation to postwar circumstances. On November 4, 
1944, the Polish government established the Central Committee of Jews in Poland 
(Centralny Komitet Żydów w Polsce, CKŻP), which became an umbrella organization 




In Slovakia, Jewish returnees could not count on any institutional support until the 
spring of 1945, when Rabbi Armin (Abba) Frieder returned to Bratislava.
110
 Immediately 
after the liberation of Bratislava (April 4), Frieder opened the Yeshurun office, initiated 
cooperation with surviving orthodox representatives, and undertook activities toward, not 
only the restoration of Jewish communal life in the city but also organization of 
immediate help for Jewish survivors-returnees.
111
 This aid, however, was limited to 
Bratislava and its vicinity due to the damage suffered by the transportation system. In 
order to ease Jewish recovery elsewhere, local self-aid committees similar to those in 
Poland formed across Slovakia. In September 1945, the Central Union of Jewish 
Communities in Slovakia (Ústredný sväz židovských náboženských obci na Slovensku, 
ÚSŽNO) was established.
112
 In contrast to the CKŻP, the ÚSŽNO struggled for 
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recognition as representative of all Slovak Jews. The orthodox congregations refused to 
recognize the ÚSŽNO until 1947. 
The CKŻP in Poland, the ÚSŽNO in Slovakia, and numerous local committees, 
could not meet all the needs of the Jewish returnees. Resources of the Polish government 
were insufficient to cover all the necessary expenses whereas the Slovak government 
refused to grant Jews any special help. Thus, the role of Jewish organizations abroad, in 
general and Zionist organizations, in particular, was critical.
113
 For example, the 
American JOINT Distribution Committee played a key role in supplying the CKŻP in 
Poland and the Jewish communities in Slovakia with money, clothes, food, and 
medicines.
114
 Other organizations included the Society for the Protection of the Health of 
the Jews (Obshchestvo Zdravookhraneniia Evreev, OZE-TOZ), the World Jewish 
Congress, the American Jewish Committee (AJC), the American ORT Federation 
(Organization for Rehabilitation through Training), HIAS (the Hebrew Immigrant Aid 
Society), the American Federation for Polish Jews, and others. The United Nations 
Recovery and Rehabilitation Agency (UNRRA) also had its share in the postwar general 
as well as specifically Jewish economic recovery.  
The Jewish survivors in Poland did not welcome foreign Jewish aid without 
reservations. The response of survivors in Łosice to a letter sent by the Jewish committee 
in Lublin with a request to register the survivors and to fill in the attached forms, aptly 
illustrates the ambivalence surrounding American help. The requested paperwork was to 
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serve as the basis for aid organizations in the United States to estimate and assemble the 
appropriate aid packages. Lasman remembered that these forms spawned heated 
discussions and varied reactions in the town. Older Jewish survivors were happy to know 
that America cared, that it remembered Polish Jewish survivors. The young were more 
skeptical recalling how their desperate need for help was ignored during the war. 
Moreover, the questions on the potential need for moral and psychological help struck the 
readers as ridiculous and detached from reality.  
 
These sons of bitches make fun of us. It’s not enough that we hardly saved our 
necks they still think of us as lunatics. We ourselves are supposed to assess that 
we need psychiatrist’s help…Nobody asked for any moral or, even more so, 
psychiatrist help. Whoever heard of such a thing? I wrote briefly that I had lost 





The general public in Eastern Europe has never held psychiatry or psychoanalysis in 
great esteem, considering psychiatric intervention only a last resort in extreme cases of 
mental disease. In the context of the immediate end of the war, questions about the 
potential need for a psychologist were considered insulting since they implied, in the 
respondent’s view, that he or she was diagnosed a “lunatic.” For the young and 
disillusioned survivors of the Holocaust in Łosice, the content and format of the 
questionnaire, although certainly prepared with the best intentions, was an offensive, 
naïve, and grossly delayed attempt to help. Here, the abyss between the American and the 
East European experience of the war – on both the communal and individual level – was 
conspicuous.  
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Nevertheless, the majority of respondents, pressed by shortages of almost 
everything and regardless of their opinion on the questionnaire, requested material aid, 
food and clothing. During the first months after return, they had no other option. In a 
special meeting between representatives of the American Jewish Committee and Polish 
Jewry, the following was said about the situation of Polish Jews in August 1945, 
 
The situation of the Jews in Poland must be described as tragic. There are no 
families, all are either single survivors of whole families or parts of families. Most 
of the surviving Jews are young – between the ages of twenty and forty. The 
children present a special problem. Orthodox Jewry has been almost completely 
exterminated. Rabbi Kahane estimated the number of surviving orthodox Jews at 
about 3/4000. Polish Jewry is on the whole a déclassé community, without any 
means. It is no exaggeration to say that the overwhelming majority of the 
surviving Jewish population lives on Government support, which has risen from 
500,000 złoty to 5,000,000 a month. Since a sum of about 200 złoty a day is 
required per person to satisfy his most urgent and primitive needs, the 






Job opportunities were still limited for Jewish survivors. Some of them did public labor, 
which paid 300 złoty per month, or engaged in street peddling.
117
 In February and March 
1945, Samuel Kahan (pseudonym Stanisław Lewandowski) wrote that only those who 
had a food stall made money in post-liberation Warszawa.
118
 He and his relatives barely 
made a living, although Kahan had been a co-owner of one of the biggest business firms 
before the war. After liberation, he peddled cigarettes, matches, and candles, making 
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between thirty-five and 150 złoty a day.
119
 It was enough to buy lard, onions, potatoes, 
and coffee, but it was not enough for milk. When a Jewish committee gave Kahan fifteen 
kilos of bread, he could sell five kilos and use the extra money for more food.
120
 The 
committee also gave monthly rations of salt, sugar, and jam. A typical diet at the time 
was dark bread and coffee for breakfast and potato soup for lunch.  
Kahan was one of hundreds of Polish Jews who made a living by black 
marketeering. Both Polish and Slovak Jews participated in black marketeering on a scale 
which is impossible to assess, but that they did participate there is no doubt. Especially, 
in postwar Slovakia, the black market was a relatively well documented phenomenon. In 
the files of the US Embassy in Prague, the following note survived from September 1945, 
“Major K. [Major Katek] estimated that between thirty and fifty percent of the average 
family’s food comes from the black market which is largely a city-country proposition 
with the city folks going to the farms to buy surplus foods and surplus rations tickets.”
121
 
After the pogrom in Topoľčany in September 1945, one of the leading Jewish figures in 
Slovakia, Vojtech Winterstein, said,  
 
Jews have to make a living. They have no money, no opportunity to make money, 
which encroaches upon all Jewish groups. Neither is a Jew allowed to come back 
to his trade where he would have an opportunity to earn. We do not agree… that a 
black market should be disallowed (znemožnený) among us. It was not we who 
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put a Jew in the black market, but the conditions that I have talked about. It’s not 




Malvina Burstein recounted that, “Life was a misery then. Stores were bombed out, 
everything destroyed. My sister [who lived in the US] sent me cigarettes after the war 
which I sold on the black market….”
123
 For cigarettes, however, turnover was not as high 
as for food.   
Black markets flourished for almost a year after liberation because the 
Czechoslovak government allowed it to exist, regarding it to be “benevolent” if not 
necessary.
124
 By 1946, the government saw no more reason for it. Between January and 
October 1946, the district national committees carried out 22,543 inspections, during 
which 37,777 cases of “breach of quota delivery regulations” were discovered. The 
committees tried 63,705 other similar offenses, of which 48,063 were found guilty.
125
 
Fines totaling 124 million crowns were imposed. A thousand people were sentenced for 
the illegal slaughter of cattle and pigs and another 1,000 were sentenced for black market 
activities between March and September 1948.
126
 Punishments varied from a fine or loss 
of trade license, to prison sentences of up to a year.   
By and large, Jewish participation in the black market economy was a source of 
anti-Jewish resentment in Poland and Slovakia alike. Anti-Jewish resentment stemmed 
partly from the belief that Jews were “rarely punished whereas a small-time Slovakian 
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profiteer was very strictly punished.”
127
 In Czechoslovakia, in a survey in 1948, when 
asked “What, in your opinion, caused resentment against Jews,” thirty percent answered, 
“They only… profiteer, and live lightly without productive work.”
128
 Other explanations 
included “selfish greediness,” a privileged position in economic and public life, “jealousy 
that Jews are rich and doing well,” restitution law, and getting richer and richer while 
Slovaks get poorer and poorer.
129
  
Next to share in the black market, relief from abroad was yet another trigger of 
anti-Jewish sentiment. In recognition of the issue, the JOINT made attempts to deliver aid 
to non-Jews although its main purpose was Jewish rehabilitation. Jewish leaders and the 
Polish government agreed that such aid was “extremely helpful in maintaining good 
relations between the Jewish and non-Jewish population.”
130
 Hence, the JOINT assisted 
with cash (a total of 2,600,000 Polish złoty) and food and clothing packages to about 200 
people, mainly those who had been involved with helping Jews during the war.
131
 The 
JOINT also delivered food supplies to monasteries which had harbored Jewish children 
during the war as well as to non-Jewish orphanages operating after the war.
132
 During the 
floods of 1947, the JOINT supplied blankets and food while Jewish orphanages offered 
food and shelter to more than a hundred non-Jewish children.
133
 Some medical aid and 
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loans were also granted. Overall, the volume of aid to non-Jews was minimal when 
compared with the total spending of the JOINT in Poland. However, the very attempt was 
necessary to improve the perceptions of aid for Jews. After all, remarks about Jews faring 
better than the rest of the population were not isolated (in Slovakia, in particular). 
Extending aid to non-Jews at least offered a counterargument. 
As in Poland, American aid for Jews antagonized non-Jews in Slovakia.  The 
JOINT – a main Jewish relief organization active in Slovakia after the war – supplied the 
Jews only. During the pogrom in Topoľčany, “special supplies” (mimoriadne prídely) for 
the Jews in the town were cited as one of the sparks inciting the crowd.
134
 After the 
pogrom, the commander-in-chief of national security in Bratislava reached deep into the 
repertoire of emotional imagery when he wrote, “There are frequent cases when Jewish 
children appear in public with chocolate in their hands, while the rest of children do not 
have enough bread.”
135
 Generally, the authors of the reports from the pogrom agreed that 
the apparently common perception that returning Jews were in a better financial shape 
added to rise of anti-Jewish resentments among people who, by and large, suffered from 
shortages.
136
 In the memorandum of “the representatives of the public and political life in 
Topoľčany,” the signatories justified popular anger at the “unjust distribution of the most 
necessary supplies, favoring one stratum while harming the rest of society.”
137
 The belief 
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in the privileged position of Jews was so common that Jewish organizations had to 
publicly address the issue.
138
 
In times of overwhelming shortages, even a small inequality in the distribution of 
material aid immediately stirred a sense of injustice. In Slovakia, in particular, “the 
rationing and price control [introduced by the government] was both inadequate and 
inefficient, for the Government to discourage supplementary feeding.”
139
 Moreover, the 
government's lack of recognition of Jews as a separate category of war victims led to the 
refusal of special supplies and unwillingness to explain to the public the Jewish need for 
foreign relief.
140
 Vojtech Winterstein kept explaining that Jews indeed publicly (verejne) 
accepted relief from “world Jewry” (svetové židovstvo) only because they were 
overlooked in the distribution of local supplies; the supplies that they were eligible for.
141
 
Winterstein concluded, “Is it strange that our brothers sent [aid] to us? Which Jew 




The Jewish communities in Poland and Slovakia could not afford not to cooperate 
with American relief organizations since they required millions of dollars to cover all 
their needs. Caring for the sick alone was a colossal task. Every third survivor in Poland 
suffered from tuberculosis; many had paralysis of hands and legs. In 1946, ninety percent 
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of Kraków Jews suffered from ills of heart, stomach, and lungs. Mental disorder plagued 
Jewish survivors.
143
 Jews in Slovakia were also, by and large, sickly. The proportion of 
Jews suffering from tuberculosis was exactly the same as in Poland: a third. A doctor 
from the Jewish hospital in Bratislava as well as “some of the Jewish community leaders 
of Slovakia” claimed, based on isolated tests, that of 30,000 Slovak Jews, “at least 
10,000” still suffered from this illness in June 1946.
144
  
All these people needed immediate medical aid. In the two countries, Jewish 
committees and relief organizations set up hospitals, TB sanatoria, and convalescent 
homes for children. They also funded old people homes and orphanages for homeless 
children and the elderly, and soup kitchens for the needy. Repatriates from the USSR 
could count on temporary shelter. In May 1946, at a time when more than 1,000 Jewish 
repatriates landed in Kraków every month, the Jewish committee in the city organized 
their arrival as follows, 
 
Repatriates, former residents of Kraków, who get off at the railroad station 
Kraków-Płaszów are placed temporarily in the PUR barracks near the station, 
from where they are directed by cars to shelters and barracks of the committee, or 
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As early as December 1945, there were 2,700 homeless Jews in the city of Kraków, 
lodged with private families or in the women’s section of synagogues.
146
 In February 
1946, the Jewish committee in Kraków reported that a “catastrophe of homelessness” was 
imminent with twenty to twenty-five people lodged in a room and still more to come.
147
 
Between February and August 1946, 8,600 Jewish repatriates registered in the Jewish 
committee’s repatriation department in Kraków.
148
 The four shelters were overcrowded 




Jewish repatriates from the USSR were different from other Jewish returnees only 
in one respect, 
  
In Łódź, Radom, Kraków, and Warszawa, the resident Jews turned out to 
welcome repatriates and to gape. They came not to stare at rags and hunger ridden 
faces – any Jew who survived the Nazis inside Poland was familiar enough with 
these things. They came, instead, to gaze on walking miracles – whole Jewish 
families, complete with fathers, mothers, and children. In Poland, on liberation 
day, hardly more than a hundred Jewish families stood intact. But here were 
Jewish families by the hundreds. Gaunt-faced women rushed at the repatriates to 
seize and hold their children for a precious minute. Men who were once husbands 
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The words return and returnee falsely imply that “by reentering one’s native country a 
person is necessarily returning to something familiar.”
150
 The return of Jewish survivors 
after the war proved how wrong this assumption was. There was nothing familiar in the 
physical and social landscape of postwar Poland and Slovakia. Particularly in Poland, war 
damage and human losses conspicuously transformed the place. Not only were physical 
conditions altered but also Jewish returnees came back transformed by suffering, 
mourning, hunger, exhaustion, constant fear, and humiliation. Because of this dual 
transformation – of a place and a returnee – the return of Jewish survivors entailed 
numerous small and large disillusionments among which the most traumatic was dual 
homelessness: the absence of home in its physical and figurative sense. As I described 
above, Jewish returnees, by and large, failed to recover their physical homes. Neither did 
they find their emotional homes – families – intact. Thus the postwar Jewish return as a 
social project of coming back home failed completely, becoming in fact the story of a 
homecoming without a home.  
Although not all returnees were Jewish, the absolute failure of homecoming was 
solely a Jewish phenomenon in postwar Poland and Slovakia. There were hundreds of 
thousands of other returnees who likewise struggled with disillusionment after the war. 
Poles and Slovaks who returned from forced labor in the Third Reich, from labor and 
concentration camps in Poland and Slovakia, from the gulag in the Soviet Union, from 
exile, and from the military had to cope with the loss of their fathers, mothers, and 
siblings, and their houses in ruins. Ukrainians (eastern Poland), Germans (western 
Poland), and Hungarians (southern Slovakia) who returned from the camps, the military, 
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and exile faced particularly harsh reality, including loss of their homes, death of their 
relatives, and the prospect of expulsion. Yet, no ethnic group other than Jews lost 
absolutely everything, that is, their entire immediate and extended families and homes. 
In the dramatically changed post-liberation circumstances, this absolute failure of 
Jewish homecoming greatly affected the social dynamic of the relations between Jews 
and non-Jews by adding an additional layer to the meaning of Jewishness. Before the 
Second World War, vibrant Jewish minorities in Poland and Slovakia, ten and three 
percent of the total population respectively, although often embattled, disadvantaged, and 
persecuted, were nevertheless a part of their respective societies. With diverse social, 
religious, economic, and cultural backgrounds, Polish and Slovak Jews inhabited various 
niches in society at large, both on its periphery and at its center. During the war, the Nazi 
policies reduced the public meaning of Jewishness to its racial (blood) component; it 
physically separated Jews from non-Jews and, consequently, remade the former into the 
ultimate outcasts of society. The “final solution of the Jewish question” not only resulted 
in the extermination of millions of European Jews but also irreversibly stigmatized its 
survivors as “ghostly others,” threatening by virtue of their very survival. When the war 
ended and Jewish “ghosts” were returning home, there was no space left for them in 
either the mental or the physical landscape. Former non-Jewish neighbors, although 
struck by their own losses, could nevertheless replace their burnt houses with those left 
by the Jewish community as well as replace their lost jobs for the ones left by Jews.
151
 In 
these circumstances, the return of Jewish survivors after liberation disrupted the new 
status quo. Moreover, the Jewish returnees’ attempts to reverse the failure of 
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Therefore, the massive transformations, no matter how traumatic, in social and 
political conditions could trigger only partial changes in ethnic relations. Rather, it was 
this disruption of the status quo for non-Jewish stayees and the traumatic realization of 
total homelessness on the part of Jewish returnees that created a new demarcation line 
between Jews and non-Jews after liberation.
153
 These postwar social processes, 
aggravated by the recent stigmatization of Jews during the war (which had split and 
separated people), gave additional meaning to Jewishness, which now came to signify 
total homelessness combined with threatening ghostliness. These ethnic boundaries, 
perceived in new ways, led to the deepening of ethnic exclusion and social separation of 
both Jews and non-Jews. Hostility and social distance became a daily reality 
accompanying the Jewish return to “no-home.”  
In order to explain postwar ethnic conflict in Bosnia in the 1990s, Anders H. 
Stefansson proposed considering “differing discourses of suffering, material interests, 
and transformations of identity” as major factors contributing to ethnic postwar splits.
154
 
He argued that “competing discourses of suffering created extremely powerful cultural 
stereotypes” which, in turn, formed new lines of separation and hostility.
155
 In postwar 
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Polish-Jewish and Slovak-Jewish relations, material interests and revised ethnic 
categories of Jewishness played a central role in producing postwar hostilities. 
“Competition in suffering,” or rather the incapacity for mutual recognition, was equally 
significant in the immediate post-liberation period in Poland. In his novel Ignorance, 
Milan Kundera brilliantly portrayed the obsession of Czech returnees from exile and 
stayees in the country with recognition of their hardships by others, and thus failure to 
recognize the suffering of others.
156
 As in Kundera’s novel, in the first weeks and months 
after liberation, the majority of Polish Jewish survivors sensed that that their non-Jewish 
neighbors did not “properly” acknowledge their tragedy. Conflicts over the recent past 
and struggles for recognition of doings and wrongdoings during the war came to occupy a 
central place in communal life right after liberation. Importantly, these conflicts did not 
develop exclusively between Jews and non-Jews but also among Jews and non-Jews 
respectively and separately. Overall, however, indifference and an inability to recognize 
each other’s losses played a considerable role in widening the existing abyss.  
When Stefansson analyzed postwar returns to Bosnia, he emphasized that social 
relations between returnees (those who left Yugoslavia during the war and returned after 
the military conflict ended) and stayees (those who stayed throughout the war) had been a 
central and multifaceted element in the experience of homecoming. Bosnian returnees 
perceived the increased social distance as the central and most “disenchanting” aspect of 
homecoming.
157
 Similarly, in postwar Poland and Slovakia, ethnic exclusion and social 
separation, as testimonies prove, became a central dilemma for Jewish returnees. Social 
exclusion led to a profound sense of social alienation manifested in reactions of 
                                                 
156
 Milan Kundera, Ignorance, trans. Linda Asher (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2002). 
157
 Stefansson, "Sarajevo Suffering: Homecoming and the Hierarchy of Homeland Hardship," 69-70. 
 136 
discontent, displeasure, or dismay. Feelings of being out of place were common among 
Jewish survivors in their former hometowns, cities, and villages. The homeland became a 
place of detachment and estrangement where the ability “to reclaim a sense of home” 
became seriously impaired.
158
 Nevertheless, some decided to stay and attempt to further 
negotiate the homecoming, overcome alienation, and eventually make a new home. Part 
of this attempt was restitution of lost property. 
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CHAPTER 4  
 
RESTITUTION OF PROPERTY (1944-48) 
 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the most common feature of Jewish 
“homecoming” was returns to homes and enterprises occupied by somebody else. As 
Lasman wrote, “…these houses were obviously not vacant and did not wait for their 
lawful owners….”
1
 In small villages, it was usually a neighbor – a familiar face –who 
occupied a survivor’s house.  
 
On the way I stood near my grandfather’s house. … I wanted to go into the house, 
sit down for a while, absorb the weeping of the walls, and watch the reaction of 
the Poles who lived there now when I reminded them who the previous owners 
had been, who had built the house and planted the trees, and who had died so 
frightfully and tragically. I clearly realized how apathetically they would react. 
After all, they all knew this had been a Jewish town [Ryki].
2
   
 
In bigger towns and cities, old-time neighbors, total strangers, or state officials took over 
abandoned apartments, businesses, or tenement houses. Leah Laskowski testified in 1983,  
 
The Red Cross took me on a stretcher to the train, and I was on my way back to 
my home in Łódź, Poland. When I reached what had once been my home, I found 
it was no longer mine. A Polish neighbor had moved in and occupied it now. All I 
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could find there to remind me of the past – was a single lamp. I remained with the 




Similar events occurred in Slovakia. Malvina Burstein, born in Trebišov 
(southeastern Slovakia) in 1913, told me the following story, 
 
After the war, I traveled to see my house. We had a big house. I came back and 
the woman [their maid before the war who stayed there to take care of the 
property] hit me. She hit me. She said, ”Why didn’t you die with the rest of the 
people?” I took the police. I would still want to come to my own house. She hit 
me again in front of a policeman, and he didn’t do anything. … I stayed just 
maybe a month in Trebišov, maybe two, I don’t remember. I didn’t want to stay 
there. I hated every moment of that. I wanted to leave.
4
   
 
 
In another interview in October 1995, Burstein implied that she eventually succeeded in 
getting the maid out of the house. Asked how long she stayed in Trebišov, she answered, 
“Just till I sold my – I cleared my house, my mother’s house….”
5
 Burstein’s story 
illuminates the same pattern of Jewish “homecoming” in Slovakia as in Poland after 
liberation: returning Jews found their prewar possessions taken by Slovak neighbors.  
That new owners did not want to relinquish their property to returning Jewish 
survivors was hardly surprising. For most of them, a new house or a store was a 
significant improvement in their economic standing, an improvement that the new owners 
were unwilling to give up. Considering postwar poverty, omnipresent ruins, and 
shortages, any piece of material property was guarded with utmost caution. Importantly, 
no authority pressured them to return those acquisitions to previous owners. The Polish 
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government was definitely more willing to legislate restitution than its Slovak counterpart. 
The Polish legislature passed three restitution laws in March and May 1945 and in March 
1946, of which all were as generous as similar laws in Western Europe. In contrast, in 
Czechoslovakia, a restitution law passed relatively late, in May 1946, and met consistent 
resistance from the Slovak government, which refused to implement it.
6
 Despite this 
legislative slowdown, proportionally more Jewish property returned to prewar owners in 
Slovakia than in Poland. Although Poland’s legislation was early and impressive, its 
implementation was mostly non-existent, especially in the Polish countryside. By and 
large, only a negligible number of houses and enterprises, mostly in Polish cities, were 
returned to their prewar owners.  
This failure had a few reasons. First, local bureaucracy was the single greatest 
obstacle in implementing Jewish restitution in both Poland and Slovakia. National 
committees in Slovakia and municipal liquidation offices in Poland made decisions 
concerning property according to their personal or institutional interests. Under the 
pretext of public interest and the need for nationalization (Poland and Slovakia) as well as 
“bad” nationality and the lack of patriotism of Jewish claimants (Slovakia), local 
apparatchiks halted many restitution cases. Although, at the time, Jewish leaders blamed 
state officials for being antisemitic, I speculate that antisemitism only rarely played a 
significant role. Most times, material interests and simple corruption seemed to have 
governed the behavior of local apparatchiks.  
Second, a general trend toward nationalization and the slow degradation of the 
principle of private property made private property restitution mostly irrelevant for 
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governmental policy-makers. As early as 1946, contemporaries in the United States 
pointed out that “postwar trends toward state-ownerships, and a state controlled economy 
(the nationalization of industries) notably in Central and Eastern Europe, seriously 
restricted the extent to which Jewish properties would be returned, while inflationary 
conditions reduced the value of the funds and securities which were recovered.“
7
  
Third, I speculate that guilt and moral obligation – the necessary preconditions for 
effective legislation and implementation of restitution – were absent from public 
discourse.
8
 Neither of the two state administrations was driven by guilt or the sense that it 
owed anything to anyone. In Slovakia, when speaking about the persecution of Slovak 
Jews during the war, the chairman of the Slovak National Council (SNR), Lettrich, 
allegedly said,  
 
The Slovak nation never had anything to do with it. The Slovaks demonstrated 
against the fascist activities of the representatives of Tiso’s regime; they hid Jews 
and helped them to overcome hardships even at the risk of being persecuted 





The Polish government, on the other hand, had no fascist legacy. On the contrary, it 
praised itself on its consistent fight against fascism, hand in hand with the “brotherly” 
Soviet Army. Governmental pro-Jewish rhetoric stemmed from political and ideological 
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considerations and had nothing to do with guilt; hence it lacked sufficient motivation to 
push effective Jewish restitution on the ground. 
 Finally and most importantly, I argue that the two governments were 
apprehensive of full Jewish restitution due to fears of the potential social unrest. Thus, 
“with a view to avoid social and political conflicts, the governments … tended to 
sympathize with citizens who have benefited from the anti-Jewish laws, and now resisted 
efforts to enforce restitution.”
10
 In Slovakia, these were the former Slovak aryanizers as 
well as the newly appointed national managers, administering property which had been 
abandoned by deported Jews. They constituted a force to be reckoned with. Especially 
partisans of the Slovak national uprising, who were given national management of 
property as a reward for their fight against fascism, were now determined to keep their 
gains. As quoted earlier, officials of both governments were aware that any appearance of 
alleged “favoring Jews” would stir trouble. Indeed, they quickly realized that the 




Before the restitution, there was robbery. The expropriation of Jews in Poland 
under Nazi occupation was different from the expropriation of Jews in quasi-independent 
Slovakia. How the robbery unfolded had a paramount effect on restitution and the 
relations of Jews with the surrounding population after the war. “Wild” looting of Jewish 
property seemed to have been more widespread in Poland than in Slovakia during the war. 
This had less to do with alleged “national disposition” than with the fact that political 
conditions in the two countries radically differed. First, the very existence of a Slovak 
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government made a substantial difference. The Tiso regime counted the economic well-
being of its citizens – ethnic Slovaks alone – among its primary political considerations. 
Thanks to policies privileging Slovaks at the expense of everyone else, including 
Germans, the average Slovak’s economic survival was not under constant threat.
11
 
Grossly oversimplifying, Slovaks seemed to be less desperate for material gains than 
their Polish counterparts, who lived under direct German occupation. The Nazi policy of 
total exploitation of Poland and the absence of a Polish government left Poles in a state of 
constant insecurity and anxiety to “arrange” proper means of living. Kazimierz Wyka, a 
renowned Polish literary critic, brilliantly portrayed the Polish economy under occupation, 
 
It was necessary [for the Germans] somehow to establish relations with the native 
population. This was achieved through the second fundamental condition: the 
rationing system as a social fiction. The rationing system imposed on the native 
population was such that no one could manage to survive. Since all trade in 
agricultural products was forbidden, every German policeman who grabbed the 
butter out of a peasant woman’s basket was acting legally. The Polish population 
was officially given nothing beyond an insufficient amount of bread. During the 
war I did not legally consume so much as one gram of lard, one drop of milk, one 
slice of sausage. Yet quite a lot of these foods came my way – and there were 
millions like me. This fiction must be considered the basis of the economic 
changes within the General Gouvernement. Even the most complex social-
psychological processes are related to it. During the winter of 1939-40, the 
population under the General Gouvernement faced a simple dilemma: to eat only 
what was permitted and die of hunger, or – somehow to make do. Naturally no 
one seriously entertained the first alternative, so the only important question was: 
how to survive despite the regulations.
12
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All behavior, even if outside of conventional morality as known in the time of peace, 
became normative as long as it secured survival; “economic life was excluded from the 
realm of social responsibility.”
13
 
Second, the sheer amount of movable and immovable property in the two 
countries differed vastly. In Slovakia, 80,000 or three percent of the total population 
“vanished” whereas in Poland three million or ten percent did. The absolute quantity and 
value of looted property was thus much higher in Poland, particularly considering the size 
of share of the Polish Jewry in the overall economy before the war.
14
 There was simply 
much more to loot in Poland than in Slovakia.  
Finally, critical for the character of wartime spoliation was “the relationship 
between the German Reich and the territories it ruled...”
15
 This relationship determined 
the modes and agencies of expropriation by regulating the share of local population and 
the central and local administration in the material profits. In wartime Poland, the power 
framework was radically different from that in Slovakia. While the Slovak government 
enjoyed relative autonomy to shape its own domestic policy, the Polish government was 
in exile and the country was under total Nazi occupation. Except for the resistance 
movement, there was no source of Polish authority in the country. In contrast to Slovakia, 
no independent Polish authority in occupied Poland had the opportunity to control 
domestic affairs and supervise expropriations. On the flip side, neither was there an 
authority which would protect the country’s economy. All the decisions concerning 
property and economic life were made by German authorities in accordance with their 
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ideological, political, and economic interests, and by and large without any consideration 
for the local economy. Germans strictly controlled the takeover of raw material, property 
of high historic value, large estates, luxurious tenement houses, and others. Also, the 
aryanization of profitable enterprises and plants was managed only by Germans. In 
villages and small shtetlekh, there was not much of sufficient value to tempt the Germans. 
So they turned a blind eye to the Poles’ massive looting of these leftovers. Neither did the 
Germans object to peasants coming in wagons to remove booty from liquidated ghettos.
16
 
In contrast, the fascist Slovak State supervised and regulated wartime aryanization, 
leaving limited room for the surrounding population to plunder abandoned property. 
Usually, as soon as Jews were deported, functionaries of the regime and members of the 
Hlinka Guard sealed Jewish property for future distribution or auctioning. Notoriously, 
these two groups stole whatever they could before sealing the apartments but did not let 
anybody else partake in the booty.  
In Poland, German interests varied from region to region. On one hand, the 
Germans treated western Poland (annexed to the Third Reich) as a subject for total 
germanization and hence protected it from wild economic devastation. The Nazi 
administration ensured that no branch of industry, trade, or commerce was in non-
German hands, yet they stopped short of deindustrialization of the region.
17
 In fact, 
Herman Göring gave orders for the massive recovery of the local industry and its speedy 
unification with the economy of Greater Germany.
18
 On the other hand, the so-called 
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General Government (Generalna Gubernia, GG) – the area of central and southeastern 
Poland occupied by the Third Reich – was considered a “dumping ground” populated by 
Untermenschen, a region whose sole economic purpose was to supply agricultural 
produce for local and German markets.
19
 The total economic exploitation of the region 
stemmed logically from Nazi ideology and the conception of Ost, which envisaged the 
expansion of German “living space” (Lebensraum) and the creation of a vast reservoir of 
cheap and slave labor through military occupation and expropriation, ultimately leading 
to the extermination of the local population.
20
    
At the beginning of the occupation, the Nazi military administration embarked on 
an extensive project of confiscation and common theft of all property left by refugees; 
their property was now considered “abandoned.” In the annexed territories, all private 
property was registered. In the GG, the Germans proceeded with a plan of meticulous 
deindustrialization, involving the plundering of raw materials and the devastation of 
industrial plants.
21
 The stolen industrial goods were then transferred to the Third Reich. 
After the war, Polish representatives found more than 7,000 train-wagons of Polish stolen 
goods in Germany and Austria.
22
 During the first year of the occupation, the Nazi civil 
administration issued a number of directives aimed at concentrating all valuables in 
German hands. Bank accounts were frozen, the larger and more luxurious apartments 
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were taken over by local German administrators (or transferred to collaborating Poles), 
and private trade and commerce were forbidden. The entire job market and the system of 
prices and wages were now controlled by the occupying power. With the extermination 
of the Polish intelligentsia and the German takeover of all managerial positions, the 
population was basically pauperized and degraded to manual labor.  
Although discriminatory economic legislation affected Jews and non-Jews alike, 
as violence against Jews worsened, so did damage to their economic status. The story of 
Kraków Jews clearly illustrates this process of gradual expropriation of Jews in occupied 
Poland (the GG).
23
 On September 8, 1939, the German administration issued instructions 
to mark all Jewish stores, cafes, restaurants, and enterprises with a Star of David in order 
to facilitate robbery and discrimination.
24
 At the end of September 1939, the 
administration started confiscating Jewish apartments, allocating the more spacious and 
nicely located ones to German officials and administrators flocking to the city (as well as 
to well-connected Polish claimants). Owners were usually given two to three hours to 
leave the premises.
25
 On November 20, 1939, all Jewish accounts and deposits in bank 
institutions were frozen. Cash withdrawals were supervised and limited. Robbery of 
jewelry from random Jews on the street and plundering their houses in search of 
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valuables (unannounced blockades of streets and searches of houses) were daily 
occurrences during the first two years of the war. So were random round-ups and 
transports to locations of public labor. On December 11, 1939, the administration ceased 
to pay Jewish pensions, including military and widows’ retirement funds.  
The Germans forbade Jews (and Poles) to transfer or sell their property, in 
particular from Jews to non-Jews. On December 15, 1939, General Governor Hans Frank 
legally established the Trusteeship Agency (Urząd Powierniczy or Treuhandstelle), which 
was to supervise the takeover and management of enterprises, retail stores, and houses by 
Germans, Volksdeutsche, and Ukrainians. Czesław Łuczak estimated that the trustees 
(treuhänder) took over about 700 enterprises in Kraków proper and 3,000 enterprises in 
the entire Kraków district by April 1940.
26
 In isolated cases, voluntary collaboration 
between a former owner and a trustee was allowed to maintain production and profits for 
both parties.
27
 In the majority of cases, however, trustees brutally confiscated enterprises 
to extract easy profits. In February 1940, Kraków Jews were obliged to register all their 
property, which further jeopardized their already fragile ownership. Efforts to hide items 
with their non-Jewish friends and neighbors were common. In many cases, however, 
denunciations sent both involved parties to prisons or concentration camp. In the entire 
GG, the confiscation of enterprises unfolded as follows, 
 
… [O]ne hundred and twelve thousand Jewish-owned businesses, often the 
smallest microenterprises, fell prey to confiscation; almost 100,000 of them were 
completely closed down. The approximately 115,000 handicraft businesses in the 
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General Government suffered a similar fate…. Those Jewish-owned businesses 
that continued to exist suffered considerable discrimination, with barely any 
capital available to them and severely limited supplies of raw materials. 
Businesses that were not considered important for the war effort or that could be 
easily replaced by their Polish or German counterparts were the first to be hit by 
confiscation. Jewish commercial firms were partly replaced by German district 
wholesale firms and partly by Polish and Ukrainian cooperatives, which had 
begun to gain favor before the war. Local governments and chambers of 
commerce or chambers of handicrafts supported this Aryanization by taking over 
whole businesses, or at least their equipment and goods. Medium-sized 
enterprises that were considered irreplaceable were administered by the 




For Kraków Jews, the establishment of the ghetto in March 1941 meant final and 
total pauperization. Three hundred and twenty buildings in a designated part of Kraków 
were to shelter approximately 15,000 Jews.
29
 The establishment of the ghetto meant that 
the non-Jewish inhabitants of the area had to move out from their houses. Some Jews 
came to an agreement with non-Jews about exchanging apartments. Such arrangements 
succeeded only rarely since overpopulation of the ghetto did not allow for a single family 
to occupy an entire apartment. Moreover, the German administration made arbitrary 
decisions which rarely coincided with private arrangements. Soon, in the face of 
deportations and rumors of projected annihilation of Polish Jews, the concerns regarding 
property lost their urgency anyway. Subsequent deportations of the sick, the elderly, 
women, and children in June and October 1942 and the final liquidation of the ghetto in 
March 1943 left a handful of properties for the German administrators and the 
surrounding population.  
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The Germans played Poles against Jews in the outright robbery that was called 
property transfer. In Kraków, for example, the German administration allocated Jewish 
apartments – of no interest to them – to Poles, knowing well enough that they created a 
potential source of conflict. Borwicz wrote in 1947, 
 
Next to the things that the victims left for storage to their acquaintances, there  
were so-called “formerly Jewish” (pożydowskie) apartments and “formerly 
Jewish” stores. Let us reiterate and realize: these were the crumbs of crumbs. But 
Germans did everything to push the population to avail themselves of these goods. 
In many cities, even before closing the Jews in ghettos, Germans took over 
apartments of Poles, directing the evicted into “formerly Jewish” apartments. As 
everywhere and as always, there was no shortage of those who greedily waited for 




Borwicz was correct in speaking of “crumbs of crumbs” available to Poles in cities like 
Kraków or Warszawa. Germans meticulously registered and controlled all property and 
property transfers in the large cities, allowing only a small portion of booty to go to non-
Germans. However, most of the time, Germans were absent from villages and small 
shtetlekh and that is where the local non-Jewish population profited the most from the 
disappearance of Jews. Let us imagine a small town where sixty percent of the population 
was Jewish before the war and occupied the center of the town.
31
 Although perhaps only 
a small minority had valuables, the overwhelming majority had at least a place of 
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residence. After the Jews were deported and if the town was not bombed or badly 
damaged, the non-Jewish population was left with vast opportunities to improve their 
material status.  
Jan T. Gross' account of wartime spoliation by the surrounding Polish population 
is particularly vivid and troubling. Gross wrote, “Property transfer from Jewish to Polish 
ownership was marked not only by opportunistic exploitation, but also by outright 
plunder, associated with mass killings of the Jews by the German occupiers.”
32
 Gross 
described how the Polish population in the countryside waited for the deportation to end 
in order to start looting; how Poles murdered Jews to acquire their property; and how 
burial sites of executed Jews were dug up in search of gold teeth caps.
33
 His study finds 
much corroboration in sources. The files of the Special Commission at the CKŻP 
describe the following incidents.
34
 In October 1942, in village Wola Lubecka (southern 
Poland), Walenty B. took all the belongings of and denounced to the police Regina 
Mansdorf and her eight-year-old daughter who were hiding in his place.
35
 Franek Z. from 
Lubcza (southern Poland) also offered hiding to Salomon Bieler, his wife and son, took 
their property, and then denounced them to the police.
36
 Another man denounced a 
married Jewish couple to the police in the winter of 1944 near Tarnów because they 
demanded their property back.
37
 After the liquidation of the ghetto in Tarnów, a local 
man looked for hiding Jews and denounced them to the Gestapo who, in appreciation of 
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his service, shared the “formerly Jewish” property with him.
38
 All victims of 
denunciation were shot. Of the ninety-six Poles listed in the files of the Jewish committee 
in Kraków for denunciation and killings of Jews in the Kraków province during the war, 
nine were directly motivated by or accompanied robbery of property.
39
 The remaining 
cases did not have enough description to judge whether property was the main motivation.  
Most of the war spoliation, however, had a more “ordinary” course. Dariusz Stola 
pointed to black-market trading during the war as one of the channels by which the 
remaining items of Jewish property ended up in Polish hands.
40
 Most often, however, 
people just moved into abandoned houses, stores, and farms. Or else they just looted 
buildings, taking whatever was left without actually taking possession of the premises. 
How common were such actions? By and large, we are left with speculations at best. 
Wojciech Lizak estimated that there were about half a million “successors” to Jewish 
property in Poland in 2004.
41
 That would translate into 2.1 percent of the postwar 
population of twenty-three million. Even having multiplied half a million by five (an 
average family), as Lizak suggested, we are left with two to three million people who 
may have been affected by the process.  
Slovakia, like Vichy France, Romania, Hungary, and Croatia, was a German ally, 
experiencing relatively limited Nazi control over its domestic policies. Tatjana 
Tönsmeyer claimed that the expropriation of Jews in Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania 
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remained entirely in the realm of domestic affairs.
42
 The three governments carried out 
expropriation of Jews eagerly since “that was viewed specifically as a ‘social policy,’ 
taking things from ‘rich Jews’ and handling them over to ‘poor Hungarians’ (Slovaks and 
Romanians).”
43
 Tönsmeyer attributed this eagerness and sense of “justice” to the 
intensification of nationalist sentiments, mass political mobilization, and the frustration of 
young graduates in the interwar period. Young professionals in Slovakia, for example, 
“had to face competition from Czech professionals who in the early years of the 
Czechoslovak state were sent to the eastern part of the republic [Slovakia] and still held 
many of the posts.”
44
 Their frustration and consequent search for "someone to blame" 
translated into antisemitism. Combined with the predominantly agrarian character of 
society, the strong Catholic Church, and a weak non-Jewish middle class, the frustration 
of the elites led to the perception of Jews as the problem to be solved.
45
 Antisemitic 
policies during the war drew heavily from this atmosphere prevalent in the interwar 
period and for a while before it.  
The expropriation of Jews was thus a domestic approach to an internal problem in 
Slovakia. Ladislav Lipscher, in his classic study of Jews in the Slovak State, claimed that 
anti-Jewish measures in wartime Slovakia were motivated  primarily by economics and, 
only secondarily, by ideological concerns.
46
 The elimination of Jews from the economic 
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life of Slovakia enabled the distribution of wealth exclusively among Slovaks.
47
 The 
amount of wealth was by no means negligible. According to the census of December 
1940, Jews, who at the time comprised only three percent of the population, owned assets 
worth approximately three billion Slovak crowns.
48
 Interestingly, the Slovak government 
partly succeeded in excluding Germans from the process and, thus, limited their 
economic influence in Slovakia.
49 Lipscher quoted the contemporary Slovak press which 
wrote, “Aryanization which would rely on non-Slovak personnel or funding would 
conflict with the interests of the state.”
50
  
Aryanization of Jewish property – the transfer of property from Jewish to non-
Jewish (Aryan) hands – started as early as the first months of independence in 1939.
51
 The 
Hlinka Guard presented it as a response to “public unrest” (nespokojnosť medzi 
obyvateľstvom) stirred by delays in the liquidation of Jewish property.52 In the spring and 
summer of 1939, the Slovak government introduced revisions in business licenses and 
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appointed non-Jewish temporary trustees to run large Jewish enterprises.
53
 In February 
1940, the Slovak Assembly issued a new law on land reform guaranteeing the state the 
right to buy and distribute land among small farmers. Although, theoretically, the law 
referred to all land in “foreign hands,” in practice it affected Jewish landowners alone.
54
 
In June 1940, the First Aryanization Act “regarding Jewish enterprises and Jewish 
employees” (o židovských podnikach a židoch zamestnaných) came into force.
55
 It 
enabled the revocation of Jewish business licenses and the subsequent liquidation and 
aryanization of their enterprises.
56
 It also authorized “voluntary” aryanization based on a 
purchase agreement at a low price between a former Jewish owner and a Christian 
claimant (kresťanski uchádzač).57 These agreements were not new – they had been 
practiced during the first year of the Slovak State when aryanization proceeded at a very 
slow pace with perhaps a few dozen enterprises aryanized.
58
  
Elimination of Jewish ownership and Jewish participation in economic life 
accelerated in September 1940 when the Central Economic Office (Ústredný 
hospodársky úrad, ÚHÚ) began managing the expropriation of Jews. On September 11, 
1940, to simplify and speed up anti-Jewish procedures, the Slovak Assembly authorized 
the government to issue decrees with the legal force of a statute in all matters concerning 
Jews. In October 1940, the government issued a decree concerning aryanization of 
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 Upon receiving notice, a Jewish owner had two weeks to leave his 
or her house. The Second Aryanization Act, issued in November 1940, was fundamental 
to the effective expropriation of Slovak Jews. The act authorized the collective 
liquidation of Jewish enterprises and the elimination of “voluntary” aryanization.
60
 From 
then on, aryanization turned into the compulsory practice of transferring Jewish property 
to non-Jews appointed by the ÚHÚ without any input from the Jewish owner (formerly 
appointed temporary trustees were also removed). Appointed aryanizers were supposed 
to, but they rarely did, pay the state a liquidation value. As for the liquidation of 
enterprises, former owners had fifteen days (from the issuance of a liquidation note) to 
close down their business – usually small artisanal shops of low value. The majority of 
these people ended up without any means to support themselves, particularly since they 
were not allowed to possess any valuables or cash in the first place.
61
  
Lipscher found that, by the end of 1941, the overwhelming majority of Jewish 
enterprises were liquidated (9,355) while only 1,888 were aryanized.
62
 First, this was due 
to the substantial difficulty in establishing competent yet “Jewish-free” Aryan 
management. Jews often stayed as specialists and consultants who de facto ran aryanized 
enterprises without drawing profits.
63
 Liquidation ruled out such arrangements. Second, 
decisions concerning appointment of aryanizers caused conflicts among the authorities 
competing against one another. Getting access to property required substantial bribing or 
networking and thus was mostly limited to the affluent and politically well-connected. In 
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1943, state officials mentioned the possibility of allowing “ordinary” people (retired 
soldiers, among others) to participate in the benefits of aryanization. That, however, did 
not translate into action at the time. The competence of potential aryanizers was also a 
concern since the state economy was at stake. Finally, German residents of Slovakia 
wanted their share in the property distribution against the will of the Slovak central and 
local administration. Liquidation, in place of aryanization, efficiently solved these 
problems and also limited the German share in the Slovak wartime economy.
64
  
In 1941, the stage was set for the final expropriation of Jews in Slovakia. In 
September 1941, the Slovak government issued the “Jewish codex” (Židovský kódex) 
which, by defining Jews in racial terms, further aggravated their situation. Deprivation of 
civil rights left Jews defenseless against economic discrimination. Measures targeting 
Jewish houses, land, and enterprises only intensified. In October 1941 all Jewish houses 
and apartments became property of the state.
65
 The resettlement of almost 7,000 Jews 
from Bratislava to the countryside left hundreds of apartments for redistribution in 
February 1942. The peak of property seizure came between March and June 1942 during 
the deportations of Slovak Jews to death camps in Poland.
66
 Between 53,000 and 59,000 
deportees left countless items of movable and immovable property. Although the 
authorities locked and sealed abandoned houses to arrange their “proper” (paid) 
aryanization and to auction valuables, looting became widespread and usually involved 
the people who carried out and witnessed the deportations (members of the Hlinka 
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Guard). In the end, not much movable property was left to auction. On May 15, 1942, the 
Slovak Assembly passed a critical law which not only legalized deportations and 
deprived the deportees of Slovak citizenship but also authorized the government to 
confiscate all the property (landed and other) they left behind.
67
  
By the spring of 1945, about 71,000 Slovak Jews had been deported and their 
property seized, sold, and distributed by the state. This gave rise to “an army” of 
profiteers, determined to safeguard their new acquisitions.
68
 In April 1946, Max 
Gottschalk of the American Jewish Committee (AJC), the author of numerous reports 
from Eastern Europe after the war, estimated that “about seventy percent of the 
population (in Slovakia) benefited directly or indirectly from the spoliation of the Jews 




Restitution in Poland 
 
In his memoir, Lasman claimed that “for now nobody thought of getting their 
property back.”
70
 His statement was true for the Polish countryside that is villages and 
small towns. Indeed, in these areas the people who returned preferred to leave without 
trying to get their houses, workshops, and stores back. Restitution of property in those 
places was literally a mater of life and death. As Gross powerfully argued, reorganized 
local communities conceived returning Jewish survivors as a threat to their new material 
status.
71
 Threats and actual killings of Jewish property claimants became a common 
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solution to this “problem.” In small villages and towns, Jews were easy targets; lone 
individuals without communal or state support to back their claims and to protect them. 
Abram Berliński in the village of Jastrzębie experienced this personally. He had a mill 
which he was able to recover in 1945. In April 1945, an armed group broke into his house. 
Berliński and his two relatives escaped to the forest but unfortunately the relatives were 
hunted down and killed. The local authorities concluded that the attackers were motivated 
by ownership of the mill. Soon after, Berliński left the village for good and his property 
was given to a leaser.
72
 Another example: in March 1947, Maks Holz went to Jarosław (a 
town in southeastern Poland) to sell his immovable property and never came back. The 
provincial commissioner wrote two months after his disappearance, 
 
The matter is suspicious since two buyers made a bid to purchase the property of 
the missing person. One of them is a butcher in Jarosław and the second is a 
shoemaker in the same locality. From Holz’s words it appeared that the butcher 
threatened him saying “If you don’t sell me the property, you will regret it.” A 




Testimonies indicate that survivors tried and often failed to recover movable property 
(money, furniture, and jewelry) which they had entrusted to Polish neighbors during the 
war. It is difficult to estimate how common it was for neighbors to refuse to return 
valuables. The majority of Jewish survivors, who left an account of their postwar 
experience in Poland, left the country partly because they encountered this kind of 
behavior “on every corner” and retained vivid memories of the experience. Those who 
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had less difficulty rebuilding their lives (which may have included recovery of their 
belongings) stayed and may have never been interviewed nor written a memoir. Their 
voices are lost. Having said that, a sufficient number of testimonies show that failure of 
trust between Jewish "entruster" and Polish "entrustee" was widespread.  
In big cities, Jewish returnees felt safer and hence more eager to struggle for the 
return of their property. The overall number of Jewish owners who wished to regain their 
houses and enterprises across Poland was relatively small. First, fewer than ten percent of 
Polish Jews survived the war. Second, every survivor was not an owner nor did every 
Jewish owner want to stay and recover his or her property. The percentage of Jewish 
survivors who planned to stay either in their place of origin, in particular, or in Poland, in 
general, fluctuated. Third, large-scale domestic migration, repatriation from the USSR, 
and internal resettlements created circumstances in which property claims became 
irrelevant, difficult, or impossible at times. For example, a program of resettlement to the 
western territories, where the majority of Polish Jews ended up after the war, allocated 
“formerly German” (poniemiecka) property to new settlers making the recovery of their 
former property left in other parts of Poland largely irrelevant. Considering all that, only 
a very small fraction of survivors, perhaps a few thousand, perhaps less, attempted to go 
through the pitfalls of restitution.  
The July Manifesto of the summer of 1944 read,  
Property that Germans robbed from individual citizens, peasants, merchants, 
artisans, small and medium manufacturers, institutions and the Church will be 
returned to the lawful owners. German property will be confiscated. … As 
economic relations are regulated, the ownership will be restored.
74
  
                                                 
74
 “Własność, zrabowana przez Niemców poszczególnym obywatelom, chłopom, kupcom, rzemieślnikom, 
drobnym i średnim przemysłowcom, instytucjom i kościołowi, będzie zwrócona prawowitym właścicielom. 
Majątki niemieckie zostaną skonfiskowane. Żydom po bestialsku tępionym przez okupanta zapewniona 
zostanie odbudowa ich egzystencji oraz prawne i faktyczne równouprawnienie. Majątek narodowy, 
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Lucjan Dobroszycki, in his article on Jewish restitution in postwar Poland, rightly noticed 
that it was not “a categorical statement that Jewish prewar property would be restored.”
75
 
Two months after the Manifesto, however, the minister of public administration issued a 
circular which directly addressed property restitution ordering “the return of all 
confiscated property…taken from all citizens persecuted by the Germans.”
76
 The circular 
was annulled after three weeks; “the official reason was that restitution required special 
legislation in the form of decrees ‘which should be thoughtfully considered.’”
77
 Perhaps 
the Australian Federation for Polish Jews referred to this circular two years later when it 
claimed that the return of property was “achieved very easily” immediately after the 
liberation.
78
 The Polish government (the Polish Committee of National Liberation, 
PKWN) allegedly facilitated the return of property to lawful Jewish owners “through its 
decisions and through its instructions to administrative officers concerned with these 
types of cases.”
79
 Even a distant relative of the lawful owner could supposedly regain 
property without difficulty. It was only later, after the “reorganization of the Judiciary 
and the taking over by legal courts of all business concerned with recovery of property” 
that things changed.  
                                                                                                                                                 
skoncentrowany dziś w rękach państwa niemieckiego oraz poszczególnych kapitalistów niemieckich, a więc 
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 Internal memorandum of the Australian Federation for Polish Jews concerning Jewish property in Poland, 




I can only speculate if indeed there was a period of “easy returns.” The 
government of the PKWN functioned between July and December 1944, in a period 
characterized by legislative and administrative chaos, and defined by a sense of urgency, 
and temporary solutions. The war was not over yet, the Soviet Army had liberated only 
the eastern borderland of the Polish territory, and the government was only just coming to 
terms with the totality of the damage caused by the war. In addition, survivors were 
coming out in very small numbers from hiding and liberated camps in eastern Poland, not 
yet threatening the new material status quo. In such circumstances, easy and quick returns 
of individual property may not have been unusual in cities in particular. Later, in January 
and February 1945, Jewish survivors may have also been able to take over property left 
by escaping Germans. A Jewish survivor from the city of Łódź reported after his arrival 
at a DP camp in Germany,  
 
On the day of liberation [January 18, 1945], there were 800 Jews left in the now 
notorious Łódź ghetto… the original 800 Jews and the newly arrived Jews 
immediately took over many of the better houses formerly used by the Germans 




Considering the circumstances in the immediate days after liberation, such wild takeovers 
of German property must have been common among local Jews and non-Jews.  
In the summer of 1945, however, when the war was over, the Polish 
administration more stable and the number of returning survivors much higher, property 
returns became more problematic. The JOINT reported from Poland in August 1945: 
“The new economic tendency of the Polish Government is first of all detrimental to our 
society as it is against, or at least makes difficulties in, getting back the Jewish property 
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 Copy of letter from Joseph Levine in Germany to Moses A. Leavitt in the New York office of the JOINT, 
24 October 1945, Collection of the JOINT, File 736, JOINT Archives. 
 162 
robbed by the German authorities….”
81
 At the meeting of representatives of Polish Jews 
in England, also in August 1945, restitution in Poland was reported as follows, 
 
Restitution of Jewish property is not so real a prospect as it may appear in theory. 
Most of the mobile Jewish property had been sold out to peasants or on the black 
market in the first few years of the German occupation for food to supplement the 
starvation rations, or rather, the non-existent rations. The remainder of the 
property was destroyed, burnt, or pillaged in the subsequent “actions” (the terror 
raids by the SA and their Ukrainian, Latvian, Lithuanian henchmen, which 
preceded mass expulsion and mass deportation and were usually accompanied by 
mass slaughter in or outside the ghettos) or in the risings. As to immobile property, 
all larger landed property, as well as heavier industry plants in the country have 
either been parceled out by the Government or virtually taken over by the State in 
this or another form. Besides, the existing antisemitism makes restitution of 
Jewish property extremely difficult, and sometimes dangerous. Houses in the 
former Jewish quarters have either been totally destroyed or heavily damaged. 
They require much repair. Where they are inhabited, the law which keeps in 
existence pre-war rents reduces their income to next to nothing. It is similarly 





   
The entire postwar legislation on property restitution applied exclusively to 
abandoned Jewish and German property since these two groups were the largest missing 
segments of society with the most property left unaccounted for. The “Bierut decrees” 
(Dekrety Bieruta) concerning “abandoned and left behind property” (majątki opuszczone 
i porzucone) were supposed to regulate restitution of property.
83
 In the legal acts from 
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March and May 1945 and March 1946, “abandoned” (opuszczone) stood for movable and 
immovable property which, due to the war, was no longer possessed by the former owner, 
his lawful successors, or their legal representatives. Additionally, property confiscated by 
the Germans was considered abandoned. “Left behind” (porzucone) included movable 
and immovable property which belonged to the German state but had not yet been 
secured under national management, or belonged to German citizens and others who had 
“fled to the enemy” (zbiegły do nieprzyjaciela). Law no. 87 of March 1946 largely 
emphasized and expanded the section on property “left behind” – now termed “formerly 
German” (poniemiecka).
84
 The March law of 1946 annulled all previous decrees and 
became the single fundamental legal act concerning restitution in Poland. 
The decree pronounced null and void all property agreements made under 
occupation. Those who acquired property from or on behalf of Germans were considered 
as acquirers in bad faith and could make no claims to property.
85
 Those who during the 
war took over abandoned or left behind property as well as those who witnessed such acts 
were now obliged to report the seizure and profits so gained. Failure to do so would result 
in imprisonment. The March law of 1946 authorized the establishment of liquidation 
offices (urzędy likwidacyjne) to allocate management of abandoned property. Public and 
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social institutions and relief organizations could apply to manage abandoned property.
86
 
If, after a period of time (ten years for immovable and five years for movable) property 
remained “heirless,” the managing institutions (or State Treasury) could acquire 
ownership by the right of occupation (zasiedzenie).
87
 The law also authorized the relevant 




District courts (sądy grodzkie) were authorized to restore ownership.89 Some 
property, however, was by law exempted from restitution. These included property 
subjected to nationalization or intended for distribution in land reform. In January 1946, 
the assembly passed the nationalization law “concerning the state takeover of basic 
branches of national industry” (przejęcie na własność państwa podstawowych gałęzi 
gospodarki narodowej).
90
 The nationalization law authorized confiscation of all 
“formerly German” industry and enterprises without compensation. The enterprises that 
would be compensated were the remaining non-German mining, oil and heavy industry, 
arms, textile, and food industries, and all other businesses which employed (importantly) 
more than fifty workers.
91
 This criterion of fifty employees was to play an important role 
in restitution proceedings.  
 Land reform also constituted an important legal backdrop for restitution of Jewish 
property in postwar Poland. The law from September 1944 (revised in January 1945) 
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 Decree concerning “abandoned and left behind property” (Dekret z dnia 2 marca 1945 o majątkach 
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authorized distribution of land – enlarging small farms and creating numerous medium-
sized self-sufficient farms – by breaking up land estates. All estates larger than a hundred 
hectares or consisting of more than fifty hectares of arable land, regardless of ownership, 
were subject to nationalization. The state would also confiscate the landed property of 
“citizens of the Third Reich, non-Poles (nie-Polacy), and Polish citizens of German 
nationality,” convicts (for betrayal, desertion, evasion of military draft, and aid to 
occupiers), as well as a large and flexible category of political enemies.
92
 Confiscation 
was to take place “without delay (bezzwłocznie), without compensation, and in its 
entirety.”
93
 For Jews as for everyone else, laws on nationalization and land reform meant 
that if they had owned agricultural land over fifty hectares they would lose it without 
compensation.
94
 If they had owned enterprises which employed more than fifty workers 
they would also lose those but with compensation “based upon principles yet to be 
worked out.”
95
 The properties that did not fit the criteria could be, at least in theory, the 
subject of individual restitution.  
Those who had lost their property in the war and had not yet repossessed it could 
file their claims in court. The local court would hear the main and additional claimants as 
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well as the regional liquidation office which had administered the property since 
liberation.
96
 “Restoration of ownership” (przywrócenie posiadania majątków), however, 
meant only the return of physical property without any legal title (prawo własności).97 In 
other words, a claimant would obtain a provisional title and actual possession of the 
property but could request a full title only after ten years of occupation.
98
 If, however, a 
closer relative emerged and filed claims during these ten years, the original claimant 
would need to relinquish the property.   
The original deadline for filing claims was December 31, 1947, but, after several 
interventions from the CKŻP, it was moved to December 31, 1948.99 The deadline for 
property claims gained urgency after 1947 but it had a limited effect on those who stayed 
in Poland as they usually went through every possible channel to regain their property 
before 1947. Émigrés were the ones who rarely managed to claim their property before 
departure and found the deadline problematic. In Czechoslovakia, heirless property 
became the subject of controversy in 1947 when the state withdrew from earlier pledges 
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to use unclaimed property to aid Jews in the country.
100
 In Poland, no such promises were 
made except for article XII of the March decree, which authorized the government to 
transfer unclaimed (heirless) property to, among others, relief organizations for “groups 




If a former owner was dead or missing, only immediate family (children, parents, 
grandparents, siblings, and spouses) could inherit the property without regular inheritance 
procedures (without need for probate).
102
 The March decree stated that “the restoration of 
property can be demanded by [owner’s] relatives in straight line (descending and 
ascending, and also children out of wedlock) and brothers and sisters as well as a spouse 
…”
103
 Thus, uncles, aunts, nephews, nieces, and cousins were all excluded from the right 
of possession. They could lodge a claim on property only after obtaining a court 
confirmation of their hereditary rights (after December 31, 1949 distant relatives lost all 
the rights of heirs).
104
 Legal advisors to the JOINT and to the CKŻP in Warszawa said 
that “it was practically impossible to win restitution cases if questions of inheritance were 
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involved….No restitution claims should be made unless the claims are made by persons 
up to the fourth degree.”
105
 
Stola found that the restrictions on inheritance had been thought out specifically 
with Jewish property in mind. Considering the low survival rate of Jewish owners and 
their immediate families, the state administration had an opportunity to take over most 
Jewish property as “abandoned.”
106
 At the same time, proponents of the restrictions 
feared “enormous wealth being concentrated in a few hands…” if the few survivors 
regained their prewar property. They thought that such an outcome would "first be unjust 
and economically unproductive and, second, [would] cause a rise in antisemitism.”
107
 
Indeed, the Jewish legal advisors, quoted earlier, confirmed that,  
 
A very ticklish political question arises with respect to Jewish property in Poland. 
It should be borne in mind that in pre-war Poland, the Jews owned over thirty 
percent [should be ten percent] of all property in Poland. If, of course, all such 
property was restituted, either to individual Jews or to a successor organization, 




Dobroszycki also pointed to the government’s fear that distant relatives, perhaps citizens 
of other countries, would claim rights to abandoned property. He quoted the Polish 
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minister of foreign affairs, who supposedly said, “We will not permit some foreign Jews, 
for instance Argentinean Jews, to inherit property in Poland.”
109
  
A contemporary observer, a correspondent for the American Jewish Committee, 
characterized the Polish restitution law as follows, 
 
While it [the law] leaves a wide opening for the nationalization of more 
substantial industrial property and for the retention of properties of special 
importance to the state, on paper it is as generous to the surviving victims of 
Nazism as most restitution laws in Eastern Europe – at least insofar as small and 
middle-sized property is concerned. The law provides for the return of communal 
property to existing Jewish communities and the use of the property of Nazi 
collaborators for the relief of victims of Nazism. On the other hand, the law fails 
to provide for heirless property and the property of the many extinguished Jewish 




Undoubtedly, the Polish restitution law was as generous on paper as it could have been at 
the time in an East European country. Policies of nationalization and redistribution of 
land swept Eastern Europe, gradually undermining the sanctity of private property which 
was to be rendered irrelevant for the system in-the-making. That there was the legal 
possibility of restitution was in itself a sign of generosity. 
As generous as it was, was it ever implemented? The obligation to report the 
takeover of property remained obviously on paper. The threat of penalty may have caused 
little anxiety at best among those who had occupied “formerly Jewish” houses. Yet it is 
hard to imagine that a peasant or a small town artisan would voluntarily go to a local 
official and say, “I took this house. What should I do now?” Admittedly, however, 
restitution law opened more opportunities for city dwellers than for villagers. In cities, 
with little or no damage (like Kraków), survivors had a better chance to recover their 
                                                 
109
 Dobroszycki, "The Jewish Community in Poland, 1944-1947: A Discussion on Postwar Restitution." 
110
 Report on restitution of property prepared for the AJC Committee on Peace Problems, 23-24 January 
1947, Collection of the AJC, AJC-GEN 10, RG 347.17.10, box 276, YIVO. 
 170 
property in the immediate weeks after liberation. Non-Jewish residents of these cities 
were less hungry for “a roof over their heads” leaving more houses empty. Also some 
tenement houses taken over by Germans were now left and could, at least theoretically, 
return to their rightful owners. All that, however, must be understood in relative terms 
and in comparison to villages and small towns where restitution was almost impossible. It 
should be noted that the better chances of regaining property in a city did not 
automatically translate into possession. Also, intact cities like Kraków inevitably became 
overcrowded when thousands of repatriates and survivors flowed into the city from the 
countryside and abroad looking for a shelter.  
Overall, until the pogroms broke out, Jewish survivors in cities had a greater 
sense of security, knowing that there was a network of assistance (Jewish committees) 
which offered material support and (the illusion of) physical protection. Anonymity in 
numbers also helped to build up the courage required to enter one’s home and repossess it. 
Even in completely ruined cities like Warszawa, restoration of ownership was not 
unthought-of. For example, an apartment house at the corner of Jagiellońska and 
Zygmuntowska Street survived the war and now was managed by a brother of the prewar 
Jewish owner.
111
 The central government offered to purchase the house in April 1946.
112
 
Understandably, however, it was an exception, not the rule.  
What was a practical way to recover one’s property? The luckiest prewar owners 
could repossess their belongings immediately upon return if a house or an enterprise had 
not yet been taken over by a private person or a liquidation office. He or she would not 
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need to be recognized by the court, pay hereditary taxes, or be inscribed as a legal owner. 
Such stories, however, were rare and mostly limited to large cities. More frequently, the 
property had been occupied by the time its original owner reappeared. If it was a local 
liquidation office which had assigned management of the property to a public institution, 
the owner had to file a claim to the liquidation office and wait for the final decision on 
restitution. If a private person occupied the property, the owner had to go through court 
proceedings to prove primary right of ownership. The former (liquidation office) was 
considered to be an easier way than the latter (court proceedings).  
By and large, municipalities were the single most affluent administrators of 
abandoned, or not yet claimed, property immediately after the war. They assigned 
management of such property with the consent of a district liquidation office. Gross 
illustrated how liquidation offices assigned abandoned property, in particular, prewar 
Jewish communal property. The described model of operation applied to communal as 
well as individual property: 
 
In principle, the local official who made the determination of how to assign 
“abandoned” property (a county prefect or a town’s mayor) had to consult with 
the Ministry of Public Administration. He…would write for permission either 
directly, or through the Trusteeship Bureau of the Main Liquidation Office… 
Now, the reality on the ground was much more layered and confusing. What used 
to be a synagogue or a Jewish community building might have been put to 
different use during the German occupation – as a warehouse for the local 
agricultural cooperative, for example, or a firehouse, or whatever – and if it suited 
everybody around all would remain as before. Or else, powerful actors on the 





For example, the city of Kraków used all the synagogues, except for one, for warehouses 
and workshops until the beginning of 1947. Only in February 1947, after a meeting 
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between representatives of Kraków Jews and the provincial authorities, did the latter 
agree to return all the synagogues to the Jewish committee for use but reserved the right 
to control the preservation of their historic value.
114
 The provincial authorities also 
implied that the Jewish organizations “could have” recovered these synagogues before 




Similar to the synagogues, all the prewar Jewish school-buildings in Kraków were 
now taken over by the city and reestablished as public schools.
116
 After the war, there 
were only two Jewish schools left: an elementary school and a gymnasium (junior high 
school). The elementary school was located in a building at Estera Street – the building 
“old, confined, and dark, and completely not suited for educational purposes; besides the 
street was full of prostitutes, the surrounding was heavily antisemitic.”
117
 Also the 
building of one of the two prewar Jewish hospitals was now made into a public hospital. 
The city also took over all the buildings which belonged to various Jewish associations 
and organizations before the war.
118
  
The Association of Jewish Artisans (Stowarzyszenie Żydowskich 
Rzemieślników), for example, struggled to take actual possession of their building which 
was now used for the municipal department of social welfare, and housed Caritas (a 
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welfare organization), nuns running an educational institution for girls.
119
 The 
Association had official decisions on restitution of the building from the district court, 
approved by the appropriate municipal department. The only problem was that none of 
the institutions occupying the building were willing to leave. The Association needed the 
place to provide a network of support and to organize workshops for its 200 members. At 
the same time, the Association was reluctant to use force for obvious reasons. They 
rightly feared a reaction of the surrounding population of Kraków if “the Jews kicked 
out” nuns and welfare organizations.
120
 So, the Association sent petitions to the president 
of Kraków, the presidium of the ministers’ council in Warszawa, and the prime minister 
of Poland. It also used personal pressures and influences, asking, for example, the 
provincial governmental commissioner for the productivization of the Jewish population 
in Kraków to intervene on their behalf.
121
  
 A fascinating document survives listing the interventions of the Kraków 
governmental commissioner on behalf of local Jews.
122
 A great number of interventions 
concerned restitution of property, mostly enterprises. Some interventions failed. 
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Maksymilian Reder, for example, unsuccessfully struggled to regain his café in the very 
center of Kraków. During the war, the café was taken over by German Treuhänder. After 
the Germans left the city, a certain Skotnicki grabbed the place. Eventually, despite the 
commissioner’s interventions, the city council decided to allocate the rooms to the 
Cooperative Bank (before the court’s ruling on restitution of Reder’s property).
123
 In 
another case, Ichud made an agreement over an enterprise which had been “taken by 
force” (przemocą zajęty) by one of Kraków’s cooperatives. Decisions in four other cases 
of individual restitution were supposedly pending. The commissioner claimed that the 
following six interventions ended “with a positive result”: Gutman’s factory of bricks and 
concrete, Wolf’s roofing paper factory Wawel, Goldberger’s factory Viennese of 
transmission belts (pasów transmisyjnych), Steinhaus’ fur-processing enterprise Krawar, 
Firm L. Baranowski of chemicals belonging to Federgruen, and Zerykier’s brick-yard. 
However, the report of the commissioner’s activity from 1947 stated that only one case – 
the completely devastated concrete Gutman’s factory – ended in full restitution.
124
 
Apparently, the commissioner’s “interventions” were limited to a presentation of the 
office’s standpoint and the sending of paperwork. As a result, “an intervention with a 
positive result” did not necessarily mean actual restitution or administrative approval 
thereof. 
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Municipalities were often interested in selling property if its maintenance was too 
expensive.
125
 Kobriner and Gutmacher – legal advisors to the JOINT and the CKŻP –  
pointed out that “certain townships have been known to insist upon selling property in 
order to obtain the proceeds to cover their expenses….The selling price of real property 
in Poland was about ten percent of its pre-war price in dollar equivalent [in April 
1948].”
126
 However, the following procedure described in an annual report of the JOINT 
was more frequent, 
 
[T]he Municipality of Warszawa [took over] lots in the Warszawa area with 
compensation to the owners. Present owners may have retained their ownership 
rights only for a limited period of time, restricted to six months from the time of 
notification. Owners of such property in Warszawa, residing outside of the 





Importantly, after the elapse of the ten-year period, beginning from the moment of 
possession, the municipality may have acquired the property title by stay.
128
 The 
municipalities were thus a primary “danger” for owners or their heirs seeking to restore 
ownership. 
But what if surviving children, spouses, or siblings were determined enough to 
struggle for restitution? For example, what did the children of Israel and Malka 
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Dorotinsky from Białystok have to do in order to recover their property (regardless of 
whether their present residence was in Poland or abroad)?
129
 First, they needed to find a 
lawyer, preferably from the same area as the property; second, they needed to get their 
parents’ death certificates and restore their own birth records; and finally, they had to pay 
fees. While finding a lawyer did not pose much difficulty, paperwork and fees did. 
Certificates were necessary to prove that claimants were the only surviving 
persons entitled to inherit. That, however, was not an easy matter since most official 
records were systematically destroyed by the Germans during the war and the chances of 
finding an original birth, marriage, or death certificate were close to zero. Only in August 
1946, did Polish legislation provide a special procedure for the restoration of these 
documents.
130
 According to the new law, an applicant was required to raise a claim to the 
Court of Justice and provide name, date and place of birth, and place of last residence. As 
for people missing in connection with World War II (participation in war activities, 
residence in the battle areas, and deportation to jail, camp, or abroad), a one year period – 
valid from May 1945 – was prescribed for presuming death.
131
 Bans had to be inserted in 
an official periodical summoning a missing person to appear before court. Finally, when 
lodging the claim, the heir had to produce an official declaration certified by a public 
notary which “justified his claim and proved that no other heir had survived.”
132
 Stola 
wrote that  
 
                                                 
129
 Reply from JOINT office in Warszawa to JOINT office in New York concerning property in Białystok, 
7 December 1948, Collection of the JOINT no. 45/54, File 778, JOINT Archives. 
130
 JOINT’s memorandum on restoration of birth, marriage, and death certificates in Poland, 8 October 






one way of getting around this obstacle [of missing records] was to produce an 
(alleged) witness who would confirm that the last owner had, before his death, 
bequeathed his property to the applicant who had survived the war and was now 
applying for recognition of their rights before the court, or confirm that the other 




Fees were also problematic, for many becoming a major obstacle in the property 
restitution in Poland. The cost of inserting bans alone was 800 Polish złoty – the 
equivalent of eight dollars (the official exchange rate was one to a hundred) or a quarter 
of the average wage at the time. Additionally, typical costs of court proceedings on 
restitution of hereditary rights amounted to “three per mille” of the present value of the 
property “as estimated by experts.”
134
 Hereditary taxes and lawyers’ fees had to be paid 
as well. A certain Natan Goldberg asked the provincial commissioner in Kraków for 
financial aid of 4,000 złoty (forty dollars) to pay a lawyer in a restitution case in April 
1947.
135
 All together the expenses usually amounted to 20,000 złoty (200 dollars).
136
 Of 
course, the absolute majority of Jewish claimants residing in Poland could not afford to 
pay the fees, without the help of the CKŻP (which also offered gratis legal aid) or 
without obtaining an exemption from the court and lawyer fees called “poor man’s 
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Having found the necessary records and witnesses, hired good lawyers, and paid 
enormous fees, and even having won the case in court, a claimant could not be certain 
that the property was his or hers. Sabina Hirschhaut in Kraków experienced this first 
hand. In May 1946, the local court ruled in her favor, approving the restoration of fifty 
percent ownership – which exactly matched her prewar share – of an enterprise 
Tartakstal located in the city of Bielsko.
138
 At the time of the court ruling, the business, 
as an abandoned property, was run by the state appointed provisional public management 
(tymczasowy zarząd państwowy) which now, in accordance with the sentence, had to 
relinquish fifty percent of its ownership. Unsatisfied with the court ruling, the current 
management appealed against the verdict and carried its suspension into effect. As 
grounds for appeal, the management cited state interest in the property, the enterprise 
being an “important branch of national economy” (ważna gałąź gospodarki narodowej), 
thus subject to future nationalization.
139
 Hirschhaut argued that the business employed ten 
workers and thus was not subject to nationalization.  
Similarly, Rudolf Mestel from Sosnowiec initially received a positive court ruling 
on the restoration of his movable property – industrial machinery from his prewar 
hardware-company Romestal.
140
 During the war, a local collaborator with the Germans 
took over Mestel’s plant, robbed its machinery, and moved it to another factory Galmet. 
When Galmet restarted after the war, it did not use Mestel’s machines, which it deemed 
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unfit for its production needs. When the court ruled in Mestel’s favor in September 1945, 
Mestel expected the quick recovery of his property. Unfortunately for Mestel, the 
prosecutor, on behalf of the provisional public management of Galmet, appealed the 
verdict. As in Hirschhaut’s case, the state-appointed management called for suspension of 
the execution of the court’s ruling on the grounds of potential “irreparable losses” 
(niepowetowane straty) to the State’s Treasury as well as the lack of proof that the 
machinery had in fact belonged to Mestel.
141
 Two years passed and Mestel still had not 
recovered his property. Moreover, in May 1947, the minister of trade and industry in 
Warszawa informed local authorities that Galmet with all its machinery would be 
nationalized and thus Mestel’s claims would be groundless.
142
  
The unwillingness of the state-appointed provisional public management to 
relinquish property on the basis of alleged “interest of the state economy” was perhaps 
the most common obstacle to Jewish restitution in Polish urban areas after the war. Here 
is yet another story to illustrate the point. Before the war, Henryk Rozenes had an 
enterprise of clips and staples, Kartodruk-Automatyk, in Sosnowiec.
143
 During the war, 
German Treuhänder took it over but kept Rozenes as a regular worker. In 1943, Rozenes 
was taken to Auschwitz. When he came back, his property had been already taken by 
public management. In the summer of 1945, Rozenes claimed right to his property in 
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court in accordance with the May restitution law of 1945.
144
 The provisional public 
management made a parallel claim two weeks later, based on “special significance” of 
the enterprise for the interests of the state (szczególne znaczenie dla interesów 
państwa).145 More than a year later, in December 1946, when Rozenes still had not 
recovered his property, he wrote to the provincial government commissioner in Katowice 
stating that the claim of  “special significance” of his enterprise was blown out of 
proportion since his firm  
 
had been closed for many months, the machinery stood unused and deteriorating, 
being not properly secured or preserved; not mentioning that the production of 
pins and clips, which had been the exclusive and only focus of production, could 




Throughout the restitution process, abuses of power and bribery were common, be 
it in a liquidation office, a city officials’ office, or court chambers. In 1947, activists in 
the Jewish committee in Kraków claimed that the lower level of administration was most 
responsible for hampering the restitution of Jewish property, “The intentional prolonging 
of the proceedings often led to the claimant’s departure abroad.”
147
 The story of Kraków 
repatriates who fought against eviction illustrates the problem. In November 1946, they 
wrote to the commissioner for productivization of Jewish population in Kraków 
requesting at least the suspension of eviction and an allocation of an apartment. 
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Apparently, their application, once approved, was eventually rescinded in benefit of a 
claimant Dręgiewicz (non-Jewish) who had already had a two-bedroom apartment in the 
center of Kraków. Repatriates (three families of eight) wrote the following: 
 
The only motivation to deny us [stay in the apartment] was our allegedly “illegal” 
takeover of the apartment. The term “illegal” is a subterfuge, calumny, and a 
misrepresentation of facts. Can one call “illegal” the fact that as repatriates, the 
prewar residents of Kraków, after seven years of wartime exile, and on our return 
to country, we found ourselves without a roof over our heads because our prewar 
apartment was fully occupied and we were not let in. In this tragic moment for us, 
our sisters… took us under their roof in an apartment which they [sisters, the 
closest relatives] occupied right before the war and which they occupied again 
after their return from concentration camp, having received an allocation [official 
decision from the city]… Nor can one call illegal the fact that, as subtenants of 
our own sisters, we applied for [official] allocation of this apartment to us on the 
basis that as repatriates, working people…, prewar residents of Kraków, parents 
of children attending schools…, and registered tenants we have full right to the 
allocation of the apartment … [emphases in the original text].
148
   
 
 
What the signatories were most concerned about was eviction in the middle of winter: 
“Physically and mentally exhausted, facing the tragedy of the loss of almost all relatives, 
now in the winter time, with school-attending children, [the repatriates] would find 
themselves homeless.”
149
 Handwritten by the city official under the letter was the 




 Jewish claimants also occasionally abused the process. At one of the meetings of 
the CKŻP in August 1946, the following comment arose “general cheerfulness” (ogólna 
wesołość), “News travels to Kraków from smaller Jewish communities that Jews started 
to sell houses which were not theirs…. Jews sell houses of those who live abroad. I 
                                                 
148
 Letter signed by three tenants of the apartment to the commissioner for the productivization of the 






[speaker Horowitz] think that this issue is pressing and needs to be solved immediately. 
Continuation of these practices would demoralize our community.”
151
 In 1948, lawyers 
Kobriner and Gutmacher pointed out that, “The Polish courts have become increasingly 
alerted to the “racket” of some Jews in going around making a business of making claims 
for the restitution of property belonging to people they know or did know, alleging that 
they are relatives or that they are the persons to whom the property belongs…”
152
   
Finally, there were isolated property takeovers which could have happened only 
after the war when workers’ cooperatives – not yet state-owned – mushroomed across 
Poland. The Ontax plant in Warszawa was an example. Three Jewish entrepreneurs, 
Henryk Zylberman, Henryk Lerer, and Salo Scharfspitz, founded Ontax – a high quality 
cosmetics’ plant – in 1933.
153
 When the war broke out, they leased the factory to 
Stanisław Skrzywan, a non-Jew, for two years. That made Skrzywan a rich man but also 
saved the factory from German management and damage until 1941. In the meantime, the 
three owners left Poland and emigrated to North and South America. In 1941, a German 
entrepreneur took over Ontax and managed it until August 1944. During the Warszawa 
uprising, the factory was destroyed, the machinery damaged or stolen, “so that only the 
bare walls remained.”  
Ignacy Mirel had been employed in the plant since its foundation. He survived the 
war in the Majdanek camp and came back to Warszawa in June 1945.  
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He managed to collect about fifteen ex-employees of Ontax, form an employees’ 
co-operative, pooled their funds, repaired one of the four floors of the factory and 
some machinery and commenced production. All the fifteen members of the co-
operative actually work in the factory and they have five additional employees so 
that the total staff is now about twenty… They make all the pre-war products, 
about sixty in number and have reached about ten percent of pre-war production. 





The plant was not nationalized since it employed less than fifty workers. However, there 
remained a danger that Ontax could be “forced into a trade association and required to 
change its production in conformity with Government plans, as is the case with some 
other industries….”
155
 Another concern was the relationship with the mother firm, 
 
The property on which the present building stands belongs to prewar Ontax. The 
same applies to the building in its damaged condition. However, the repairs 
effected on the building, the reconstructed machinery, and the present capital, raw 
materials and finished merchandise are the property of the employees united in 
the co-operative. It will be quite an accounting problem to unravel accounts 
between the prewar firm, the mother firm, and the employees in the co-operative 




Nonetheless, Mirel was willing to pay royalties on “processes which they used and which 
belonged to the mother firm.”
157
 By the beginning of 1946, it was clear that the founders 
of the plant had no intention of returning to Poland. 
 To conclude, I have no statistics of how many houses and enterprises returned to 
their rightful Jewish owners after the war. However, considering the small number of 
survivors, the structural damage suffered by buildings, the fear of backlash in the Polish 
countryside, the general devaluation of private property accompanying the gradual 










nationalization, and the government’s hesitancy to facilitate the process, the actual 
number of restituted properties must have been quite small. In a report prepared for the 
AJC concerning restitution of property, an unknown correspondent wrote in the 
beginning of 1947, 
 
It is a highly characteristic feature of the situation of the Jews in Poland that 
within the huge mass of information available on the various aspects of their 






Restitution in Slovakia  
 
 
One of the first laws attempting to regulate the restitution of property in postwar 
Czechoslovakia was presidential decree no. 5/1945 on the annulment of property 
transactions, issued on May 19, 1945. The decree invalidated any transactions on 
movable and immovable, private and public property made after September 29, 1938 (the 
Munich Agreement) since they were made “under duress of occupation and threat of 
national, racial, and political persecution.”
159
 It also authorized the government to 
establish national management (národna správa) of property confiscated from the 
“politically unreliable.” However, as with any legislative act made in Prague, this act did 
not legally bind Slovakia unless it was confirmed by the SNR and the Board of 
Commissioners. This practice resulted from an ongoing political competition between 
Prague and Bratislava and from attempts of the latter to preserve political autonomy. 
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Jelinek wrote that decree no. 5/1945 was not authorized in Slovakia because it “fell 
victim to the Slovaks’ battle for their country’s prerogatives within the Republic.”
160
 
The Slovak Assembly adopted only those articles of the presidential decree that 
concerned national management.
161
 Slovak decree no. 50/1945 authorized the 
establishment of national management on property confiscated, abandoned, or taken over 
after the Munich Agreement
162
 National committees were responsible for establishing 
national management, except for banking, mining, large industry, and large estates, which 
were left to the Slovak National Council.
163
 National managers (národni správcovia) of 
property were supposed to be “nationally and politically reliable, with appropriate 
professional and practical knowledge.”
164
 A manager would pledge to fulfill his duties 
“conscientiously (svedomito), with the solicitude of a righteous landlord, and with regard 
to the economic welfare and other public interests.”
165
  
From the Jewish perspective, the Slovak legislation or lack thereof had multiple 
fatal flaws that affected restitution of their property. First, in contrast to the Czech lands, 
the Slovak central administration failed to invalidate all property transactions made after 
the Munich Agreement, which meant that aryanization of Jewish property maintained its 
legality in Slovakia. The Slovak Assembly did not annul aryanization for reasons that 
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underlined all Slovak politics immediately after the war. The Slovak government sought 
a political comfort zone in the face of the uneasy legacy of the Tiso regime. As long as 
the wartime Slovak State was considered legal, its decisions had to be considered valid, 
including aryanization. Grievances of the aryanizers, who had taken over Jewish 
property, were thus as legitimate as grievances of Jewish survivors. Fearing social unrest 
of frustrated beneficiaries of the Tiso regime, the new government avoided targeting the 
material interests of this group while at the same time attempting to disassociate itself 
from fascism.
166
 For Slovak Jews, it created a no-win situation.  
Second, the Slovak legislation ignored article XXIV of the presidential decree; 
this was the article critical for Jewish material interests. The article stated that property 
under national management, which had belonged to “blue-collar workers, farmers, 
businessmen, small and medium entrepreneurs, clerks, members of free professions, and 
people in similar social positions, and had been taken over due to national, political, and 
racial persecution, should be returned to their previous owners or their heirs.”
167
 In 
accordance with the presidential decree, evidence of suffering political or racial 
persecution and loyalty to the “democratic-republican state ideas of the Czechoslovak 
Republic” sufficed to demand the annulment of national management of the property.
168
 
The absence of this article in the Slovak legislation meant that the restitution of Jewish 
property in Slovakia was still not prescribed or regulated by law.  
                                                 
166
 Significantly, the Democrats (DS), who won the Slovak elections, had many former right-wing activists 
in their ranks. 
167
 Presidential decree no. 5/1945 “concerning the annulment of certain property transactions effected in the 
period of restricted liberties and the national management of property assets of Germans, Hungarians, 
traitors and collaborators and of certain organizations and associations,” 19 May 1945, digital collection of 
the historical legislation of the ministry of the interior of the Czech Republic, 
http://www.mvcr.cz/sbirka/1945/zakon_2q.html#castka_4 (accessed June 26, 2008). 
168
 Ibid.  
 187 
Finally and most importantly, the Slovak Assembly authorized the establishment 
of national management not only of property confiscated from German and Magyar 
“traitors and politically unreliable people” but also of abandoned property, often Jewish. 
Although individual Jewish owners secured national management of their own businesses, 
it was, by and large, non-Jewish partisans and combatants who held these posts. The 
Organization of Victims of Racial Persecution at the hands of the Fascist Regime in 
Bratislava (Sdruženie fašistickým režimom rasove prenasledovaných v Bratislave, SRP) 
argued that it was illogical that Jewish property had national management even when the 
former owner or his heirs were still alive, considering the abundance of vacant properties 
formerly owned by “Germans, Magyars, and traitors.” The Central Union of Jewish 
Communities in Slovakia (Ústredný sväz židovských náboženských obci na Slovensku, 
ÚSŽNO) and the SRP repeatedly protested against a situation in which many Jewish 
properties remained vacant at the state’s disposal, without national management, while 
those which had national managers had non-Jews appointed for this function – people 
who were unfamiliar with the specific property (cudzí národní správcovia).
169
 The 
commissioners in Bratislava apparently approved of such appointments in the name of 
“the public interest.”  
However, it should be noted that national committees occasionally appointed 
Slovak Jews to national management posts. Three months after the Slovak legislation on 
national management, the district national committee (okresný národný výbor, ONV) in 
Nitra informed all local committees that the authorities in Bratislava had instructed them 
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to appoint former Jewish owners, co-owners, or their relatives as national managers of 
their abandoned houses.
170
 Some Slovak Jews were also appointed national managers on 
property that had never been theirs. Keleti, a Jewish survivor from Spišská Nová Ves, 
remembered how young Jewish men took over national management of confiscated 
Hungarian property after the war. 
 
Fredi, as a Jewish boy from a so-called “good family” was a big loiterer and never 
even finished high school. He was successful in escaping to the west and he 
returned after the war to his homeland. He fought during the war in the 
Czechoslovak Army in Great Britain. Now, at home, he was looking for a good 
job, as the gold miners in Alaska or California. The Klattiks, a Hungarian family, 
owned a relatively nice grocery in Spišská Nová Ves where they also owned a 
delicatessen. Because Fredi participated in the fight against the Nazis as a 
Czechoslovakian soldier in a foreign army, and Klattik was “nationalized” 
because he was a Hungarian, Fredi was named “national administrator” of the 
store. The whole city was jealous that such a “loiterer” got such a good position. 
He stole a little, as all “national administrators” did after the war…He worked 
really very hard this time and brought a lot of profit to the city and government 
(the national administrators had only a salary). One day the so called “brave” 
gentile boys waited for him when he left and he got a terrible beating. He had to 
go in an ambulance to the hospital to be treated, although he was not 
hospitalized… The next victim was a very handsome young Jewish man, named 
Engländer. He was a strong, tall man, survived the holocaust, so that he 
participated as a partisan during the Slovak national uprising. He was a skilled 
electrician and similar to Fredi he was working as the “national administrator” of 
a Hungarian electrical workshop – Tandžák. He was dating a beautiful gentile 
girl…Again, this was “too much”… Engländer was the national administrator of a 
prosperous company and was the boyfriend of a beautiful Christian girl. This 




Some Jewish national managers, although not beaten, had to deal with other unpleasant 
consequences of their appointment. For example, Artur Langer, a national manager of an 
alcohol industry, employing forty-two workers in Levoča, was arrested and stood trial for 
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black marketeering and profiteering from the illegal sale and distribution of alcohol.
172
 
He was fined and sentenced to imprisonment. Regardless of whether he was guilty or not, 
Langer made a few personal enemies among the enterprise’s stockholders, the authorities 
in Bratislava, and members of the works council, which did not help his case. Apparently, 
members of the works council were heard to say, “This Jew needs to be taken off.”
173
   
Overall, national management proved particularly detrimental for Jewish safety 
and their relations with non-Jews. When the anti-Jewish riots broke out in Bratislava in 
August 1946, Jewish organizations blamed the conflict surrounding national management 
of Jewish property. In a letter to the National Legislative Assembly of the Czechoslovak 
Republic (Ústavodárné národni shromáždĕní republiky Československé, ÚNS), the SRP 
pointed out that partisans, who happened to be particularly active in the riots, were also 
well represented among national managers and co-managers of Jewish enterprises.
174
 
Once partisans – national managers – had to return their newly acquired property, they 
would blame Jews for their loss. That is what happened in August 1946, “As a result of 
the restitution law, some of the partisans fell by the wayside (vypadli), some felt 
threatened and thus became welcome tools in the hands of elements hostile to us.”
175
 The 
Jewish organizations pointed to Slovak decree no. 50/1945 on national management and 
the subsequent lack of preventive measures as indirectly responsible for the trouble.  
Slovak degree no. 50/1945 based the determination of German and Magyar 
nationality primarily on “language used in the family” (jazyk užívaný v rodinnom styku) 
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 Letter from the circles of the SRP to the National Legislative Assembly of the Czechoslovak Republic 




which, as I discuss in a later chapter, put German and Magyar-speaking Jews in the 
category of “German and Magyar traitors.”
176
 As a consequence, confiscation of property 
belonging to Germans and Magyars came to pose one of the central dilemmas for Jews in 
postwar Slovakia. In June 1945, President Beneš signed decree no. 12/1945 authorizing 
the confiscation of landed (agrarian) property for the land reform.
177
 All Germans and 
Magyars (regardless of citizenship), traitors and enemies of the state in the years 1938-45 
regardless of their nationality and citizenship, and joint-stock companies which served 
German and fascist aims during the occupation would lose their land “with immediate 
effect and without compensation.”
178
 Only Germans and Magyars who “actively 
participated in the fight for liberation of the Czechoslovak Republic” would be exempted. 
As in all critical matters concerning citizenship and property, the national committees 
would decide on exemptions as well as on land distribution.
179  
The SNR soon approved this legislation. Following the presidential decree, it also 
exempted loyal Germans but it completely ignored loyal Magyars, leaving hundreds of 
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Magyar-speaking Jews without legal protection. Furthermore, the Slovak legislation 
reaffirmed the practice of using “language used in the family” to determine German and 
Magyar nationality.
180
 That consequently spelt trouble for numerous Jewish land-owners 
in southern Slovakia (formerly occupied by Hungary) whose primary language of 
communication at home was Magyar. Under the occupation, the Hungarian state 
expropriated them and allocated their property to non-Jewish Magyars. When this 
territory returned to Slovakia after the war, the ownership of Magyar-speaking Jews 
became highly vulnerable. Every time a local authority determined Magyar nationality, 
the owner faced confiscation.  
 “Internal colonization” (vnútorna kolonizácia) of southern Slovakia further 
aggravated the situation in the region. The Slovak “colonization” was closely intertwined 
with land reform and resembled the process of resettlement of the Recovered Territories 
in western Poland. The colonization aimed at inhabiting the region – now preferably 
“clear” of Hungarians – with a purely “Slavic” population. The confiscation of Magyar-
owned land and its distribution among medium, small, and landless Slovaks was to serve 
that purpose. National committees and resettlement commissions were authorized to 
appoint “colonizers” for landed property abandoned or under confiscation, occasionally 
smaller than the fifty hectares prescribed by law. The process affected not only “enemies 
and traitors of the Slovak nation” but also regular war returnees, among them Jews, who 
found a “colonizer” in their houses upon their return. In January 1946, the SRP 
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complained to the Slovak National Council that Jewish “owners who came back from 
concentration camps or from the Czechoslovak army could not get into their houses 
because colonizers were there.”
181
  
By 1946, there were at least twenty-five cases of confiscation of Jewish property 
in southern Slovakia.
182
 Júľius Szalvendy and his wife came back to their house in 
Rokytnik after the war. They had succeeded in reviving their land when, in early October 
1945, colonizers showed up without warning, armed with a decision from the 
commissioner of agriculture to take over and break up Szalvendy’s land. The Lustig 
family in Rimavská Sobota received a confiscation order despite the family’s declaration 
of Slovak nationality, a “farmer of profession” in their midst, and another one “injured in 
the fight for liberation.” When Lustig applied for national management of his property, 
his application was denied because the property was already under motion for 
confiscation. Magdalena Reinitzova from Gortvapusta was on welfare because her 
property was broken up and colonized. Her appeal got lost in a bureaucratic mess for 
more than half a year. Pavel Salvendyho served as lieutenant in the Czechoslovak Army 
and participated in the partisans’ fights. After the war, a fellow partisan applied for a 
motion to confiscate Salvendyho’s property. When František Schwarc came back from 
Mauthausen to his land in Ožďany, his property had already been confiscated, broken up, 
and colonized. Schwarc was not let into his house. His application for the attestation of 
political reliability was denied due to “voluntary draft in to the Magyar Army.”
183
 Also in 
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Ožďany, Vojtech Schreiber’s house was under confiscation although it should have been 
exempted from the process, having no land attached.
184
  
In October 1945, President Beneš spoke indirectly to Jewish fears of property loss 
in yet another decree on confiscation of enemy property.
185
 He referred to what became 
the standard basis for protection of German- and Magyar-speaking Jews in postwar 
Czechoslovakia. The document specified that Germans and Magyars who “remained 
loyal to the Czechoslovak Republic, never betrayed the Czech and Slovak nation, and 
either actively participated in the fight for liberation or suffered under the Nazi or fascist 
regime” would keep their property.
186
 Exempted from confiscation was property lost due 
to national, racial, or political persecutions after the Munich Agreement.
187
 At the same 
time, the decree declared that those who supported (nadržovať) germanization or 
magyarization in the Czechoslovak Republic would lose their property.
188
 As I discussed 
earlier, accusations of magyarization have been historically and consistently troublesome 
for Magyar-speaking Jews.  
The exemptions must not have been properly enforced if the ÚSŽNO and the SRP 
complained about confiscation and colonization at the expense of Jewish owners 
throughout 1946 and 1947. Every month or couple of months, the two organizations 
drafted letters to Bratislava and Prague reminding the authorities of the problem. The 




 Presidential decree no. 108/1945 “concerning the confiscation of enemy assets and the establishment of 
the National Restoration Funds,” (Dekret presidenta o konfiskaci nepřátelského majetku a Fondech národní 
obnovy), 25 October 1945, Šutaj, Mosný, and Olejnik, Prezidentské Dekréty Edvarda Beneša v 
Povojnovom Slovensku, 141.  
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 Ibid. Presidential decree no. 108/1945 also regulated allocation and distribution of confiscated property. 
Similar to previous legal acts on confiscation and land distribution, it prioritized participants in the fight for 
liberation along with their families, those impaired by warfare and national, racial, or political persecution, 
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 194 
ÚSŽNO and the SRP complained not only about the use of language as the criterion for 
the determination of nationality in Slovakia but also about the national committees’ greed 
for land.
189
 In Slovakia, as opposed to Bohemia and Moravia, any doubt about the 
nationality of an owner led the local administration to “simply declare him a traitor only 
so confiscation could take place.”
190
 “Formerly German” property in western Poland and 
“formerly Magyar” property in southern Slovakia seemed too tempting to leave their 
distribution to mere “justice” or chance, “If one wanted to confiscate, substantiation 
could be found or made up” (konfiškovať sa chcelo a dôvod sa našiel, alebo sa urobil).191 
The determination of the former owners’ “wrong” nationality sufficed to get the desired 
piece of land. Slovak Jewish leaders observed with sarcasm that “such confiscation 
proceedings suggested that a great many Magyars, Germans, collaborators, and traitors in 
Slovakia were Jews, including foreign soldiers and partisans of Jewish origin, and those 
who did not know the Magyar language at all.”
192
 
Furthermore, many confiscations took place without a formal decision and, when 
such confiscation was eventually annulled, restoration of previous ownership was 
difficult to process. Also, during “internal colonization,” land was allocated to 
“economically weak people, especially farmers,” which made restitution claims even 
more problematic. For example, the Czechoslovak government gave Jewish land near 
Nitra, Hlohovec, and Topoľčany to landless farmers from Orava, expelled from their land 
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after the Polish annexation of the region.
193
 Taking property away from these non-Jewish 
farmers was not only morally ambiguous but also had the potential to antagonize them.
194
 
Jewish leaders argued that the farmers had already paid for this land, so asking more of 
them would be unfair. The Slovak Jewish leaders suggested that only state-administered 
compensations could solve the problem.
195
  
During the fall of 1945 and throughout 1946, the ÚŠZNO and the SRP were in 
constant contact with the Bratislava and Prague governments, demanding effective 
restitution of Jewish property. They sent letters, project ideas, complaints, and 
suggestions. In December 1945, for example, the ÚŠZNO and the SRP protested against 
the most recent plans for the legislation of restitution.
196
 One of the most controversial 
points was the projected partial return of property to guarantee merely “adequate 
existential security” (primerané existenčné zaistenie). The authors asked on what moral 
and legal grounds could an owner receive less than he had come to own with his 




In March 1946, the SRP asked why the SNR had not approved the presidential 
decree annulling all transactions made during the war despite the fact that it was 
prescribed for the entire country (celoštátne) and was successfully executed in Bohemia 
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and Moravia. Moreover, the SRP suggested that since the Slovak State passed all laws 
concerning Jewish property during the war, it seemed “morally justifiable” that its 
successor, the SNR, should undo the wrongs of the previous regime.
198
 Further, they 
criticized governmental restitution plans from December 1945 and their 
implementation.
199
 Apparently, the state was supposed to first return what it possessed to 
private owners and then pass appropriate restitution law. In the end, the SRP claimed, the 
commissioner of finances was willing to give back some “crumbs from Jewish property” 
while the restitution law was nowhere in sight.
 200
   
In the same letter, Slovak Jewish leaders pointed to the difference between Jews 
and other victims of war as far as restitution was concerned.
201
 They argued that Jews 
should get their property returned whereas non-Jews should be compensated since the 
damage suffered by the latter was due to “a common enemy” while Jews were wronged 
by the system and by individuals who benefited from anti-Jewish discrimination. Such 
beneficiaries should take responsibility for their actions and return their ill-gotten 
property to the Jews. Moreover, the authors complained that when other victims were 
compensated with money, Jews were not. The authors also suggested that separate laws 
for Jews and non-Jews should be passed as far as the confiscation of landed property was 
concerned. The main point was that the Jewish material situation was getting worse and 
required the intervention of the state, especially considering the active promotion and 
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 Finally, on May 16, 1946, the Provisional National Assembly of the 
Czechoslovak Republic passed a law on restitution.
203
 Act no. 128/1946 on “annulment 
of certain property transactions effected in the period of restricted liberties and other 
interference with property,” was supposed to regulate restitution in Czechoslovakia.
204
 
First, the law declared null and void all property transfers made after September 29, 1938 
(Munich) “under occupation or national, racial, and political persecution.” That referred 
to movable and immovable as well as public and private property. Exempted from the 
law was property transferred to politically reliable individuals who acted in the former 
owner’s interest with his consent and for adequate compensation.
205
 Restitution law 
enabled the return of property, restoration of property title, and restitution of any other 
previous state of affairs of aggrieved persons and their legal successors unless found to be 
politically unreliable, Germans, Magyars, or traitors. Importantly for Magyar-speaking 
Jews, the language used in the family as a criterion for the determination of nationality 
was completely ignored although “support of germanization or magyarization” was listed 
as an obstacle to restitution. Those who had declared Magyar and German nationality in 
                                                 
202
 Ibid. 
203 The Provisional National Assembly of the Czechoslovak Republic (Prozatímní národní shromáždění 
republiky Československé) had its first meeting on October 28, 1945. The National Front appointed its 
members. The establishment of the Czechoslovak parliament – the central legislature – diminished the 
political role of the SNR which now was more dependent on Prague. In 1946, the Provisional National 
Assembly was replaced by the National Legislative Assembly of the Czechoslovak Republic (ÚNS).  
204
 Decree no. 128/1946 “concerning the annulment of certain property transactions effected in the period 
of restricted liberties and other interference with property,” 16 May 1946, Knapp Viktor and Berman 
Tomáš, Vrácení majetku pozbytého za okupace: Restituční zákon (Prague: V. Linhart, 1946). Also compare 
to “Survey of Reconstruction (Laws) in Europe” prepared by the Legal Secretary of the Research 
Department of the WJC, British section, Dr. P. Weis, 1947, Collection of the AJC, AJC-GEN 10, RG 
347.17.10, box 294, YIVO. 
205
 Viktor Knapp and Tomáš Berman, Vrácení majetku pozbytého za okupace: Restituční zákon (Prague: V. 
Linhart, 1946).  
 198 
the past but “never betrayed the Czech and Slovak nations, participated in the fight for 
liberation, or suffered under the Nazi regime” could claim property return. If, for some 
reason, the return of property was impossible or the former owner lacked interest, 
compensation equivalent to the current value was an option.
206
 If the minister of justice 
(and the equivalent commissioner in Slovakia) declared the return of a particular property 
to be a danger to “important public interests” (důležité zájmy veřejné), such restitution 
would be halted. District courts were authorized to enforce restitution. Importantly for 
Slovak Jews, article IX stated that district courts could enforce recovery of property even 
when the local authority refused to annul national management.
207
  
In Slovakia, the pressure not to carry out restitution was overwhelming.
208
 Jewish 
leaders were possibly the only group that thought of the restitution law as necessary and 
fair (“not generous but fair”). 
 
The local institution charged with executing the laws and orders on restitution was 
not particularly eager to act… Offices in Slovakia boycotted the law or evaded it 
under the pretext of bureaucratic procedures. The Office of the Commissioner of 
Justice and the Courts, charged with enforcing the law, was particularly 
resourceful in circumventing it. Jewish enterprises and stores were not restored to 
their legal owners, but given over into the custody of a “national manager.” The 
manager could be the original owner, but this was not necessarily so. Cancellation 





In September 1946, the ÚSŽNO and the SRP listed the most conspicuous activities aimed 
at evading the restitution law. The commissioner of justice did not authorize the 
implementation of restitution. On the contrary, it issued a directive which violated the 
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sovereignty of the justice system by suggesting that courts should be “particularly 
cautious when handling” those articles of the restitution law which referred to settling a 
Jewish owner in his old property before the case was processed.
210
 The commissioner of 
finances did not return Jewish valuables stored in the Treasury. Neither did the 
commissioner of agriculture return land to the Jews. The commissioner of trade and 
industry informed the Slovak Jewish community that the Jews would never regain 
property as had been prescribed in the restitution law. Instead, the commissioner vowed 
to use the “public interest” clause to protect property from enforced restitution. Small 




 The story of Leopold Reiss from Trnava illustrates some of the pitfalls of the 
restitution of Jewish property in Slovakia in 1946, after the law had already been 
implemented in the Czech lands. Reiss left Slovakia for the United States in 1940 and 
returned in 1946.
212
 His parents and three brothers perished during the war. After his 
return, Reiss wanted to regain his parents’ house and their prewar enterprise – a hardware 
store attached to the house. Reiss easily received national management of his house but 
the store had already had three national managers, two of them partisans. As for the 
house, Reiss’ management remained on paper. He could not move in because it had 
already been occupied by one of the three national managers of the store and by an 
officer of the local gendarmerie.
213
 When Reiss brought up the restitution law from May 
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1946, he was told that the law was a mere piece of paper (restitučný zákon je iba kus 
papieru).
214
 As for the store, obviously, regaining it at this point was impossible without 
a decision from the commissioners in Bratislava. Reiss sent requests for intervention to 
the commissioners of industry and internal affairs. Internal correspondence between the 
departments of the office of the commissioner of internal affairs made it clear that Reiss 
had little or no chance of getting the store. The officials argued, first, that Reiss had gone 
to America and had no proof that he had participated in the fight against fascism and for 
the liberation of the Czechoslovak Republic.
215
 Second, he became an American citizen 
and, as a “foreigner” (cudziniec), he could not hold national management. Third, the 
restitution law that Reiss referred to had not yet been carried out in Slovakia (October 
1946). Fourth, his wife had never been nor was Slovak. And, finally, the store’s national 
managers were deserving partisans who had managed the store in exemplary fashion.
216
 
All that was said in October 1946 – almost half a year after the restitution law passed in 
Prague and two months after the Assembly of Partisans and anti-Jewish riots in 
Bratislava. 
The anti-Jewish riots, which followed the Assembly of Partisans (Partizánsky 
zjazd v Bratislave) held on August 2-5, 1946 in Bratislava, marked a significant setback 
in Slovak-Jewish efforts at restitution. Until the summer of 1946, agreements between 
national managers and former Jewish owners were not uncommon. Two parties made an 
arrangement, routinely approved by the commissioner of trade and industry, which led to 
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cancellation of national management of the property.
217
 After the Assembly and riots, the 
commissioner “explicitly forbade” the making of such agreements. In some cases, the 
commissioner allegedly reinstalled national management of the property, without 
sufficient substantiation.
218
 The same commissioner also annulled a directive allowing 
the return of houses which were “in the hands of the state.”
219
 Finally, he closed down the 
department which held all aryanization material and managed de-aryanization. Jewish 
employees of the department were asked to resign.
220
 
Most importantly, after the anti-Jewish violence in August 1946, the Board of 
Commissioners suspended the execution of the restitution law.
221
 The Board announced 
that the law required an executive decree and should be suspended in the meantime.
222
 
The Jewish community found the suspension to be an act without precedence in the 
history of the pre-Munich Republic and postwar Czechoslovakia. First, the restitution law 
did not require any executive decree and, second, the Board of Commissioners – as the 
executive power – had no prerogative to change the existing law.
223
 Finally, the Jewish 
leaders argued, interpretation of the restitution law was not the prerogative of the central 
executive and needed to be handled by the courts.
224
  
The Assembly of Partisans became a turning point in the history of restitution in 
postwar Slovakia and this was not by coincidence. Many partisans – veterans of the 
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Slovak uprising in 1944 – were granted national management of confiscated and 
abandoned property as a reward for service to the country. Obviously, restitution and the 
return of property to prewar owners meant significant material loss for these people. 
Attacks against Jews on the streets of Bratislava were attacks against those who 
threatened partisans’ economic well-being. Here, Gross’ thesis on the correlation between 
the population’s fear of Jews coming back to take their valuables and the heightening of 
violence against Jews finds conspicuous confirmation. The Slovak central authorities 
must have been fully aware of this connection if they suspended the restitution law 
immediately after the riots. Moreover, apparently national committees issued a statement 
in August 1946 (before the official suspension of the restitution law) to calm anxiety 
among partisans, “According to our credible information the restitution law will be 
changed shortly or annulled, thus a court is not authorized to pass resolutions 
(uznesenia)…and if a court passes such resolution we will never recognize it.”
225
 
Although the suspension was soon called off, it did create a lot of “bad blood” 
between the Slovak administration and the Jewish community.
226
 ÚSŽNO and SRP’s 
September report, drafted almost immediately after the anti-Jewish riots in Bratislava, 
questioned restitution in Slovakia. Land was not being returned nearly “per absolutum;” 
small enterprises had mostly been liquidated during the Slovak State so there was nothing 
to return; the majority of medium enterprises would not be returned due to the so-called 
public interest clause; big firms were nationalized; a great portion of houses would not be 
returned due to “public interest”; movables could not be returned because they had 
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disappeared or were bartered away or disposed of otherwise. How was it supposed to 
“undo the harm that the Slovak State did (napáchal) to the Jews?”
227
 Such practices, the 
authors argued, challenged the courts’ “moral right” to try fascists for the crime of Jewish 
expropriation. To stress the point, they even came up with an imaginary monologue of 
Tiso,  
You judge me because I have seized [property] for myself. But I say that I acted 
in agreement with the people’s will and today’s regime since you do not return 
[property] either; you merely threw us out of a saddle; and now you give Jewish 





This fragment shows that the Slovak Jewish organizations considered property 
restitution a major stumbling-block (kameň úrazu).229 For Slovak Jews, restitution was 
not merely a matter of material survival. Rather, it carried the symbolic load of blame and 
victimhood. Restitution was about undoing the harm inflicted by the Slovak State, about 
compensation for suffering and losses, about justice.
230
 The Slovak Jews believed that the 
SNR should be an un-doer since it took over power after the wartime Slovak polity 
becoming its successor and continuator. Although single Slovak politicians may have 
developed a sense of guilt for the “sins” of the Slovak regime, postwar Slovak politics as 
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a whole was not driven by this sentiment.
231
 Legal documentation from the time reveals 
that Slovak political elites were preoccupied with rebuilding the political equilibrium 
with Prague and a social equilibrium at home. The latter meant finding ways to minimize 
the demands of fighters against the regime and the resentment of its beneficiaries by 
rewarding those who fought against fascism without severely punishing those who served 
it. In this equation, there was very little room to hear and satisfy Jewish claims.   
Data collected by the ÚSŽNO and the SRP showed that by May 1947, there were 
still about twenty enterprises in Slovakia where national management had failed to resign 
despite the court’s decision on its annulment.
232
 Slovak Jewish leaders blamed the 
commissioner of trade and industry in Bratislava, which refused to fire national managers 
from the contested enterprises. Scattered across Slovakia, these businesses varied in size 
(employing from five to 135 workers) and profile. For example, Weltson in Bratislava 
produced straps and leather belts (seventy-six employees), Robert Quitt in Leopoldov 
made furniture (thirty employees) while Gustav Burg & Son in Bánovce traded lumber 
and plywood (five employees).
233 
 The story of Weltson is particularly well documented. Its owners, Armin and 
Alžbeta Brüll, perished during the war.
234
 Weltson was aryanized in 1940. After the 
liberation of 1945, the Slovak authorities established national management of the 
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business. At some point in 1946, a cooperative (verejna obchodna spoločnosť), two-
thirds made up of Brüll’s heirs, applied for restitution of the enterprise. On November 29, 
1946, a district court in Bratislava approved of Weltson’s restitution.
235
 On December 7, 
1946, the cooperative sent the restitution agreement to the commissioner of trade and 
commerce in Bratislava requesting annulment of the national management of Weltson. 
Along with the agreement, the cooperative sent a resolution of Weltson’s works council, 
signed by sixty workers, which demanded annulment of the national management. The 
resolution stated that only restitution could secure the undisrupted production and the 
execution of production plans and thus put an end to the current problems suffered under 
national management. The national manager of Weltson also joined the signatories of the 
resolution, declaring readiness to yield his position.
236
  
At this point, it seemed that Weltson’s restitution was merely a matter of time. 
However, the commissioner of trade and commerce complicated the process by refusing 
to nullify national management of Weltson, despite the decision of the court and the 
request of the works council. In April 1947, Weltson’s staff reapplied for the annulment 
of national management, claiming that the current situation was harmful to its morale.
237
 
Soon after, Secretary Jašik of Weltson’s trade union suddenly called for a meeting of all 
employees. At the meeting, Jašik posed a rhetorical question: what if Weltson should fall 
into the hands of capitalists or “people and the nation.”
238
 Jašik’s answer was that 
national management should be maintained until the state nationalized the works, “Will 
you decide or will Klingers, Wolfs, Schwarzs, Baruchs… tell you what to do?” (Klinger 










and Wolf were former owners while Schwarz and Baruch were imaginary Jews). Jašik 
dismissed comments that, in accordance with the law, Weltson would not be nationalized 
and he proceeded by reading a resolution against restitution of the company. The works 
council rejected Jašik’s resolution and decided to vote. When the first vote approved of 
restitution (twenty-six to tweny-five votes), Jašik called the vote invalid. The second vote 
ended in favor of Jašik’s resolution (twenty-nine to twenty-seven votes).
239
 Both votes 
were non-confidential (hand-raising). In any case, voting should not have had any effect 
on the status of the company. The court and the commissioner of trade and commerce 
were the only competent bodies in the matter.  
What Weltson’s case showed was that, first, state officials could disregard court 
decisions depending on their current interests disguised as “public interest” and, second, 
that nationalization loomed large over the restitution of Jewish property in Slovakia. Four 
nationalization decrees from October 1945 subjected all mining, power, iron, chemical, 
and steel plants to nationalization. Also nationalized were all other large plants with more 
than 150 or 800 employees (depending on the particular branch of industry), basic 
branches of the food industry with 150 to 500 employees including breweries and mills 
generating a specific amount of produce. All banks and all private insurance companies 
were to be nationalized regardless of their number of employees.
240
 Except for politically 
unreliable Germans and Magyars, all other owners would receive compensation which 
was established at the current value of the property.
241
 For Jewish owners of medium 
enterprises Czechoslovak nationalization seemed more lenient than its Polish counterpart, 
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which left in private hands only enterprises hiring less than fifty workers. Nationalization 
in Czechoslovakia, however, was to extend after the 1948 coup d’état, doing great 
damage to owners of newly restituted property. 
Overall, up to May 1946, only a small number of businesses had been restored to 
previous Jewish owners.
242
 In July 1947, JOINT Director for Czechoslovakia Israel 
Jacobson reported, 
 
Many of the small businesses have been returned, but very few outright. In most 
cases, the owner has been appointed national administrator. In many instances, the 
former “aryanizator” is still a partner in the business…. In many cases, where 
individual houses have been returned to the former owners, or to their heirs, it has 
been almost impossible for these people to obtain possession of these houses for 





According to the estimates of the chairman of the WJC compensation department, 
Robinson, about 2,000 claimants had applied for restitution by the early months of 
1947.
244
 Jacobson cited 1,500 cases which required financial aid in initiating the 
restitution proceedings in the Czech lands and Slovakia.
245
 By December 1947, homes 
and small farms were being returned while the large farms “and some other properties 
were still subject to conflicting and complicated procedures.”
246
 By and large, a 
significant portion of Jewish belongings remained the property of the state. For example, 
                                                 
242
 JOINT Weekly Review, 4 October 1946, Collection of the JOINT, File 644 J6 A1, JOINT Archives.  
243
 Quarterly report on Czechoslovakia (December 1, 1946-March 31, 1947), submitted by the JOINT 
director for Czechoslovakia, Israel J. Jacobson, 7 July 1947, Collection 45/54, File 200, JOINT Archives. 
Also see abstract of Jacobson’s report, received on July 10, 1947, Collection 45/54, File 200, JOINT 
Archives. 
244
 Report on stolen Jewish property by Chairman of the WJC Department of Compensations Nehemiah 
Robinson (in Polish), Collection of the CKŻP, 303/XIII/190, pages 65-9, AŻIH. 
245
 The average cost was estimated at 5,000 crowns. Letter from the JOINT office in Prague to the JOINT 
office in Paris, 18 April 1947, Collection of the JOINT no. 45/54, File 209, JOINT Archives. 
246
 JOINT Weekly Review, 26 December 1947, Collection of the JOINT, File 644 J6 A1, JOINT Archives. 
 208 
in 1947, ninety percent of houses still belonged to the state.
247
 Yet, restitution of Jewish 
property in the Slovak countryside must have surpassed that in Polish villages and small 
towns. When describing the attacks of Ukrainian troops on northeastern Slovak villages 
in 1947, Keleti wrote, “They began to murder the few Jews who returned after the terrible 
sufferings to villages in east Slovakia, where they owned small flour mills, village saws, 
small shops and inns, to continue their daily work, which was interrupted during the 
Slovak State.”
248
 Similar Jewish returns to mills, saws, and inns in provincial central and 
eastern Poland in 1945-47 were impossible, except for isolated and short-lived cases. 
In the meantime, Slovak Jewish leaders pushed for effective restitution by 
illustrating the limited role of Jewish restitution in the overall economy.
249
 The number of 
Jewish enterprises before the war reached 10,000 of which 8,000 were liquidated and 
only 2,000 aryanized, making the number of aryanizers insignificant.
250
 Only relative 
progress had been made in the restitution of communal property. For observers abroad, it 
seemed that property would be gradually handed over to individuals, particularly to those 
who enjoyed “special priorities on the grounds of political reliability, military service 
abroad, their status as victims of political and racial persecution, etc.”
 251
  
By 1947, a considerable portion of Jewish property in Slovakia and the Czech 
lands remained heirless, meaning it had never been claimed by former owners or their 
heirs. The deadline for filing property claims was later (June 17, 1949) than in Poland. 
While the deadline did not cause much anxiety or controversy, the fate of unclaimed 
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property did. The Jewish community in Czechoslovakia (Czech and Slovak) wished to 
claim heirless property for public Jewish purposes.
252
 They believed that heirless property 
should be used for the benefit of the Jewish community, especially since the government 
had already mentioned such a course of action. In 1946, for example, the ministry of 
social welfare intended to create a fund to manage heirless property (“the administration 
of which was to be represented equitably”) which would provide for “the rehabilitation of 
the victims of Nazism and social services for them generally, the victims of racial 
persecution to have first claims.”
253
 The Jewish organizations in Bohemia, Moravia, and 
Slovakia put pressure on the government to prepare a separate law on heirless property 
“in the spirit of the original governmental decision” and in accord with the international 
treaties on reparations.
254
 However, the Jewish organizations were not invited to the 
governmental session at which a special amendment was drafted which allocated all 
heirless property to the Currency Liquidation Fund – established to complete currency 
reform (reimbursing people whose accounts were blocked immediately after 
liberation).
255
 Despite Jewish protests, parliament passed the establishment of the Fund 
with the amendment in July 1947. The president signed the law.
256
 The government 
declared that the funds would not be used “in a manner contrary to the Republic’s 
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obligations” laid out in international treaties.
257
 That, however, was a mere verbal 
declaration which did not guarantee the Jewish communities access to the funds. In a line 
of defense, the parliamentary committee for budgets allegedly stated that  
 
The establishment of a separate fund for Jewish survivors might create the 
impression that the Jewish part of the population received far reaching 
preferential treatment which could give rise to antisemitic feeling, and that the 







Poland and Slovakia were not exceptional in a larger European perspective in 
terms of handling restitution. Despite differences between the East and the West (more 
profiteers of Jewish property and a tentative character of restitution due to projected 
nationalization in the East), both parts of the European continent failed to deliver 
“material justice” during the first two years after the war. In 1947, Milton Winn from the 
AJC prepared a report on the status of restitution of Jewish property in Europe. Having 
conducted surveys in Greece, Turkey, and Czechoslovakia, Winn concluded, 
 
First, it became evident that as the war and the toll it took of Jewish lives and 
Jewish property recedes into the background of the thinking of those in power in 
the various countries, and as these political people and forces became more and 
more concerned with their present political situation, less and less energy and 
thought is being devoted to the narrower Jewish problems of civil rights and 
property rights. Particularly in the field of property rights, conflicting interests 
have arisen during the passage of time. Those who have become possessed of title 
to property, being in possession resist any attempt to restore such property to 
those who may be rightfully entitled to it. This resistance manifests itself in 
obstructions of remedial legislation, adverse pressures on those in charge of 
implementing the return of seized property and active opposition to efforts made 
to secure these rights. This opposition often finds its basis in religious and racial 
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discrimination. Second, it became evident that the initial impetus toward 
restitution was, on the whole, carried out in broad legislation, but that the force of 
this impetus has become nullified in the process of execution. The inevitable 
technical delays, lack of clarification, the raising of rather difficult legal points, 
and, again, the undoubted bias coloring judicial and administrative decisions, has 
brought about a situation where, in many instances, the broad purposes of the 
original legislation have been defeated. Third, and this affects all local efforts to 
bring about a proper solution is the fact that the indigenous Jewish groups in the 
countries involved find themselves in a weak political and economic situation so 
that their representations are disregarded. Being without power, they are denied 
access to the higher political levels which might cure some of the unfavorable 
conditions, or, if they are granted such access, are put off with vague promises 
which are never really implemented or followed though.
259
   
 
Similar to Slovakia, the French legislature did not recognize Jews as a distinct subject 
minority and thus was hesitant to recognize Jewish distinct losses. The government was 
fixed on reintegrating Jews into society and hence treated them as ”one among many of 
Vichy’s numerous victims.”
260
 As a result, the legislation was incomplete. Bureaucratic 
slowdowns added to the misery. However, in contrast to Slovakia, these obstacles only 
delayed but not ultimately prevented the French Jews from effective restitution.
261
 
In Poland and Slovakia, as in France, the central authorities were apprehensive of 
restituting Jewish property as it led to “grave societal problems.”
262
 Fear of a rise in 
antisemitism and violence led to the government’s cautious approach to property 
restoration. In Slovakia, commentators on the pogrom in Topoľčany (September 1945) 
and in Bratislava (August 1946) directly linked both events to restitution of Jewish 
property. After the Topoľčany pogrom, the Bulletin of the Czechoslovak ministry of 
information published the following statement of the ministry for the interior,  
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Investigations by security organs brought to light that the population of the 
Topoľčany district had been disturbed, long before the demonstrations, by untrue 
rumors disseminated by former members of the Hlinka Guards, of Hlinka’s 
Clerical Party, and by “Aryanizers” of Jewish property. The obvious reason for 
the deliberate policy of these reactionary elements was their fear for the property 
which they had gained by so-called aryanization during the clerical regime. They 
continued their efforts to force returned owners to leave the town, by instigating 
anti-Jewish demonstrations. By these means, the Hlinka “Aryanizers” wanted to 





A year later, after the Bratislava riots in August 1946, an internal memorandum of the 
commissioner of internal affairs listed restitution as the number one cause of antisemitism 
in Slovakia.
264
 Not coincidentally, riots broke out during the Assembly of Partisans who 
constituted a large section of the national managers of property in Slovakia.      
As for Poland, the US Army Sergeant Joseph Naton, stationed in Germany, 
reported in July 1945, 
  
The attitude of the newly liberated Polish people is not surprising… Although 
perhaps only one out of every hundred Jews in Poland remains alive today, there 
are good economic reasons for not welcoming them back. Many Jews have claims 
to property now held by Poles, who either bought or took it from the Germans, 
who had confiscated it from the Jews. The Poles do not want to relinquish it. 
Effort to rehabilitate Polish Jews economically only increases existing sentiments 




Even if Naton’s report is considered unreliable (his comments were based on second-
hand knowledge acquired from Polish-Jewish survivors), there is plenty of evidence 
proving that his was a widespread conviction at the time. Minister of Labor and Social 
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Welfare Jan Stańczyk, for example, explained anti-Jewish violence as the activity of 
“bands” or “gangs” which killed Jews because they “expected them to have some 
movable possessions like money, gold and jewels” and, by “the fact that the Poles took 
over former Jewish shops and factories when they were abandoned by the German 
administrators and of course are very reluctant to give them back.”
266
 The JOINT’s 
correspondents in Poland also came to the conclusion that, in addition to the legacy of six 
years of Nazi propaganda, “the instinctive resentment against the mere idea of restitution 
enhanced the antisemitic feeling of the people.”
267
 At a meeting of the CKŻP, only six 
days after the pogrom in Kielce, when the participants were still grappling with what had 
happened and why, property restitution came up at least three times in the 
conversation.
268
 The CKŻP saw property claims and the pogrom in Kielce as interrelated.   
Jan T. Gross, in his book Fear, showed that the conflict surrounding property was 
a central incentive for anti-Jewish violence in the immediate years after the war. Gross 
argued that fear of losing profits obtained during the war and calming one’s own 
conscience by eliminating victims and witnesses stood at the root of most violent attacks 
against Jews after the war. Cited evidence from Poland and Slovakia seems to confirm 
his hypothesis. Yet, greed, and fear of unmasking past crimes can not fully explain this 
tenacious clinging to newly acquired goods even at the expense of murder. Without 
grasping the degree of poverty endured by the peasants after liberation, at least in the 
most devastated parts of the country, one can not understand the level of anxiety over a 
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piece of belonging. The following description comes from the first-hand experience of a 
group of Quakers – the Religious Society of Friends – who came to Poland in the end of 
September 1945 for a ten-day inspection trip across the country.  
 
Stopnice is a town on a provincial road running from Tarnów north to Opatów 
(east from Kraków)… Stopnice was lost and retaken alternately by the Germans 
and the Russians several times in the course of the fighting. It is ninety-five 
percent destroyed by the artillery fire and aerial bombing to which it was 
subjected. It once had a population of about 8,000, 6,000 of whom were Jews. Not 
a Jew has returned, but there are now about a thousand Poles back, and to find 
shelter they must live in holes, in cellars with two and three inches of water, in 
box-like shelters with all cooking arrangements out of doors. Their bed clothing 
has gotten wet in the recent rains and is rotting and molding… The agricultural 
land around Stopnice is still heavily mined…. In addition this whole region has 
been overrun by a plague of mice. In the fall of 1944 the fighting made it 
impossible to harvest the crops and the mice got such bounteous food that they 
multiplied …and this spring and summer they have eaten the seed, and what they 
did not get there they have eaten as it grew. … The roads by which Stopnice is 
reached are terrible and trucks rarely get there. The only food these people are 
able to get is potatoes which they have gotten by taking a sack and walking ten or 
fifteen kilometers and begging. There is a little bread and other food in the open 
market in town, but the people have almost no money so they cannot buy at the 
high prices it costs. Their food is principally potatoes, salt, and water… A small 
shipment of marmalade and sugar was sent to these wretched people who had 
nothing to put it on. … After a trip of inspection that took us into cellar after 
cellar until one could scarcely bear it to go further, these people had the audacity 
to tell us, “But we are not as bad off as the villages.” By villages they meant the 






If any “formerly Jewish” house had still been in this town, the residents would have taken 
it in a heartbeat. If the Jewish owner had come back to restore his or her property, 
lynching would not have been out of the imaginable, especially considering that violence 
in postwar Poland was a daily reality, a norm rather than aberration.   
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It would, surely, be a truism, or even a sign of naturalism, were one to posit that 
these horrific acts merely attest to the fact that violence (or the use of force) is an 
anthropological constant, an eternal feature of human nature and the human 
condition, one to have puzzled generations of historians, ethnographers, 
philosophers, and politicians. Rather, however eternal or universal violence might 
be, it also seems curiously historical and specific, insofar as every generation, 
every historical period, produces its own sociopolitically determined forms of 




Caught in a moment of radical transformation in politics, economy, culture, and 
social relations, Poland and Slovakia struggled to define new categories of inclusion and 
exclusion. The criteria of belonging to national communities and civil societies were 
fundamentally redefined and reframed during the first years after the war. The ethnic 
violence which left thousands of people dead in the name of ethnic purification appeared 
to have been an intrinsic part of the process. As I will argue in the latter part of this 
chapter, ethnic violence should not be reduced to a mere side effect or an “inevitable” 
consequence of the political and social change involved in the ethnic redefinition of a 
country. Instead, violence should be examined as a vehicle of ethnic reconfiguration. In 
fact, it was violence that reinforced and crystallized the rigid categorization of people 
along highly exclusionary ethnic lines.  
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This chapter has two main analytical foci. First, I intend to illustrate the startling 
distinction between the ubiquity of violence, in general, and ethnic violence, in particular, 
in everyday life in postwar Poland and the relative paucity thereof in Slovakia, with the 
notable exception of violence against Slovak Jews. Ethnic violence dominated the Polish, 
not the Slovak, landscape. I should clarify what I mean by ethnic violence. The mere fact 
that violence occurs between two peoples of two different ethnic affiliation does not 
“naturally” render this violence “ethnic.” Instead, I understand ethnic violence, following 
the definition given by Rogers Brubaker, as 
 
Perpetrated across ethnic lines … in which the putative ethnic difference is coded 
– by perpetrators, targets, influential third parties, or analysts – as having been 
integral rather than incidental to the violence, that is in which the violence is 






 Ethnic violence as defined above predominated in postwar Poland. Neighborly violence 
on ethnic grounds against Germans, Ukrainians, and Jews was common. In contrast, in 
Slovakia, the two main ethnic minorities (Hungarians and Germans) were spared physical 
attacks. Jews were the only minority targeted due to their different ethnicity.  
Second, I propose to describe how centers of power – the official media and other 
sources of authority – interpreted and represented ethnic violence for their own ends.
3
 In 
order to do so, I will examine “the discourses of violence” in Poland and Slovakia. In 
other words, I will illustrate what Paul Brass defines as “the ways in which participants 
and observers – local and external, media, politicians and authorities, journalists and 
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academics – seek to explain incidents of violence.”
4
 The comparative aspect of this 
subject will be particularly interesting since, despite apparent similarities in social and 
political frameworks, the interpretative mechanisms of anti-Jewish violence were subtly 
different in the two countries due to differences in the motives of the controlling political 
interests. For example, specific cases of violence, like the Topoľčany pogrom, were 
defined as ethnic, whereas others, like the Kraków pogrom, were represented as a non-
ethnic occurrence in order to meet the particular interests of the interpreters. Classifying 
violence as ethnic or non-ethnic was inevitably a political act. 
The violence discussed below, almost without exception, occurred on the 
boundary between public and private spaces. Much of the redefinition of ethnic 
boundaries in postwar Poland and Slovakia was the state’s doing – a part of grand 
political projects controlled by the state (like repolonization and reslovakization 
discussed elsewhere). Indeed, state agencies often inspired and approved ethnic 
violence.
5
 At the same time, however, the focal spaces for ethnic violence are rarely 
military fields and state institutions but rather streets and corners of towns and villages, 
country roads, forest paths, and trains. Hence, this middle ground between the public and 
the private will remain the central backdrop of this chapter.  
Also, all the acts of violence presented in this chapter can be classified as physical 
“exertion of physical force so as to injure or abuse; …intense, turbulent, or furious and 
often destructive action or force.”
6
 In the majority of cases, however, the ramifications of 
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violence extended beyond physical brutality. After all, even the fear of possible 
victimization is a subtle yet invasive form of abuse. Verbal violence also obviously 




Violence against Jews, in Poland and Slovakia between 1945 and 1948, stands at 
the center of this chapter. However, the analysis of postwar antisemitism would be 
incomplete without presenting the context, namely the problem of ethnic violence in 
general at the time. This contextualization provides a fresh analytical perspective on anti-
Jewish violence by placing antisemitic outbreaks in the larger picture of contemporary 
social dynamics. Discussing brutality against other ethnic minorities conveys how 
ubiquitous violence was in postwar Poland.  
The most striking example of an ethnic group victimized solely due to its 
ethnicity in postwar Poland and Czechoslovakia was the German group. The following 
emotional confession of Alice Braun, a Jewish woman from Slovakia, reflected the 
general sentiment toward Germans, not only among Jews, but also many Poles, Czechs, 
and Slovaks after liberation,   
 
I was just terribly upset and I wanted revenge for my parents. I just wanted to 
have revenge, and, coming back to that, when I was in Nachod I still reproached 
myself. I couldn’t do it I guess, when we were in Nachod the Czech people told us: 
now, you girls have the [revolver? revenge?] The Russians came already and they 
had about thirty or forty SS-men in the brewery, and they said to us: we give you 
guns and you can go and shoot anyone you want. And none of us went. And I 
reproach myself because that much I owe to my mother and my father that I 
should have killed at least one German. And I didn’t do it. I hated them because 
they did that to my parents. I hated them for myself too but that was nothing 
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comparing to what they did to the ones whom they killed, and it bothers me like 
anything to this day that I didn’t do anything about it.
7 
 
To people like Braun, the term “German” came to symbolize absolute evil during the six 
years of the war. Fresh memories of the German occupation and the crimes committed by 
the Nazi regime left the oppressed with an acute sense of humiliation and helplessness, 
which exploded into calls for justice and harsh punishment. In extreme cases, individuals 
viewed personal revenge as the only way to overcome their fury and grief.  
Either way, as a call for justice or a call for revenge, anti-German rhetoric 
dominated private and public discourse. As Edmund Dmitrów established in his path-
breaking study of Polish attitudes to Germans in 1945-48, there was  
 
an exceptional convergence and uniformity of views on the German question in 
Polish political thought of various shades as well as in official propaganda; this 
uniformity was even more exceptional under circumstances of fierce political 





Dmitrów’s analysis of contemporary memoirs, literature, songwriting, radio shows, and 
press material showed that the majority of Poland’s residents were of the same mind. 
Anti-German resentment served as a unifying factor among Poles after the war. In the 
intimacy of a household, on the street, and in government chambers, antigermanism 
bridged ethnic and social divisions.
9
 Indeed, the one common viewpoint shared by state 
policy-makers and the public was the one concerning the so-called German problem. The 
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harassment of Germans had the social and political stamp of approval to the extent that 
when a Jewish woman, Hanna Zajtman, was beaten during the Kraków pogrom she 
wondered, “Why were they beating me? I’m not a German.”
10
 Apparently, beating 
Germans had acquired the status of something almost “natural,” allowed to happen. 
Deputy Prime Minister Władysław Gomułka was clear, “Germans will be 
severely punished. Responsibility must be borne by the whole German nation, which in 
its mass bowed down to Hitlerism and tolerated the Hitlerite reign.”
11
 The notion of 
collective German responsibility, regardless of individual responsibility, reflected the 
most dominant theme in postwar anti-German rhetoric. The Germans were assumed to be 
guilty by virtue of being Germans. State-promoted punishment included expropriation, 
expulsion, and imprisonment. Each of these methods used violence as a means to an end 
and each involved ordinary people in its execution. Among these practices, imprisonment 
best illustrated the degree of social sanction for the use of violence against Germans in 
the aftermath of the war in Poland. The creation of prisons and labor camps for German 
civil prisoners and prisoners of war and subsequent formation of cadres opened jobs for 
those willing to take advantage of the new anti-German regulations.
12
  
Jerzy Kochanowski, in his study W Polskiej Niewoli (In Polish Captivity), 
established that more than 180 camps for German prisoners of war operated in postwar 
Poland.
13
 The main labor camps were scattered across central and western Poland in 
Jaworzno, Potulice, Warszawa, Sikawa, Gronów, and Mielęcin. The Polish authorities 
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often adopted former Nazi labor camps located in western Poland like Gleiwitz (Polish: 
Gliwice), Potulice, Lamsdorf, (Łambinowice), Schwientochlowitz (Świętochłowice), 
among others. Bernadetta Nitschke found that there was the total of 235 penal institutions 
which housed more than 100,000 Germans in postwar Poland.
14
  
The mortality rate was high in those institutions. In Lamsdorf alone, between 
August 1945 and the fall of 1946, 6,480 Germans perished there, including 623 
children.
15
 A list of the causes of death included “starvation, disease, hard labor, physical 
injury, infection, and execution.”
16
 The majority of the interrogated and tortured people 
were not guilty of involvement in the Nazi party or Nazi military apparatus. However, 
individual innocence had no bearing on the proceedings. Putting Germans in prisons 
facilitated bloody personal revenge. Helga Hirsch argued that often young Jewish 
survivors made up managerial cadres in the camps for Germans.
17
 Salomon Morel, the 
commander of the Świętochłowice camp, was the most notorious example.18  
The former victims of the Nazi regime perceived the use of violence as one way 
to return to “normal” life. Whether revenge helped or further scarred the individuals and 
communities involved is impossible to assess. It is certain, however, that it intensified 
negative stereotypes featuring Polishness and Jewishness as the antonym of Germaneness. 
The constant memorializing and remembering of German oppression during the first 
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years after the war fostered dislike and fear of Germany; it showcased antigermanism as 
essential for “true Polishness” and Germans as the archetypal “other.” Hence, the 
violence in the immediate years after the war fixed the impregnability of the boundaries 
between Germans, and Poles and Jews, between being a German and being a Pole or a 
Jew. 
Similar dynamics developed in Polish-Ukrainian relations. The Polish historian 
Grzegorz Motyka argued that in the beginning of the conflict (1943), the Ukrainian 
population helped their Polish neighbors as much as they could.
19
 The high number of 
mixed marriages also encouraged a neighborly climate. Unfortunately, with the 
intensification of propaganda as well as the aggravation of bloodshed, Catholic Polish 
speakers (taken for Poles) and Orthodox and Greek Catholic Ukrainian speakers (taken 
for Ukrainians) became more and more suspicious of each other. Deep-seated resentment 
against the Polish colonization of the region (dating back to the sixteenth century) and 
hunger for land were the major roots of the conflict. The abyss inevitably widened, not 
surprisingly, since the Polish-Ukrainian violence surpassed in cruelty anything that 
happened to the Germans in Poland after the war. The Polish-Ukrainian conflict was also 
more visible than the anti-German violence. While the beating and torture of Germans 
took place mostly in prisons in western Poland, Polish-Ukrainian hostility spread in the 
open, in the squares and streets of villages and towns in southeastern Poland.  
In the years 1943-47, the countryside and the major cities of Lublin, Rzeszów, 
and Przemyśl were scenes of murderous ethnic conflicts between Poles and Ukrainians 
(see chapter 2). A survivor of the Volhynia massacres, Zygmunt Stański, recalled events 
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in the village of Poryck-Pawłówka in the summer of 1943. On July 11, 1943, Ukrainian 
military units attacked a crowd gathered at a local Roman Catholic church, slaughtering 
the majority of them. On the next day, the attackers came back to finish the “cleansing” 
of the village. About 500 people were murdered.
20
 Stański also gave shocking testimony 
about the fate of mixed families. He described an incident involving a young Ukrainian 
man whose mother was Polish. The man allegedly received an order to kill his mother. 
Before executing the order, the son communicated the plan to his father, a Ukrainian. 
After failed attempts to dissuade him, the father killed his son and took his wife and 
remaining four children out of the city.
21
  
The village of Pawłokoma (near Rzeszów) became synonymous with the most 
notorious murders of Ukrainians. In January 1945, Poles in Pawłokoma blamed the local 
Ukrainians for the kidnap and murder of nine Polish residents. In revenge, on March 1-3, 
1945, the AK gathered Pawłokoma’s Ukrainian population in the Orthodox church to 
interrogate them about who had killed the nine Poles. When nobody confessed, the 
Ukrainian men were executed at the local cemetery while the women and children were 
forced to leave the village.
22
 Overall, the Home Army (AK) unit killed close to 360 
Pawłokoma’s Ukrainians.
23
 More than a month later, after a series of murders of 
Ukrainians in Dynów, Łubno, and other places, the UPA chose the village of Borownica 
(near Przemyśl) for reprisals. On April 21, 1945, around 4:00 A.M., the Ukrainian 
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partisans surrounded the village and killed dozens of Poles.
24
 They burnt the place and 
expelled the remaining Polish population. These incidents were by no means isolated. 
The cycle of violence persisted, leaving thousands dead, Poles and Ukrainians, as well as 
forcing the remaining Ukrainian population out of the country.
25
  
The conflict intensified at the turn of 1944/45 when a wave of persecutions and 
murders of local Ukrainians rolled through the Przemyśl and Rzeszów regions in 
southern Poland. When the Polish state started deportations of Ukrainians from eastern 
Poland, the UPA changed its tactics from murdering civilians to burning villages. This 
shift stemmed from a change in the group’s priorities; the major goal now was to hinder 
state-organized deportations. Transfers of population from Poland to the Soviet Ukraine 
and vice versa in early 1945, in particular, became scenes of enforcement and brutality. 
Special police units kept threatening local Ukrainian inhabitants, destroying their 
property, and often killing the obstinate. Meanwhile, the UPA civilian and military units 
fought back by attacking Polish police, destroying railroads and bridges, and 
assassinating members of the resettlement commissions.
26
 In the process, thousands of 
civilians were killed.   
In Slovakia, in contrast to Poland and the rest of the postwar Czechoslovak 
Republic, the Germans were relatively safe.
27
 Soňa Gabzdilová and Milan Olejník 
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established that violence against Germans was absent from the postwar social 
landscape.
28
 Instead, it was common to find cases of ordinary Slovaks challenging the 
state controlled persecution of German civilians by actively supporting and helping 
them.
29
 Sympathy for the German minority stemmed mainly from the character of the 
German presence in Slovakia during the war. Lenient Nazi policies toward their Slovak 
ally, as well as a relatively short period of direct military occupation, contributed to the 
virtual calm over the German question in postwar Slovakia. Also, numerically the Slovak 
Germans were hardly significant. Fifty-seven thousand Germans in Slovakia constituted 
merely 0.17 percent of the total population of 3,459,000 in 1945.
30
 However, when 
considering these statistics, it should be noted, that numbers do not necessarily generate 
particular social responses. Slovak Jews, for example, who were also outnumbered by the 
rest of the population, still became a target of violence. 
Rather than Germans, it was Hungarians who were resented in postwar 
Slovakia.
31
 Political announcements and decrees targeting the Hungarian minority in 
Czechoslovakia were of necessity contained to the Slovak lands since 600,000 to 650,000 
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of 700,000 Czechoslovakia’s Magyars lived in southeastern Slovakia in 1946.
32
 Not 
surprisingly, political and social conflict with Hungary and the Hungarian minority was 
focused in this area. The governments in Prague and Bratislava found the Magyars – like 
the Germans in the Czech lands – collectively guilty of the betrayal of the Czechoslovak 
Republic (for instance, responsibility for the pre-Munich crisis, the Munich Agreement, 
and the Vienna Arbitration) and support of fascism (for instance, the collaboration with 
Nazi Germans and violence against Czechs and Slovaks during the war).
33
  
The disfranchisement, expropriation, and expulsion of Hungarians had wide 
popular support in Slovakia. Public opinion surveys revealed broad dislike of Magyars 
among the Slovak population in 1948 when the Czechoslovak government was working 
on radical transformation of its policies concerning the Magyar population, including 
reinstatement of their civil and political rights. Almost half the respondents (forty-seven 
percent) did not agree that “the Magyars should obtain civil and political rights in 
Slovakia” whereas thirty-five percent did agree.
34
 Similarly, fifty-five percent of the 
Slovak respondents approved of the expulsion of Magyars from the country.
35
 Barnovský 
observed that, overall, anti-Magyar policies had the greatest support among youth 
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(eighteen to twenty-nine years of age) and the least among farmers, thirty percent of 
whom gave neutral (“do not know”) answers.
36
 
At the same time, as the Hungarian historian Kalman Janics observed, anti-
Hungarian sentiments did not translate into violence, “Certain calmness reigned for 
awhile in Slovakia. There was no lynching of Hungarians. It took the harsh measures 
decreed from above to arouse mass nationalist hatred.”
37
 As the years went by, the anti-
Hungarian campaign intensified but, even with the harsh laws issued by the president and 
the SNR, Hungarians did not suffer cruelty similar to that experienced by Ukrainians in 
Poland or by Germans in the Czech lands. I have not found any evidence of neighbor-
inflicted persecutions of the Hungarian population in Slovakia after the war. Only en 
passant did Janics mention “the nationalist excesses, not uncommon in the Danube 
region…intended to intimidate the Hungarians – or manifestations of pent-up 
revolutionary passions, heightened by the presence of the Red Army as liberators” in the 
beginning of 1945.
38
 But he did not expand on it, nor did he offer any references for these 
“chaotic events, considered to be as nothing unusual under postwar conditions.”
39
 
Nonetheless, the Hungarian minority in Slovakia was not entirely shielded from 
physical violence. Expulsions and confiscation of property organized and executed by the 
state in its attempts at redrawing ethnic lines in Czechoslovakia involved psychological 
and physical abuse. Indeed, to force someone from his or her property was not a peaceful 
practice. Uncertainty, made worse by psychological intimidation, must have been 
widespread among the Magyar minority. Slovak Hungarians, who waited day and night 
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in anticipation of the notice to leave the country and then actually were forced to pack 
and move, were also victims of violence. 
To summarize, the most striking difference was the omnipresence of ethnic 
violence in postwar Poland as opposed to its absence in Slovakia. This observation, 
however, is only relevant to ethnic violence which occurred on the street, “among 
neighbors,” without direct or indirect instigation by state agencies. In terms of state 
policies on ethnic issues, Poland and Czechoslovakia were similar. Brutal expulsions, 
expropriations, and detentions of Germans and Magyars in Slovakia, Germans in the 
Czech lands, and Germans and Ukrainians in Poland were equally violent state 
interventions into people’s lives. It was the treatment of ethnic minorities by their 
neighbors that greatly outdid, in quantity and quality, the brutality of anything that 
happened to individual Germans and Magyars in Slovakia. The only people who were 




In 1945-48, acts of violence against Jews – attacks on streets and roads, in 
apartments, and on trains – occurred in both countries, although on a different scale. 
Large violent outbreaks, like the pogroms in Kraków, Kielce, and Topoľčany, were 
sporadic, only dotting the history of the first three years after the war in Poland and 
Slovakia. Kersten pointed to the wavelike character of violence targeting Polish Jews 
after the war.
40
 March, April, and August 1945 were the periods of the highest intensity 
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of “anti-Jewish excesses” in Poland.
41
 Indeed, in March 1945 alone, according to data 
from the ministry of public security, more than a hundred Jewish survivors were killed 
and nine seriously wounded.
42
 The safety of Jewish returnees further deteriorated in June 
and August 1945, when violent outbreaks occurred in Lublin, Rzeszów, Działoszyce 
(Kielce province), and Przemyśl.   
In Lublin, on June 9, 1945, a few men broke into a hospital run by nuns where 
Jewish patients were admitted. They killed one person and wounded another one.
43
 In 
Rzeszów, three days later, on the morning of June 12, 1945, a police detachment, having 
been informed of an alleged ritual murder, searched Jewish apartments for a child’s 
corpse. Rumors of ritual murder (“confirmed” by the police search) and the subsequent 
detention of the tenants attracted a crowd on the streets. People cursed the Jews as the 
police escorted them to the police station; passers-by threw stones, plundered the 
apartments, and beat up a few Jewish residents.
44
 Eventually, the provincial police 
commander (Wojewódzka Komenda Milicji) ordered the immediate release of the 
detained Jews without interrogation. I have no information concerning further 
proceedings in the case. In Działoszyce, on the night of June 16, 1945, a group of people 
threw grenades into buildings occupied by Jewish returnees. Of approximately 150 Jews 
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residing in the town at the time, five were killed and fifty wounded.
45
 In Przemyśl, as in 
Rzeszów, rumors of a child allegedly saved from being kidnapped by a Jewish woman, 
circulated around the city. Fortunately, no major public disturbances occurred.
46
  
August 1945 marked another period of ethnic tensions in the geographical 
quadrangle of the southeastern and central provinces between Kielce, Kraków, Lublin, 
and Rzeszów. The Kraków pogrom was the most intense and most widely publicized but 
by no means an isolated event at the time. As early as the beginning of the month, in 
Radom (near Kielce) and Przemyśl, underground organizations distributed leaflets 
demanding that the Jews leave both towns before August 15, 1945. In the meantime, four 
Jewish survivors were killed in Radom.
47
 Jews were victimized in Opatów (Kielce 
province), Sanok (near Rzeszów and Przemyśl), Lublin, Grójec, Gniewoszów (near 
Lublin), Raciąż (north of Warszawa), just to mention a few.48 The most astonishing, 
however, was an assault in Rabka. On the night of August 12, 1945, someone hurled a 
hand grenade into a home for sick Jewish orphans (sierociniec). The house was under 
gunfire for about two hours. Nobody was injured but the orphanage was soon closed 
down.
49
 On August 13, in Chełm (near Lublin) anti-Jewish riots lasted eight hours. A few 
people were beaten and their property plundered.
50
 In central (Łódź, Radomsko), northern 
(Bydgoszcz), and southcentral Poland (Tokarnia near Kielce, Skaryszew, and Zwoleń 
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near Radom), as well as in Silesia (Czeladź near Katowice) rumors of ritual murder 
circulated, aggravating the climate of tension and insecurity.
51
  
After a few relatively calm months, another wave of violence occurred in 
February and April 1946.
52
 According to data collected by Kersten, in April 1946 alone, 
approximately 300 Jewish survivors were killed in Poland.
53
 But it was the pogrom in 
Kielce on July 4, 1946 that became a household name in the master narrative of 
antisemitism in postwar Poland.
54
 This came to symbolize the peak of anti-Jewish 
violence, for it took the lives of forty-two people and pushed tens of thousands of others 
to leave the country. On July 1, 1946, an eight-year old boy disappeared. Two days later, 
he turned up alive, telling a story of Jews holding him in a basement. On July 4, police 
searched the Jewish repatriates’ shelter at 7 Planty Street where the boy had been 
allegedly detained. A crowd gathered as the policemen had spread rumors about 
kidnapped Polish children on their way to the house. Since “men in uniform” spread the 
news about Jews imprisoning Polish children, the public considered it “the truth.” 
Initially, the crowd merely observed the police searching the house. But when the third 
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police patrol, accompanied by the army, entered the house and brought the Jewish tenants 
out to the street, the crowd became increasingly aggressive. The action of the police 
triggered violence. The rioters beat the Jews, threw them out of the windows, and 
plundered the buildings. By the end of the day, forty-two people were killed, many more 
injured. Sixty-two attackers were arrested. 
While hundreds of Jews were killed across Poland, in Slovakia, the numbers were 
much lower. No local pogroms reached the intensity of Kielce.
55
 I have no definitive 
estimate of how many Jews were injured in violence in Slovakia after the war. Based on 
available data, I speculate that at least twenty people were killed and at least one hundred 
injured in 1945-48 across Slovakia. Nonetheless, given the relative absence of violent 
outbreaks against Magyars and Germans and the generally low level of brutality in daily 
life in comparison to Poland, instances of violence against Slovak Jews were 
conspicuous. In 1945 alone, anti-Jewish riots took place in Košice on May 2, in Prešov in 
the summer, and, most notoriously, in Topoľčany on September 24. Simultaneously with 
the outbreak of anti-Jewish violence in Topoľčany, individual incidents occurred in 
Žabokreky and Chynorany.
56
 On September 23, 1945, people threw stones at a young 
Jewish man in the train station as well as into a house of a Jewish family in Žabokreky (a 
village north of Topoľčany). On the next day, Sunday, September 24, a crowd of people 
gathered on the streets shouting antisemitic slogans. According to the testimonies 
collected by the SRP in Bratislava, national security officers in Žabokreky denied Jews 
protection based on “information” that they had allegedly killed four children in 
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Topoľčany.57 Early Sunday evening, people gathered on street corners to talk about the 
Topoľčany blood libel accusations and other news of the day. The atmosphere grew 
hostile and, later that night, a few local Jews were beaten and their apartments robbed.
58
 
In Chynorany (near Žabokreky), on September 24, a man was harassed and beaten near 
the train station and his nearby apartment ransacked.
59
 Considering that the rumor was 
that Jews had killed thirty children in Topoľčany, it seems to have been fortunate that no 
larger disturbances occurred in the town. 
Another wave of violent attacks targeting Slovak Jews occurred in the summer of 
1946. The commissioner of internal affairs in Bratislava issued, in August 1946, a 
memorandum on public order and safety, addressed to all district national committees, 
officers responsible for safety, as well as to the central headquarters of national security, 
in which he called their attention to possible unrest in the future.
60
 The commissioner 
recommended detention or suspension of any member of the national security force who 
participated in any antisemitic and anti-state activity. He also called for wide-ranging 
restrictions on public gatherings.
61
 The document came in response to events in 
Bratislava on August 1-6, 1946. During the Assembly of Partisans, participants robbed at 
least ten apartments, wounded nineteen people (four seriously), and demolished the 
kitchen for Jewish returnees.
62
 The SRP reported a four-day-long series of robberies and 
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beatings of Jewish residents across Bratislava that spread far outside the city limits. As 
early as a week before the Assembly, posters appeared on city walls warning, “Attention 
Jew, a partisan is coming to beat Jews,” “Czechoslovakia is for Slovaks and Czechs, 
Palestine is for Jews,” “Jews to Palestine!” “Jews out!” “Hang the Jews!”
63
 On Thursday 
night (31 July-1 August), a group of people broke into an apartment occupied by Jewish 
residents and robbed it. On Saturday (3 August) evening at around 8:30 P.M., a group of 
partisans and civilians randomly checked the identification of passers-by and beat those 
whom they identified as Jews. The same evening, a larger group of partisans, some in 
uniform, and civilians gathered on a street with the intention of attacking Jews. Non-Jews 
who sided with the Jewish residents were not spared either.
64
 When the crowd attacked 
the repatriates’ kitchen a couple of hours later, the army intervened and restored quiet in 
the city, by 11:30 P.M.
65
 However, unrest continued until Tuesday, August 6, 1946. At 
the time of the Bratislava riots, attacks on Jewish returnees occurred in Nové Zámky (2 
August), Žilina (4-6 August), Komárne (4 August), Čadca (5 August), Dunajská Streda, 
Ipoľske Šahy (8-9 August), Liptovský Svätý Mikuláš, Beluša, Tornaľa (11 August), 
Šurany (17-18 August), and Veľká Bytča.66  
While 1947 was a relatively quiet year (with the exception of the anti-Jewish riots 
in Bardejov in June 1947), violent attacks against Jews again occurred in 1948. In 
Bratislava, on August 20, 1948, in the morning, two women beat each other up at the 
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farmers’ market at the SNP Square.
67
 One of the women was Emilia Prášilová, the other 
was Alica Franková. Prášilová started the brawl by yelling at a seller for privileging Jews 
like Franková.
68
 In response, Franková called Prášilová “a fascist, an SS-woman” who 
forgot that it was no longer 1942, “These times are gone when one could handle Jews in 
this way!”
69
 Pulling each other’s hair was just a beginning. The police finally took the 
two women to the police station, releasing them soon after. In the meantime, a small 
crowd gathered in front of the police station and, when Franková left the building, people 
started to beat and kick her. In the end, the police took her back inside and, then, to the 
national security station where Franková spent two days. In the meantime, on August 20, 
before noon, people who had gathered in front of the police station beat two other Jewish 
women, one of whom had to be taken to hospital. The same people, mainly young, in 
their twenties, yelled slogans like “Hang the Jews!” and “Jews out!”
70
 In the evening, 
around 8:00 P.M. a larger crowd gathered at the SNP Square and moved toward Jewish 
Street where most of the public institutions for Jewish survivors were located. The home 
for the elderly, the youth hostel, the hospital, and the girls’ dormitory were closed but the 
repatriates’ kitchen failed to shut down before the crowd appeared. As a result, the 
kitchen was ransacked for a second time. The crowd also threw stones into the hospital’s 
windows. The disturbances lasted until 10:00 P.M. On the next day, August 21, a crowd 
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gathered again on the same square but, this time, the national security forces quickly 
dispersed it.
71
 Forty people were sentenced to three weeks to two years in prison.  
Soon after the riots (September 23, 1948), public opinion interviewers asked the 
following, “Recently there were anti-Jewish riots in Bratislava. Do you approve of them, 
or not?”
72
 Thirty-seven percent answered positively, thirty-five percent disapproved, and 
twenty-eight percent did not know.
73
 The answers were distributed more or less equally 
across age, gender, religion, and occupation, with the exception of Greek Catholics, who 
approved the riots in the largest percent (forty-seven percent, while thirty-two percent of 
Protestants and thirty-nine percent of Roman Catholics also answered positively). When 
asked if there were more “honest or dishonest” (statočnych alebo nestatočnych) Jews in 
Slovakia at the time, sixty-three percent of the respondents said there were more 
dishonest (nestatočnych) Jews, whereas only five percent declared otherwise.74 
Answering another question, “Frankly speaking, were you against the Jews during the 
Slovak State and are you against the Jews now?” fifty-six percent of the respondents 
claimed that they were now, that is in September 1948, against the Jews, whereas only 
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thirty-four percent declared that they had been against the Jews during the war.
75
 Overall, 
twenty-two percent (or a fifth) more of the respondents claimed to dislike Jews in the 
period after the war than during its course. Such an open expression of resentment and its 
alleged increase within a period of a few years was due to either increased social 
acceptability of dislike of Jews after the war, blurred memory of what had been the case 
during the war, or an actual increase in anti-Jewish sentiments. 
 
Case Studies of Kraków and Topoľčany 
 
In 2006, Kraków, located in south-central Poland on the banks of the Vistula 
River, was one of the major cities of Poland, ranking third (after Warszawa and Łódź), 
with a population of 757,000. In 1945, Kraków had about 298,500 residents.
76
 
Immediately after liberation, in January 1945, there were approximately 500 Jews 
registered in the city.
77
 This number grew rapidly from the constant immigration of Jews 
from the East, from camps, from hiding, as well as from villages and small towns. By the 
end of 1946, the number of Jews in the city had reached 6,600, of whom only one-third 
were returnees to the city of their birth or youth.
78
 The majority of the Jewish survivors in 
postwar Kraków was new to the city and often treated their stay as a short break before 
continuing their journey to another destination.   
As elsewhere in Poland, 6,000 was only a fraction of the prewar presence. In 
1938, of 251,500 residents of Kraków approximately 60,000, or twenty-five percent, 
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were Jews. The Kraków prewar Jewish population was highly diverse with a large 
religious and mainly impoverished community residing in the Kazimierz quarter; with 
pockets of acculturated Jewish families who lived on the boundary between gentile and 
Jewish society; and, finally, with radically assimilated individuals who had cut their links 
with the Jewish religion, language, and tradition.
79
 Kraków Jews were mainly lower 
middle class employed in the commercial sector and light industry but with a strong 
presence in the city’s liberal professions and arts. 
During the Second World War, the entire Jewish population of the city became 
the subject of discrimination, persecution, and, finally, extermination. The Kraków ghetto 
was formally established in March 1941 to become one of the largest ghettos in wartime 
Poland. Although the area adopted for the ghetto was originally inhabited by 
approximately 3,000 people, it eventually held a population of 15,000. In 1943, the ghetto 
was liquidated and the majority of its prisoners was sent to concentration and death 
camps across southern Poland. The local non-Jewish population and the German 
administration took over the apartments, houses, movable property, and commercial 
enterprises left by the community of 60,000 between 1941 and 1943. In January 1945, the 
residents of Kraków also appropriated Jewish property that the fleeing Nazis left 
behind.
80
 As a result, postwar Kraków was a city radically changed.  
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In Kraków, rumors of ritual murder circulated days before the pogrom occurred 
on August 11, 1945. On June 27, a crowd, agitated by the news of a Jewish woman 
allegedly arrested for the abduction of a child, gathered in one of Kraków’s market places 
(Kleparski Square). They almost demolished a shop belonging to a man named Halbreich 
but a police detachment dispersed the crowd in time.
81
 Police intervention, however, did 
not succeed in ending the stream of accusations. In the same market, women repeated 
rumors of thirteen Christian children’ corpses allegedly discovered in Kraków. During 
the trial following the pogrom on August 11, 1945, one of the witnesses testified that he 
heard women yelling “loudly, threats and insults directed at Polish Jews: ’They should all 
be killed; if [the Jews] had such power as the Germans they would have murdered us 
all.’”
82
 Markets are, by nature, places with a concentration of people and, hence, 
particularly conducive to collective agitation. Like Kleparski Square, Szeroka Square in 
the Kazimierz district functioned as a flea market after the war.
83
 Youngsters gathering in 
the square, very close to the Kupa Synagogue at 27 Miodowa Street, had, for a few weeks 
in the summer of 1945, regularly thrown stones at the synagogue to disturb services on 
Friday nights and Saturday mornings.
84
  
As on previous Saturdays, on August 11, 1945, during the morning Shabbat 
service in the Kupa Synagogue, a group of youngsters threw stones at the main entrance 
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on Miodowa Street. The worshippers attempted to chase the attackers away. Jewish 
soldiers, present in the synagogue at the time, ran outside and “one of them caught a boy 
throwing stones at the synagogue’s window and beat him. The boy freed himself and ran 
away screaming…”
85
 However, it was the behavior of another boy, Antoni Nijaki, which 
was crucial to the development of events. Nijaki entered the synagogue and, then, ran out 
screaming “People, help! They want to murder me!”
86
 The rumor of ritual murder, a 
rumor repeated for several days, found its “confirmation” in a scared boy escaping from 
the synagogue. His screams became the trigger for the anti-Jewish riots in Kraków. 
 Shortly after 11:00 A.M., the crowd from the nearby flea market at Szeroka 
Square attacked the synagogue. The gate was forced open in search of the supposedly 
murdered Catholic children. Attackers demolished the synagogue’s interior, trampled on 
the holy objects, and dragged the Jews from the synagogue to the street amidst yells, 
curses, and beatings. One of the attackers, Franciszek Bandys, a janitor in the Jewish 
shelter, with a group of the police went to the annex by the synagogue. Sara Stern, a 
resident of the Jewish shelter at 26 Miodowa Street, testified on Bandys’ attack, 
 
[Bandys, a janitor] pulled from the crowd, or led out from the synagogue, a girl, 
almost undressed, in a torn skirt and shirt, scuffling. He kicked her and jabbed 
her, and a crowd of people behind them assailed her. The janitor then escorted the 
girl I don’t know where. After about fifteen minutes I noticed the girl in a car 
which came and stopped in front of the synagogue. The girl was beaten with 
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This was not an isolated incident. Hateful screams accompanied the scenes of violence. 
Bandys yelled, “You whore, if Hitler didn’t finish you, we will,” “You are on Polish soil 
and dare to murder Polish children!”
88
  
Soon, plundering and demolishing spread further in the city. Attackers searched 
the buildings, stole anything they found, and beat up the Jewish residents. Non-Jewish 
passers-by and residents of the district who showed sympathy to the attacked and stood 
up in their defense exposed themselves to verbal abuse and assault.
89
 When Józef 
Drzewiecki tried to stop a man chasing a small Jewish girl, the assailant “punched him in 
the face with his fist. He said, ‘what do you son of a b— care, it’s a Jewish child.’”
90
 The 
fear of robbery and beating stopped many witnesses from helping the attacked. Based on 
available data, it is impossible to assess whether and to what extent help was granted. 
Likely, most of the observers remained passive.  
Among the assailants, the most visible were those in uniform – policemen and 
soldiers. The fact that among the twenty-five accused, twelve were in uniform is 
illuminating. Instead of defending the victims, policemen led and encouraged the 
violence. The active participation of representatives of law and order sanctioned, de 
facto, violence against Jews. When one of the accused was asked why he had acted with 
such cruelty, he said, “Everybody around said the Jews were murdering children. I saw 
the soldiers caught mainly Jews, and the old hatred of Jews started boiling in me so I 
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simply let it out.”
91
 The underlying logic was that if the authorities (władza) beat and 
plundered, then all felt free to do the same without the fear of reprisal and responsibility. 
Civilians who participated in the riots were mainly local residents, by and large 
poorly educated, unskilled, and unemployed. However, hostility toward Jews was not 
limited to the poorest and the least privileged. One victim’s testimony suggested that 
health-care professionals in the hospital, a Catholic nun, and skilled railway workers, 
among others, did not significantly differ from the poor in their hostility toward the 
Jews.
92
   
The actual number of victims of the violence, which erupted in Kraków on 
August 11, 1945, is unknown. The report of the CKŻP stated that five people were 
“seriously wounded [of whom] four were in the hospital at the surgical ward, and one 
was in the hospital in the building of the Jewish Committee at 38 Długa Street.”
93
 
Possibly many more were injured but not seriously enough to need hospitalization and 
thus remained undocumented. On August 14, the Polish Press Agency reported two 
people killed: Róża Berger and another unidentified woman. The American Jewish Year-
Book from 1946 added a third casualty, sixty-two-year-old Anszel Zucker.
94
 Overall, the 
only death that was confirmed in all the sources was that of Berger, who was buried in 
the Jewish cemetery at Miodowa Street.
95
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The riots were most intense between 11:00 A.M. and 1:00 P.M., calming down 
around 2:00 P.M., only to gain strength again in the early evening. The provincial police 
and the office of state security in Kraków attempted to disperse the crowd and detain the 
perpetrators for several hours. By late evening, the streets of the prewar Jewish quarter of 
Kazimierz, to which the riots were limited, were quiet. The police arrested twenty-five 
people during the next few days. Following the interrogations of the accused and the 
witnesses, the police completed the investigation on September 1 and passed the case to 
the prosecutor’s office of the Kraków district. Between October 1945 and February 1946, 
the military district court in Kraków sentenced ten people to prison terms of six months 
to seven years.
96
 Although tensions persisted throughout the city for another few days, 
they did not turn into full blown riots and no one else was hurt.  
Forty-four days later similar events occurred in Topoľčany, in western Slovakia. 
Located on the western bank of the Nitra River, Topoľčany is now a medium-sized town 
with the population of about 29,000. Although much smaller and culturally and 
politically much less affluent than the neighboring cities of Bratislava and Nitra, 
Topoľčany was an important commercial center of the region before World War II. The 
local Jewish community was amongst the richest in Slovakia with a relatively small 
population (only the eleventh biggest Jewish community in Slovakia). In 1930, the total 
population of the town reached 8,731 of whom approximately 2,200, or twenty-five 
percent, were Jews.
97
 In 1938, this number increased to 3,000.
98
 According to the census 
of 1930, a third of the local Jews considered themselves Jewish by nationality while the 
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remaining two-thirds registered as Slovaks, Magyars, and Germans.
99
 By and large, the 
Jews of Topoľčany constituted a considerable portion of the local middle class: doctors 
(sixty-seven percent), lawyers (fifty-nine percent), and political activists, among 
others.
100
 Besides the liberal professions, commerce was another major area of Jewish 
economic activity. In 1930, of 615 businesses in town, including stores and workshops, 
320 (fifty-two percent) had Jewish owners.
101
 Politically, Topoľčanians oriented 
themselves toward the right with the radical HSĽS having a majority in the town’s 
council. However, it should be noted that the third political force in the town before the 
war (after the HSĽS and the Communists) was the Jewish Party (Židovská strana) with a 
large constituency among non-Jews.
102
 In short, on the one hand, there was an affluent, 
sizeable (one-fourth of the total population), and relatively well-integrated Jewish 
population in Topoľčany, and, on the other hand, the town’s authorities and a significant 
portion of the population accepted the anti-Jewish rhetoric of the political right.    
During the war, when the Slovak State introduced anti-Jewish measures like 
aryanization of property, the estates, businesses, and movables of the prosperous 
Topoľčany’s Jewish community became an easy and very attractive target. Members of 
the local HSĽS, in particular, profited from aryanization since they were the ones who 
took over the most prosperous of the eighty-nine aryanized businesses in the city. Robert 
Y. Büchler, a historian of Topoľčany’s Jewish community, also claimed that the majority 
of profiteers were not Topoľčanians but outsiders with no prewar connections to the 












 Regardless of their origins, the aryanizers stayed in the town after the war and 
became the fiercest defenders of the economic status quo. Therefore, when former Jewish 
owners gradually returned to Topoľčany (of approximately 2,800 prewar Jewish residents 
about 750 returned) and claimed their property, the new owners and their families turned 
against them.
104
   
Anti-Jewish slogans appeared on city walls and individual Jews were harassed for 
at least four weeks before the events.
105
 The most immediate trigger to violence were 
rumors of the nationalization (poštátnenie) of the Catholic schools in Topoľčany. As 
early as September 10, 1945, nuns running the Catholic school for girls heard rumors that 
the school would soon be nationalized and they would be replaced.
106
 As the rumor 
circulated, it gradually acquired new features including the supposed Jewish origin of the 
new state-designated teachers. The mothers of students loudly accused Jews of trying to 
take over the school in order to protect their own children attending the institution. In his 
analysis of the pogrom, Ivan Kamenec pointed to a lack of evidence regarding whether 
the school authorities actually believed these rumors.
107
 Whatever the case, the 
headmaster, E. Kokodičová, asked the local mothers for help in preventing the school’s 
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 In response, representatives of the parents petitioned 
the commissioner of education in Bratislava requesting a cancellation of nationalization 
projects.
109
 On Sunday, September 23, 1945, after worship, a group of women (mainly 
mothers of the students) decided to call a demonstration against nationalization of the 
school for the next day.
110
  
On Monday, September 24, at 8:00 A.M., about sixty women came to the offices 
of the district national committee (Okresný národný výbor, ONV) to demand a halt to the 
school’s nationalization as well as the removal of the Jewish children from the school.
111
 
At this point it was not clear who said what to the protesters. According to the report of 
the commissioner of internal affairs in Bratislava, the ONV deputy chair allegedly told 
the women “to take guns and go for the Jews.”
112
Another clerk supposedly sent the 
women to speak to the city’s school inspector. According to the SRP in Bratislava, the 
women were told that it was none of their business, which supposedly further infuriated 
them.
113
 Upon the women’s arrival, the inspector attempted to convince the protesters 
that the rumor of the school’s nationalization was untrue. At that point, as Kamenec 
found, there were already about 160 people gathered in front of the inspector’s building, 
ready to move toward the school.
114
 Anger levels increased when more and more stories 
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of Jews throwing out nuns and tearing down crosses and other religious symbols 
circulated in the crowd.  
Women coming from the inspector’s office started yelling anti-Jewish slogans 
like, “Away with Jews, Jews are guilty of everything, expel Jewish children from our 
schools, and prohibit Jewish doctors, the Bergers, to vaccinate our children!”
115
 Violence 
became imminent when the protesters accused a Jewish physician, Karol Berger (“Jewish 
doctors, the Bergers”), who that day had vaccinated children (seven to eight-years-old) in 
the school, of poisoning them. Historically, the “endangerment” of a Christian child 
proved the deadliest for the Jews (blood libel). The infuriated mothers broke into the 
school demanding access to the classroom where the doctor was vaccinating the children. 
Having heard and misinterpreted the cry of the children (obviously scared by the uproar 
outside the school), the mothers broke into the room, dragged the doctor out, screaming, 
“You Jew, you poison our children!” and handed him to the crowd outside the school.
116
  
Berger, along with another victim, a Jewish soldier, managed to escape to the local 
national security offices (Národna bezpečnost, NB) and eventually ended up in a nearby 
hospital with others injured in the riots.
117
 Throughout the town, 200 to 300 people 
attacked and beat Jewish residents on the streets and looted their apartments.
118
 A group 
of people even tried, without success, to drag the Jewish children out of the school. 
Others, equally unsuccessfully, went to the local branch of the NB and demanded that the 
Jews who had found refuge in the building be handed over to them.
119
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The municipal authorities reacted to the unfolding events with considerable delay. 
The rumors were denounced as false on the city radio only once, at 6:45 P.M. in the 
evening, when the worst was already over.
120
 Having failed to disperse the crowd before 
the attack on the school, the local police found themselves incapable of containing its 
growth. When it became evident that the resources of the local branch of the NB (seven 
men) were insufficient, the city council turned to the local army garrison for help. Twenty 
soldiers were deployed to pacify the city streets. As in other pogroms at the time, the 
soldiers joined the rioters instead of subduing them.
121
 One of many reports about the 
demonstration that circulated in the commissioner’s offices in Bratislava blamed the 
inexperienced and indecisive commander of the unit, who was unable to stop his men 
from being lured by the crowd, who were screaming, “Soldiers come with us to beat the 
Jews!”
122
 Soldiers pulled Jews out of their apartments under the pretence of walking them 
to the safety in the buildings of the NB and then handed the unsuspecting victims to the 
infuriated people on the street.
123
  
Finally, around noon, a special auxiliary (asistenčny) unit dispersed the crowds.124 
An hour or so later, the Topoľčany streets were quiet. At 6:00 P.M., when an NB unit of 
forty policemen arrived from Bratislava (faced with intensifying total chaos, the city’s 
national committee turned to the Central Bureau of National Security for assistance), the 
riots were over. Overall, in the Topoľčany pogrom, forty-seven people were injured, 
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among whom fifteen needed hospitalization.
125
 The following day, on Tuesday 
September 25, the NB units from Bratislava arrested nine to eleven of the most active, 
and mostly very young (seventeen to twenty-four-years-old), participants in the 
pogrom.
126
 In total, about fifty people were arrested, of whom many ended up in the labor 
camp in Ilava or a prison in Topoľčany.127 The military conducted a separate 
investigation and arrested twenty soldiers in connection with the riots. There is, however, 
no evidence of any trial proceedings after the pogrom. 
 
Interpretations of the Kraków Pogrom 
 
The two pogroms, in Kraków and Topoľčany, generated considerable response in 
the respective countries. Local and central authorities, public associations and societies, 
and above all the press, vied with each other in reporting and commenting on the events. 
An examination of the Polish and Slovak press, official reports, statements, memoranda, 
and leaflets published after the two events reveal two recurrent models of coverage – the 
master narratives of the Kraków and Topoľčany pogroms. 
Analysis of dozens of articles, published in the aftermath of the Kraków events, 
cast some light on the dominant narrative of the Kraków riots.
128
 First, reporters 
expressed shock and disgust over the events, emphasizing the only recently ended horror 
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of the war, as well as the incongruity between the tragedy and its scenery. That Kraków, 
a city of a hundred churches and the oldest Polish university, widely considered the 
spiritual capital of the country, became a scene of antisemitic riots appeared to be a 
contradiction in terms.
129
 Second, the journalists almost never called the events “a 
pogrom.” Rather, they used euphemisms, like “Kraków occurrences” (zajścia 
krakowskie, wypadki), labeled the riots “antisemitic excesses” (ekscesy antysemickie) and 
“disturbances” (zamieszki), or gave them a criminal cast, using the terms like “crime” 
(zbrodnia), “criminal operation” (przestępcza akcja, zbrodnicza akcja), and “criminal 
provocation” (zbrodnicza prowokacja).  
Why not “pogrom” then? In my opinion, the press, particularly the newspapers 
strongly tied to the government, avoided the term since, by definition, it suggested 
intense mob violence of a rebellious character. At the same time, the official organs tried 
to downplay the size of the riots while portraying the governmental forces as highly 
capable. Also, I speculate that the press avoided the word “pogrom” due to its 
connotation of state provocation. Since the anti-Jewish riots in Russia in the 1880s, 
“pogrom” was associated with the idea of “official planning or collusion.”
130
 As Brass 
stated,  
 
pogroms might indeed best be defined as attacks upon the persons and property of 
a particular ethnic, racial, or communal group in which the state and/or its agents 
are implicated to a significant degree, but which are given the appearance, by 
design of the authorities or otherwise, of a riot [a riot understood as “outbreak 
among the people in violation of the laws and order of the state.”].
131
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Finally, the strong ethnic component of the word “pogrom” – violence against Jews – 
was also thought as unnecessary. The authorities and the press preferred to interpret the 
riots as a politically motivated crime rather than ethnic violence since the former had 
more potential in the fight against the political opposition.  
A third recurring element of the official press coverage was the blaming and 
naming of the villains with a vocabulary which, in the late 1940s, was central to official 
“newspeak.” The press presented the riots as the “work” (robota), “operation,” or 
“provocation” (prowokacja) of “reactionary forces” (reakcja), “paid confidants of the 
London reactionary government-in-exile” (płatni zausznicy londyńskiej reakcji), and 
“certain political circles” (pewne koła polityczne). The reactionaries supposedly provoked 
and organized “certain social elements” (elementy społeczne), “lumpenproletariat,” or 
“dark people” (ciemnota), and “social scum” (szumowiny społeczne) like ”pimps and 
prostitutes” (sutenerzy, prostytutki i alfonsy) – social and political “trash.”
132
 The term 
“reactionary” (reakcja) referred to the entire political and military underground (above all 
the radically nationalist NSZ) at home and abroad, led by the London based government-
in-exile.
133
 The press tended to emphasize the alleged ideological kinship between the 
“reaction” and the prewar Polish regime, the Sanacja (regime of moral reformation). The 
terms “squirearchy-capitalist clique” (klika obszarniczo-kapitalistyczna) and “sanacja’s 
mafia” (mafia sanacyjna) were used to discredit the rioters as cruel capitalists who 
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wished to resurrect the old system of social injustice. Finally, the journalists brought up 
the alleged Nazi legacy of the opposition, calling the latter “homegrown fascists” 
(rodzimi faszyści), “volksdeutche” and “reichsdeutche,” and “epigones of Hitlerism” 
(epigoni hitleryzmu). No other tactic was more likely to discredit a political opponent: 
any linkage to Nazism was utterly shameful immediately after the war.
134
   
The reactionaries allegedly had several main motives in organizing the riots. The 
antisemitic outbreak was supposed to discredit the Polish government in the international 
arena by portraying it as incapable of controlling the situation in the country. Also, the 
disturbances were supposed to stir up anarchy and chaos and thus further weaken the 
government’s position. Finally, the outbreak was supposed to disturb reconstruction and 
halt the rebuilding of the country. In short, antisemitism was one of the many means to 
discredit, weaken, and ultimately bring down the government. In its place, the 
underground supposedly wanted to reestablish the prewar regime, which would take land 
away from the peasants and factories away from the workers. The authors then concluded 
that the enemy underestimated the government, which, despite difficulties, could and 
would establish and execute “law and order.” The articles usually ended with a call for 
the severe punishment of the participants in and organizers of the riots as well as for the 
continuation of the fight against ignorance and “reactionary forces.” There was also a 
dose of optimism about the successful outcome of the struggle.
135
 
Needless to say, not every article matched the above narrative. There were 
numerous variations on the theme. For example, Marian Piechal from Dziennik Łódzki 
                                                 
134
 The reconstruction of the narrative based on articles from Dziennik Polski 187, 190 (1945), Głos Ludu 





drew attention to how superficial the influence of literary and journalistic circles was if 
their message did not affect the crowds. He called upon artists and journalists to take 
partial responsibility for the crime.
136
 Another example came from Tygodnik Powszechny 
(Universal Weekly), a Roman-Catholic weekly published in Kraków from March 1945, 
which ignored the version blaming the military underground’s provocation and, instead, 
blamed the Germans. According to the journalist, Jerzy Zagórski, postwar Germany had 
the greatest interest in provoking anti-Jewish outbreak in order to shift the blame for the 
extermination of Jews to other nations. Zagórski also blamed the deep-seated prejudices 
and ignorance of the masses for generating the violence.
137
  
It is hard to establish to what extent the press was a mere vehicle for government 
propaganda or whether it was the actual reflection of popular beliefs. The fact that most 
articles covering the Kraków pogrom mirrored the government’s officially promoted 
version is not sufficient to prove total governmental control over the press. Judging from 
the general chaos, the weakness of an administration, the lack of tools for effective 
enforcement (including censorship), as well as ad hoc formed journalistic cadres in the 
first months after the war, the Kraków press in the summer of 1945 can not be dismissed 
as a mere agent of the government’s will. Krzysztof Dowgird called the years 1945-47 in 
press history, “a period of relative pluralism,” when the number of press titles 
skyrocketed, every city had at least two dailies of different political options, the 
opposition had the limited right to publish, the number and circulation of literary 
                                                 
136
 “Nauka ze Zbrodni” (Lesson from the Crime), Dziennik Łódzki (1945). Also see Robotnik 215 (1945).  
137
 “Żydzi, Polacy i Zaminowane Dusze” (The Jews, Poles, and Mined Souls), Tygodnik Powszechny 26 
(1945). 
 254 
weeklies grew, and high quality magazines were still available.
138
 Tygodnik Powszechny 
was the best illustration of the continual presence of intellectual integrity in the period.
139
  
The most common type of journalism was represented by the daily newspapers 
Dziennik Polski (Polish Daily) in Kraków and Rzeczpospolita (The Republic). Both were 
published by the publishing cooperative Reader (Czytelnik) created in 1944 by Jerzy 
Borejsza, an active member of the PPR and the man in charge of publishing in postwar 
Poland. Both dailies, although required to stay in line with official policy, hired and 
published journalists known for their competence and professionalism, by no means mere 
puppets of the system. Newspapers such as Dziennik Polski and Rzeczpospolita thus 
functioned on the boundary between government policy and independent journalism, the 
latter reflecting opinions of a significant segment of the Polish intelligentsia. It should be 
noted that the convictions of the intelligentsia immediately after the war were not 
necessarily in radical opposition to the government. In fact, many journalists genuinely 
believed in the “socialist progress” and social and political change promoted by the 
authorities and the party at the time. Enthusiasm for change and support for reforms and 
for the general rebuilding of the country were common, particularly among the educated 
strata in urban areas. Many believed that antisemitism was indeed alien to socialist and 
communist ideals and, inevitably, it was the doing of anticommunists, fascists, and so-
called reactionaries (as opposed to those who promoted “progress”).
140
 The fact that so 
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many articles were in tune with one another stemmed from this peculiar mix of 
governmental imposition and grassroots convictions. 
In short, the rhetoric of the press represented the official interpretation of the 
events in Kraków, in line not only with the government but also with a significant 
segment of the literati, intelligentsia, and, in general, enthusiasts for reconstruction. Not 
surprisingly, all these sectors were extremely vocal after the pogrom, considering the 
availability of vehicles of expression and access to media. The government, both central 
and local, army, police, political and social organizations, trade unions, and others issued 
statements, announcements, and memoranda condemning the events. The first to issue a 
statement was the district board of the socialist, peasant, and communist parties. 
Subsequently, similar announcements were published by the mayor of Kraków, 
presidents of institutions of higher education in Kraków, the trade union of journalists, 
the headquarters of trade unions in Poland, the district voivode’s council and voivode’s 
office, the Polish scouts and youth organizations, Kraków students, the assembly of 
Polish artists, the writers of the city of Łódź, and others.141 Political organizations and 
associations organized rallies and demonstrations in Kraków and across the country. For 
example, the local branches of the Polish Socialist Party and Polish Workers’ Party  
organized a rally against antisemitism in Kraków while the trade unions staged 
demonstrations in factories in Łódź and Warszawa.142 Needless to say, the rhetoric of all 
these events recycled the narrative presented above. 
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The responses of the central government were similar. Five days after the events, 
the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the PPR debated the issue, concluding that 
the struggle against antisemitism was a part of the final encounter with “fascist elements” 
in Poland.
143
 Participants in the meeting decided on concrete measures to combat 
antisemitism. Those included rapid reaction to antisemitic outbreaks, cooperation with 
broader strata of society, expulsion of the unemployed from Kraków (sic!) and other 
cities, expulsion of “reactionary” students and lecturers from universities, 
productivization of Jews, and material compensation for the victims of the pogrom.
144
 
The resolution that followed only partly included the above proposals. At its core, it was 
a perfect representation of the narrative of violence in Kraków analyzed before.
145
 At the 
same time, by no means did it serve as a blueprint (the resolution, after all, was issued 
days after the main body of articles had been already published). Statements and 
interviews by other centers of authority like the prime minister, the president of Kraków, 
and the regional national council, which were simultaneous or shortly followed the PPR 
resolution, did not stray from the dominant rhetoric of dozens of other announcements 
and articles published at the time.
146
 
The only source of a counter narrative was the political underground, which had 
limited access to national and local media and thus a limited readership. Inevitably, then, 
the counter interpretation and representation of the events in Kraków had very few outlets 
and means to be heard. The clandestine press emphasized the possible provocation of the 
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NKVD in cooperation with the national security forces, police, and the army. Authors of 
the text distributed by the underground, entitled Enough of Soviet Shuffling claimed that 
Soviet manipulation was evident in the Kraków “occurrences.”
147
 As proof that the 
Soviets and Polish communists organized and staged the whole event, the authors 
referred to the fact the NKVD arrested the Jews before they arrested the rioters. The 
authors were not clear, however, about the motives of the provocateurs. Another 
document, produced by an unknown clandestine political organization, stated that the 
main aims of the provocation were the intimidation of the opposition and thus pressure to 
stop the critique of the “Jewish question” in Poland; accusation and discreditation of the 
underground at home and abroad; and preparation of public opinion in the West for an 
influx of Jews from the East.
148
 Even a superficial reading of the two texts suggests that 
their rhetoric was a carbon copy of the official narrative except that blame was placed in 
the opposite direction. 
 
Interpretations of the Topoľčany Pogrom 
 
The Slovak press, in comparison to its Polish counterpart, devoted much less 
attention to the Topoľčany riots.149 Only two major titles in circulation at the time, Čas 
and Pravda, published an immediate commentary on “Topoľčany violence” 
(topoľčianske násilnosti) and returned as well to the subject occasionally during the three 
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weeks following the event.
150
 The first to react was Čas, which published the initial 
reports on the events on September 30, followed by Pravda’s article on October 2, 
1945.
151
 As Kamenec rightly observed, their coverage reflected their politics. Čas, an 
official organ of the Democrats (DS), published articles that emphasized the unethical 
aspect of antisemitism, persistence of the postwar moral crisis, and the continued 
influence of ľudák (Slovak fascist) prejudices against Jews. The journalists of Čas 
pointed to efficient policies on property restitution as a means to resolve the problem of 
antisemitism in Slovakia and called for patience among Slovak Jews as restitution could 
not be handled overnight.
152
 Overall, Čas tended to de-politicize the problem by stressing 
the moral and economic aspects of antisemitism.
153
  
Pravda, on the other hand, an official organ of the Slovak Communist Party 
(KSS), used the Topoľčany pogrom as a tool in the emerging political struggle against the 
Democrats. Kamenec wrote that Pravda, by and large, devoted more space to every 
manifestation of antisemitism in Slovakia in order to discredit the DS.
154
 Every outbreak 
of anti-Jewish violence was supposedly proof of the DS’s inconsistency in dismantling 
the legacy of the Nazi regime, including the consequences of the aryanization of 
property. Similar to the DS, the KSS pointed to the influence of Nazi ideology and 
property issues as the main sources of the riots. However, instead of drawing conclusions 
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of a moral and social nature, the KSS called for political measures against the agents of 
fascism. Pravda recognized antisemitism as not a temporary disturbance but as an attack 
against the newly reestablished republic.
155
 For example, Pravda’s interview with 
Chairman of the Board of Commissioners Karol Šmidke on October 6, 1945, illustrated 
the point.
156
 The introduction to the interview stated that fascism still had its adherents, 
who were ready to tear out the “young roots” (mladé korene) of the state and undermine 
its very foundation. Such a danger called for particular “vigilance and severity” 
(ostražitosť a prísnosť) against fascist “elements.” The author painted an image of 
obscure fascists, at home and abroad, who were only waiting for the right moment to put 
“spokes in the new republic’s wheel.”
157
 The Topoľčany events allegedly proved how 
imminent this danger was. Šmidke emphasized the need to punish severely the rioters not 
only for the sake of maintaining law and order at home but also to uphold the image of 
Slovakia abroad. He believed that the relics of fascism in Slovakia might discredit the 
country abroad, which, considering the respect Slovakia earned through the uprising of 
1944, would be a major loss. Šmidke also claimed that a thorough investigation and 
severe punishment of the Topoľčany rioters would serve as a warning (výstracha) against 
all “reactionaries” and “fascist elements” in the future. Finally, he added that an 




Šmidke represented the voice of the government, which was much more involved 
in the interpretation of the pogrom than the official press coverage suggests. A significant 




 “Zvyšky fašistickej ideologie zdolať stoj čo stoj” (To overcome relics of the fascist ideology by hook or 






number of reports and statements circulating between Bratislava and Prague proved that 
the government did not view the events as entirely inconsequential. A week after the 
pogrom, on October 2, 1945, the government in Prague issued a statement in which it 
demanded that the SNR promptly undertake the investigation, prosecution, and 
punishment of the guilty parties.
159
 The Prague government also stipulated a “thorough 
cleansing” (dukladna očista) of the Slovak administration. The government assumed, as 
in Šmidke’s words in Pravda, that it was the presence of fascist “elements” from the 
former Slovak State that contributed to contemporary tensions.
160
 The commissioner of 
internal affairs in Bratislava (the report of November 3), the NB office in Topoľčany (the 
report of October 5), the NB office in Bratislava (the letter of October 15) as well as the 
Prague government (the letter of October 5) agreed that the former members of fascist 
organizations such as the detachments of the Hlinka Guard were the major organizers and 
provocateurs of the anti-Jewish riots in Topoľčany and thus should be promptly 
arrested.
161
 The assumption was that the riots were not spontaneous manifestations of 
social unrest along ethnic lines but an organized crime of “fascist elements.” Government 
sources pointed to former members of the Hlinka Guard (gardišti) as the most active 
participants in the riots. For example, an anonymous resident of Topoľčany, in a letter 
sent to the government in Prague, denounced the two Boček brothers (a teacher and a 
                                                 
159
 Copy of the official letter from Prime Minister Zdenek Fierlinger to the SNR in Bratislava, 5 October 
1945, PV – Národné výbory II/1/1947, box 582, SNA. 
160
 The government recommended that the SNR would issue special decrees concerning the practical 
enforcement of equality for all citizens including Jewish citizens of Czechoslovakia. Ibid. 
161
 Pohotovostne oddiely Hlinkovej gardy. Copy of the report from the anti-Jewish demonstrations in 
Topoľčany on September 24, 1945, 3 November 1945, PV – Národné výbory II/1/1947, box 582, SNA. 
 261 




The “fascists” were not the only ones blamed for the antisemitic outbreak in 
Topoľčany. In addition, the reports blamed nuns and the Catholic clergy for instigating 
the pogrom by telling children (who then told their mothers) that the nuns would be 
expelled and replaced by Jewish teachers. The NB office in Bratislava even 
recommended the removal of the leading Catholic figures (for example, the nun superior 
as well as the head of the Catholic school) from Topoľčany.163 Aryanizers – residents 
who were the most interested in preventing the return of Jews for fear of losing their 
newly acquired property – were named the spiritual instigators (duchovní pôvodcovia) of 
the riots.
164
 To complete the analysis of the Topoľčany pogrom, the commissioner of 
internal affairs also pointed to the Catholicism of the majority of the town’s residents and 
the anti-Jewish propaganda of the Slovak State during the war as factors contributing to 
antisemitism.
165
 The latter was apparently widespread since the letter from the 
commander-in-chief of the NB in Bratislava from October 15, 1945 read that “there are 
very few people in Topoľčany who would not approve of the events of September 24, 
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1945. Today in a conversation with a worker, farmer, or a member of intelligentsia you 
will find out that people hate Jews outright.”
166
 
The above letter from the NB office reads like malicious gossip or a denunciation 
report. It was full of personal attacks on employees of both the district national 
committee (ONV) and the NB office in Topoľčany. According to the author(s), weakness 
and indecisiveness, which were supposed to have enabled the riots, were the least of the 
administration’s flaws. For instance, the letter accused the head of the ONV in 
Topoľčany of embezzling the city’s resources, scolded the deputy head for incompetence, 
and called a clerk from the security department intellectually incapable.
167
 Topoľčany’s 
office of NB did not escape criticism either. In a more constructive manner, the author(s) 
of the letter pointed to the absence of effective intelligence as the leading cause of the 
slow reaction to the riots. The work overload and lack of personnel could not, however, 
justify the failure to prevent or, at least, promptly suppress, the riots.
168
     
Interestingly, the reports also emphasized the alleged role of the Jews in inciting 
the pogrom by their “provocative behavior” and by isolating themselves from their non-
Jewish neighbors. In the reports, there was an apparent trend in the interpretation of the 
Jewish role in the pogrom. The closer to the pogrom in terms of time and location, the 
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more reporters paid attention to narrating the events rather than interpreting them. For 
instance, the authors of the report compiled in Topoľčany, just a few days after the 
pogrom (October 5, 1945), did not include a single mention of Jews provoking the riots. 
With the passage of time and in reports written far from the scene, they became more 
aggressive in pointing to the Jews as the main cause of the riots. As more time elapsed, 
authors tended to change their previous judgments. For example, the letter from the 
commander-in-chief of the NB in Bratislava to the commissioner of internal affairs of 
October 15, 1945, stated that “the main blame for the demonstrations rests on the 
provocative behavior of citizens of Israelite religion against Christian citizens.”
169
 This 
statement was directly preceded by a story of a Jewish woman who supposedly claimed 
in public that it would be well in Topoľčany only if Marshall Stalin’s Street was paved 
with Christian skulls instead of rocks.
170
 Meanwhile, the report of the commissioner of 
internal affairs, written more than two weeks later and based almost entirely on the letter 
of the NB, fully omitted the above statements. At the same time, the commissioner’s 
report kept the paragraph emphasizing the Jews’ unwillingness to “make friends” with 
their Christian neighbors and, thus, Jewish responsibility for deepening the abyss. The 
letter also briefly mentioned the role of Jews as magyarizers and their allegedly 
privileged position in receiving food supplies.
171
  
On October 7, 1945, at a public gathering organized by the SRP, the Jewish 
leaders addressed these issues as well as complaints that the Jews could not speak Slovak. 
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They stated that the Jewish leadership had obliged itself to make sure that in a year there 
would not be a single Jew without knowledge of the Slovak language in Slovakia.
172
 
Apart from the self-critique, the Jewish representatives talked about the suffering of the 
Slovak and Czechoslovak Jewish community during the war and the hope for a better 
tomorrow.
173
 They emphasized that a good Catholic Slovak had nothing to do with the 
persecutions during the war. On the contrary, they said, the Catholic Church always took 
the side of the Jews. In unison with the Czechoslovak government, the speakers pointed 
to Hitler’s legacy as the cause of contemporary antisemitism. The presenters also 
emphasized the loyalty of the Jews to the nation and the state as well as their eagerness to 
contribute to political, economic, and cultural progress of the “mother country” (vlasť). 
Jewish participation in the uprising and their work in the underground and anti-Nazi 
espionage were highlighted to illustrate the point.  
To summarize, close examination of the reports in the two countries reveal two 
discourses on ethnic violence, which differed considerably in spite of their similarity in 
condemning antisemitism and blaming the political opposition. In Poland, the intensity of 
the power struggle between Communists and the opposition demanded the use of radical 
means. The interpretation of ongoing social and political events in order to ascribe to 
them their “correct” meaning was an important aspect of the political fight since both 
sides were aware that control over the system of knowledge and establishment of a 
monopoly on “the truth” helped to give them control over society at large. As a result, in 
1945-48, public life underwent a radical politicization. Almost every social act, every 
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social practice performed in the time of the power struggle, including acts of violence, 
became political acts.  
The violence against Jews in Kraków was no exception. At the moment when 
they occurred, the Kraków riots were profoundly ethnic in the sense that the ethnic 
identity of the perpetrators and victims superseded any other systems of reference. The 
killed and injured in the pogrom were targeted solely as Jews (regardless of what 
Jewishness meant to the perpetrators). In the aftermath, however, the rhetoric surrounding 
the violence in Kraków, by and large, downplayed the ethnic factor in favor of 
politicizing the events.
174
 The Kraków pogrom was turned into a political act, planned 
and organized by political interests on the “wrong” side in the power struggle. As I 
described above, one of the means to do this was to use highly politicized or ethnically 
neutral vocabulary and eliminate the word “pogrom.” Also, negligence in the 
examination of sources of antisemitism and problematic ethnic relations among non-
Jewish and Jewish residents of the city was a way to strip the event of its ethnic 
connotations. Instead, casting blame on the political opposition (“reactionary forces”) and 
discussing methods for their effective dissolution took center stage.  
In comparison to coverage of the Kraków pogrom, the extent of reaction to the 
riots in Topoľčany was much more subdued and the final rhetoric much less politicized. 
It was hardly surprising, since the political struggle in Slovakia did not, during the years 
1945-47, reach the intensity of the Polish struggle. The absence of civil war, participation 
of the opposition (Democrats) in the government, agreement between Communists and 
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Democrats on a common enemy (the legacy of the Slovak State and the homegrown 
fascist regime), and, finally, the absence of anti-Soviet fears in opposition circles 
contributed to a lower degree of politicization of public life in Slovakia. Since power was 
still democratically distributed, there was no need for total control over interpretation and 
“the regime of the only truth.” Hence, ongoing social and political processes, ethnic 
violence included, had less value and less recognition as possible means in the political 
fight. 
As a result, press coverage of the Topoľčany pogrom was limited to a few articles 
and lacked the tone of a crusade, so striking in the Polish counterpart. True, the Slovak 
press also used the Topoľčany events to call for a campaign against the remains of 
fascism in the country. But in the Slovak press the vocabulary of “people’s radicals and 
aryanizers” (ludacke radikaly, a arizatory), “reactionaries,” and “fascists” referred to the 
Slovak members of the fascist regime who had been defeated and presented no real 
challenge to the powers-that-be. In contrast, in Poland the terms “reactionary” and 
“fascist” stood for the broad spectrum of legal and illegal opposition that indeed 
“threatened” the political system in the country. Consequently, in comparison with their 
Polish counterparts, the Slovak press and government reports devoted more room to 
analyzing the possible causes than to an outright aggressive political campaign. Of 
course, by saying that Slovak journalists and officials focused more on causality of the 
events I do not suggest that they were bias-free and apolitical searchers of truth. In fact, 
facile scapegoating of the fascist legacy as the main source of violence was common. The 
official Slovak sources cast blame on the Jewish victims themselves in a manner 
unthought-of in the official postwar Polish press but symptomatic of the general approach 
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of the government and media to Jews in Slovakia – an approach which I discuss 
elsewhere.
175
 But overall, ethnic violence was much less politicized in Slovak public life, 




Current Interpretations of Anti-Jewish Violence in Poland and Slovakia 
 
There are many interpretations of the origins of postwar anti-Jewish violence in 
Poland.
177
 And although the debate is far from over, the most recent analytical 
interventions bring us closer to a better understanding of the roots of postwar 
antisemitism. In the introduction to Polacy, Żydzi, Komunizm: Anatomia Półprawd, 
1939-68 (Poles, Jews, and Communism: Anatomy of Half-Truths, 1939-68), Kersten 
foregrounded negative stereotyping as a key to understanding Polish-Jewish relations 
after the war.
178
 She and Jerzy Szapiro traced the universal beginnings of the stereotype 
in,  
 
[U]nsatisfied needs, from disappointments, from dissatisfaction with oneself or 
one’s life, or in the face of opinions – one’s own, those of one’s surroundings or 
of the world – about oneself, one’s group, one’s nation. [The stereotype] emerges 
from the desire to compensate for feelings of inferiority, from the unsatisfied need 
to affirm one’s worth. It is born under the pressure of experience and emotions 
arising most often from fear, out of the feeling that the individual, a group, or a 
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However, close reading of Kersten’s work on postwar Polish-Jewish relations suggests 
that for her the dynamics of the historically specific triangle of Jews – the Communist 
regime – Polish society were central to the anti-Jewish violence in the period. On one 
hand, the alleged link between the Communist regime and the Jews (the myth of the Jew-
communist) and, on the other, the connection between the opposition and antisemitism 
and xenophobia, both formed symmetrical mirror “phantoms” that, according to Kersten, 
greatly affected the dynamic among Poles and Jews, 
 
One needs, certainly, to ask a question, to what extent these phantoms reflected 
the mentality and viewpoints functioning in various circles of society. There is 
reason to claim that [the phantoms] constituted active, emotionally charged 
constructs with significant power of influence, which cannot be reduced to 




Equally important were the surrounding circumstances: “unceasing acts of violence” 
(nieustające gwałty) “explosive” enough (materiał zapalny) to ignite and lead to 
murder.
181
 In Kersten’s analysis of the Kielce pogrom in 1946, she underlined the general 
political circumstances as well as specific war and postwar histories as critical to 
understanding postwar antisemitism. But, above all, Kersten believed that the major 
source of antisemitic violence could be found in the mental framework of Polish society 
(what Kersten called “social atmosphere”), its postwar propensity for anti-Jewish 
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sentiments in moments of crisis.
182
 Kersten called it “the condition of society” (kondycja 
społeczeństwa), which encompassed not only anti-Jewish elements of Christian tradition 
and the antisemitism of the 1930s but also the events of the war, which resulted in the 
isolation of Jews from the rest of society, “Jews perished because they were Jews, 
because they returned from nonexistence – after all they were not supposed to be here 
any more.”
183
 Finally, postwar “competition in suffering” and the general sense of 
frustration compensated by aggression contributed to persistent outbreaks of anti-Jewish 
violence.
184
 Kersten also added stereotypes based on economic conditions. However, she 
tended to consider economic factors as secondary (in her work, Kersten seldom quoted 
primary or secondary sources that pointed to property return as one of the major causes of 
postwar anti-Jewish riots).  
In my opinion, there are two weaknesses in Kersten’s intervention: the analysis of 
“society” as a whole with Jews a priori located outside of it and the treatment of the anti-
communism of “Polish society” as a given. First, there is no way to prove that Poles and 
Jews constituted two separate quasi-camps after the war. Neither is there a basis to 
conceptually locate Jews outside society as if they were not a part of it. Indeed, Jews 
were perceived as outsiders and aliens but it is not a reason to employ the same categories 
in a historical analysis of the problem. Second, there are no surveys available to prove 
that the absolute majority of Poles had definitive attitudes toward Jews, the communist 
regime, and the relation between the two. The fact that rioters yelled anti-Jewish and anti-
communist slogans did not reflect on all strata of society nor did it mirror the social 
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dynamics in all the regions. I consider statements defining Polish society immediately 
after the war as anti-communist en masse as highly problematic and impossible to prove.  
In 2006, Gross’ book Fear introduced a new and important reading of the causes 
of postwar antisemitism in Poland. Gross shifted emphasis from the role of the myth of 
the Jew-communist (Kersten) toward the role of economic factors, namely property 
return. He suggested, “We must seek the reasons for the novel, virulent quality of 
postwar antisemitism in Poland not in collective hallucinations nor in prewar attitudes, 
but in actual experiences acquired during the war years.”
185
 By “actual experiences,” 
Gross meant the acquisition of Jewish property during the war and the threat of losing it 
after the war. He argued, 
 
Living Jews embodied the massive failure of character and reason on the part of 
their Polish neighbors and constituted by mere presence both a reminder and a 
threat that they might need to account for themselves. A live Jew converted 
mienie pożydowskie, “formerly Jewish property,” into property that belonged to 
somebody else, and various strata of Polish society could not bear any 
examination of the books documenting how it was acquired, in an infinite 
multitude of transactions, what went under the pożydowskie label.186 
 
Non-Jews across Poland, out of opportunism, were complicit in Nazi crimes of Jewish 
expropriation. Poles materially profited from the disappearance of their Jewish neighbors 
and were unprepared to deal with the consequences after the war was over. As Gross 
eloquently put it,  
 
In each case the experience was intimate, violent, and profitable. It took place at 
the interface of Polish Jewish relations, on the lower rungs of society, and it was 
insular. Each community followed its own dynamic and structure of opportunities, 
and the memory of those events remains sharp, distinct, and localized.
187
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I pointed to this phenomenon in chapter 3 in the context of murders committed by 
villagers. Returning Jews were a reminder of often horrific crimes, thus constituting an 
unbearable burden of renewed presence. As Kersten put it in 1992, “Jews perished … 




 The originality of Gross’ argument lies, in my opinion, in shifting attention from 
the power of myths, stereotypes, and prejudices – “hallucinations” as he called them – to 
the power of “everyday experience” as the main source of incentives for human behavior. 
An in-depth examination of primary sources from the period proves his hypothesis right. 
The application of this analytical framework also proves helpful in understanding 
violence against Ukrainians after the war in Poland (a question of land), violence against 
Germans (revenge), or violent outbreaks against Jews in Slovakia (property). At the same 
time, the total dismissal of the power of “hallucinations” in governing aggressive human 
behavior and the reduction of the role of stereotypes to a mere pretext impoverishes this 
otherwise persuasive hypothesis. Even though beliefs and myths may not be sufficient or 
even necessary factors leading to ethnic violence, they do signify an important layer in 
building motivation for violence. They help to translate individual grievances into 
homogenizing constructs (“this Jew did that and that and all Jews are like that”). For 
example, if mothers of vaccinated pupils in the school in Topoľčany had not believed that 
their children had been poisoned, the pogrom would have never occurred or it would 
have had an entirely different character. Thus, completely ignoring the role of stereotypes 
in postwar acts of violence against Jews weakens if not distorts any historical analysis. 
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Despite this weakness, Gross’ analytical model applies to the two case studies in 
this work. Indeed, Kraków residents’ fears that they would be forced to return Jewish 
property (combined with the actual poverty and the meager living conditions of the day) 
created a climate of insecurity, mistrust, and hatred. Kraków’s Kazimierz quarter – 
Jewish until the war – was almost entirely settled by the Kraków poor and newcomers 
after liberation. Mostly unskilled and with no livelihood, living in poverty and constant 
frustration, the inhabitants of Kazimierz were part of an environment extremely 
conducive to antisemitic outbursts. That is not to say that the poor are more prone to 
antisemitism than the rich and the privileged. Rather, poverty is only one of the factors in 
an aggravating climate of hostility and mistrust. Moreover, it was not poverty per se but 
the promise of improvement in the living conditions through property appropriation that 
turned into a trigger for the riots. As someone said, the poor and the miserable without 
hope do not carry revolutions. But the poor who are given hope and achieve small gains 
are likely to rebel and ask for more (“revolution of rising expectations”). Anti-Jewish 
riots in Kraków were such a cry for more, namely for securing new acquisitions formerly 
belonging to Jewish neighbors. Fear of losing what had been expropriated and what had a 
potential to better one’s life pulled people on the streets into violence against Jews.  
Kamenec, one of a handful of scholars who analyzed the pogrom in Topoľčany, 
singled out economic factors in explaining these events.
189
 Kamenec argued that the 
consequences of the aryanization (arizačný process) from the war period, the postwar 
appointment of national administrators (národni správcovia), and postwar restitution 
were at the core of anti-Jewish enmity in postwar Slovakia, which, in turn, led to 
outbreaks of violence. Thousands of Slovak aryanizers (arizátori) and national 
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administrators benefited from the takeover of Jewish enterprises, houses, land, and 
movable property left by the deported.
190
 Accompanied by efficient anti-Jewish 
propaganda, the threat of Jewish survivors returning became a source of hystérie among 
new owners.
191
 According to Kamenec, the fascist regime spread rumors of Jewish 
preparations for anti-Christian and anti-Slovak revenge after the end of the war. In 
western Slovakia, for example, stories circulated that in Sicily after liberation “Jews at 
once occupied their stores and estates and paid off old scores by shooting aryanizers.”
192
 
Moreover, Kamenec argued, postwar tensions increased due to a lack of law (and 
competent administration, I would add), regulating the manner in which property 
restitution was to be handled. As I described in the previous chapter, restitution in 
Slovakia was not legally formalized until late 1946.  
To conclude the analysis of the causes of postwar anti-Jewish violence, I argue 
that the power of anti-Jewish stereotypes, rising expectations of the poor, and fear of 
losing property still do not suffice to understand the intensity of pogroms after the war. In 
my opinion, devaluation of human life and ubiquitous lawlessness must be considered to 
fully grasp this phenomenon. Not only people got more used to killings, death, and 
violence, but also there was nobody to stop them. The disintegration and slow 
reconstruction of state structures, including the police, created a vacuum of execution of 
power in which criminals felt completely unrestrained. Weapons were too easily 
obtainable too. 
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Finally, the general “demoralization” of society must also be counted as a root of 
postwar anti-Jewish violence. Gross wrote, 
 
… We must guard against the easy insight that Nazi policies simply rubbed off 
onto the Poles, who grew to emulate the occupiers and became “demoralized.” 
Given the ruthlessly exploitive character of the Nazi occupation, the occupiers’ 
universally displayed contempt for the Poles, and the ferocious resistance their 
measures engendered in all milieu of Polish society, anything that Nazis did was 




But that is precisely the point that Kazimierz Wyka fiercely argued in his Excluded 
Economy. Demoralization of the Polish population was not a product of “rubbing off” but 
rather of “survival” outside the law and against the law of the occupier. The population 
under occupation learnt how to “manage” through swindling, stealing, and any con 
possible. They learnt how to earn without work. About Poles, who profited from wartime 
robbery of Jewish property, Wyka wrote, 
 
For the attitude of ordinary Poles to the tragedy of the Jews may be summarized 
as follows: in murdering the Jews, the Germans committed a crime. We would not 
have done this. The Germans will be punished for this crime. They have stained 
their conscience, but we – only benefit now and in the future only we will benefit, 




And, here, lay the greatest damage that the German occupation did to Poles as a 
community of citizens: they completely undermined the notion of morality in daily life. 
Nothing like that happened in Slovakia and that, in addition to the absence of civil war, 
partially explains why violence against Slovak Jews never reached the Polish level. 
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One of the aims of this thesis is to explain how mutual perceptions among Jews 
and Poles and Jews and Slovaks were transformed after the war and how these 
transformations affected daily relations on the street. The narration of violence and 
violence’s contemporary interpretation turned out to be useful in outlining these 
processes. One of the approaches is to analyze the impact of the media coverage of 
violence on the ordinary citizen. Highly fragmentary sources indicate that while in the 
fall of 1944 there were only thirty titles on the Polish press market, in 1948 there was a 
total of 880 titles, regional and national. The circulation of dailies was between 50,000 
and 200,000, and weeklies 50,000 to 80,000 (this for a population of twenty-four 
million).
195
 However, these numbers give a very limited insight into the readership and 
the media’s political and social impact. After all, circulation tells us how many issues 
were published, not read.
196
 The readership may have been much larger (when factoring 
the multiple readership in libraries and oral transmission of news among family and 
friends) or much smaller (periodicals subsidized without sales).  
In Czechoslovakia, the ratio of press titles to the population of 3,300,000 was 
probably similar to Poland. There were twenty-eight major national newspapers alone on 
the Czechoslovak market in 1948.
197
 Having included all types of regional periodicals, 
factory papers, and village papers, the total number of titles would reach three digits. 
Between 1945 and 1948, the Communists had at their disposal twelve major newspapers 
whereas the Democrats had eight (including Čas in Bratislava and Svobodne slovo in 
                                                 
195
 “System medialny w PRL,” http://portal.wsiz.rzeszow.pl/plik.aspx?id=7272 (accessed June 29, 2008). 
196
 For this remark, I am thankful to Zvi Y. Gitelman. 
197
 Vratislav Bušek and Nicolas Spulber, ed., Czechoslovakia (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957), 
111-13. 
 276 
Prague). The Czech Socialist Party, the Catholic People’s Party, the Social Democratic 
Party, and other non-Communist organizations also had press at their disposal.
198
  
Another way to assess the effects of the media representation of violence on the 
ordinary man or a woman is to point to specific choices people made after the event. The 
reaction of Kraków Jews, for example, who, in numbers higher than before the pogrom, 
left the city in the fall of 1945, suggests that the majority of Jewish readers dismissed the 
officially promoted optimism for the future and the promise of putting an end to anti-
Jewish violence.
199
 Also, the subsequent increase in the number of applications for 
change of names suggested that the Kraków Jews preferred to believe in “disappearance” 
of visible signs of Jewishness as the only way for staying in Poland rather than the state’s 
promises of Polish-Jewish harmony.
200
 At face value, these reactions would suggest that 
it was violence as it happened and as it was experienced and internalized by the residents 
that affected people’s choices and relations on the street rather than the controlled media 
representations. At the same time, however, it is impossible to establish to what extent 
the violence experienced or the violence represented in the papers pushed people to leave 
or change their names. I speculate that for Americans, for example, it was as much 
personal experience as the media coverage of the events of September 11, 2001, that 
shaped their knowledge and emotional reaction to the event; to the extent that the two 
sources of knowledge may have become indistinguishable.  




 My research on the Kraków pogrom indicated that, although it was not a new phenomenon, Jewish 
emigration from Kraków did increase in the fall of 1945, a few weeks after the outbreak. Natalia Aleksiun 
estimated that, in July 1945, 4,600 Jews left Poland whereas in August 1945 their number doubled to 9,875. 
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What, in my opinion, postwar violence did was to intensify neighborly perception 
of each other along ethnic lines; the perception which had been already in place before 
and during the war. As I mentioned before, ethnic identity superseded any other systems 
of reference in the pogroms in Kraków and Topoľčany. When people were killed, they 
were killed as and because of being Jews; their ethnicity took precedence over all other 
political and economic affinities.
201
 In the course of violence, a doctor of Jewish origin 
was above all a Jew and, only second, a doctor. More importantly, especially in Poland, 
postwar anti-Jewish violence further antagonized already (from before and during the 
war) hostile ethnic identities of Polishness and Jewishness, making “Polish Jewishness” 
more difficult to achieve. 
Also, ethnic violence after the war brought to light revised ethnic images of 
victims and perpetrators. On the one hand, Jewishness after the war acquired an aura of 
resurrected ghosts, the unwanted who aspired to special treatment, who were stigmatized 
by their war experience and demanded answers about the committed crimes. On the other 
hand, Polishness gained an imagery of victims of Bolshevism and Nazism who harbored 
anti-Russian and anti-Jewish sentiment, who took Jewish property and betrayed their 
neighbors. As a result, being Jewish came to mean fear for life and necessity to chose 
between non-Jewishness and emigration. Thus, violence turned out to be an important 
means of delineating the limits of belonging to a national and ethnic community. It 
helped to solidify social boundaries along highly exclusionary ethnic lines. In short, 
bloodshed was not just a consequence of rigid ethnic categorization, already put in place 
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in the two countries, but rather an agent actively reinforcing hostility along ethnic lines 
after the war.  
Violence shaped individual lives, sometimes making people reassess life in the 
community, in society, or out of it. Overall, it was not abstract “minorities” or “groups” 
that suffered violence but individuals who sometimes lived their lives as a part of a 
community and sometimes did not, who registered in organizations built along ethnic 
lines and sometimes did not. These were individuals who had their own ideas of who they 
were, ideas that did not necessarily coincide with definitions formed by their neighbors. 
However, neighbors and neighborly violence were not alone in pushing Jews to reassess 
their perceptions of themselves and their place in society. In the next chapter, I will 
describe how the state classified Jews along ethnic lines, forcing them to take all the 
















CITIZENSHIP OF JEWS (1945-47)          
 
In basic terms, citizenship is a personal status, held by all members of the nation-
state, bestowed by the state, and consisting of universal rights as well as duties. 
According to the classic definition given by T.H. Marshall, citizenship is “a status 
bestowed on those who are full members of a community” that involves not only civil 
and political rights but also social entitlements like the right to welfare, education, and 
security among others.
1
 Marshall not only stresses the social aspects of citizenship but 
also linked citizenship to membership in a community rather than in a state. This 
intervention, as Nira Yuval-Davis argued, “enabled us to analytically discuss citizenship 
as a multi-tier construct, which applies to people's membership in a variety of 
collectivities – local, ethnic, national and trans-national.”
2
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The following analysis rests on the understanding of citizenship as “the 
relationship of belonging” to a dominant “strong” community as well as relationships 
among people within and between communities. Citizenship conceived as a process that 
defines these relationships serves as a lens to illuminate changing boundaries within and 
around a society. For this purpose, particularly useful is Rogers Brubaker’s notion of 
citizenship as “social closure,” where citizenship is an instrument to shield the state from 
unwanted outsiders.
3
 In Brubaker’s argument, an ideal liberal citizenship, in the 
democratic Enlightenment tradition embodies principles of equality, freedom, autonomy, 
and the right to be different. The practice of citizenship, however, often faces challenges 
in the form of the tangible forces of the state as well as the intangible legacy of “culture 
and tradition.” In practice, then, citizenship delineates social boundaries and serves as a 
tool of exclusion in the name of common good. Brubaker’s definition of social closure 
enables an analysis of the external as well as domestic forms of closure that shield 
citizens not only from foreigners from the outside but also from outsiders within the state 
borders. 
The state excludes from “the bounded citizenry” those residents whom it labels 
outsiders, “not because of what they are but because of what they are not – because they 
                                                                                                                                                 
subject in relation to ‘something outside of it.’” Subjectivity also captures “the complexities of citizenship 
as both highly individualized and, at the same time, a collectively invoked social identity and subject 
position.” Kathleen Canning and Sonya O. Rose, "Introduction: Gender, Citizenships and Subjectivities: 
Some Historical and Theoretical Considerations," in Gender, Citizenships and Subjectivities, ed. Kathleen 
Canning and Sonya O. Rose (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002). Nira Yuval-Davis, "Women, Citizenship, and 
Difference," Feminist Review: Citizenship: Pushing the Boundaries, no.57 (1997); 
Somers, "Citizenship and the Place of the Public Sphere, Law, Community, and Political Culture in the 
Transition to Democracy," 611. 
3
 Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1992). 
 281 
are not recognized or acknowledged as insiders.”
4
 The modern nation-state makes the 
distinction between insiders and outsiders predominantly along ethnic lines, thus making 
closure against outsiders an equivalent of closure against “ethnocultural non-nationals,”  
 
Every state claims to be the state of, and for, a particular bounded citizenry 
usually conceived as a nation. The modern nation-state is in this sense inherently 
nationalistic. Its legitimacy depends on its furthering, or seeming to further, the 




At the center of Brubaker’s analysis lies the notion that differing definitions of 
citizenship have been shaped by deeply rooted understandings of nationhood, namely that 
“conceptions of nationhood…have determined the tracks along which the politics of 




Citizenship in a nation-state is inevitably bound up with nationhood and national 
identity, membership of the state with membership of the nation. Proposals to 
redefine the legal criteria of citizenship raise large and ideologically charged 
questions of nationhood and national belonging. [Contemporary] debates about 
citizenship in France and Germany are debates about what it means to belong to 
the nation-state. The politics of citizenship today is first and foremost a politics of 
nationhood. As such, it is a politics of identity, not a politics of interest…. It 
pivots more on self-understanding than on self-interest. The “interests” informing 
the politics of citizenship are “ideal” rather than material. The central question is 




Thus, conceptions of nationhood and the interests of the state are bound, “Judgments of 
what is in the interests of the state are mediated by self-understanding, by cultural idioms 
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 This theory is particularly useful in the discussion of the criteria of belonging in 
postwar Czechoslovakia and Poland. After the war, the two states were in the process of 
redefining the boundaries surrounding their dominant communities, defining anew who 
was and who was not a member of their citizenry. The idea of the nation-state and 
national homogeneity strongly informed this process and was fundamental to 
Czechoslovak and Polish policy-making at the time. This drive toward homogeneity, 
however, was not peculiar only to Czechoslovakia and Poland but reflected a general 
political trend in Europe after the Second World War.  
 
… [T]here was great concern to stop the violence of spontaneous ethnic cleansing 
in ethnically mixed regions and a deep desire to prevent future conflicts through 
the separation of populations. Both Herbert Hoover and Winston Churchill 
believed that organized transfers of populations were the only means of ending 
the ethnic violence that plagued Eastern Europe, and they regarded homogenous 
nation-states as the only path to a stable postwar peace. Hoover declared in 1942, 
“The hardship of moving is great, but it is less than the constant suffering of 
minorities and the constant recurrence of war.” Churchill reiterated this sentiment 
in 1944: “There will be no mixture of populations to cause endless trouble… A 




The governments in Czechoslovakia and Poland did not simply ape the Allied powers. 
Rather politicians and political thinkers in the two countries independently formulated 
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This quasi-doctrine of ethnic homogeneity undoubtedly determined how the two 
states selected their insiders. Since membership in the state was to overlap with 
membership in the nation, the governments had to make sure that no “ethnocultural non-
nationals” would remain in the country.
11
 Citizenship thus came to serve as a shield 
against the unwanted “others.” In order to adjust citizenship to its postwar role, the 
redefinition of the criteria for acquiring citizenship was critical. The redefined criteria 
were embedded in the discourse of ethnicity and national belonging.
12
 I argue that this 
redefinition was not a mere one-sided bestowal of new rules on society but rather a 
negotiation between the government, community leaders, and ordinary people. 
Submitting applications for citizenship, proving one’s eligibility, and appealing an 
unfavorable decision were methods of negotiation, which rendered residents active 
participants in the process. The Jewish returnees and their community leaders were 
among those who strove to secure their status as full-fledged members of the 
Czechoslovak and Polish states.  
In this chapter, I will show how Jewish survivors in postwar Poland and Slovakia 
achieved (and not merely received) citizenship through dialogue and conflict between 
their representatives, the local administration, and the Polish and Slovak governments. I 
will compare the effects of these negotiations on the legal status of Jews and their daily 
experience. To illuminate these issues, I will analyze two parallel processes: the 
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verification of Polishness in western and northern Poland and the issuance of attestations 
of political reliability in southern Slovakia in the years 1945-47. These two processes 
were a part of projects administered by the Czechoslovak and Polish governments which 
aimed at ethnic homogenization and involved the enforcement of “Slavic” ethnic 
uniformity (reslovakization and repolonization) and the elimination of the “non-Slavic 
elements” (demagyarization and degermanization). Especially Slovak Jews found 
themselves trapped in the midst of these processes and faced the need to negotiate their 
legal standing if they wished to remain in the country.    
I chose western and northern Poland and southern Slovakia as loci of my analysis 
for a few reasons. First, more than seventy percent of the Jewish population in Poland 
after the war concentrated in the west and north of the country, in the so-called 
Recovered Territories (Ziemie Odzyskane).
13
 Similarly, the majority of Slovak Jews lived 
in the big cities of western and southern Slovakia after the war. Second, the Jews who 
resided in both regions were most vulnerable to discrimination, i.e. German- (Poland) and 
Magyar- (Slovakia) speaking Jews.
14
 Thus, their status best illustrates issues examined in 
this chapter. Third, the examination of regional processes casts light on more general 
trends in state policies and the impact of these policies on the Jewish experience in the 
entire country. For example, the way in which the upper echelons of Warszawa handled 
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local problems in western and northern Poland did not just reflect their understanding of 
the region but also manifested their general stance on citizenship and nationality. 
Regional narratives enable the examination of postwar experiences with all their 
peculiarities and inner tensions, an examination that the national narratives of “Jews in 
Poland” and “Jews in Slovakia” fail to deliver. 
 
German-Speaking Jews in Poland 
 
In contemporary Poland, citizenship and nationality are hardly distinguishable in 
public and private discourse. More than ninety percent of citizens of Poland claim Polish 
origin and speak Polish without questioning the terms of their belonging. This conflation 
of citizenship and nationality is not a mere reflection of ethnic homogeneity but rather a 
consequence of a long-lasting transformation of the ways in which people “imagined” 
their place in the dominant community in Poland. The following analysis does not aspire 
to examine this process; it only points to one of its aspects, namely the significance of the 
first two years after the war in obscuring the lines between citizenship and nationality in 
the public imagination. The regulation of Jewish status with the accompanying 
ambiguities and tensions was a part of this process.  
Leszek Olejnik wrote that the Polish government did not formulate a policy on 
nationalities for at least the first few months after the liberation of 1945. The politicians 
seem to have believed that deportations and resettlements would solve the problem 
eventually.
15
 Thus, at the time they paid little or no attention to the criteria for Polish 
citizenship. The July Manifesto of the Soviet-sponsored Polish Committee of National 
                                                 
15
 Leszek Olejnik, Polityka Narodowościowa Polski w Latach 1944-1960 (Łódź: Wydawnictwo 
Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, 2003). 
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Liberation (PKWN), issued on July 22, 1944, dealt only superficially with the issue. The 
signatories of the Manifesto declared “…restitution of all democratic freedoms, equality 
of all citizens regardless of race, denomination, and nationality.”
16
 This political 
commitment was to be reinforced in February 1947, when the appendix to the Small 
Constitution stated that the legislature would “continue to realize the basic civil rights 




Similar to the later Czechoslovak Košice Program (April 1945), the Polish 
Manifesto of 1944 singled out the Germans for retribution.
18
 The Manifesto read,  
 
The time has come for reprisal on Germans for agony and suffering, for burnt 
villages, demolished towns, destroyed churches and schools, for round-ups, 
camps, and executions, for Auschwitz, Majdanek, Treblinka [death camps], and 
for the murdered ghettos.
19
  
                                                 
16
 “…przywrócenie wszystkich swobód demokratycznych, równości wszystkich obywateli bez różnicy rasy, 
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(July 1944). Hence, the Polish Manifesto was more aggressive than the Czechoslovak Program; it opened 
with a direct attack against the political opposition at home and abroad, delegalizing both. 
19
 Although not explicit, the association between the camps, ghettos, and Jews was clear. The signatories of 
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Committee of National Liberation, 22 July 1944, in Kozłowski and Sziling, ed., Historia PRL: Wybór 
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This statement set the tone for any pronouncements on Germans for the coming years. In 
February 1945, Deputy Prime Minister Władysław Gomułka of the Communist Party 
(PPR) said, “Germans will be severely punished. Responsibility must be borne by the 
entire German nation, which in its mass went under Hitlerism’s command and tolerated 
Hitlerite reins.”
20
 Obviously, the government channeled this virulent anti-germanism to 
further its own political agenda. For example, anti-germanism helped the government to 
unify and mobilize society around the national idea and hence paved the way for its 
legitimization on nationalistic ground.
21
 Above all, anti-germanism fit into the ideology 
of ethnic homogeneity. It neatly dovetailed with the then-fashionable vision of the New 
World and building a New Poland – nationally uniform, free of criminals, and with 
justice for all. Consequently, the government saw the projects of degermanization 
(odniemczanie) and repolonization (repolonizacja) of the western and northern territories 
as the most “natural” part of this process.  
The degermanization – “elimination of Germaneness” (akcja zwalczania 
niemczyzny) – involved expulsion, detainment, and expropriation of Germans, as well as 
the elimination of the German language (culture) from public and private life.
22
 The 
expulsion of Germans from Poland to the Soviet and British zones in Germany between 
1945 and 1947 was the central means of the process.
23 Along with expulsions, the 
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government worked out an effective system of punishment for German war criminals.
24
 
On November 4, 1944, a decree “concerning protective means against traitors of the 
nation” was issued. The decree targeted those Polish citizens from central and eastern 
Poland who, at any point of the Nazi occupation, declared “German nationality or 
German origin” and thus “took advantage of rights and privileges by virtue of (z tytułu) 
affiliation with German nationality or German origin.”
25
 The punishment included 
“detention, placement in a location of seclusion (camp), and submission to forced labor 
for an indefinite time, regardless of criminal liability.”
26
 The Treasury would confiscate 
the traitor’s (and immediate family’s) property. The traitors and their relatives from the 
same household would lose public rights and civil honorary rights (obywatelskie prawa 
honorowe) as well as parental and tutelary rights.
27
 Also liable for the loss of civil and 
public rights, life imprisonment, and capital punishment were these people who escaped 
from detention, hid their property, or aided convicts.
28
  
Polish Germans were deprived of their citizenship a year after their Czechoslovak 
counterparts. While the Czechoslovak government stripped Germans of citizenship in 
August 1945 (presidential decree no. 33/1945), the Polish government issued a similar 
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decree in September 1946. Decree no. 310/1946 deprived of Polish citizenship people 
(and their families) who showed a “distinct German national character” in their conduct 
(swym zachowaniem wykazały niemiecką odrębność narodową).29 Expropriation and 
deportation (wysiedlenie) were to follow the loss of citizenship. The decree applied only 
to people who had Polish citizenship before September 1, 1939 (i.e., it was not valid for 
the Recovered Territories).
30
 Interestingly, the declaration of German nationality did not 
suffice to prove German national distinctness, meaning that the administration did not 
automatically consider people who had signed the Volksliste as Germans.
31
 Instead, 
critical for the determination of German nationality were a “distinct German national 
character” (the use of the German language), participation in a German organization, and 
the display of a negative attitude toward Polish society.
32
  
Beginning in 1947, the use of German in any form, in public or private, was 
considered a “manifestation of ill-will toward the Polish state” (okazywanie niechęci dla 
Państwa Polskiego) and thus subject to punishment, ranging from a warning to a fine or 
imprisonment.
33
 Silesian Voivode Aleksander Zawadzki spoke publicly of “cleansing the 
region from German accretions” and the need to deepen hatred of the German language 
as sine qua non of Polish existence in Silesia (“us or them”).
34
 When speaking of mixed 
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marriages, Zawadzki concluded that “Germaneness (niemczyzna) should not be allowed 
to fry in a Polish sauce…. Germans are our mortal enemies and we must fight against 
them with all means available.”
35
 Any manifestation of compassion toward German 
POW’s or the broadcast of German songs in restaurants and cafes was also punishable. 
The administration urged people to remove German inscriptions from their family graves. 
Although contested and stopped shortly after its introduction (due to the obvious 
analogy), the local administration introduced the practice of marking Germans with the 
letter “N” (Niemiec – a German in Polish) and concentrating them in a ghetto-like 
manner.
36
 Further serving the degermanization and repolonization, the signs and street 
names were changed from German to Polish, giving the province a “Polish look.”  
The repolonization – restoration of Polishness (polskość) – entailed state-
controlled settlement of the Polish population, verification of Polish nationality, 
education (courses in language and history), and culture-building initiatives like the 
collection of Polish books, among others. Similar to the reslovakization of southern 
Slovakia, repolonization translated into the forceful assimilation of the local population. 
Two main approaches to repolonization – pessimistic and optimistic – dominated the 
debate. Pessimists were cautious in estimating the possible success of repolonization. 
They stated that the majority of the local population would not repolonize that easily if at 
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all hence, they should leave the country.
37
 The argument was that “hostile elements” that 
repolonized only superficially might “stab Poland in the back” should an occasion arise 
and, therefore, aggressive expulsions were safer than leniency toward any “questionable 
element.”
38
 Optimists believed that almost half of “the indigenous population” (ludność 
rodzima) of western and northern Poland was of Polish origin and could easily 
repolonize.
39
 That stance implied an understanding of Polishness and Germaneness as 
flexible, and if necessary, moldable identities. Jan Misztal quoted one of the Polish 
Catholic activists who wrote that “nationalization” (unarodowienie) of as many as a 
million of the “germanized Slavic population” in western Poland was within reach.
40
 
Another journalist wrote, “A German passport and a level of germanization are not 
crucial. It is Polish origin and Polish blood that matters.”
41
  
In the rhetoric of repolonizers, Polishness was the essence of the land “recovered” 
from Germany; Polishness was “its roots, and its soil.” Thus, they believed that not even 
“a drop of Polish blood” should be wasted without making all attempts at 
repolonization.
42
 The “restoration of stifled Polishness” of the residents of western and 
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northern Poland became an imperative of the central authorities after liberation.
43
 But 
who was Polish and who was not; and how could one be distinguished from the other?
44
 
The process seemed difficult since Poles and Germans had mingled together for so long. 
As the voivode of Silesia stated,  
 
The fact that all our brothers Opolanie [people from the city and the countryside 
of Opole] were forcefully counted among the citizens of the Third Reich and the 
fact that they were densely mixed with a foreign German element on their … land 
left deep imprint on them [Poles] … – all of this caused the necessity to 




The verification (weryfikacja) seemed to have served a few purposes at once: increasing 
the numbers of Poles, selecting people of “doubtful” nationality for expulsion, and 
regulating the distribution of property.
46
  
In March 1945, the provincial administration of the Recovered Territories started 
the process. Prewar residents of western and northern Poland who declared “local” or 
”here” (tutejsi) nationality before the war and “neutral” after the war now became the 
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main target of the verification process.
47
 Once they claimed Polish nationality and 
expressed their desire to stay in the country and maintain legal status (the enthusiasts of 
repolonization encouraged them to do so), they had to undergo an assessment of their 
Polishness. When approved, they obtained a certificate of Polish nationality 
(zaświadczenie polskiej przynależności narodowej).48 Similar to the attestations of 
political reliability in Slovakia, the Polish certificates shielded them from discrimination 
and guaranteed their civil rights. The certificates also regulated individual material 
survival and personal freedom.  
The determination of Polishness was thus critical. It also turned out to be more 
difficult than expected. Until the beginning of 1946, the criteria for the determination of 
Polish nationality in western and northern Poland depended on the politics of the specific 
regions. In January 1946 the minister of the Recovered Territories made the first attempt 
to standardize the process. In his study of the verification, Misztal found that the 
government based the standardization on the following premises: 
 
A person of Polish origin or a person who showed unity (wykazująca łączność) 
with the Polish nation should be considered as belonging to the Polish nation. Due 
to many instances of dormant consciousness of Polish origin, the consideration of 
surnames, germanized en masse, and blood relations with Poles was necessary. 
Unity with the Polish nation could be proved by the inner attitude (postawa 
wewnętrzna) and language and by membership in Polish organizations or 
participation in the fight for Polishness. Also, the cultivation of Polish customs in 
the family, despite the dangers, demonstrated a connection and solidarity with the 
life of Poles, could prove it [the unity]. In the cases of discrimination of a member 
of a family for a political crime, the remaining members of the family should not 
be discriminated without a well founded reason [my emphases].
49
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In other words, the government defined Polishness based on origin and/or unity with the 
nation. The most enigmatic was the concept of “inner attitude,” which could be 
interpreted in many ways. Most importantly, the central administration understood 
Polishness as an inherited legacy and/or behavior. In this sense, national identity was not 
merely fixed by birth but rather by individual choice.  
In April 1946, the ministry of the Recovered Territories completed the 
standardization of criteria determining Polish nationality (see appendix 1).
50
 In 
accordance with ministerial directive, the behavioral aspect carried more weight than 
origin or kinship. Even if an applicant was of “Polish origin” but had betrayed the nation, 
he or she would be denied the attestation. On April 28, 1946, the president of the State 
National Council (Krajowa Rada Narodowa, KRN) and the minister of the Recovered 
Territories signed a decree concerning Polish citizenship for residents of Polish 
nationality in western and northern Poland.
51
 The right of citizenship was awarded to 
everyone who had permanently resided in the territories before January 1, 1945, who 
proved Polish nationality to the verification committees, received the attestation of 
Polishness, and declared loyalty to the Polish nation and the state.
52
  
Past behavior proved to be of paramount importance in rehabilitation of the 
Volksdeutsche – Polish citizens of German origin from the territories annexed to 
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Germany who signed Volksliste, i.e., declarations of German nationality during the Nazi 
occupation.
53
 In accordance with the law from May 1945, if Polish citizens signed the 
Volksliste “against their will or under duress and proved their Polish national distinctness 
with their behavior,” they maintained their rights.
54
 In such cases, a declaration of loyalty 
to the Polish nation and state was required. A decree from June 1946 stated that “a Polish 
citizen who declared German or another nationality privileged by the invader between 
September 1, 1939 and May 9, 1945 was liable to imprisonment up to a maximum of ten 
years.”
55
 Traitors would also pay a fine and lose public and civil rights as well as their 
property. Commutation of a sentence was possible if the perpetrator “…acted due to 
ignorance (ciemnota) or lack of civic manners (wyrobienie obywatelskie) justified by the 
living conditions.”
56
 Other criteria for innocence and acquittal included suffering severe 
persecution for refusal to declare German nationality and participation “in the fight for 




Obviously, a framework which allowed for Polishness to be earned through 
“good” behavior was of great significance for Jewish survivors. In October 1947, the 
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voivode of Silesia decreed the establishment of civic control commissions (obywatelskie 
komisje kontrolne), one of whose tasks was to “identify firms and stores which had 
signboards bearing German first and last names and effect their replacement with Polish 
ones.”
58
 However, he made an exception for the signboards with Jewish names. This 
“favoritism” was part of the government's recognition of the particularity of the Jewish 
experience. As early as in July 1944, the Polish Manifesto (unlike the Czechoslovak 
Košice Program) pointed to Jews as a group of particular interest, “The Jews, whom the 
occupant so brutally oppressed, will now be assured of the right to rebuild their existence 
and of the equality of rights de jure and de facto.”
59
 References to death camps and 
ghettos also implied governmental recognition of the particularity of the Jewish 
victimhood. On numerous occasions, Jewish survivors received promises of civil rights 
from the Polish authorities. In January 1945, Prime Minister Edward Osóbka-Morawski 
said, “The Jewish population who remain alive will be able to take full advantage of not 
only de jure but also de facto legal equality...”
60
  
The Communists – the Secretariat of the PPR Central Committee – formulated 
their official policy toward Jews in October 1947. The decree O pracy i zadaniach 
Polskiej Partii Robotniczej wśród ludności żydowskiej (On work and tasks of the PPR 
among the Jewish population) stated that  
 
The solution to the Jewish question in Poland must be based on the principle of 
joint (wspólna) work and the fight of the Jewish population at home, together 
                                                 
58
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with the whole Polish nation, for the solidification of the system and the power of 




Further, the decree reinforced principles of “national equality” with a view toward 
enabling the development of Jewish life in Poland,  
 
Denial of prospects and the need for a normal national development of Jews in 
Poland…is unfair since it leads to a setback in the creative forces of the Jewish 
population and furthers the activity of hostile reactionary elements… In the face 
of the establishment of normal conditions for life and development of the Jewish 
population in Poland, based on complete national equality of rights 
(równouprawnienie narodowe), … migration of Jews from town to town and their 




The decree also mandated the preservation of the central and apolitical role of Jewish 
committees in organized communal life, equal opportunities and full employment, 
“productivization” of the Jewish population in industry and cooperatives, intensification 
of communist political influence within the Jewish community, restoration of Jewish 
cultural life in order to bring up the Jews “in the spirit of People’s Poland and Marxism,” 




Regardless of its ideological bias, this text illuminated how the PPR perceived the 
Jews as a community. For the leading Communists, “the Jewish population” and “the 
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Polish nation” seemed to have been two separate categories of belonging, a cultural and a 
national one respectively, friendly and collaborative but non-inclusive unless assimilated. 
Eugeniusz Mironowicz argued that although the Polish government and the communists 
allowed Jews to organize nationally and culturally (the only national minority accorded 
that privilege), they expected that Jewish communal life would take on a more cultural 
than national character.
64
 The ministry of public administration, for instance, instructed 
the provincial administration to treat the Jewish committees as social or political 
institutions of charitable, not national, profile.
65
 Janusz Mieczkowski claimed that, 
indeed, the Polish state never “recognized the Jews as a national minority with full rights 
(my emphasis).”
66
 He described how the voivode of Szczecin (northwestern Poland) 
claimed the absence of national minorities in June 1947 when more than 6,000 Jews still 
lived in the province.
67
  
Mironowicz explained this ambiguity by pointing out that the state’s efforts to 
build a nationally homogenous state (without minorities) coexisted with its policy of 
enabling Jewish survivors to reconstruct their communal life. Tomasz Szarota pointed out 
that, for example, the Jews in Lower Silesia were a “national minority enclave in-the-
making” in a nationally homogenous state in-the-making and thus politically 
problematic.
68
 It was one thing to let Jews reconstruct their communal life as a religious 
and cultural minority, and hope that individuals would assimilate into the dominant 
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national community, and quite another to support their national aspirations and sense of 
national separateness. The recognition of any national minority would have contradicted 
the doctrine of homogeneity. However, the special status of Jews as “natural allies in the 
fight against fascism” called for some acknowledgement.
69
 The working compromise was 




Alina Cała and Halina Datner-Śpiewak argued that the political considerations of 
the day were also crucial in shaping the pro-Jewish governmental policies,  
 
The Polish Left, the Communist Polish Party [Komunistyczna Partia Polski, KPP] 
in particular, fought resolutely against antisemitism, associating it exclusively 
with rightist attitudes. Hence, the Polish Left considered the fight against 
antisemitism to be a significant tactic against opponents after the war and counted 
on widespread support from the Jewish population for political transformations. 
Communists supported Jewish initiatives of self-governance and used the 
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In a similar vein, Mieczkowski argued that the recognition of Jewish equality and 
subsequent use of the “Jewish motif” served to promote the illusion of equality and 
freedom for all citizens in official propaganda.
72
  
A good example of this was a proclamation from June 1945 by the minister of 
public administration, declaring that Jews in newly annexed Lower Silesia should be 
given far-reaching aid considering “that, after the martyrdom of German concentration 
camps, they will be a loyal guard over Polishness in the Recovered Territories.”
73
 A 
couple of weeks later the local Jews proclaimed that  
 
Lower Silesia became their [Jews’] motherland… With Germany’s 
downfall…Jews took guard (objęli straż) of factories and workshops, declaring 
their Polishness loudly and proudly. They paid dearly with their blood and sweat 




The overlap between the aspirations of Jewish survivors willing to stay in Poland and the 
proclamations of the Polish central government seemed evident. In administrative 
practice, however, this ideal was unfeasible. The difficulties that German Jews (German-
speaking and former German citizens) faced in the local administration in western and 
northern Poland showed that Jewishness did not guarantee civil equality. 
German Jews or German-speaking Jews were by no means a large community in 
postwar Poland. Szyja Bronsztejn spoke of a small group of 135 “indigenous Jews” 
(autochtoni-Żydzi) living in Lower Silesia immediately after the liberation of 1945.75 In 
contrast, Bożena Szaynok spoke of “a large group” of German Jews living in Lower 
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Silesia until at least the beginning of 1946.
76
 Ewa Waszkiewicz found records of twenty- 
seven German Jewish funerals taking place in the city of Wrocław in 1945 and 1946.
77
 
She also cited the correspondence of the Jewish Religious Congregation, written mostly 
in German and Hebrew, which indicated the presence of German-speaking Jews as well 
as their Zionist political inclinations.
78
 Having added the small pockets of German-
speaking Jews in other provinces of western and northern Poland, including Upper Silesia 
and Pomerania, I estimate that only a few hundred German Jews lived in Poland during 
the first two years after the war. Although seemingly negligible, considering their 
numbers, I argue that the tension surrounding the legal status of German Jews illuminates 
the general criteria for citizenship in postwar Poland. 
The first signs of the administrative problems concerning the legal status of 
German Jews in Poland appeared in June 1945 when the representatives of the CKŻP, the 
local Jewish committees in Lower Silesia, and the central government met to discuss the 
issue. The central and local administration promised to pass decrees that would enforce 
”legal equality in every sphere and in every respect (w każdej dziedzinie i pod każdym 
względem) between German Jews and Polish Jews.”79 A month later, the Jewish 
committee in the Gdańsk province (northern Poland) sent a memorandum to the voivode 
of Gdańsk, reminding him that German Jews, despite their foreign citizenship, enjoyed 
the same rights as Polish citizens due to their suffering as Jews during the war,  
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People, who were submitted to painful or even horrific personal persecutions and 
property reprisals from Germans, who have not gotten civil rights since 1933 
…are now, after the expulsion of Germans and downfall of the murderous Nazi 
regime, in an unchanged situation. …In the face of the absence of relevant laws, 
the Polish authorities treat them as German citizens with all consequences, i.e., 
loss of property, forced labor, and, recently, even resettlement from the territory 
of the Gdańsk province…Then it seems supremely right and fair that the new 
democratic Polish State does not identify [these Jews] with Germans but rather 
treats them equally with its own citizens considering the oceans of wrongs, tears, 




Author(s) of the memorandum requested that “the legal and financial status of Jews and 
persons of Jewish origin,” holding German citizenship or citizenship of the Free City of 
Gdańsk, should be equalized with the legal and financial status of Polish citizens who had 
possessed German citizenship or citizenship of the Free City of Gdańsk.81 They also 
demanded that the resettlement of German Jews be suspended and instructed the 
responsible institutions to separate Jews from the groups assigned for deportation. 
In the summer of 1945, the government issued two decrees that played a 
fundamental role in regulating the legal status of German Jews in Poland. On June 20, 
1945, the minister of public administration issued a directive to all provinces across the 
Recovered Territories specifying the requirements for temporary attestation of Polish 
nationality. In accordance with the directive, the people eligible for attestation were 
former citizens of Germany and the Third Reich who  
 
On August 31, 1939, resided in the territories recovered by Poland in 1945 and 
maintained Polish nationality, who were not members of the NSDAP [the Nazi 
Party] …, and who would sign a statement of loyalty to the Polish nation [złożą 
pisemną deklarację wierności narodowi polskiemu].82  
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 Directive of the minister of public administration from June 20, 1945 (L.dz. II.C. 805/45) as quoted by 
Jan Misztal in Misztal, Weryfikacja Narodowościowa na Ziemiach Odzyskanych, 210. 
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On July 10, the minister of public administration issued yet another instruction, ordering 
the administration in western and northern Poland to issue attestations of Polish 
nationality to people subjected to Nazi persecution due to their nationality or marriage to 
a person discriminated against due to his or her nationality.
83
 The instruction highlighted 
two groups: “the persecuted by virtue of (z tytułu) Jewish nationality” and the Germans 
who were discriminated because they refused to divorce their Jewish spouses.
84
 In 
October 1945, the administration further modified the rules, emphasizing behavior as a 
primary criterion. Consequently (like in Czechoslovakia), the following could not 
undergo verification: members of the Nazi Party, the SS, the SA, and members of pro-
German associations and organizations as well as German teachers and military officers, 
and people who voluntarily Germanized their names. 
To sum up, by privileging behavior (suffering from persecution) in the 
determination of nationality and civil rights, the government opened the door to 
citizenship for Jews regardless of their former citizenship, origin, language, and religion. 
I speculate that, in accordance with the governmental prescriptions, suffering under Nazi 
persecution came to equate Polish and Jewish nationality, rendering them 
interchangeable. After all, Jews could theoretically obtain attestations of Polish 
nationality, guaranteeing exemption from forced labor, the right to food rations, and the 
temporary right of residence in Poland (until the final determination of legal status), upon 
showing certificates of Jewish nationality and/or proof of suffering persecution during the 
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 However, clerks who made those decisions on a daily basis had their own 
understanding of the relationship between Jewishness and access to civil rights, which 
did not concur with the government’s.
 
 
In western and northern Poland, verification commissions (komisje weryfikacyjne) 
were responsible for the determination of nationality. The voivode of Silesia ordered that 
the commissions involve “…local (miejscowi), reliable citizens (godni zaufania) of 
unquestionable Polish nationality.” These included representatives of the executive (like 
the town’s mayor), teachers’ trade unions, Polish political organizations and associations, 
the police, and the intelligence service.
86
 In theory, the commissions were to be 
comprised of people who had resided in the province before and during the war and had 
thorough knowledge of local ethnic relations.
87
 The commonly held belief was that these 
residents guaranteed fairness of the verification due to their familiarity with local 
relations as opposed to newcomers who, not knowing local histories, were bound to 
misjudge the nationality of applicants. I speculate that, in practice, all the members of the 
commissions – locals and outsiders – had similar motivations, ranging from personal 
interests to the so-called common good. Moreover, the outsiders had limited room to act 
against the well-established communal “who is who” since the prewar communities had 
ceased to exist, shattered by the war and postwar migrations and were mainly replaced by 
new social structures in-the-making.  
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Misztal argued that the testimony of three signatories, “confirming” the Polish 
nationality of a petitioner, usually sufficed to obtain the final approval of Polishness from 
the verification commission.
88
 In addition to the testimonials, the commissioners were 
also supposed to consider the applicant's attitude toward Poles, activities under German 
occupation, and the spirit (duch) in which the applicant brought up his or her children.
89
 
Mixed marriages did not guarantee successful verification, although they could serve as a 
basis for an application. The applications of women married to Germans were supposedly 
processed through the lens of the husband’s political past, his proficiency in Polish, his 
attitude to the state and Polish nation, and her national consciousness, and the spirit in 




These administrative practices and laws differed regionally. In Upper Silesia 
(southwestern Poland), membership in a local Polish organization, three testimonies from 
members of the Union of Poles in Germany, and three testimonies from locals whose 
Polish nationality was “beyond doubt” were necessary to obtain a certificate of Polish 
nationality.
91
 Subsequent instructions lowered the requirements to one of the above 
documents accompanied by evidence of the use of the Polish language at home and the 
ability to read and write Polish. In the north, the requirements were less restrictive. 
Claudia Kraft, in her study of the ethnic re-composition of northern Poland, argued that 
the local administration was primarily interested in “hoarding citizens for the Polish 
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state” and thus aimed at “categorizing as many as possible as Poles…”
92
 The majority of 
the residents considered their regional identity to be more important than their national 
allegiance. Being a “Warmian” or a “Masur” (Warmianin, Mazur – names deriving from 
the names of the regions) resonated more with a personal sense of identity than a Pole or 
a German. In May 1945, the administration issued a directive instructing that Warmians 
and Masurs should be registered as “indigenous,” thus Polish.
93
 The ability to speak 
Polish was temporarily ignored, although the administration organized special 
repolonization courses for people who wanted to learn the language. Consequently, 
Polish citizenship became a commodity that was relatively easily accessible. Needless to 
say, similarly to reslovakization in southern Slovakia, none of these practices succeeded 
in the actual homogenization (repolonization) of northern Poland. Provincial registers of 
population were the sole success: in June 1945, they showed 45,964 fewer Germans and 
40,000 more Poles in comparison to the data from the spring of 1945.
94
 
Zygmunt Izdebski argued that overall the verification commissions based their 
decisions primarily on behavior during the war, treating past conduct as the foremost 
marker of nationality in Poland after the liberation of 1945. He wrote in 1947, 
 
The ground for the verdict of a verification commission… was the commission’s 
free conviction [?] based on the analysis of a person’s behavior toward next-door 
Polish masses, the display of Polish or German national separateness regardless of 
objective factors such as language and origin which played only a 
supplementary… role… From a sociological … point of view, nationality…is… a 
certain state of man’s mind. A measure of this state… can not be anything else but 
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Izdebski’s conclusion seems somewhat idealistic. Of course, there must have been cases 
of decent commissioners who made decisions to the best of their abilities. But even with 
the best intentions, these decision-makers had to juggle with the obscure notions of 
“display of Polish or German national separateness,” “unity with the Polish nation and 
attitude toward Polish matters,” “spirit,” or “inner attitude to Polishness” which could 




In actual bureaucratic practice, “objective” criteria seemed to have weighed less 
than mere indifference or the vital personal interests of the members of the verification 
commissions. Most commonly, the commissions processed the applications 
mechanically, without an in-depth reading of the documentation. But there were cases 
when applications were not even read. Tearing up the documentation of people who had 
conflicts with a verification commissioner was not uncommon.
97
 The Polish Western 
Union (Polski Związek Zachodni, PZZ) in Katowice complained that “…applications for 
verification go to the trash without processing, thrown there by the hand of a village 
administrator who took with his other hand the appropriate pay for allotting a farm to 
someone else.” Complaints and subsequent controls from district and municipal 
commissions helped to keep the lower rank officials in check but could not prevent the 
abuse of power.  
That such abuses occurred was hardly surprising. After all, the commissioners 
held enormous power over people’s economic existence. Recognition of one’s Polishness 
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granted one land (property) and a residence permit whereas Germaneness meant 
detention, expropriation, and expulsion. Considering the stakes, “the indigenous 
population” (the subjects of verification) and new settlers (mostly repatriates from eastern 
Poland) found verification to be one of the central, most contested issues at the time. 
Every unsuccessful verification (i.e., denial of Polish attestation) meant tangible gains for 
the repatriates. If the former property owner failed the verification, the repatriate kept the 
property while the owner was detained and forced to leave the country.
98
 If, however, the 
former owner was successfully verified, the repatriate had to give up the newly acquired 
property. Thus, the repatriates preferred to perceive every “indigenous person” as a 
German, or rather a “german” (niemiec) in lower case. The repatriates called the verified 
“Poles for twenty-five zlotys” (the fee for verification) claiming that it was the 
newcomers, and not the verified locals, who were true Poles.
99
 For example, one of the 
employees of a verification commission in Silesia had to swallow “acrimonious remarks, 
that he produced ‘volk-Poles,’ a hostile element that should be resettled without fail.”
100
 
Ultimately, the verification process did a great deal of damage to local 
communities in-the-making. It led to the sharpening of social and ethnic lines by 
separating allegedly “false” Poles (the unverified) from the “true” ones (the repolonized) 
and by distributing material and civil assets accordingly. Misztal quoted testimonies 
describing how, in the provinces where verification was not yet under way, the old 
residents and repatriates lived “peacefully” but “now, when Poles from camps [transitory 
camps for German prisoners] were verified, repatriates did not let these citizens into their 
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 Intimidation and violence against the verified were not isolated incidents 
either.
102
 Due to false testimonies, denunciations, and obscure definitions of Polishness, 
even people who had received Polish attestation ended up in camps or were expelled as 
Germans.  
Interestingly, Jews found themselves on both sides of the battle. They were both 
the agents of repolonization and the victims of degermanization. Unfortunately, I was 
unable to establish how many Jews had to undergo verification as Poles/Germans, but 
that they were entangled in both processes is beyond doubt.
103
 I have already described 
the rhetoric surrounding Jewish settlement in Lower Silesia. How both the settlers and the 
government perceived the Jewish presence to be “a loyal guard of Polishness” in the 
region. In a report to the plenipotentiary of the central government in Lower Silesia (July 
1945), the CKŻP complained about the constant disadvantages faced by Jews while 
settling, getting a job, and finding an apartment.
104
 The CKŻP mainly blamed lower rank 
clerks (niżsi urzędnicy) for mistreating Jews, i.e., attempting to deport Jews and 
privileging Germans [sic!]. Interestingly, the CKŻP kept emphasizing the apparent 
privileging of Germans at the expense of Jews when it seemed obvious that the horrors of 
the war deemed Germans unworthy of good treatment. Obviously, the CKŻP used the 
term “Germans” in the same vein as non-Jewish repatriates did: to describe German-
speaking residents of the region who received Polish attestation and thus threatened the 
material existence of the new settlers-repatriates.  
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At the same time, some “Germans” turned out to be German-speaking Jews who 
had to undergo the verification process. That many failed to be verified is indicated in a 
letter from June 1947 written by the chairman of the provincial Jewish committee, Jakub 
Egit,  
 
… [These German Jews] have not obtained Polish citizenship yet and their 
applications for [being declared]“indigenous population” have been denied. 
Local authorities want to start resettling these people to Germany where [Jews] 
dread to go to live among their enemies. By treating them like Germans, the local 
authorities contradict a political stance of the government, which granted 
protection to people of Jewish nationality, persecuted by the Nazi regime. … We 
request an intervention with the central authorities, so they will instruct local 
officials on how to treat these people [German Jews] in order to enable them to 




These stories of German-speaking Jews, failing to get the attestation of Polish nationality, 
suggest that language did not necessarily lose its significance as an ethnic marker after 
the war. Like Izdebski, Misztal suggested that an individual’s behavior (postępowanie i 
postawa) during the occupation became the main criterion for nationality due to specific 
and confused ethnic relations in western Poland. He argued that language, in particular, 
lost its importance as an ethnic marker since many residents who had “a sense of 
developed separate national consciousness” (poczucie rozwiniętej odmiennej 
świadomości narodowej) could not speak the Polish language and vice versa. Perhaps 
language had a limited impact on individual self-identification in the region. But I 
suggest that it remained an important indicator of nationality as far as bureaucratic 
practice was concerned. If behavior during the war had indeed been the primary criterion 
for approval, German-speaking Jews would not have faced any problems. Suffering Nazi 
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persecution would have been an instant entry ticket to civil rights, as prescribed by the 
central government. That German-speaking Jews suffered disadvantages can only be 
explained by the persistence of traditional markers of nationality like language in the 
bureaucratic determination of citizenship.  
Another way to explain this phenomenon and, at the same time, defend Izdebski 
and Misztal’s argument, is to show that language itself became a mark of patriotic 
behavior. A good example is a complaint that representatives of Poles in Prudnik (Silesia) 
sent to the government officials,  
 
Why should we declare to be Poles or non-Poles, if that piece of paper with a 
signature does not say anything about our nationality, but actions do, like 
participation in the uprisings, the Polish language, customs and habits, and our 




For these local residents, the choice of language was a patriotic act – a mark of “good” 
Polish behavior. As in Slovakia, regional authorities in Poland were not strangers to these 
local modes of thinking and cultural codes. The convictions, fears, expectations, and 
pressures of the local population were also those of local apparatchiks. If the German 
language was commonly associated as a marker of betrayal then a German-speaking Jew 
was to be considered a traitor. Whatever interpretation we chose, language undeniably 
remained a part of the equation.  
As a result, “Jews of foreign nationality” (Żydzi obcej narodowości) – German-
speaking Jews of German citizenship in particular – faced challenges concerning not only 
their legal status but also their daily security. They found themselves in double jeopardy: 
as Jews they were disliked by their neighbors and, as Germans, they were disliked by 
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their neighbors and by the state administration. In fact, establishing whether 
discrimination against these people was a manifestation of anti-German or anti-Jewish 
popular sentiment is hardly possible. In August 1945, the plenipotentiary of the 
government in Jelenia Góra (Lower Silesia) requested information on how to deal with 
“Jews whose loyalty during the war was under suspicion,” suggesting that provincial 
authorities did not trust German Jewish survivors, suspecting them of collaborating with 
the Nazis.
107
 Non-Jewish neighbors (repatriates) also treated German Jews with suspicion 
as they heard them speak German and thus considered them to be Germans.
108
 That, 
however, was not unusual in the midst of the verification process which turned 
Germaneness into a subject of contest, an identity freely ascribed depending on social and 
political needs.  
In September 1945, a local national security office demanded that a Jewish 
committee in Jelenia Góra remove all German Jews from their membership registry and 
take away their certificates of Jewishness. National security motivated the decision as 
follows, “We cannot allow that a member of your institution would be ‘a half-Jew’ or ‘a 
quarter-Jew,’ not mentioning Germans…”
109
 In October 1945, the plenipotentiary of the 
central government in Jelenia Góra asked his superiors in Lignica if the local Jewish 
committee should accept membership and protect the interests of German Jews who had 
been persecuted by Nazism and whether the committee should issue certificates of 
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Jewishness to these people.
110
 Szaynok found that, in several districts, the Jewish 
committees were banned from issuing certificates to German Jews.
111
 
Occasionally, lack of clarity in the law may have played a role. The same 
plenipotentiary in Jelenia Góra sent a note to Lignica in August 1945 requesting 
directives on how to treat “Jews of foreign nationality like Jews of French, Czech, 
German, Dutch, and other citizenship.”
112
 Bureaucrats in Jelenia Góra had no idea how to 
act particularly in the case of German Jews who had no or “unclear” documents: “Jews 
with Polish citizenship are treated like Poles, but as far as foreign Jews are concerned 
there are no instructions on how to act.”
113
 Further, the note read, “There were cases of 
Jews of foreign nationality who demanded the allocation of a store or other establishment 
which seemed unacceptable to us (niedopuszczalne).”
114
 Apparently, their superiors in 
Lignica had no idea what to do with “foreign Jews” either and asked the ministry of 
public administration in Warszawa for clarification.
115
 
The following story of Augusta Sara Thiel is one of many illustrations of the daily 
problems that challenged German-speaking Jews. In a small town in Lower Silesia, in 
April 1946, a Russian commandant forcefully took over a pension (pensjonat) belonging 
to a German Jew, Augusta Sara Thiel, in the presence of the town mayor (wójt) and the 
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 She was slapped in the face, pushed to the ground, threatened with 
a pistol, and locked in a bathroom for twenty-four hours. Then, she and her German co-
workers were allowed to take a few essentials before they were forced to leave.
117
 
Apparently, the mayor of the district (starosta) offered to allow Thiel to return to the 
house, an offer which she refused to accept until the German tenants could come back as 
well.
118
 The mayor even suggested that Thiel left her house “voluntarily,” in solidarity 
with the German tenants.
119
 People who took over her house dismissed her Jewish papers 
including a temporary certificate of Polish nationality, issued by the plenipotentiary of 
the government in December 1945, stating that “…Thiel Sara-Auguste… should be 
treated as a person excluded from the German population and therefore should not come 
under the law concerning Germans.”
120
 The certificate followed the decree of the 
ministry of public administration from June 20, 1945 discussed above. That the certificate 
was dismissed as non-valid perhaps was due to its expiration date (February 3, 1945). 
More likely, however, the assailants considered her German and found her Jewishness of 
no relevance to the case. In Thiel’s case, the disconnection between governmental decree 
and administrative practice on the ground was striking. 
Very likely the majority of German Jews faced problems similar to Thiel’s and 
these hardships pushed many to leave Poland. The small number of remaining German 
Jews may also indicate that many had never planned to apply for the Polish citizenship 
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anyway, intending to emigrate when the opportunity arose.
121
 For example, leaders and 
members of German Jewish communities in Pomerania maintained German citizenship 
and had no intention to apply for its Polish counterpart, choosing loyalty to the German 
state. Mieczkowski, in his study of national minorities in postwar northern Poland, 
quoted representatives of a German Jewish committee who allegedly justified their 
policies of exclusivity in March 1946 as follows: “When Szczecin [a major city in 
northwestern Poland] is a free city and the German authorities come back here, they will 
disband our union if we have foreign citizens in our ranks.”
122
 Thus, the departures of 
German-speaking Jews in the middle of 1946 seem to have resulted not only from 
antisemitism and bureaucratic discrimination but also from personal disappointment with 
the political status quo.  
Those, like Walther Kurnik, who decided to stay, had to go through interminable 
bureaucratic procedures. Kurnik, “German citizen, a Jew of origin,” wanted to stay in 
Poland and keep his position as accountant in the furniture factory in Nowa Ruda.
123
 In 
the summer of 1946, in the midst of mass expulsions of Germans, Kurnik requested a 
permit of residency (zezwolenie na pobyt) fearing imminent deportation.
124
 He justified 
his request with his Jewish origin and suffering persecution under Nazism. He also asked 
for the possibility of receiving Polish citizenship, considering that his ancestors had been 
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Polish citizens who emigrated to Germany in 1830. Documentation supporting his 
request included a certificate of competency and expediency from his workplace and a 
certificate of Jewishness from the Jewish committee in Kłodzko. In November 1946, 
provincial authorities submitted his request for a permit of residency to the ministry of 
the Recovered Territories, allowing Kurnik to reside in Poland until the final decision 
was made.  
I have no documents concerning the ultimate resolution of Kurnik’s case. 
However, Kurnik’s temporary residency showed that despite bureaucratic loopholes 
German Jews could receive Polish residency. Szaynok claimed that in Lower Silesia all 
German Jews who applied for citizenship ultimately received it and could remain in the 
region.
125
 By December 1948, of the million indigenous residents of western and northern 
Poland who underwent verification, the majority received attestations of Polish 
nationality.
126
 Approximately 60,000 to 70,000 people, who did not apply for the 
attestation until the end of 1946, were forced to undergo the process in 1949. The 
remaining population left the country or received citizenship in accordance with the law 
from January 1951 which bestowed citizenship on all who had resided in Poland since 




Before the law of 1951, the citizenship of German-speaking Jews who wanted to 
remain in Poland was by no means predetermined. Representatives of German-speaking 
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Jews (the Jewish committees) were forced to defend their rights and negotiate their status 
with the local administration and the central government. These negotiations showed, 
among others, that the resentment of Germans made state officials more prone to 
disregard instructions from the upper echelons of Warszawa to exclude Jews from the 
anti-German measures. At least in western and northern Poland, Germaneness seemed to 
have taken precedence over Jewishness as a factor defining one’s position in society, 
although anti-Jewish resentments should not be underestimated either.  
 
Magyar-Speaking Jews in Slovakia  
 
After the liberation of 1945, President Beneš and the Czechoslovak government, 
like their Polish counterparts, sought to exact retribution against members of the nations 
considered responsible for war crimes. The government applied the principle of collective 
responsibility, turning Germaneness and Magyarness into synonyms for fascism. 
Implicated were citizens of Czechoslovakia who, at any point since 1929, had declared 
German and Magyar nationality in a census or “had become members of national groups 
or organizations or political parties in which persons of German or Magyar nationality 
were united.”
128
 In article VIII of the Košice Program, the authorities declared that “the 
terrible experience of the Czechs and the Slovaks with the German and Hungarian 
minorities, the overwhelming majority of whom became the tools of invaders from the 
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outside aiming to destroy the republic…compel new Czechoslovakia to intervene 
profoundly and for good.”
129
  
As early as the end of 1944, after the liberation of eastern Slovakia, the Slovak 
National Council (SNR) formulated discriminatory policies toward Magyars, which 
included stripping them of their right to vote, to work, to own property, and to receive an 
education.
130
 In April 1945, the Košice Program outlined the policies on Germans and 
Magyars for the entire republic. Those Germans and Magyars who were to stand trial for 
crimes against the republic and the Czech and Slovak nations would be deprived of 
Czechoslovak citizenship immediately and banished from the country for good, unless 
sentenced to death.
131
 Germans and Magyars who moved to Czechoslovakia after the 
Munich Agreement in 1938 would also be banished immediately, unless under criminal 
investigation (with the exception of those who had worked for the benefit of 
Czechoslovakia).
132
 The confiscation of German and Hungarian property and the setting 
up of people’s courts to try German and Hungarian war criminals was also envisaged. In 
these matters, the Košice Program served as a blueprint for all subsequent ordinances of 
the SNR and the decrees of the president of the republic.
133
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In June 1945, the government officially declared Germans and Magyars to be 
traitors and enemies of the state.
134
 Also, the newly coined term of “unreliable people as 
far as the interests of the state were concerned” (osoby štátne nespoľahlivé) 
unambiguously connected German and Magyar nationality to disloyalty to 
Czechoslovakia.  
  
Unreliable persons were: 
1. Persons of German or Magyar nationality….  
2. Persons who developed activity directed against… independence, integrity, 
democratic-republican form of the state, safety, and defense of the Czechoslovak 
Republic; who incited toward such activity; or persons who… deliberately 
supported by any means German and Hungarian invaders….   
3. In the judiciary, those whose administration deliberately served German and 
Hungarian leadership in the war or fascist and Nazi aims.
135
    
 
  
By branding Czechoslovak Germans and Hungarians as “politically unreliable,” the 
government asserted their incompatibility with the postwar republic. This move promoted 
the ethnic stereotyping of Germans and Magyars, equating both with unreliable political 
conduct. During the first three years after liberation, this equation came to play a crucial 
role in the process of social and national closure. 
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What followed was the mass expulsion and expropriation of the German and 
Hungarian minorities in the Czechoslovak Republic. The Slovak administration, less 
concerned with the Germans, focused its attention on the more than 600,000 Hungarians, 
most of whom were concentrated in the south of the country. In February 1945, the SNR 
ordered the expulsion of Magyars who settled in southern Slovakia during the 
occupation. Schechtman found that by the end of 1945, about 25,000 Hungarians were 
removed from southern Slovakia.
136
 The transfer of Hungarians from the region, 
however, was never completed because the western governments demanded that the 
process be stopped. Facing international condemnation, Slovakia attempted to solve the 
problem by different means such as: a population exchange with Hungary (approximately 
30,000 Slovaks left Hungary and about the same number of Hungarians left Slovakia) 
and the enforced removal of Hungarians to the Czech borderlands (about 44,000 people). 
The ultimate failure of the two programs led the government to formulate a new policy of 
reslovakization of Magyars, described in chapter 2. 
In order for the policies of expulsion to work, the government had first to deprive 
Germans and Magyars of state protection. The way to accomplish this was to deny them 
Czechoslovak citizenship. The first time after liberation that the Prague government 
attempted to regulate issues of citizenship for Germans and Magyars was in the Košice 
Program (see appendix 2). But it was presidential decree no. 33/1945 that became the 
fundamental legal document regulating Czechoslovak citizenship for Germans and 
Hungarians.
137
 Every subsequent ordinance and legal instruction on matters of citizenship 
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issued in Slovakia in the years 1945-48 was based on this decree (see appendix 3).
138
 In 
short, the decree deprived of citizenship all Germans and Magyars in the Czechoslovak 
Republic, except those who registered as Czechs or Slovaks in any official census 
between 1938 and 1945 as well as those who during that time “professed themselves 
Germans or Magyars under duress or under extenuating circumstances.”
139
 As a result of 
the decree, people with German or Magyar ties who wished to maintain their citizenship 
had to report to the district national committees (okresne národné výbory, ONVs) to get 
the proper papers. 
Considering the central role of these agencies, a short description is warranted. In 
December 1944, President Beneš decreed the creation of national committees in liberated 
territories which would “act as fully sovereign bodies until such time as the central 
government could assume its superior role.”
140
 Article V of the Košice Program declared, 
In contrast to the previous bureaucracy, [which was] an administrative apparatus 
alienated from the people, popularly elected national committees will be formed 
in communities, districts, and provinces (v obcích, okresech a zemích) as new 
organs of state and public administration…. In their jurisdiction the national 
committees will administer all public affairs, control the subordinate democratic 
bureaucracy, and take care of public security in concert with both central and 
local police forces. The government will carry out its policies via the national 
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Decree no. 26/1945 of the SNR, also issued in April 1945, defined national committees 
as organs of state administration that would take over from former communal councils, 
mayors, town halls, and communal notaries. The liberated people (osvobozený lid) would 
elect the personnel of the committees in popular elections (lidem volené).
142
 The elected 
were supposed to be “the people’s best representatives” (nejlepší představitele). The 
committees, however, were comprised mainly of people of Slavic origin (Czechs and 
Slovaks), politically reliable, whose competence and intellect rarely matched what their 
office required. These clerks held an unprecedented concentration of power in critical 
matters such as property and citizenship.  
Beginning in April 1945, national committees mushroomed around the country. 
The government created three levels of committees in the Czech lands: local, district, and 
provincial.
143
 In Slovakia, local (miestny národný výbor, MNV) and district national 
committees were set up. Instead of provincial level committees, the commissioner of 
internal affairs in Bratislava oversaw the work of national committees across Slovakia. In 
the regions where Czechs and Slovaks constituted the minority, for example southern 
Slovakia, the government appointed the administrative commissions (správne komisie) 
and commissars until the Slavic representatives could assume power and set up the 
national committees.
144
 On the following pages, I will focus on the work of the district 
national committees in western Slovakia and the work of the administrative commissions 
in southern Slovakia as the main administrative organs responsible for the determination 
of citizenship (štátne občianstvo) and nationality (veci národnostné) as well as the 
issuance of certificates of political reliability (ľudovodemokraticka spoľahlivosť). 








The national committees treated these matters as interrelated. They based 
decisions concerning invalidation or maintenance of citizenship on the determination of 
nationality and attestation of political reliability. Thus the latter – also called civil 
reliability (štátoobčianska spoľahlivosť) or people’s-democratic reliability 
(ľudovodemokraticka spoľahlivosť) – became the most desired document in 
Czechoslovakia in the spring of 1945. Without it, maintaining citizenship, getting a job in 
the public sector, keeping property, buying land, leasing an apartment, or voting was 
impossible. Even retaining employment depended on this one piece of paper.  
Until the fall of 1945, the criteria for a successful application were not clear due 
to the absence of federal law regulating reliability issues in the entire country.
145
 The lack 
of standardization made the processing particularly chaotic.
146
 The national committees 
made their decisions based on oral instructions from the ministry in Prague.
147
 Finally, on 
November 12, 1945, the commissioner of internal affairs in Bratislava issued an 
ordinance regulating the procedure in Slovakia.
148
 The major criteria for a positive 
decision were: Slavic (slovanska) nationality, the absence of treacherous, fascist, and 
collaborative activity followed by investigation and court sentence, or reasonable 
suspicion thereof.
149
 People of German and Magyar nationality were not eligible to 
receive reliability certificates since, de facto, they had already been deprived of 
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Czechoslovak citizenship in accordance with presidential decree no. 33/1945. The 
determination of German and Magyar nationality was based primarly on presidential 
decree no. 5/1945 from May 1945, which stated that as  
 
People of German and Magyar nationality shall be considered those who on the 
occasion of any census since 1929 acknowledged their German or Magyar 
nationality or who became members of national groups or organizations or 




In other words, people who were members of German or Magyar organizations during 
the war automatically became Germans or Magyars and were recognized as such by the 
postwar state administration. Hence being a German or Magyar became more a political 
than an ethnic category. Such “traditional” signifiers of ethnicity like religion and origin 
were mostly ignored (except for language) in favor of self-identification (declaration of 
German and Magyar nationality in a census) and political affiliation. Thus, a favorable 
ruling on political reliability boiled down to the determination of German and Magyar 
nationality. 
Germans and Magyars were judged reliable only if they proved their loyalty to the 
republic, never betrayed the Czech and Slovak nations, and actively participated in the 
fight for liberation or suffered under the Nazi or fascist regime. These included soldiers 
serving in the Czechoslovak Army abroad, women whose husbands had not lost 
Czechoslovak citizenship, men whose wives were of Czech or Slovak nationality, were 
married before March 16, 1939 and remained loyal to the Czechoslovak Republic, and, 
finally, those who could prove that they had been coerced or forced by extenuating 
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circumstances to declare German or Magyar nationality in “the period of increased threat 
to the republic.”
151
 Under the aforementioned conditions, the district national committees 
could issue Germans and Magyars temporary certificates “until a definite decision on the 
Czechoslovak citizenship of the said person was made by the relevant competent central 
offices.”
152
 Germans and Magyars who declared Czech or Slovak nationality under 
occupation were eligible for the attestation of reliability as Czechs and Slovaks.
153
  
Standard questionnaires in the application process for attestation of political 
reliability reflected these criteria. The questionnaires asked about the political stance of 
the applicant and his or her activities during the war. Besides a standard inquiry on 
personal data (name, age, language, nationality, citizenship, etc), the remaining twenty-
two questions revolved around the political conduct of the applicant between September 
29, 1938 and the end of 1944. The questions concerned possible membership in German 
and Magyar fascist organizations or the Slovak Hlinka Guard (HG), attendance at Slovak 
schools run by the HSĽS, participation in various social and political activities organized 
by the HG and HSĽS, possible stays in Germany, persecution of Czechoslovak citizens, 
membership in the Slovak State administration, takeover of property during the war, 
possible participation in the partisan warfare and the uprising, among others.
154
  
Thus, in accordance with the law, the determination of German and Magyar 
nationality rested predominantly on political conduct during the occupation. However, 
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 Circular of the commissioner of internal affairs in Bratislava on citizenship of persons of German and 
Magyar nationality, 20 February 1947, PV – Secretariat 1947, box 79, SNA. “The time of increased threat 
to the republic” applied to the period from May 21, 1938 until the end of the war. See instructions on the 
matters concerning Czechoslovak citizenship, summarized by Counselor Mikuláš Huba – the head of the 






 Questionnaire from the district national committee in Nitra regarding an application for a certificate of 
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the national committees had their own understanding of who was and who was not a 
German and Hungarian and tended to prioritize language as well as the applicant’s 
private affairs as decisive. That the clerks tended to cling to the more traditional markers 
of nationality, especially language, is illustrated in the story of Margita Czaková from 
Hrnčiarovce. Born in Slovakia of Magyar parents, twenty-four-year-old Czaková applied 
in January 1946 for Czechoslovak citizenship, which she had lost in August 1945 in 
accordance with presidential decree no. 33/1945.
155
 As an applicant of Magyar 
nationality (maďarská národnosť), Czaková warranted a particularly thorough 
investigation. The office of national security, the city and district national committees in 
Nitra, and the city office in Hrnčiarovce issued positive statements concerning her status. 
The main focus of the investigation was Czaková’s past loyalty or disloyalty to 
Czechoslovakia and the Czech and Slovak nations, her possible participation in the 
defense of the country, and persecution from the Nazi and fascist regime immediately 
before and during the war.
156
 The office in Hrnčiarovce issued the following statement: 
During the occupation, she [Czaková] behaved loyally toward the Czechoslovak 
Republic, was not a member of the Magyar Party, did not stand up politically 
against the Czechoslovak Republic, attended a Slovak school although there was a 
Magyar school in Hrnčiarovce. According to the presented evidence, she assisted 
the Slovak revolt during the Slovak National Uprising by harboring a partisan 
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Thus it seemed that Czaková should have had her citizenship easily reinstated since she 




However, Czaková’s behavior during the war was not the only factor under 
scrutiny. The local administration also investigated her linguistic skills. The national 
security in Nitra reported to the national committee that although Czaková spoke 
Hungarian in private, in public she attempted to speak only Slovak which she knew 
“fairly well.”
159
 Czaková understood that the language she spoke at home and in public, 
as well as the schools she attended, had the power to ultimately prove her “true” 
Slovakness. She thus wrote the following, 
 
I am of Slovak nationality (národnosti slovenskej), although my parents were of 
Magyar nationality, and am registered as a person of Magyar nationality in the 
last census of 1940. However, that happened without my knowledge or my 
agreement … [Czaková was under age and thus registered under the nationality of 
her parents]. In fact, I am an alumnus of a Slovak school…, I attended a people’s 
Slovak school in Hrnčiarovce, all together eight grades, I moved and then I have 
always been among Slovaks, I know Slovak perfectly and myself I feel to be 
hundred percent a Slovak woman. I intend to marry a Slovak (lieutenant of the 
Czechoslovak Army). Similar my brother Peter Czakó feels … and we declare 
that only our parents are people of Magyar nationality, but we are not – we are 
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Czechoslovak citizenship of Margita Czaková, 5 September 1946, Okresný národný výbor v Nitre, 




 Letter from the national security in Nitra to the city national committee in Nitra concerning the 
Czechoslovak citizenship of Margita Czaková, 31 May 1946, Okresný národný výbor v Nitre, 
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 Statement of Margita Czaková regarding her nationality, 31 May 1946, Okresný národný výbor v Nitre, 
administration ONV 544/46, SAN. 
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Similarly, Barbara Czaková (maiden name Gero; Margita’s relative) from Hrnčiarovce 
based her request for citizenship on the fact that she was born in Slovakia like her 
grandparents and that “she could not take responsibility for the fact that her mother 
tongue was Magyar (zato ja nemôžem).
161
 
Ultimately, language proved to be the central criterion used by lower rank clerks 
to determine Slovakness and hence political reliability. The district national committees 
usually accompanied a positive decision on reliability with a statement confirming 
Slovak nationality by virtue of previous censuses, a Slovak spouse, and the use of Slovak 
language as the sole vehicle of expression (lack of knowledge of any other language was 
a bonus).
162
 In January 1946, the Slovak commissioner of internal affairs even 
reprimanded the national committees in Bratislava and Košice, finding fault with the fact 
that too many Germans and Magyars were being granted Slovak nationality based on 
shaky evidence – language used at home and marriage to a Slovak.
163
 The committees, 
however, did not act against the law. In fact, they followed decree no. 104/1945 of the 
SNR (August 1945) which stated that  
 
To determine allegiance to German and Magyar nationality, the language used in 
familial contacts [v rodinnom styku] is particularly decisive, so was membership 
in a German or Magyar political party after September 29, 1938, or the 
declaration of nationality in the censuses since 1929.
164
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 Letter from the commissioner of internal affairs in Bratislava concerning matters of citizenship, 
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President Beneš entirely ignored language as a criterion for the determination of German 
and Magyar nationality in decree no. 12/1945 (June 1945), but the subsequent legal acts 
had to acknowledge what had been common practice at lower levels of administration.
165
 
In February 1947, the commissioner of internal affairs in Bratislava echoed decree no. 
104/1945, stating that along with political affiliation and declared nationality, the 
language used in the family must be recognized as a crucial factor in the determination of 
nationality.
166
 In November 1947, the commissioner admitted that the criterion of 




The issue of language was especially problematic for Jews who had in the past 
declared German and Magyar nationality and/or spoke German and Magyar. Since the 
central government did not recognize Jews as a separate legal or national category in 
Czechoslovakia, the local administration freely ascribed nationality (Jewish, Czech, 
Slovak, German, or Magyar) on an individual basis. Considering the legal treatment of 
Germans and Hungarians, ascription of either nationality had particularly harsh 
repercussions for almost half (forty-three percent) of all the Jews living in Slovakia after 
the war. Of 30,000 Jewish Slovak survivors, approximately 3,700 Jews had declared 
German nationality and 9,000 had declared Magyar nationality in the census of 1930. The 
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remaining fifty-seven percent constituted the Jews of Subcarpathian origin and people 
who declared Jewish, Slovak, and Czech nationality in 1930.
168
  
Since lower rank clerks prioritized language, Jews who, at any point in the past, 
declared German and Magyar nationality and/or were German and Magyar speakers were 
often denied certificates of political reliability based on their alleged linguistic 
“inadequacies.” In September 1945, Winterstein commented on the common accusation 
that Jews lacked sufficient knowledge of the Slovak language,  
 
Jews speak Magyar [maďarčia]! It is true that on the land formerly ruled by the 
Arrow Cross [Nyilasmi] people speak Hungarian until now. It is forgotten, 
however, that the youth had to attend Magyar schools between 1938 and 1945. 
We have warned the returning youth who passed through Bratislava not to speak 
Magyar, to which they responded that they were coming from gas chambers 
where they could not learn the Slovak language!!! Since we do not like it we will 
try to assure that all Jews speak Slovak within a year from now. Let the 
newspapers write about it but not the contrary. Today on a street you will not hear 
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In a public address in November 1945, Winterstein said, 
 
When Jews applied for the attestation of reliability, they did not get it. The 
criterion was the language that [applicants] spoke at home. There were instances 
when the refusal of the attestation of reliability was literally justified by the 
German or Magyar nationality of a Jew. At the same time, I realized that many 
among those who made decisions on political reliability themselves would not 
have survived a thorough investigation. [In the process] they [clerks] give Jews 
language tests; in Bratislava they even
 
 hired an etymologist and, I am certain, that 
any Slovak would fail with him too. Although in western Slovakia a Jew, as a 






In short, due to the common use of “private language” (spoken at home) as the main 
criterion for the determination of nationality, a Jewish applicant who spoke German or 
Magyar “to his mother” was automatically classified as a German or a Magyar.
171
 Thus, 
Winterstein argued, serious concerns arose about the status of these Jews who could not 
speak Slovak at all. 
The allegation of “linguistic promiscuity” among the Jews in Slovakia and the 
problems of attesting to their reliability were not merely manifestations of prejudice 
among lower rank clerks.
172
 Rather, they stemmed from a commonly held belief in the 
negative role of German and Magyar Jews in Czechoslovakia that permeated all strata of 
society, including high political echelons. For example, Minister of Culture and 
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Information Václav Kopecký – an influential communist politician – declared in July 
1944, 
Those Jews who feel themselves to be Germans or Hungarians must face the same 
measures that will be taken against the Germans and Hungarians in 
Czechoslovakia. The liquidation of antisemitism does not mean that we will grant 
the Jews special privileges if they feel themselves to be Germans or Hungarians. 
Nor will we allow those who feel themselves to be Germans and Hungarians to 
hide their true feelings behind the claim of Jewishness. Liquidation of 
antisemitism cannot be allowed to cause harm to the national and Slavic character 




This statement implied that German Jews were forces of germanization and that 
Hungarian Jews were forces of magyarization.
174
 Considering the government’s policy of 
ethnic homogenization, such alleged Jewish practices were considered harmful.  
Without a doubt, the most frequent accusation against Hungarian-speaking Jews 
in postwar Slovakia was their alleged allegiance to active magyarization (enforcement of 
Magyar language and culture in their milieu). This accusation had a long history, dating 
back to the nineteenth century.
175
 It is worth noting that, in September 1946, Minister of 
the Interior Vaclav Nosek issued a decree which stated that if a petitioner was suspected 
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of germanization or magyarization, his request for Czech and Slovak nationality would 
be denied.
176
 Germanization and magyarization were defined as follows: 
Germanization (or magyarization) is understood as an activity, which aimed at 
spreading Germaneness (or Magyarness) [němectvo/maďarstvo] on the Slovak 
soil at the time of the First Republic and before. For example, it [germanization 
and magyarization] entails the foundation of German (or Magyar) schools and 
cultural institutions within Slovak communities (Schulverein, Turnverein, 
Nordmark, Kulturverein, etc., and alike). Further, the additional endorsement of 
these institutions, for example, that persons under consideration, working as 
employers or chief clerks, exerted direct or indirect economic pressure on Slovak 
employees so they would have sent their children to the German (or Magyar) 
schools, participated in the German or Magyar cultural, sporting, or political life, 
voted for the German or Magyar political parties, etc. In particular, the problem 
refers to instances in which it was documented that the persons under 
consideration financially (economically) or morally endorsed German or Magyar 
irredentism in the period of the increased threat to the republic, or that they 
employed out of principle persons of German or Magyar nationality as chief 




Mere affiliation to German and Magyar nationality, the use of the German or Magyar 
language and ignorance of Slovak, as well as participation in German and Magyar federal 
(spolkovy) or cultural life, insofar as it did not entail endorsement of germanizing or 
magyarizing pursuits, was not supposed to qualify as germanization or magyarization 
activities.
178
 On the other hand, a person who had not declared German or Magyar 
nationality in a census after 1929, but rather had consistently declared Jewish nationality 
and, at the same time, pursued germanizing or magyarizing activity, was considered a 
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traitor to the Czech and Slovak nation.
179
 Germanizers and magyarizers were to be 
deprived of Czechoslovak citizenship and property and expelled (vystěhování do ciziny), 
although not under the law of transfer (ač odsunu nepodléhaji).180  
Closely related to the allegations of germanization and magyarization was the 
accusation that Jews had sympathized with Magyar fascists during the war. 
Representatives of the Slovak Jewish communities repeatedly responded to both 
accusations. In November 1945, in Košice, Winterstein said, 
 
They [Slovaks] reproach Jews on speaking Magyar and welcoming Horthyho 
[Miklós Horthy – the regent of Hungary in the years 1920-44]. It is true that there 
were individuals among the Jews who were members of the Magyar nationalist 
parties, but they were the minority. To be just, however, one must consider that all 
of this happened at a time when Jews had a choice between the fascist Slovak 
State and the liberal Magyar state. Yet those who were in Kompasze and against 




In the same address he continued, 
 
As far as the reproach that Jews magyarized [maďarizováli] until 1918 is 
concerned, I have to say that it would be a mistake not to recognize that there 
were many like that; however, from 1919 the majority of Jews sent their children 
to Slovak schools and earnestly pursued assimilation to the Slovak environment. 
It is also said that in Komárne and in Košice Jews speak Magyar. To that I will 
add a “but,” because in the First Republic [1918-38] ninety to ninety-five percent 




Winterstein’s argument was correct despite the exaggeration in percentages and numbers. 
As Bruno Blau pointed out in his article in 1948, during the nine years between the 
censuses of 1921 and 1930, the number of Jews in Slovakia who declared Czecho/Slovak 










nationality rose from 29,136 to 44,009, an increase of fifty-one percent.
183
 At the same 




In October 1945, the ÚSŽNO and the SRP indicated that the major problem about 
attesting the political reliability of German- and Magyar- speaking Jews (apart from the 
issue of language and political accusations) was the lack of clearly stated criteria for 
eligibility. The representatives of the ÚSŽNO and the SRP complained that attesting the 
reliability of Jews of German and Magyar nationality had not yet been determined in a 
manner comparable to that of persons of Czech, Slovak, and other Slavic origins.
185
 In a 
letter to the president of the Czechoslovak Republic from November 1945, Winterstein 
complained that the national committees “did not know how to manage” (neviedia si 
rady) the people who had declared “Jewish nationality” because the status of Jewish 
nationals had not yet been legally clarified.
186
 The author recommended that “Jewish 
nationality” (židovska národnosť) be considered “Slavic nationality” (národnosť 
slavianska) in attesting their reliability and citizenship.
187
 He also pointed out that the 
national committees were still making decisions based on “subjective belonging” 
confirmed by “objective signs,” in other words, previously declared nationality in the 
census of 1938 and membership in political organizations.
188
 
The first attempt to regulate the status of “persons of Jewish origin” was an 
ordinance of the commissioner of internal affairs issued in November 1945. In 
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accordance with article I of the ordinance, “persons of Slovak, Czech, or other Slavic 
nationality” alone were eligible for the attestation of reliability. Article XI of the 
ordinance stated that  
 
Persons of Jewish origin, who declared Jewish nationality, if they were and 
remained loyal to the Czechoslovak Republic and never betrayed the Czech and 
Slovak nation, should be granted certificates of national, state, and people’s 





The instructions for the ordinance, sent three months later from the commissioner of 
internal affairs in Bratislava to the district national committee in Vráble, clarified the 
above noting that “the provisions of article XI in the cited decree did not refer to persons 
of Jewish denomination (origin, nationality) who, in official reports, of their own volition 
or under pressure, declared German or Magyar nationality.”
190
 Jews who declared 
German or Magyar nationality in any census immediately before or during the war would 
be considered Germans or Magyars following presidential decree no. 33/1945.
191
 The 
attestation of reliability would not be granted unless an applicant could prove 
“extenuating circumstances” at the time of his or her declaration of nationality. In other 
circumstances, when the applicant declared German or Magyar nationality of his own 
will or did it before the occupation, then the attestation of reliability was out of question. 
Article XII of the ordinance stated that in the determination of nationality “decisive, in 
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 In the census of 1921, of 354,342 Jews living in Czechoslovakia, 48,628 declared German nationality 
while 21,584 declared Hungarian nationality (mainly in Slovakia). In the census of 1930, of 356,930 Jews 
living in Czechoslovakia, 45,732 declared German nationality while only 9,728 declared Hungarian 
nationality (mainly in Slovakia). As I mentioned before, approximately forty-three percent of the Jewish 
survivors had declared either nationality before or during the war. Also see Blau, "Nationality among 
Czechoslovak Jews."     
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particular, would be language used in familial contacts or membership in a German or 
Magyar political party after October 6, 1938, or the declaration of nationality at the last 
census.”
192
 If at least one of the above conditions was not met, then the attestation of 
reliability would be denied unless other exceptional circumstances were in place in 
accordance with presidential decree no. 33/1945.
193
 
By March 1946 not much had improved. Representatives of Slovak Jewry still 
complained that “in many places and in an increasing number of instances, Jews were 
refused certificates of national reliability merely on the basis of the language they spoke 
“privately” without regard to their declared nationality...”
194
 The same letter pointed out 
that the entire attestation process usually took a year or two, and that working was 
practically impossible during the wait.
195
 In September 1946, in the midst of the 
reslovakization process, the ÚSŽNO and the SRP complained that Jews of German and 
Magyar nationality in Slovakia still struggled to maintain citizenship and secure 
attestations of reliability. The national committees across Slovakia did not follow official 
circulars and constantly created obstacles to granting Jews attestations, justifying their 
decisions with the claim that Jews were Germans, Magyars, and traitors.
196
 The ÚSŽNO 
and the SRP also requested that the language used “within the family” should not serve as 
the main criterion for the determination of nationality, which the commissioner of 
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 Letter from the ÚSŽNO to Chairman of the Slovak National Council Jozef Lettrich in Bratislava, 19 




 Report of the ÚSŽNO and the SRP in Bratislava, 11 September 1946, Winterstein Collection, W4 1946-
48, SIHS. 
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internal affairs dismissed as unwarranted, unlawful, and discriminatory.
197
 The 
commissioner stated that all cases involving the racially persecuted should be carefully 
investigated and exceptions should be made only to ensure that the language of an 
applicant did not serve as the sole basis for denial of attestation.
198
  
September 1946, when the ÚSŽNO and the SRP submitted the complaints, 
marked the peak of the reslovakization process (see chapter 2). Part of the process was 
the clarification of the legal criteria for determining nationality in southern Slovakia. In 
April 1946, the Board of Commissioners in Bratislava issued the initial instructions to the 
national committees and administrative commissions on the classification of the two 
groups eligible for reslovakization.
199
 The matter was time sensitive since the 
Czechoslovak government was obliged to submit the final list of Magyars assigned for 
exchange with Hungary (i.e., expulsion) by the end of August 1946. On June 17, 1946, 
the commissioner of internal affairs issued an official ordinance, which became 
fundamental to determining nationality during reslovakization (see appendix 4).
200
 Based 
on the government’s definition of Magyar nationality, the ordinance declared the 
following as eligible for Slovak nationality and thus reslovakization: people who declared 
Slovak, Czech, or other Slavic nationality in the census of 1930 but later changed their 
declaration to Magyar nationality; who declared the above nationalities now (i.e., 1946 
but did not declare such in 1930, 1939, or 1940) and never betrayed the Czechoslovak 
Republic, were not members of fascist Magyar political parties and organizations, and did 
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 Active participation in the fight for liberation of the 
republic or suffering under Nazi or fascist terror also had to be investigated.
202
                                            
To the Slovak Magyars for whom the reslovakization campaign was designed, it 
was obvious that signing up for reslovakization was the most effective way to escape 
resettlement. Those who declared Magyar nationality before or during the war were fully 
aware that reslovakization was the only means to keep citizenship and thus retain all civil 
rights, including the right to property and a livelihood. For these people reslovakization 
was “to be or not to be” in Czechoslovakia. On a daily basis, they were bombarded by 
posters promising, “Persons who sign up will have the possibility to keep Czechoslovak 
citizenship.”
203
 Not surprisingly, then, according to the head of the Central Commission 
for Reslovakization, there were communities in southern Slovakia (particularly those 
which traditionally had large Hungarian population) where half or more of the local 
Magyar population signed up for the program.
204
  
The district census commissions and the district control commissions handled 
every individual case. The commissions usually consisted of representatives of local 
administration and intelligentsia: a school inspector, an educational inspector, a district 
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commander of national security, the chief of the city national committee (with a decisive 
vote), a functionary of the Slovak League, and, finally, “a local specialist on the 
nationalities’ situation.”
205
 Šutaj found that the commissions based their entire 
assessment on so-called objective marks (objektívne znaky) of ethnicity in accordance 
with the ordinance from April 1946, 
… manifestations of allegiance to Slovak culture (schools, federations, Slovak 
political and apolitical organizations), surname (although not always) as well as 
denomination of an applicant. The most prevalent mark of Slovak origin was 
accepted command of the Slovak language inherited after parents in the first 
generation. Other marks of Slovak origin included family tradition, then 
awareness, that the ancestors were Slovaks who used Slovak language as means 




Marriage to a Hungarian and immediate or extended family in Hungary negatively 
affected an applicant’s eligibility. Criminal history, membership in Magyar fascist 
organizations, activity against the Czechoslovak Republic under occupation, and support 
of magyarization were also bases for denial.
207
  
Accusations of magyarization were particularly harmful for Magyar-speaking 
Jews in Slovakia who wished to reslovakize. As I discussed before, the responsible 
offices tended to determine the nationality of Jewish applicants as German or Magyar 
instead of Slovak or Jewish months before the government launched its reslovakization 
program. Such determination of nationality bore obvious consequences for the applicants: 
vulnerability to discrimination and possibility of expulsion. In these circumstances the 
panicked reaction of eighty-six Jewish residents of Kráľovský Chlumec (southern 
                                                 
205
 Ibid., 11. The Slovak League (Slovenská liga) was a Slovak nationalist organization founded in 1920, 
active until 1948. See Róbert Letz, Dejiny Slovenskej Ligy na Slovensku, 1920-1948 (Martin: 
Vydavateľstvo MS, 2000). 
206




Slovakia, occupied by Hungary since 1938) who, in May 1946, were denied recognition 
as Slovak or Jewish nationals due to failure to submit certificates of nationality from the 
census of 1930 was not surprising.
208
 In the case of the Jewish community in Kráľovský 
Chlumec, the ostensible reason for not recognizing the applicants’ nationality as Jewish 
or Slovak was the failure to submit administrative documents. Most often, however, the 
pretext for denial was arbitrary and based on the language of the applicants, the schools 
they attended, and possible accusations of magyarization.  
Summarizing the results of the reslovakization campaign in September 1946, the 
ÚSŽNO and the SRP reported that many Jews residing in the south of Slovakia applied to 
sign up for reslovakization in order to prove their willingness “to assimilate in every 
respect (že sa v každom ohľade chcú prispôsobiť) into Slovak culture.”209 The Jews from 
southern Slovakia believed that by doing so they would “perform a patriotic deed and 
help to solve the Magyar problem, hence proving their loyalty and devotion to the 
Czechoslovak Republic.”
210
 However, as early as in July 1946, in some districts of 
southern Slovakia, most notably Levice (Nitra region) and Košice (Košice region), the 
percentage of rejected applications submitted by persons of Jewish origin was 
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disproportionately high, reaching ten percent in Levice.
211
 Part of the problem was that 
the application forms had no column for denomination, thus leaving no room for 
affirmations of one’s Jewish origins and anti-fascism.
212
 The primary concern was that 
the majority of applicants were at the mercy of the local national committees and 
administrative commissions. To make things worse, the Central Commission for 
Reslovakization was neither willing nor able to supervise and revise every applicant’s 
case in Slovakia. The authors of the report argued that these circumstances generated 
panic among Jews, who were fully aware of the connection between the reslovakization 
and the projected expulsion of persons of Magyar nationality. Many Jews who had their 
reslovakization application rejected, mainly in southern Slovakia, attempted to evade 
deportation by avoiding their apartments and workplace.
213 
However, it is doubtful that many (if any) Magyar-speaking Jews were actually 
deported. During reslovakization and soon afterward, the authorities in Bratislava and 
Prague issued a number of rules that ultimately safeguarded Jewish status and residence 
in Slovakia. For example, in June 1946, the commissioner of internal affairs issued a 
special ordinance to regulate the determination of nationality during reslovakization as 
well as to regulate the processing of attesting reliability and citizenship of people of 
Jewish origin (see appendix 5).
214
 The ordinance declared that “persons who declared 
                                                 
211
 Letter of the ÚSŽNO and the SRP to the commissioner of the internal affairs in Bratislava, 15 July 
1946, Winterstein Collection, W4 1946-48, SIHS. 
212
 The participants of the fourth meeting of the Central Commission for Reslovakization explained the 
absence of questions on denomination as “oversight” (nedopatrenie) and refused to attach any meaning to 
this mistake except for possible incompleteness of the final demographic-statistical summary. See minutes 
from the fourth meeting of the Central Commission for Reslovakization, 16 August 1946, Reslovakizačná 
komisia, 1946-47, box 1, SNA. 
213
 Report of the ÚSŽNO and the SRP in Bratislava, 11 September 1946, Winterstein Collection, W4 1946-
48, SIHS. 
214
 Ordinance no.15.820/1/1946-III/2 on the determination of nationality of persons of Jewish origin issued 
by the commissioner of internal affairs in Bratislava, 4 June 1946, PV – Secretariat 1947, box 79, SNA. 
 343 
Jewish nationality in 1938 should be placed on an equal footing [with persons who 
declared Slavic nationality] as long as decisions on …reliability and citizenship are 
concerned.”
215
 Without the declaration from 1938, Slovak nationality should be 
determined if petitioners declared “Slovak or Czech nationality at present… if else they 
met conditions of the instructions for reslovakization”; if they knew the Slovak or Czech 
language; if they had evidence of any declaration of Slavic nationality (the census of 
1930, military registration, police application, etc.), or evidence of attendance at a school 
with Slavic language instruction.
216
 Any of the above sufficed if petitioners “were and 
remained loyal to the Czechoslovak Republic, never betrayed the Czech and Slovak 
nations, and their present life answered for this spirit.”
217
 
In the opinion of the leaders of the ÚSŽNO and the SRP, the best way to 
circumvent the problems of Jewish nationality and reliability was to promote legal 
recognition of all Jews residing in Czechoslovakia as persecuted under the Nazi regime. 
Such recognition, the leaders believed, could serve as the most efficient grounds for 
presumption of political reliability of all Czechoslovak Jews. As early as October 1945, 
ÚSŽNO and SRP representatives recommended that all Slovak Jews be considered 
politically reliable in principle – on grounds of fascist persecution – until proved 
otherwise.
218
 Jews who declared German or Magyar nationality during the war did so, the 
authors argued, under duress or in circumstances “deserving particular consideration.”
219
 
In short, from the Jewish perspective, the matter was simple: anyone persecuted by the 








 Document concerning certificates of political reliability for the Jews of German and Hungarian 




Nazis was worthy of good treatment after the war. At the time, however, the 
commissioner dismissed the ÚSŽNO and the SRP’s appeal to consider all racially 
persecuted persons as politically reliable a priori as unjustified (ničím neodôvodnené) and 
opposed to the present law.
220
 
The ordinance of the commissioner of internal affairs from November 1945, 
discussed earlier in regard to Jewish nationality, also complicated the matter by 
narrowing the definition of “persecution” to racially motivated internment. In a letter to 
the president of the Czechoslovak Republic, a representative of the SRP expressed 
concern that such a narrow definition of persecution would leave out those Jews who 
were not sent to camps.
221
 In September 1946, the minister of the interior in Prague 
clarified the matter. He decreed that the people whom “Nazism persecuted as ‘Jews’ or 
‘half-Jews’ (židovské míšence) and who lived in the occupied territory or in the territory 
indirectly governed by the Germans, should, with minor exceptions, be considered as 
persons who suffered under Nazi or fascist terror.”
222
 In other words, an individual whom 
the law of the fascist regime considered Jewish or half-Jewish should be considered 
racially persecuted and thus eligible for Czechoslovak citizenship and property ownership 
(confiscated otherwise). The remaining conditions entailed loyalty to the Czechoslovak 
Republic and a pledge of never having betrayed the Czech and Slovak nations.  
Following the government decree, in November 1946, the commissioner of 
internal affairs in Bratislava issued an instruction to all the district national committees, 
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the administrative commissions, the national committees in Bratislava and Košice, the 
Central Commandership of National Security, and the Resettlement Bureau in 
Bratislava.
223
 The instruction mirrored the governmental decree: 
Persons whom the fascist regime marked as of “Jewish origin” or “Jewish half-
blood,” or persons to whom the fascist laws on legal position of Jews or Jewish 
half-bloods referred to, should not be counted on the lists of persons of German 
or Magyar nationality about to be expelled, and these persons do not come under 
the deportation laws under any circumstances. If [such persons] are found in 





The instruction also followed the ministerial decree on the regulation of maintenance of 
Czechoslovak citizenship and the attestation of national and political reliability discussed 
before. The commissioner recommended that in the cases of suspected germanization or 
magyarization among persons of Jewish origin, only a court of law could settle the 
matter.
225
 If, however, there was no evidence that a racially persecuted person betrayed 
the Czech and Slovak nations, an application for Czechoslovak citizenship should be 
immediately processed and approved. 
  Along with racial persecution under fascism (detainment), participation in the 
national fight for liberation was yet another category of eligibility for the determination 
of Czech and Slovak nationality, political reliability, and citizenship. Law no. 255/1946, 
issued in December 1946, defined “a participant in the national fight for liberation” as 
one who,  
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between March 15, 1939 and May 4, 1945 was restricted in his personal freedom 
by imprisonment, internment, deportation, or else was in favor of anti-fascist 
struggle …, or on grounds of political, national, racial or religious persecutions; 
the restriction of personal freedom lasting at least three months, or else a shorter 
period but [a person] suffered the actual detriment of health or a more severe 





By the beginning of 1947, evidence of racially motivated detainment should have 
sufficed for the attestation of reliability. An applicant should not have had to present 
proof of participation in the fight for liberation if he or she could document persecution. 
However, the request for additional proof must have happened often since representatives 
of the SRP complained in December 1947 about the poor or non-existent implementation 






A close reading of primary sources on postwar Jewish history in the two countries 
reveals that nationality was as critical in establishing communal and national boundaries 
in Czechoslovakia as it was in Poland. The governments in Prague (and Bratislava) and 
Warszawa were building nation-states where “good” nationality was a condition for 
inclusion into the citizenry. “Good” translated into Slavic: Polish, Czech, and Slovak 
nationalities guaranteed citizenship. “Bad” – German nationality in Poland and German 
and Magyar in Czechoslovakia – hampered chances for citizenship. However, the 
determination of who was and who was not Polish, Czech, Slovak, German, and Magyar 
turned out to be more complicated than expected.  
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In the two countries, the central governments that formulated the legal criteria and 
the local administrations that implemented them struggled to find an optimal method of 
selecting nationals from non-nationals. What was the result? The two central 
governments in Warszawa and Prague found the rhetoric of “behavior” particularly 
useful since it helped to expand their control over the politics of inclusion by drawing 
clear-cut lines between traitors and patriots, insiders and outsiders. The rhetorical 
creation of an apparent overlap between political behavior under occupation and ethnicity 
(Germans and Magyars considered to be traitors and Poles, Czechs, and Slovaks seen as 
anti-fascists) loomed as an effective means in the grand project of “social closure.”
228
  
At the same time, however, the government in Bratislava and lower rank 
bureaucrats in this region considered the language used in the family to be the most 
credible indicator of one’s national belonging. For them, language marked loyalty or 
betrayal and thus translated into the most suitable criterion of belonging in the wake of 
the recent war and governmental instructions. However, experiential and linguistic 
criteria of nationality were incompatible, as the cases of German- and Magyar-speaking 
Jews from western and northern Poland and southern Slovakia proved. Their stories 
illuminated the gap between law and praxis; a gap which became an area of conceptual 
tension and conflict between the central policies and the actual principles guiding the 
determination of citizenship.  
For Jewish survivors, the employment of ethno-linguistic criteria of belonging 
presented fundamental obstacles to citizenship. In Czechoslovakia, the government did 
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not treat Jews as a separate national category, leaving them in what I call a grey zone of 
belonging. Jewish survivors could claim the right to citizenship as Slovak, Czech, 
German, and Magyar nationals but not as Jews. In contrast, the Polish government 
considered Jews (not without ambiguity) as a separate minority group of interest. Thus it 
was more explicit and seemed more accommodating as far as the legal status of Jews was 
concerned. For example, the July Manifesto promised Polish Jews legal equality as early 
as the summer of 1944. Subsequent anti-German legislation described Jews as special 
victims of the Nazi regime. Polish politicians pronounced their special concern for Jews, 
promising equality and the opportunity to pursue a ”normal life.”  
Despite these differences, Jews who spoke languages of “bad” nationalities – 
German or Magyar – were equally disadvantaged in both countries. This was not 
surprising since the determination of their nationality mainly depended on the good will 
of the employees of the national committees and the verification commissions in Slovakia 
and Poland respectively. By and large, the lower administration tended to consider 
Jewishness not merely as a nationality but rather as a category modifiable by nationality 
marked in turn by language. For example, German or Magyar nationality (manifested in 
language) negatively tempered one’s Jewishness whereas Polish, Slovak, or Czech 
nationality (again, manifested in language) added a positive value to it. In other words, 
German- and Magyar-speaking Jews who wished for Polish and Czechoslovak 
citizenship respectively faced as many troubles as non-Jewish Germans and Magyars did. 
Of course, once labeled as Germans and Magyars, the applicants were vulnerable to 
expropriation and deportation which was not without significance to the local officials. 
Notes on personal interests and corruption in bureaucratic dealings, recurrent in Polish 
 349 
and Slovak sources, unmistakably point to what was apparently a common problem.
229
 
With or without a personal stake, these administrative decisions obviously rendered 
nationality a subject of tensions and conflict between the Jewish applicant and the lower 
rank clerk.  
I speculate that the encounters between the petitioners who came to submit, 
resubmit, or appeal applications, and the clerks of national committees and verification 
commissions were pivotal moments in interethnic relations in Poland and Slovakia. By 
labeling and classifying people along ethnic lines, these encounters contributed to 
shaping the character of ethnic relations across the two countries. Each act of naming a 
person Slovak, Polish, German, and Magyar had critical consequences for the individual 
and for the ethnic fabric of society. Individuals marked as Germans and Magyars became 
outsiders deprived of rights and property; the majority was forced out of the country 
changing the ethnic composition of society. As local communities, especially in western 
and northern Poland, were in-the-making, the verification commissions contributed to 
shaping the profile of the newly created social structures. The ethnic lines drafted at the 
time laid the foundation for communal relations for the years to come. 
By 1950 in Slovakia and 1951 in Poland, the majority of Jews who stayed 
retained their citizenship despite frequent classification as Germans and Magyars. 
Although Jewishness by itself was not a pass to citizenship, in the end it did help 
German- and Magyar-speaking Jews to secure civil rights in the two countries. The laws, 
which favored behavior as a determinant of nationality and which thus protected the 
citizenship of those Germans or Magyars who had actively participated in the fight for 
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liberation or suffered under the Nazi regime, helped Jewish survivors to secure their civil 
and material status in postwar Slovakia. Similarly, the equation of Jewishness with 
special victimhood enabled German-speaking Jews to retain their status in postwar 
Poland. Thus, suffering from Nazi persecution became the ultimate entry ticket into 
Polish and Slovak citizenry. Just as traitorous activity had the power to kill, loyal conduct 
had the power to redeem. This redemption, however, was by no means presupposed but 
rather resulted from two years of political and social negotiations between the 






1. Directive of the ministry of the Recovered Territories concerning the attestation of 
Polish nationality for the residents of the Recovered Territories, 6 April 1946. 
 
Article III: Persons who will submit required application and prove their Polish 
origins or show their unity with the Polish Nation and will declare loyalty to the 
Nation and the State of Poland will be considered the persons [posiadające polską 
przynależność narodową] of the Polish national affiliation. 
Article IV: The interested persons can prove Polish national affiliation by all 
evidence available, in particular: 
1. Polish origins can be proved by id cards or registrar records, or by the sound of 
a family name, or by blood relations [pokrewieństwo] with Poles, 
2. Unity with the Polish Nation could be proved by the membership in Polish 
organizations or participation in fight for Polish cause [sprawa polska], or by 
the inner attitude [postawa wewnętrzna] and language, or by cultivation of 
Polish customs in family, or by the connection with the Polish folk culture and 
the life of Poles, or by the outer attitude [zewnętrzna postawa] during the Nazi 
rule showing solidarity with Poles while exposing oneself to danger.  
Article V: The following persons of Polish origin will not be recognized as 
persons affiliated [przynależne] to the Polish Nation: 
1. Who, with the long standing and notorious behavior, showed the full unity with 
the German nation or hostile attitude toward Polishness [polskość], 
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2. Who committed one of crimes specified in the decree of August 31, 1944 
concerning the punishment for fascist-Nazi criminals, guilty of murders and 
persecutions of civilians, prisoners of war and traitors of the Polish Nation…, 
3. Members of the fascist organizations…, 
4. Teachers of German schools, professional officers of the German army…, 
functionaries of the secret state police (Gestapo), functionaries of concentration 
and labor camps, publishers of German party printed materials. 
Article VI: In principle, the membership in the NSDAP and its branches alone 
does not make the basis to deny attestation of Polish national affiliation, 




2. Article VIII of the Košice Program, issued by the National Front of the Czechs and 
Slovaks, 5 April 1945.  
 
The citizens of the Czechoslovak Republic of German and Hungarian nationalities 
who had Czechoslovak citizenship before the Munich decision of 1938, and who 
are anti-Fascist, will have their Czechoslovak citizenship confirmed and their 
return home shall be facilitated; the same applies to those who carried out an 
active struggle already in the period before Munich against Henlein [Konrad 
Henlein, a leader of the Sudeten German Party] or the Hungarian irredentist 
parties, for the defense of Czechoslovakia, and who after Munich and March 15 
[1939, the beginning of the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia] suffered 
persecution at the hands of the German and Hungarian authorities because of their 
fidelity to the Czechoslovak Republic, to those who were imprisoned or sent to 
concentration camps, or were forced to flee abroad from German and Hungarian 
terror, and actively participated there in the anti-fascist struggle for 
Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak citizenship of the remaining Czechoslovak 
citizens of German and Hungarian nationality will be invalidated. These citizens 
have the option to request Czechoslovak citizenship, and the agencies of the 





3. Article I of Constitutional Edict of the president of the republic no. 33/1945 
concerning the right to Czechoslovak citizenship of persons of German and Magyar 
nationality, 2 August 1945. 
                                                 
230
 Misztal, Weryfikacja Narodowościowa na Ziemiach Odzyskanych, 350.  
231
 The English translation of the fragment from Janics, Czechoslovak Policy and the Hungarian Minority, 
1945-1948, 106. For the original text, see “Programme československé vlády Národní fronty Čechů a 
Slováků přijatý 5. dubna 1945 v Košicích, tzv. Košický vládní programme,” 
http://www.svedomi.cz/dokdoby/1945_kosvlpr.htm (accessed August 2007). 
 352 
1. Czechoslovak citizens of German or Magyar nationality who acquired German 
or Magyar citizenship under the regulations of the foreign occupational forces 
shall have lost their Czechoslovak citizenship by so doing. 
2. The other Czechoslovak citizens of German or Magyar nationality shall lose 
their Czechoslovak citizenship on the day this edict comes into force. 
3. This edict does not apply to Germans or Magyars who, during the period of  
the increased threat to the Republic (Article XVIII of the Edict of the President of 
the Republic, dated June 19, 1945 concerning the punishment of National 
Socialist Criminals, Traitors and their Accomplices and concerning the Special 
People's Courts) registered as Czechs or Slovaks during the official census. 
4. Czechs, Slovaks, and persons of other Slav nationalities who during that time  
professed themselves Germans or Magyars under duress or under  
extenuating circumstances shall not be adjudged Germans or Magyars insofar  
as the ministry of the interior, after a thorough examination of the particulars  





(Article IV specified that married women and juveniles shall be judged separately. 
Applications for national reliability “submitted by the wives and underage children of 
Czechoslovak citizens are to be judged with lenience; until a final decision is made the 
applicants are to be considered as Czechoslovak citizens.” Article V stated that even  
Czechs, Slovaks, and members of other nations, who applied for German or 
Magyar citizenship during the time of the increased threat to the republic 
…without being forced to do so by reason of duress or special circumstances, 





4. Ordinance of the commissioner of internal affairs in Bratislava no.20.000/I-IV/1-1946 
concerning the reslovakization of citizens, 17 June 1946. 
 
1. Persons who, in the census of 1930, declared Slovak, Czech, or other Slavic 
nationality, 
2. Persons who declare the above nationalities now and are of Slovak, Czech, or 
other Slavic origin, if they: 
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a. betrayed the Czechoslovak Republic, 
b. were not members of  fascist Magyar political parties and organizations, 
c. did not support magyarization.
234
 
When evaluating the facts under points 2 a-c, one must also investigate if the said 
person actively participated in the fight for liberation of the republic or suffered 
under Nazi or fascist terror. In accordance with this ordinance, one can declare 
Slovak or Czech nationality at the registrar [súpisovy] commissar’s office at the 
city or district national committee (or administrative commission) until July 1, 




5. Ordinance of the commissioner of internal affairs in Bratislava no.15.820/1/1946-III/2 
on the determination of nationality of persons of Jewish origin, 4 June 1946. 
1. Regardless of their language and other marks, persons who declared Slavic 
nationality [slovanska národnosť] in the census of 1938 must be considered as 
Slovaks or Czechs or members of other Slavic nationality. Persons who declared 
Jewish nationality in 1938 should be placed on an equal footing [with persons 
who declared Slavic nationality] as long as decisions on requests for the 
attestation of national, state, and people’s democratic reliability and citizenship 
are concerned.  
2. If, for the technical reasons, the persons cannot submit evidence that they 
declared Slavic or Jewish nationality in 1938 …, their nationality should be 
determined with the use of the following aids [pomôcki]: 
a. the declaration of Slovak or Czech nationality at present… if else they meet 
conditions of the instructions for reslovakization, 
b. knowledge of the Slovak or Czech language, 
c. evidence of the declaration of Slavic nationality in the offices (for example, 
military registration, police application, etc.), 
d. evidence of attendance at a school with Slavic language instruction, 
e. evidence of the declaration of nationality in the census of 1930, 
any of the above… suffice for the determination of Slavic nationality if the said 
person was and remained loyal to the Czechoslovak Republic, never betrayed 
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After the First World War, it may have been necessary to try to find some 
meaning in the senselessness of mass death, in the private grief shared by millions. 
After the Second World War, the horrors of Nazism and Communism, the mass 
bombing of civilians, the attempts at genocide, and the brutal uprooting of 
millions of refugees, it was perhaps necessary to do just the opposite: to turn 





Richard Bessel and Dirk Schumann asserted that the enormity of mass death during the 
Second World War purged the belief that there was “an identifiable meaning” in this life 
experience; what remained were “deeply disturbing questions and fears, and a desperate 
flight into normality.”
2
 As people had no tools to narrate the cataclysm they had just 
experienced, moving on and having a “normal life” again appeared to be the best option.  
“Normal life,” however, is a subjective term; its meaning changes according to 
the times it refers to. What a post-war society construed as normal is not necessarily 
considered normal today. For people in the late 1940s, the ideal of normality was peace.
3
 
After the war, normality seemed to be the extreme opposite of war. Survivors imagined 
normality as not having to hide, not fearing death on a daily basis, not being alone and 
                                                 
1
 Richard Bessel and Dirk Schumann, "Introduction: Violence, Normality, and the Construction of Postwar 
Europe," in Life after Death: Approaches to a Cultural and Social History during the 1940s and 1950s, ed. 






lonely; the ideal was to make a living without beggary, and, if age and circumstances 
allowed, marry and have children, and perhaps belong to a community which would offer 
emotional and financial support. 
There was nothing normal about the “normality” of the postwar individual and 
collective “life after death.”
4
 There was nothing normal about victims of German 
persecution, camp inmates, orphaned and sick children, women raped by the Soviets, 
thousands of traumatized men, soldiers and veterans, and millions of others who tried to 
put their lives back on track. Neither was there anything remotely normal about the 
postwar conditions in which they sought to rebuild their lives. Violence, war damage, 
lawlessness, and chaos were commonplace.   
  In this situation, the people in charge locally as well as relief and political 
organizations abroad presumed that Jewish life had to be “reconstructed” and that Jews 
needed to be “rehabilitated.” Scholars of East European Jewish history, by and large, 
labeled the entire social change, which unfolded between 1945 and 1948, a 
“reconstruction” and “rehabilitation” of Polish and Slovak Jewry. These concepts, 
however, should be used cautiously, being more problematic than they first appear. 
Historians and anthropologists of other regions and other ethnic groups have pointed to at 
least two major flaws in these two terms. First, as Richard Black and Khalid Koser 
argued, these terms “seem typically to refer to top-down development initiatives in 
postwar societies.”
5
 In other words, they imply that the Jewish return to normality had 




 Richard Black and Khalid Koser, "The End of the Refugee Cycle?" in The End of the Refugee Cycle? 
Refugee Repatriation and Reconstruction, ed. Richard Black and Khalid Koser (New York: Berghahn 
Books, 1999), 25. 
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nothing to do with individual initiative but was in totality orchestrated by higher 
institutions, the government, and interested organizations.  
Second, as Laura Hammond argued, the terms “reconstruction” and 
“rehabilitation” are borrowed from the rhetoric of disaster management.
6
 But damage to 
human beings differs from physical or structural damage and requires a different response 
and a different terminology:  
 
Many returnees in fact, do not see the object of repatriation as the “rebuilding” or 
“reconstruction” of their lives. Likewise, they often do not aspire to reclothe 




Hammond suggested that terms like “construction, creativity, innovation, and 
improvisation” 
 
would be more applicable than “reconstruction” or “reintegration.”
8
  
Both critiques are applicable to the story of the return to normality of Polish and 
Slovak Jews. True, Jewish survivors needed relief funds and an institutional network to 
help them find a place to stay, get medical help, find relatives, and make a living. Dozens 
of institutions mobilized to provide such support. The Polish government (unlike the 
Slovak one), the Jewish committees (the CKŻP in Poland and the ÚSŽNO and the SRP in 
Slovakia), the Society for the Protection of the Health of the Jews (Obshchestvo 
Zdravookhraneniia Evreev, OZE-TOZ), and, most notably, American Jewish relief 
organizations were paramount in helping Jewish survivors to either integrate into the 
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country’s economic and social life or emigrate.
9
 Indeed, as I show in this chapter, without 
their aid, Polish and Slovak Jews would have had a more difficult road toward individual 
and communal ”recovery.” Yet, such unilateral emphasis on top-down “reconstruction” 
fails to record (although does not deny) the individual initiative, creativity, and 
improvisation of Jewish survivors – their strategies of normalization. Especially in 
Slovakia, where the government did little to help the Jews, people had to count on their 
own resourcefulness to make ends meet. Thus in this chapter, I attempt to present Jews’ 
postwar “return to normality” as a social process which involved as much individual 
initiative as top-down institutional aid. 
 
Return to Normality in Poland 
 
After the Kielce pogrom of July 1946 – a central push for emigration – the Jewish 
population shrank to less than a half of its size from the spring of 1946.
10
 According to 
statistics compiled during the Passover of 1947, the number of Jews registered in Poland 
fell from 222,000 to 88,270.
11
 Considering that some Jewish survivors still lived under 
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assumed Polish names and never registered in any of the eighty-four Jewish communities, 
there were probably between 95,000 and 100,000 Jews in Poland in the spring of 1947.
12
 
These numbers remained more or less stable until 1949-51 when the government allowed 
emigration to Israel and approximately 28,000 people left.
13
 
The slowdown in emigration was mainly due to the decline in the violence and 
chaos of the first eighteen months after liberation. Jews traveling “everywhere without 
fear” and walking on the streets in the big towns “with long beards and in long coats” – 
unthinkable in 1945 and 1946 – were normal occurrences in 1947 and 1948.
14
 Director of 
the JOINT for Poland William Bein wrote in March 1947,  
 
Although it [antisemitism] still exists to a great extent, it is undeniable that much 
of its impetus has been lost and many antisemitic tendencies have stopped. Since 
the publication of the election results [January 1947] no violence against Jews has 
been noted, and despite a beneficial relapse, the Jews are still nervous and hope 
that more and more tolerance will be shown to the small number of surviving 
Polish Jews. Although many of the Jews are still sitting on their valises, a great 
number have settled down to work in the hope that they will be able to lead their 
lives in peaceful surroundings, and there are still thousands of Jews who want to 




Like many Jews in Poland, Bein attributed this new safety to “the strong measures of the 
government” after the elections in January 1947, the elections, which he claimed, had “a 
deep effect on the psychology of Jews in Poland.”
16
 The struggle for power between the 
Communists and the opposition, which had plunged the country into civil war, finally 
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stood at its conclusion. Victory for the Communists translated into the government taking 
a tighter grip over law and order in the country. Although repression of the opposition 
increased, violence on the street, in general, and anti-Jewish violence, in particular, 
subsided in the first quarter of 1947.  
The tighter grip meant more rigorous implementation of laws against 
antisemitism.
17
 People were more and more scared. When a JOINT correspondent asked 
the proprietors of a small hotel near Wrocław about antisemitism in Poland, they wanted 
to know the correspondent’s identity and the purpose of his visit before answering his 
question. Finally, they answered, “People say very little. We are afraid to talk against the 
Jews. We know someone who was very antisemitic and outspoken against the Jews and 
he was arrested. We do not say anything but we know what we think.”
18
 Another 
interviewee, a wealthy owner before the war and a state official when interviewed, said, 
“Please do not ask me, I would rather not discuss it.”
19
 Similar expressions reflected not 
only a fear of the authorities but also the belief that Jews enjoyed special protection due 
to their involvement in the government – Judeo-communism (see chapter 2).  
I suggest that, despite its grip over the popular imagination, belief in Judeo-
communism had done little or no harm to Polish Jews since the pogrom in Kielce. People 
“talked,” perhaps “whispered” about Jews “running the show” but this “whispered 
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antisemitism” failed to ignite violence after 1946. The government also employed 
propaganda to undercut the rumors. Here is an excerpt from the Manual of Political 
Education, a textbook for a two-year army course for privates,  
 
Do you recall the days before the war, when anti-Semites claimed that all Jews 
were traders and speculators, and that once Poland got rid of Jews she would be 
rid of speculation? And what happened? Today there is but a handful of Jews in 
Poland, very few of them are engaged in business. Is there, however, no 
speculation in Poland? Yes, there is. As a matter of fact, many Poles are engaged 
in black market, trade, and speculation…Do Polish Jews work for the 
Government? Of course, some of them do. Do they hold these jobs because they 
are Jews? No. They hold them because they are qualified…However, in 
consideration of what we have said, is it true that Jews hold many state offices in 
Poland? Of course not. A trip to any ministry, any provincial or any other state 





Popularity of the belief in Judeo-communism agitated those Jews who held official posts. 
They feared that  
 
At the first opportunity… all Jews in high positions would be killed by antisemitic 
right wing Poles in opposition to the present government and [that these Poles] 
were supposed to even have prepared a list of all Jews in Poland for use when 




However, regardless of suspicion and fear, the stereotype failed to impede the Jewish 
return to normality, especially in western Poland.  
In Lower Silesia, in particular, people spoke with growing “enthusiasm” about 
rebuilding Jewish life. In 1947, leaders of the Lower Silesian Jewry tended to 
overemphasize the enthusiasm of Silesian Jews for the regime and for the improvement 
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 Their optimism was not isolated and seemed to reflect the general 
sentiment among Lower Silesian Jews at the time. For example, Chief Rabbi of Wrocław 
Trojstman felt that the conditions in 1947 were “much better” than in 1946. He believed 
that 75,000, or seventy-five percent, of all the Jews in Poland would remain there. He 
said, “In my heart I feel better. Occasionally there are smiles but there is no danger and 
that is important. What they think, I do not know.”
23
 
If the criteria for normality are a non-violent environment, the prospect of starting 
a family and finding employment, and a sense of communal belonging, then indeed 
Lower Silesia became a unique milieu for Jewish “normalization.” The absence of 
antisemitic outbreaks in western Poland was conspicuous in comparison to other parts of 
the country. Apparently, there was no longer a need “for any special steps to combat 
antisemitism since the relations between Poles and Jews were generally so good.”
24
 A 
JOINT correspondent talked to a non-Jewish bookkeeper and a superintendent of a 
private car repair shop in the city of Wrocław. Questioned about antisemitism, the 
superintendent said,  
 
“Why, Jews are very popular here”… After the superintendent had taken on a 
small workshop, a Jew appeared who had more right to it than he and took it over 
for himself, with the approval of the authorities. In spite of this, he said he felt no 
bitterness… [In Wrocław] he found the Jews had changed very much. While 
before the war they were generally extremely orthodox, now many eat pork and 
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He and the bookkeeper (a manager of a small bank before the war and a repatriate from 
Ander’s Army) said that “they had suffered so much alongside Jews in German camps 
that they could have only sympathy for Jews and they felt this was typical of most people 
in the Regained Territories.”
26
 
An American Jewish observer had a more skeptical take on the apparently 
harmonious ethnic relations and Jewish enthusiasm for life in western Poland, 
 
It must also be stated that the optimism expressed by every Jew interviewed 
seemed to contain, not unnaturally, a certain, if indefinable and perhaps 
unconscious, element of bated-breath hopefulness which leads them all to put the 
best possible face on conditions, perhaps a slightly better face than may be 
entirely justified – as though wishing hard for ideal conditions might help to make 
them so. There is no doubt, however, that the situation has greatly improved 
during the past year, or that the position of the Jews in Poland, and to a lesser 
extent the relationship between Poles and Jews, is decidedly better than before the 
war. At the same time, it must be remembered that the average Pole was and 
largely still is antisemitic. The disappearance of overt antisemitism is in large part 
the result of conscious suppression by individuals of instincts within themselves – 
as well as partly due to pressure from the authorities. There are also a number of 
Poles who are fiercely opposed to antisemitism, and it is increasingly being 
realized that the remnant of the former Jewish population of Poland is no 
“danger” or problem, and the common decency and the memory of common 
suffering demand at least intelligent and positive sympathy. Almost every Pole of 
intelligence is commendably suppressing and trying to outgrow his inherited 




This commentary illuminates the belief that Polish antisemitism was a natural instinct 










 In the subsequent decades, this belief or lack thereof became a major distinguishing marker between 
those Jews who stayed in Poland and those who emigrated in the late 1940s; the former repudiating the 
notion and the latter, by and large, embracing it. 
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Whether “suppressed” or not, antisemitism indeed was not a major problem in the 
postwar years in Lower Silesia. The government policies against antisemitism were a 
factor but more significant were the specific conditions in the region. In August 1947, a 
consultant of the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds in New York, 
Mordecai Ezekiel, noted, 
 
In western Poland, especially in the south (Silesia) and the West, where the “New 
Territories” taken over from the Germans are being resettled, life is pioneer-like, 
with everyone a newcomer and with an American quality of lack of roots – and 
even the Poles resettled there from Eastern Poland seem to have left their 
prejudices behind (except for recurrent clashes between Germanized Poles who 
now claim Polish citizenship and eastern Poles who want to oust them as 




I speculate that this “pioneer-like” quality of life was central to peaceful Jewish and non-
Jewish coexistence. Everybody was preoccupied with rebuilding their lives; everybody 
was a settler and a newcomer. Jews were not a threat to the material status quo; they were 
not seen as returnees eager to regain what had been theirs. In the Recovered Territories, 
there was no recent history of non-Jewish neighbors taking Jewish property and no sense 
of guilt. Everybody started anew. What also helped was a common enemy – Germans. 
Fear and hatred of local Germans united all newcomers by providing a platform for 
communication between Jews and non-Jews. The central conflicts revolved around those 
Germans who claimed to be Polish and refused to leave. Importantly, Lower Silesia, as 
well as other parts of western Poland, had enough German “leftovers” to satisfy the 
material needs of settlers – countless houses, businesses, and pieces of land.   
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Lower Silesia was also unique in its level of industrialization. In the late 1940s, 
enthusiasm for manual industrial work was widespread. What a man of the twenty-first 
century is so tired of and eager to mend, the man of the 1940s held in esteem and strove 
to “normalize.” Romanticized descriptions of industrialized country land were common, 
“A city of smoking chimneys, a city of mill furnaces bursting with flames, a city of mines, 
a city noisy and feverishly busy, bustling with hurrying people – this is Wałbrzych, one 
of the most precious pearls in the necklace of cities in the Recovered Territories...”
30
 
What place could have been a better venue for creation of a “New Jew” – a proletarian 




The Haskalah’s idea of revised Jewish employment – “productivization” of Jews 
– recaptured the imagination and activities of those Jewish leaders who advocated the 
reconstruction of Jewish life in postwar Poland.
31
 The purpose was not only to find 
employment for Jewish survivors, but also to rehabilitate them psychologically and 
socially through work. Above all, behind these efforts lay the belief that 
“productivization” would lead to improved relations with non-Jews. The argument was 
that antisemitism in Poland stemmed partly from Jewish traditional overrepresentation in 
trade and liberal professions and hence could be mended only by “the normalization” of 
Jewish employment. The idea was that to be like Poles – to be the norm rather than the 
exception – Jews needed to enter farming and manual labor. Only then would they be 
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fully accepted and able to build normal lives. However, this idea should not be 
interpreted as an attempt at radical assimilation. Michał Grynberg argued that the creation 
of Jewish cooperatives – a central aspect of productivization – was meant to keep Jews in 
touch with the Jewish community and not the opposite.
32
 
 The productivization of Jews did not remain on paper. The CKŻP, with the 
approval of the central government, established the Bank for Jewish Economic 
Rehabilitation (Bank dla Produktywizacji Żydów) and the Economic Center Solidarity 
(Centrala Gospodarcza Solidarność) to facilitate Jewish productivization.33 The Bank, 
which operated as a credit cooperative, gave loans to all Jewish cooperatives and 
hundreds of private Jewish businesses (crafts workshops and others).
34
 The Economic 
Center Solidarity was created to coordinate the development of Jewish cooperatives by 
supplying them with raw materials and aiding in product sales.
35
 The Center had twenty-
one stores around Poland catering mainly to non-Jews.
36
 In 1948, when the government 
strove to eliminate “private initiative” and further the centralization of the economy, 
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including cooperatives, it made an exception for the Economic Center.
37
 In recognition of 
the special needs of the postwar Jewish rehabilitation, Solidarity was allowed to operate 
independently with the stipulation that all Jewish cooperatives would join it.
38
  
In 1945, there were only twenty Jewish cooperatives (of a total thirty-seven) in 
Poland.
39
 But, two years later, their number increased to 200, with a total employment of 
5,000.
40
 The largest number of Jewish producer cooperatives was in Lower Silesia – 
ninety-four, or sixty-seven percent of all cooperatives in the region.
41
 The first Jewish 
fishing cooperative (Spółdzielnia Rybak Szczeciński) in Polish history was established in 
Szczecin (northwestern Poland).
42
 The remaining cooperatives were in Kraków, 
Katowice, Warszawa, and other towns of central Poland.
43
  
Many Jewish cooperatives were grass root initiatives of individuals and groups 
determined to go off welfare and support themselves with methods conformable with the 
prevailing ideological climate. The majority of the co-op founders were repatriates from 
the USSR, who had experienced cooperatives in interwar Poland and the wartime Soviet 
Union.
44
 Some had neither skill nor capital. In 1945, many initiatives failed due to the 
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inability to find a locality, machinery, and capital.
45
 Local authorities were not always 
eager to invest in these undertakings either. For example, Mojżesz Gries, who lived in 
Palestine in 1947, authorized an attorney to carry reprivatization or establishment of a 
cooperative in the enterprise of Tomaszek i Gries
  
(buttons and buckles) which he had left 
behind in Kraków.
46
 But nothing was accomplished in this venture due to municipal 
inertness. For similar reasons, Izak Thorn failed to transform his factory Ritsch (zippers) 
in Kraków into a cooperative in spite of having enough machinery and raw material to 
give jobs for twenty people.
47
  
The productivization of Jews, with its network of institutionally coordinated aid 
and government support, contributed to higher employment rates and changed patterns of 
occupation. It should be noted that in addition to a relatively small number of surviving 
children and the aged, a large segment of the adult Jewish population in postwar Poland 
could not work due to war-related illnesses.
48
 Of all Jews residing in Poland in 1947, 
approximately thirty-three percent, or 33,000, were “gainfully employed.”
49
 Of the 
employed, thirty-eight percent worked in cooperatives (artisans), twenty-seven percent 
were employed in white-collar jobs (state administration, Jewish institutions, “socialized 
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the Committee on Reconstruction Planning, Information concerning Poland, 1 April 1947, Collection 
45/54, File 751, JOINT Archives. 
 368 
industry,” and others), and ten percent in the steel industry, transportation, and mining.
50
 
Four percent of the employed Jews worked in agriculture.
51
  
In 1948, these trends fluctuated minimally.
52
 By October 1948, Jewish 
involvement in trade made up four percent and five percent in liberal professions (of the 
overall Jewish employment), thus shifting a prewar stereotypical paradigm of “Jewish 
merchants and doctors.” In 1945-46, Jewish peddlers (mainly women) still carried goods 
from one storekeeper to the next in towns and cities.
53
 As time passed, peddling gradually 
decreased, except in regions with less industry and less opportunities. Also, as Jacob Pat 
claimed, there were “plenty of Jewish ‘silent partners’ in gentile undertakings.”
54
 These 
people were obviously not registered as employed in business. The most complicated was 
the employment of older religious Jews “who were not so easily able to learn a new 
profession, and who before the war were mostly merchants. It seldom happened that a 
Jew with a beard and a long coat would join a cooperative.”
55
 If they did, they usually 
struck an agreement with the management that instead of working on Saturday they 
would work a little longer each day.  
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Lower Silesia exemplified the new pattern of Jewish employment. In September 
1947, the WJC reported that more than fifty percent of “employable” Jews were 
“gainfully employed” in Lower Silesia – a total of 15,000 people.
56
 Approximately 4,000 
worked in state-owned heavy and light industries, 2,000 were employed in cooperatives, 
2,400 worked in social organizations (mainly Jewish), and 300 worked in agriculture. 
National and municipal administration in Lower Silesia employed about 1,300 Jews. 
Others found jobs in the liberal professions, private enterprises, artisanship, and trade, 
among others. With pride, Lower Silesian Jews noted that the first tramcar driver in 
Wrocław after the war was a Jewish woman.
57
 Dr. Plockier said that “the Jews here are 
especially anxious to engage in ‘productive’ work, as against trade…”
58
 
Five hundred Jewish “heroes of labor” in Lower Silesia, a hundred of them in 
mining, showed that Silesian Jews indeed managed to build normal lives, i.e., lives which 
fit into the normative reality around them.
59
 In October 1948, there was apparently a 
Jewish cooperative “on nearly every street” of Wałbrzych, “a city of workshops and 
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working people, a city of creative effort. It is no accident that it has become the seat of 




Take, for instance, the largest labor cooperative of needle workers in Wałbrzych. 
It was originated at the end of 1945 by twelve persons, recruited from among 
demobilized soldiers, former partisans in the People’s Army and former inmates 
of Hitler’s concentration camps. One year later, the cooperative employed 
seventy-six people and the ratio of the cooperative’s own capital to foreign capital 
was 1:4. Today [October 1948] there are 160 employees and the ratio of capital is 




Each success was widely publicized. The Jewish cooperative Metalowiec (Metal-worker) 
in Łódź was celebrated when it won a contest announced by the Central Union of the 
Textile Industry for construction of a “precision machine” – a machine “indispensable” in 
the textile industry but, until the fall of 1948, imported from abroad.
62
  
Farming was a particularly sensitive matter for Jewish leaders promoting the 
productivization of Polish Jews. In 1947, across the country, there were approximately 
200 Jewish farming families, comprising more than 500 people (four times more men 
than women) – mainly farming co-op members.
63
 The majority of Jewish farmers worked 
in Lower Silesia, becoming the pride of the local Jewish community.
64
 For example, in 
Kidlin, near Dzierżoniów (known as Rychbach), one of large farming cooperatives was 
operated by Jews.  
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This farm, formerly belonging to a German count, consists of 260 hectares. 
Seventeen Jewish families live together in the extensive buildings and between 
them provide twenty farm hands. Policies and other decisions are arrived at by 
vote during periodic meetings. There is a Jewish farm manager in addition to the 
German overseer, who has stayed on in an advisory capacity [sic!]. The manager 
assigns the next day’s work every evening during a common meeting. Asked 
about the success of the cooperative effort, he said that a few of the first settlers 
on this estate had to be asked to leave, as they did not have either the 
temperament or the desire to cooperate. Now, however, the operators of the farm 
work in great harmony. This farm has been operated for nearly three months and 





The deputy chairman of the Jewish committee in Dzierżoniów said that relations between 
members of the Jewish cooperative farm in Kidlin and their Polish neighbors “were very 
good. He agreed, however, that the situation here [Lower Silesia] is quite different from 
the norm in Central Poland, where peasants, having occupied the same villages for many 
generations, tend to be ultra conservative…”
66
  
These efforts were not merely means to rehabilitate Jewish survivors and integrate 
them into the economy of the country. Their purpose was to break the stereotype of a 
“Jew-merchant” by providing evidence that Jews were productive as manual workers in 
industry and farming. The chairman of the Wałbrzych Jewish committee, Fischbein, said, 
“Before the war Poles tended to think of Jews only as tradesmen, now they respect them 
as fellow workers.”
67
 That Polish peasants admired Jewish farmers was a cause for 
satisfaction. In northern Poland, on a train to the Jewish farm cooperative Wspólne Sianie  
(Common Sowing), an American reporter and a local peasant allegedly struck the 
following conversation, 









“Are you on your way by any chance to see those devils?” 
 “What devils are you talking about?” I asked. 
“Why, those Jews, I take it, who settled here and established a farm cooperative,” 
was his answer. I thought that I ran into an anti-Semite, most likely, an enemy of 
the new, democratic Poland. Soon however, my neighbor corrected me. 
“You’ll see for yourself, sir, that they are real devils. In my life I knew two Jews: 
Moszek the tailor and Kiwka the shoemaker. But such Jews like those on the 





Further, the secretary of the cooperative talked about Jews taking care of livestock,  
 
You should see and hear how our Jews take care of our beasts, even talk to them. 
Perelman, one of our members, while attending to the swine last Saturday, thus 
addressed them: Listen, you swine, you’re taken care of by the Jews, so don’t act 
like pigs. You’ve got to remember that Saturday is Sabbath day among the Jews, 





As a “New Jew,” however, the farmer did not mind attending his pigs (of all animals….) 
on Sabbath.  
In Lower Silesia, there was a widespread belief that Polish Jewish relations were 
better than ever and better than anywhere else in Poland due to the apparent success of 
Jewish productivization, 
 
In fact, Poles have taken part in all recent Jewish celebrations in Lower Silesia. 
Relations between the two cultural groups are better now than they were ever 
before the war. This is partly because the Jews have turned out to be such good 
workers, once they had a chance to show what they could do. The Polish 
community admires and likes this. There is enthusiasm everywhere in the 
Recovered Territories for productive work. A year ago, after the Kielce pogrom, 
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Whether employment of Jews in state industry and cooperatives affected Jews’ image and 
their relations with coworkers after the war remains an open question. I suggest, however, 
that the productivization offered an argument for the state-sponsored campaign against 
antisemitism while industry provided a venue for indoctrination of large numbers of 
workers. Lectures, morning talks (poranki), and radio programs, all were deployed for the 
cause.  
Outside this “postcard world,” there was a world of day-to-day relations or 
absence thereof in the work place. Especially in central and eastern Poland, there were 
still small industries and private businesses (like non-Jewish crafts workshops) that 
refused to hire Jews, religious or not.
71
 At the same time, the state heavy industry did not 
discriminate against Jews, at least on paper. In the Kraków province, Jews were 
employed in energy plants, light industry, state offices, hospitals, and other non-Jewish 
institutions.
72
 In Lower Silesia, in industry, mining, and even in farming Jews and non-
Jews, including Germans, mingled together. For example, in Dzierżoniów, in 1946, there 
were thirty-six farms occupied in more than eighty percent by Jews. Jewish and non-
Jewish farmers often co-owned a farm.
73
 Also, the majority of Dzierżoniów farms 
employed seasonal workers of various ethnicity (equal numbers of Jews, Poles, and 
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Germans), including Jewish farms employing Germans.
74
 The government representative, 
however, commanded that the Germans be exchanged for Jewish workers in the Jewish 
farms. 
It should be noted that Jewish farming and cooperation between Jewish and non-
Jewish farmers was limited to Lower Silesia. In central and eastern Poland Jewish 
farming was almost non-existent.
75
 Jewish owners of landed property hoped to recover 
and sell it, and move to a nearby city or abroad. But even in Silesia, the overall picture 
was not thrilling, especially as far as the beginnings of Jewish farming in the summer of 
1946 were concerned. First, most Jewish settlers had no farming experience, being 
artisans, merchants, or white collar workers before the war.
76
 Some saw farming as a 
temporary occupation before returning to their original profession or before emigration. 
Second, the shortage of basic furniture, equipment, agricultural machinery, and cash 
greatly hampered Jewish (and non-Jewish) farming. Finally, Jewish repatriates, who 
constituted the majority of Jewish farmers, were psychologically and physically 
exhausted, even “apathetic.”
77
 For them, toiling on the soil and keeping a household was 
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often too much to handle, at least for a few weeks or months upon return.
78
 Only 
gradually, in 1947 and 1948, did Jewish farming improve, and so did the conditions of 
living.  
As for Jewish cooperatives, hardly any of them employed Jews alone. On account 
of having taken over some small Polish cooperatives already in existence or due to a 
shortage of Jewish specialists, Jewish cooperatives frequently employed non-Jews who 
made up twenty to thirty percent of the employees.
79
 Especially the lack of Jewish 
women translated into a higher employment of non-Jewish women. For example, in the 
cooperative Tricot (Hosiery), Polish women constituted forty percent of the employed.
80
 
The cooperative Teatr Dzieci Warszawy (Theater of Warszawa’s Children) had half 
Polish and half Jewish membership.
81
 In Kraków’s cooperative Metalotechnika, a third of 
the employees were Jewish.
82
 Jewish cooperatives made sure, however, that “in no 
instance was a Jew unable to join a cooperative because of non-Jewish membership.”
83
  
Overall, Jews and non-Jews mingled in the workplace without major incident 
between mid 1946 and the end of 1948. Yet, there were problems which soured relations 
among workers. For instance, when a growing number of Jewish employees wanted to 
leave Metalotechnika in 1946, the Jewish committee in Kraków blamed low salaries, the 
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financial problems of the cooperative, and the antisemitism of its non-Jewish members.
84
 
By and large, the distribution of financial aid seemed to have been the most common 
source of conflict. In Lower Silesia, Plockier mentioned that Jewish miners received 
JOINT supplements to their salaries while non-Jews did not. He presumed that it must 
have caused some sense of frustration and injustice among non-Jewish miners.
85
 In 
October 1946, the provincial commissioner for the productivization of Jews in Szczecin
 
wrote about relations between Jewish and non-Jewish farmers,  
 
Emphasis should be laid on the very civic and reasonable position of the [Jewish] 
Committee which provides the same aid to Jewish as to Polish workers who come 
together with Jews in the transports [repatriation from the USSR]. In landed 
property, for example, in Kelpin, relations between Jews and Poles are very 
familiar (simply cordial). However, in other properties, where Jews came 
separately and where Poles do not receive any help and do not use the cows from 





In the summer of 1947, the same provincial commissioner in Szczecin reproached the 
provincial Jewish committee for removing non-Jewish members from the list of those 
allowed financial aid in the Jewish fishing cooperative.
87
 Apparently, the provincial 
Jewish committee in Szczecin left out non-Jewish workers when it distributed food 
packages. The commissioner pointed out that such intentional omission of non-Jewish 
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Despite higher employment rates, many Jews still needed relief between 1946 and 
1948. The cost of living rose gradually and what seemed a sufficient wage at the 
beginning of 1946 was not enough in the summer of 1947. Prices of some foods doubled 
or tripled within a year.
89
 Food ration cards, which up to December 1946 provided about 
nine million workers with minimum calories, were limited to seven million people by 
October 1947.
90
 Wages varied depending on occupation. In the first two years after the 
war, people in liberal professions could make “big money,” especially lawyers.
91
 
However, the government’s policy of eliminating “private initiative” cut their earnings 
(public jobs paid less than the private sector). Owners of small private enterprises, 
although “doomed,” could still make about 60,000 to 70,000 złoty per month.
92
 The 
imposition of high taxes was the most efficient way to drive private entrepreneurs toward 
cooperatives. The minimum wage in an average Jewish cooperative was 8,000 złoty; in 
leather cooperatives – 25,000. Very good cooperative specialists could make 45,000 to 




 For example, one kilo of bread cost thirty-four Polish złoty in July 1946, forty złoty in April 1947 and a 
hundred in May 1947; the price of a kilo butter increased from 342 złoty in July 1946 to 600 złoty in April 
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50,000 złoty per month.
93
 At the same time, the salary of teachers in public schools did 
not exceed 7,000 to 8,000 in September 1948.
94
 
In an average household of four (Jewish and non-Jewish alike), with an average 
salary of 8,000, both spouses had to work to make ends meet. There was hardly a family 
where one person could maintain a home by working in a factory or an office.
95
 After 
paying rent and covering bare necessities, there was not much left to clothe a family or 
defray medical expenses. In April 1947, Bein complained that the average earning of a 
Polish Jew was not sufficient to buy shoes.  
 
The economy of the Jews still does not permit them the purchase of clothing 
needed. Practically no Jew can afford the purchase of a good pair of shoes. 
Parents of children who need three to four pair of shoes a year can under no 
circumstances afford to buy this. Based upon our experience, we estimate that we 
will have to clothe 20,000 men [of the total of 45,000], 15,000 women [of 40,000], 




In 1948, the JOINT tried to convince Polish Jews to contribute money to provide 
sufficient finances to support the needy but not many could donate.
97
 Many young Jews 
in their prime had emigrated, affecting the general demographic and financial capacities 
of the Jewish population as a whole. In this situation, the aid from Jewish foreign and 
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Polish relief organizations was priceless, especially when the UNRRA terminated its 
activities in Poland in 1947.
98
  
Family, Education, and Language 
 
Reunion with family, whether close or distant, was to play a central role in 
rebuilding normality after the war. The following letter from an agricultural laborer, Pinia 
Thur, from Słupsk provides a glimpse into what family meant to survivors. 
 
I thank you [the JOINT] with all my heart for locating my family in Poland and 
Canada. Since I have been contacted by your office, an immense change took 
place in my outlook on life and in my feelings. Until now I was completely 
broken down and resigned. Now everything is changed. The contact with my 





For many survivors, the sense of absolute loneliness, aggravated by a difficult living 
situation and constant reminders of the war, made it very hard to imagine a normal life in 
Poland. Emigration and the search for a new life in a new place were common responses, 
especially among the single and the youth. The rediscovery of long-mourned relatives, 
meeting a new life-partner, or having a baby could make life in Poland imaginable.  
Although at the beginning of 1947, there were still disproportionately few Jewish 
children under the age of sixteen (17,000 out of 100,000 of the Jewish population), these 
statistics were to change. The baby boom of 1946 and 1947 in Poland did not exclude 
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Polish Jews. In 1947, the birthrate increased notably with 2,000 children born.
100
 In 
August 1947, Mordecai Ezekiel reported that, “in the urban cooperatives many are 
marrying and settling down, and the birth rate is already very high.”
101
 An increase in the 
number of Jewish kindergartens reflected the slow return to normality.
102
 So did the 
decrease in the number of orphanages. In 1946, the CKŻP maintained thirteen children 
homes whereas in October 1948 only eight.
103
 
In the quest for stability and normality, people rushed to marry. Pat wrote from 
his trip to Poland in the beginning of 1946,  
 
Poland’s Jews are getting married. Abraham Kravietz, the new Rabbi of Łódź, 
tells me that he has already performed 372 wedding ceremonies. Everyone wants 
to get married: middle-aged Jews, eager to build normal homes again and to 
forget the ghetto ghosts which now [remind] people of their loneliness; repatriates 
from Russia who did not find their families alive; young people who are tired of 
their outlaw youth, and who now want what all their ancestors have wanted – a 
wife, a child, a home; widows and widowers whose first mates were among the 
Jews’ six million martyrs, and who now want to start from scratch. And finally 
there are those whose marriage takes them into another world, into other circles, 
other peoples. Their marriage, they believe, will help them to escape forever from 




In the beginning of 1947, there were more Jewish men (45,000) than women (40,000) 
survivors, which turned Jewish women into “a commodity in demand.” Dichter’s mother 
told him, “Young Jews marry one another… I’ve already been proposed twice. They had 
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The shortage of Jewish women was only one of many factors contributing to the 
rise in intermarriages. Another, more important, factor was the abundance of 
opportunities to meet non-Jews at school and work. When accompanied by lack of 
personal hesitation – perhaps loss of faith, perhaps the refusal to consider national or 
cultural attachment in the choice of a spouse – and the absence of family and communal 
pressure, romantic involvements with non-Jews ceased to be a dangerous exception but 
an accepted norm. Pat described a secular marriage ceremony between the daughter of 
Alter Kacyzne, Shulamith Kacyzne, and the Italian ambassador, Eugenio Reale, in a 
Warszawa courtroom in February 1946,  
 
“Your faith?” asked the Catholic judge turning to the Jewish poet’s daughter. 
“No faith,” she answered quietly. 
“Your faith?” the judge asked the Ambassador, a member of the Communist 
“Polit-Bureau” of Italy. 
“Roman Catholic,” said the groom… 
 
 
In the Kraków’s registrar office, between November 1946 and August 1947, ninety-three 
mixed couples got married.
106
 Assuming that the average was about eighty-five to ninety 
mixed marriages per half a year, a total of approximately 500 couples intermarried in 
Kraków within three years. Five hundred of 4,000 Jewish adults was a considerable 
percentage, although still the majority of Jewish survivors sought to settle down with a 
Jewish spouse.  
                                                 
105
 Wilhelm Dichter, Koń Pana Boga (Kraków: Znak, 1996), 81. 
106
 Report on the activity of the provincial commissioner for the productivization of the Jewish population 
in Kraków province between November 1, 1946 and August 15, 1947, August 1947, Collection of the 
KWŻ, KWŻ-2, APKr.  
 382 
At the root of the desire for intermarriages lay the urge toward assimilation; the 
belief that to build a normal life one needed to leave one’s community of origin and 
integrate fully into the majority. Similar motivations lay partly behind the changing of 
names. Applications for a change of name, collected in the Institute of National Memory 
in Kraków (Instytut Pamięci Narodowej), illuminate the main motivations of the 
claimants.
107
 Whether the driving force was the need for acceptance, fear of rejection, or 
the simple need to get and keep a job otherwise in jeopardy, those who assumed “Polish-
sounding” names did so in the hope of building a normal life in a homogenous country 
where a “Jewish-sounding” name stood out and could cause trouble. Menasche Keller 
wrote the following in his application to assume the name Mieczysław Dąbrowski:  
 
During the occupation, I was forced to change my first and last name and I 
assumed [the name] Mieczysław Dąbrowski in order to avoid the fate of the Jews 
persecuted for racial and political reasons by the fascist occupier. Being aware 
that the environment, infected by Hitlerism poison, still hates a foreign race, and 
considering that I do not want to have a German-sounding name, I decided to 





Keller wrote it in Vienna, but his reasoning could be well suited for any applicant in 
Poland. A professor of the University in Łódź, Witold Steinberg, applied to assume the 
name Rudziński because he did not want to bear a “German-sounding” name, which had 
been “imposed on his ancestors.”
109
 Sala and Feibisch Goldhirsch justified their 
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application to change their names to Zofia and Franciszek Złotoleń by the non-Polish 
sound of their birth names.
110
 
Besides the willingness to shed any visible mark of Jewishness in apprehension of 
antisemitism, the simple force of habit, and the need to get papers ready pushed Jewish 
survivors to assume their war pseudonyms. That was especially true for applicants who 
filed from abroad. Herman and Feiga Grünwald, for example, had used the assumed 
names Jan and Maria Nowak consistently since 1943. After the war, when the Grünwalds 
emigrated to Hungary and had new passports issued, they urgently needed Polish identity 
cards with assumed names.
111
 Occasionally, it was mere force of habit, without 
bureaucratic urgency, that pushed people to apply for a name-change. Arnold Rothblum, 
for example, applied for permission to change his name after he safely landed in 
Jerusalem. Born in Kraków in 1923, Rothblum used the pseudonym Adam Bernat during 
the war and had been known as such ever since. Having settled in Israel, he did not want 
to return to his Jewish name since he had spent most of his adult life as Bernat.
112
  
Yet, others like Izaak Lieber cited their “moral obligation” to give up a “German 
sounding” name. At the time of his application, Izaak with wife and child were in Prague 
on their way to the United States. Lieber wrote,  
 
First, during the German occupation, I was hiding under the  name Józef Libera 
[Lieber attached a fake baptismal certificate that he had used during the war]. 
Second, my real name Lieber has a German sound and spelling, hence I – a 
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Most commonly, Polish Jews cited a “non-Polish sound” and the use of a “Polish-
sounding” name during the war as reason for the application, knowing the regulations 
concerning the change of names. In accordance with a decree from November 1945, 
every citizen of Poland could change names if his or her real name was “degrading or 
ridiculing” human dignity (hańbiące albo ośmieszające lub nielicujące z godnością 
człowieka); if a claimant used a pseudonym in the Army, underground activity, any other 
fight for liberation, or to avoid German terror (celem uchronienia się przed aktami gwałtu 
najeźdźcy niemieckiego lub jego popleczników) and wished to keep it as his or her formal 
name; or if a last name had a non-Polish sound or a form of a first name.
114
    
Perhaps those who changed their names and chose non-Jewish spouses “still felt 
and considered themselves, as the marans once did, as Jews.”
115
 Perhaps, some chose a 
non-Jewish spouse and non-Jewish name in a calculated attempt at assimilation. Yet, 
there were those who wanted to build their lives somewhere in-between Jewishness and 
non-Jewishness. The most telling example were people who bore two names – a “Polish 
sounding” name for their job and a “Jewish sounding” name for their social life among 
other Jews.
116
 Establishing what percent of the people wanted to shed their Jewish 
identity and to what degree poses difficulties. Only speculations are left as far as shades 
of acculturation and assimilation are concerned. The most difficult to trace were those 
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who wanted to radically assimilate since they put extra effort not to leave any evidence of 
Jewishness in public or private life.
117
  
The general census of all Jews during the distribution of matzoh for the Passover 
of 1947 cast some light on the problem. In the town of Zabrze (Silesia), the Jewish 
committee estimated that 308 or ninety percent of local Jews showed up for the 
registration.
118
 Some of them lived under double names – they had been registered in the 
committee under their Jewish names but lived their “public lives” under their assumed 
non-Jewish names. When asked to fill in a section on their assumed names, they all 
refused to disclose it. Five individuals had never been registered in the Jewish committee 
under either name but showed up for the distribution anyway. They only agreed to be 
recorded on a list of matzoh receivers but not in the official registers of the committee.
119
 
To sum up, in Zabrze, the overwhelming majority of local Jews lived openly “Jewish 
lives” under their unchanged names while the absolute minority cut almost all ties with 
the community of origin. In larger cities, the number of radically assimilated Jews may 
have been greater, but the proportions were hardly different. 
Language offers another clue to Jewish acculturation and assimilation in postwar 
Poland. After the war, Yiddish, Polish, and Hebrew competed to become the central 
vehicle of communication for Jews in Poland. Polish eventually prevailed: Hebrew 
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speakers left for Israel while Yiddish speakers mostly assimilated and turned to Polish in 
and outside their homes. However, in the first years after the war, linguistic assimilation 
was not yet predetermined. The emphasis on Yiddish in education and institutional life 
showed that Jewish leaders believed that the reconstruction of Jewish life in Poland was 
tied to the Yiddish language. The use of Yiddish in primary Jewish schools, for example, 
was an informed intellectual and political decision. In the beginning of 1946, the CKŻP 
summoned representatives of Jewish education to Warszawa in order to discuss Jewish 
schooling. They decided on establishing a network of schools in which the language of 
instruction would be Yiddish.
120
  
In September 1947, the CKŻP maintained thirty-four primary schools (3,000 
pupils) based on the educational program of the government, with Yiddish as the 
language of instruction and Polish taught from the first grade and Hebrew from the 
third.
121
 The CKŻP also organized Yiddish afternoon courses.122 The Council of Jewish 
Religious Congregations maintained thirty-six Yesodei Torah schools (1,100 pupils) 
which taught in Yiddish and focused on religious subjects.
123
 Besides Yiddish schools, 
there was a system of Hebrew schools. Zionists supervised eleven Tarbut schools (1,000 
pupils) which had Hebrew as the language of instruction and were designed to prepare 
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students for emigration to Palestine. They also organized courses in Hebrew and training 
camps. 
Overall, at an elementary level, Jewish children had the most opportunity to learn 
and speak either Yiddish or Hebrew. In 1946 and 1947, the majority of Jewish children 
lived in separate Jewish orphanages, studied at Jewish elementary schools, and played in 
Jewish “recreational centers,” having limited contact with non-Jewish children.
124
 Yet, 
despite these opportunities, the overwhelming majority of Jewish children knew Polish 
exclusively or best, having survived in non-Jewish homes and monasteries. Six- or seven-
year-olds knew only Polish. Older children could not understand Yiddish either. When 
Pat visited one of the Jewish schools in Kraków and wanted to speak Yiddish to the 
children, the teacher, who did not know Yiddish herself, told him that “only a few of the 
children understood Yiddish. The others knew Polish only.”
125
 The lack of Yiddish 
teachers was another problem. In the nine largest Yiddish schools in Poland (with more 
than one hundred students), instruction was in Yiddish in seven and in Polish in two.
126
 
One of the Kraków Jewish orphanages had no Yiddish instructor because the institution 
could not find one.
127
 Since seminars organized for Yiddish teachers did not attract 
enough candidates, the CKŻP considered importing them from abroad.128 
In 1947, about 1,500 Jewish children attended public schools with Polish as the 
language of instruction. Sending a child to a public or Jewish school was the individual 
(and political) choice of parent(s) or a parenting institution; a decision with important 
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consequences for the child. The chairman of the Wałbrzych Jewish committee, Fischbein, 
said,  
 
In the mixed schools in the beginning there were difficulties between Jewish and 
Polish children, but this was no longer so [1947]. The initial difficulties were not 




According to Pat, by the beginning of 1946, fifty-seven children had transferred from 
public to Yiddish schools due to an “unwelcoming” atmosphere.
130
 To avoid unpleasant 
situations, Jewish children tended to hide their background. For many children, especially 
those who survived with Polish families, that was a matter of habit.
131
 However, some 
believed that mixed schools and more contact between Jewish and non-Jewish children 
could “eliminate antisemitism.” For example, a principal of a Jewish orphanage in 
Kraków asked the provincial commissioner for the productivization of Jews to arrange 
contact with a public orphanage in the city.
132
 
At higher levels of education, contacts between Jewish and non-Jewish students 
intensified. In the absence of Jewish institutions (there was only one Jewish high school 
in Wrocław and one music school) about 2,000 Jewish students chose to attend public 
high schools and universities.
133
 In 1947, Jews made up only 0.4 percent (100,000 of 
twenty-three million) of the general population and two percent of the student body (956 
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Jewish students in colleges).
134
 The majority of them used Polish in their daily 
communication. They may have still spoken Yiddish at home if one or both parents were 
alive, but “on the street” they switched to Polish. The only place where this was not true 
was Lower Silesia, where Jews spoke Yiddish openly. As Pat described Dzierżoniów, 
 
Evening comes and everything is as it should be – no nervousness, no terror, no 
sneaking home for fear of pogrom mongers. I look up one of the streets that cut 
through the market place and for the first time I set foot in postwar Poland I see a 
large sign saying in Yiddish letters: Community Center. It is simply impossible to 
imagine such a sign in any other Polish city – Warszawa, Łódź, Białystok, or 
Kraków – all great Jewish centers once. “This is going to be a Jewish city,” says 




Across Poland, the choice of language at home and on the street was a matter of 
prewar background, age, political outlook, and economic standing. Remaining in Poland 
and integrating into the Polish economy usually meant turning from Yiddish to Polish, at 
least in one’s work or on the street. In the new postwar conditions, knowledge of the 
Polish language became a necessity. A survey of the WJC of September 1947 stated that, 
“in today’s Poland, the Polish language is spoken by the overwhelming majority of the 
population. Among the Jews, the majority is now composed of Polish speaking 
elements.”
136
 The Jewish community, by and large, considered ignorance of the Polish 
language as a disadvantage at best, and an unacceptable error, at worst. Describing a 
Tarbut school in Szczecin, the governmental commissioner wrote, “One of the teachers 
did not know any Polish at all which was pointed out as inadmissible (co wytknięto jako 
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 In Jelenia Góra, in a questionnaire of the Jewish Committee’s 
youth department, “lack of qualifications and ignorance of the Polish language” were 
cited as major difficulties and drawbacks of youth employment in the town.
138
  
The appropriation of the Polish language should not be construed as a mark of 
radical assimilation. In the late 1940s, Irena Hurwic-Nowakowska conducted a survey on 
national self-identification among Polish Jews. Twenty-two percent claimed to be Polish 
(among those, two percent thought of themselves as Polish and Jewish at the same time) 
whereas seventy-four percent considered themselves to be “members of the Jewish 
nation.”
139
 The majority of Polish Jews in 1946 and 1947 were still culturally, socially, 
and politically Jewish while speaking Polish. By culturally, socially and politically 
Jewish, I mean respect for Jewish tradition without religious adherence; subscription to 
the idea of common origin and common experience (especially World War II); close 
social interactions – friendships and marriages – mainly with other Jews; and favoring 
political solutions which met the interests of Jews as a cultural and national community. 
Only beginning in 1948 and 1949 did radical assimilation start making inroads among 
Polish Jews. After liberation, the ideal was acculturation without assimilation. As the 
deputy-chairman of the Lower Silesian provincial Jewish committee, Plockier, noted, 
“The [Jewish] leaders are “trying to preserve Jewish national culture while developing a 
thoroughly Polish spirit. As their cultural life develops they are anxious to retain their 
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Jewish character and not to be assimilated (my emphasis).”
140
 Developing Yiddish 
schools and organizing Jewish cultural life, while using the Polish language during their 




If cultural life reflected a level of communal return to normality, a large segment 
of Polish Jews had achieved that by the end 1947. At the time, about thirteen Jewish 
periodicals, with a circulation of 60,000, were published in Poland (in Polish and 
Yiddish).
141
 Three Jewish theaters (the biggest ones in Wrocław and Łódź) performed in 
Yiddish and Polish.
142
 Across the country, Jewish survivors organized twelve choral 
groups, including one in Otwock by the famous Jewish composer Leo Weiner, orchestras, 
art studios, libraries, sport clubs (especially soccer), twenty-six dramatic groups, and a 
Jewish children ballet (Wrocław). In 1947 alone, four cultural conferences and thirty-six 
concerts were organized, and 156 radio programs (mainly in Yiddish) were broadcast. 
The Society for Fostering Jewish Art was established in 1946. The Society organized 
exhibitions of the art of Maurycy Gottlieb, Artur Markowicz, Jonas Stern, and others. In 
November 1947, the Jewish Cultural Association was founded.
143
 The Film Section of the 
Cultural Division of the CKŻP made three short documentaries and one feature length 
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movie entitled We Who Survived – a portrayal of Jewish postwar economic and cultural 
recovery in Poland.
144
 The Central Jewish Historical Commission, centered in Warszawa 
with branches in each major city of Poland, published books and bulletins, and organized 
lectures. 
Cultural activities drew friends, associates, and coworkers together, making a 
community possible. So did political activism. Natalia Aleksiun, in her study of the 
Zionist movement in postwar Poland, showed that the Zionist party and kibbutzim 
replaced lost families by meeting basic material and emotional needs of Jewish 
survivors.
145
 The Zionist movement created a community of friends, which offered a 
home and a work place. Although the movement’s main objective was emigration to 
Palestine (more than 100,000 emigrated from Poland to Palestine between 1945 and 
1948), it also created opportunities for normal lives “here,” in Poland. No other political 
movement at the time, including Bundism, accomplished that.  
The system of cooperatives, although smaller in scope, was almost as effective as 
the Zionist movement in engendering a sense of community. Grynberg showed that 
Jewish cooperatives were the makers of Jewish communal life after the war – “a business 
card” (wizytówka) of the Jewish postwar community.
146
 Cooperatives organized cultural 
and sport clubs, amateur theaters, libraries, reading rooms, and professional training 
courses, keeping their members in touch with Jewish cultural and social life. Similar to 
the Zionist movement, cooperatives replaced the lost families and facilitated making new 
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friendships and relationships. They became quasi-homes. Pat quoted a cooperative 
member in Lower Silesia,  
 
“I could earn the little I need working by myself,” says a Jewish tailor. “I might 
even make more that way. But I joined the co-op because I am lonely. My 
thoughts keep going back to where I came from – to the furnaces [concentration 




As Pat concluded, “with twenty workers and ten sewing machines in one room, life 
becomes merrier…”
148
 Moreover, cooperative workers usually lived in workers’ hostels, 
getting an additional sense of community and togetherness.  
Overall, the cooperatives took over many functions of Jewish committees, 
financing the latter. The “cooperative community” was by no means negligible in size 
either. By the end of 1947, it had 5,000 employees.
149
 With families, the members of 
cooperatives made up a society of about 15,000, or fifteen percent of the entire Jewish 
population in Poland. It should be noted that, like the Zionist movement, the Jewish 
cooperatives had a strong ideological edge. The very idea of cooperative employment 
was embedded in socialist thinking. The Jewish communist party (the Fraction PPR) was 
the most involved in the project of the productivization and the creation of cooperatives, 
and prewar communist activists were among the co-op initiators.
150
 In cooperatives, there 
were also frequent talks and lectures on “socio-political topics” and other activities in 
tune with the prevailing rhetoric at the time.
151
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The community which seemed to have lost the most appeal among Jews in Poland 
was the community of religion. The WJC survey from September 1947 stated that “the 
majority of Polish Jews were religiously minded.”
152
 Verification of this claim, however, 
is difficult without statistics and without definition of what “religiously minded” meant. 
In January 1948, Chief Chaplain of the Polish Army and Chairman of the Organizing 
Committee of Jewish Congregations David Kahane gave an interview to the Jewish Press 
Agency. When asked about the attitude of Polish Jews to religion, Kahane answered, 
 
We notice a marked revival of religious feelings. Proof thereof is the mass 
attendance at religious services. Requests for circumcision of infants and 
enrollment for pre-Bar-Mitzvah instruction (confirmation) are growing, and there 




However, when Zachariah Shuster from the JOINT European office attended Kahane’s 
Friday service in the sole remaining synagogue in Warszawa, in April 1948, he found 
“exactly a ‘minion’ of Jews huddled around the Rabbi….”
154
 Shuster was also told that 
this synagogue filled up on major religious holidays only. Overall, about sixty percent of 
the Jews would celebrate Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kipur.
155
 The general revival that 
Kahane referred to appeared illusive or relative at best. The common impression was that 
“One barely sees a bearded Jew in traditional garb.”
156
  
The secularization of Polish Jews had less to do with communist ideological 
inroads and more with a loss of faith among survivors as well as mass emigration of those 
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who still believed. The demographics of survivors and repatriates from Russia did not 
favor religious devotion either. Mainly young and middle aged, these people were less 
prone to attend religious services on a regular basis. Finally, the necessity to integrate 
into Poland’s economic and cultural framework, including work shifts on Saturdays, also 
contributed to the gradual emptying of synagogues.  
In mid 1947, there were thirty-eight synagogues per 100,000 Jews, thirty kosher 
kitchens (down from fifty-seven in September 1946), and sixteen mikvat.
157
 In Białystok, 
with 400 Jews, a schochet conducted all religious ceremonies.
158
 In 1947, the 
Organizational Committee of Jewish Religious Congregations in Poland distributed 
tefilin, prayer shawls, and gifts to 350 boys (before bar mitzvah).
159
 In the same year, the 
JOINT supplied the CKŻP and the Council of Jewish Religious Communities with 5,000 
prayer shawls for holiday services. Considering the total population of 100,000 people, 
religious needs seemed to have been minimal. By 1948, there were sixteen to eighteen 
rabbis left in Poland due to mass emigration.
160
 Most importantly, overall, the orthodox – 
a minority among survivors – were the most willing to leave Poland.
161
 As a result, as 
Ezekiel reported, there were “isolated cooperative farms [for example, where] Jewish 
farmers complained about isolation” from religious and cultural activities.
162
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On a brighter note for the religious community, in larger cities where buildings of 
worship were preserved and a large Jewish population survived religious activities were 
in full swing.
163
 In Kraków, Łódź, Wrocławek, Dzierżoniów, and Wałbrzych brand new 
matzoh bakeries began operating in 1947 and 1948.
164
 In the fall of 1948, a new slaughter 
house was built and opened in Kraków.
165
 Interestingly, the prewar law forbidding 
religious meat slaughter in places where Jews constituted less than three percent was not 
abolished after the war. Instead, it was not implemented and kosher meat was available 
everywhere where Jews lived. In the Recovered Territories, the law had never been in 
force and Jews were getting a monthly allocation of kosher meat that surpassed their 
needs. Hence, the Poles were buying it “because they didn’t have to stand in queue.”
166
  
  Similar to Slovakia, for a couple of postwar years, there was detectable tension 
between the CKŻP and the Council of Jewish Religious Congregations in Poland. The 
two institutions functioned separately, often arguing about, for example, the distribution 
of foreign aid. The CKŻP and the Council finally completed the institutional unification 
under the conditions that the CKŻP’s offices would close on Saturdays and that kashruth 
would be observed in public canteens, among others. The CKŻP accepted the conditions 
except the observance of Sabbath.
167
  
Finally, it should be noted that a return to normality would have been impossible 
without individual and collective mourning – without narrating the trauma. 
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Memorialization of wartime suffering was a way to help individuals to come to terms 
with their experiences.
168
 The major commemorative events included the opening of the 
Museum of Jewish Martyrdom in Majdanek and the fifth anniversary of the Warszawa 
ghetto uprising in 1948.
169
 At the center of the commemoration was the unveiling of a 
granite monument (the work of Nathan Rapaport) in the heart of the former Warszawa 
ghetto. Besides thousands of Polish Jews, fifteen to twenty percent of the 20,000 
attendees at the ceremony were non-Jews.
170
 That could, but did not necessarily indicate, 
public interest or sympathy. Possibly, many attended the commemoration because their 
institution delegated them, because they were curious, or because they genuinely 
considered it a proper thing to do. The Polish Research and Information Service at the 
JOINT in New York estimated that in Upper Silesia, for example, twenty-five percent of 




Return to Normality in Slovakia 
 
In general, with exception of Polish Lower Silesia, Slovak Jews enjoyed a 
relatively more peaceful environment in their return to normality (finding a job, starting a 
family, and belonging to a community) than Polish Jews. Slovak Jews lived in a country 
spared from civil war, where the level of violence never reached the Polish heights. 
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Having said that, it should be noted that the anti-Jewish riots in Slovakia lasted much 
longer than in Poland. In Poland, anti-Jewish violence reached its apogee and ended in 
1946, whereas in Slovakia it never reached a peak but never ceased either. In August 
1948, when Poland had been clear of pogroms for almost two years, Slovak Jews still 
suffered violence in the capital city of Bratislava. 
In Slovakia, like in geographically proximate Poland, the economic situation 
improved by the second half of 1946 in comparison to 1945. The government still 
approved of small and medium private enterprise. Production and export increased and a 
scarcity of workers opened prospects for employment.
172
 The severe winter of 1946/47 
changed this pattern, slowing down agriculture. Eastern Slovakia, like Poland, suffered 
floods in the spring of 1947. By the summer of 1947, food shortages and rising prices 
were a daily reality. Although food was more easily obtained and prices increased more 
steadily in Slovakia than in the Czech lands, some products were not easily available. For 
example, in the fall of 1947, the shortage of flour and bread led to small scale 
demonstrations in Nitra.
173
 First male workers and, a day after, their wives demonstrated 




 In 1948, bad harvests caused further food shortages. The buying power of the 
currency diminished and the unofficial rate of the Czechoslovak crown went from 150 to 
300 to an American dollar by March 1948.
175
 After the coup d’état of February 1948, the 
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Slovak economy moved gradually toward adjustment to the economic policy of the rest 
of Czechoslovakia. In April 1948, all enterprises employing more than fifty people were 
nationalized.
176
 Certain branches of industry – for example, food production – would be 
nationalized regardless of number of employees. Only about eight percent of the total 
volume of industry and trade remained private.
177
 The social security system, taxation, 
and land distribution would undergo reforms. It was still unclear, however, how the new 
political and economic situation would affect Slovak Jews. 
 In the first three years after the war, the Jewish population in Slovakia fluctuated 
between 28,000 and 33,000. In June 1947, Zachariah Shuster from the American Jewish 
Committee (AJC) estimated that there were 33,000 Jews in Slovakia (as opposed to 
23,000 in the Czech lands).
178
 In March 1948, the number of Slovak Jews was estimated 
at 30,000.
179
 The largest Jewish community lived in Bratislava. In April 1946, of 7,000 
Jews in Bratislava, only 1,000 lived in the city before the war.
180
 In 1948, the number of 
Bratislava’s Jews dropped to 5,000.
181
 The second largest Jewish community was in 
Košice (4,000). These two cities were, by far, the biggest Jewish centers in Slovakia. The 
third largest Jewish population was in Dunajská Streda with 771 Jewish residents, 
followed by Nitra (703), Michalovce (606), and Nové Zámky, Prešov, and Žilina with the 
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Jewish population of about 500 each.
182
 The remainder of more than a hundred Jewish 
communities in Slovakia varied in population from twenty to 300. 
Slovak Jews, by and large, were younger than Czech Jews. Leon Shapiro, whose 
reports from Eastern Europe were regularly published in the American Jewish Year-Book, 
wrote that “forty-three percent of the local Jews in the Czech lands are over fifty years of 
age, and about twenty-five percent belong to the same age group in Slovakia.”
183
 In terms 
of age, Polish and Slovak Jews were more alike than Slovak and Czech Jews. In Poland, 
in 1947, adults in their twenties and thirties constituted 27.7 percent of the Jewish 
population. Five- to nine-year-old children constituted 5.3 percent and people over sixty 
made up only 1.8 percent of the Jewish population in Poland.
184
 Slovak Jews had a 
similar demographic profile. As in Poland, Jewish survivors in Slovakia were, by and 







In the middle of 1947, the JOINT director for Czechoslovakia, Israel J. Jacobson, 
wrote, “Jews are participating to a large extent in the economic life of the country.”
186
 
And further, “Rehabilitation goes on apace in Slovakia.”
187
 In the end of 1945, the JOINT 
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estimated that every third Slovak Jew still needed and received cash relief.
188
 In April 
1947, the JOINT assisted 4,700 Jews in Slovakia, including children, youth, the sick, the 
elderly, single mothers, and the unemployed.
189
 Among the assisted, there were more 
than 1,000 people who were healthy enough to work but could not find a job.
190
 Among 
them, 450 lived in groups of two to three in small villages, in an entirely non-Jewish 
environment. Between July and October 1947 alone, 1,600 to 3,000 people still received 
monthly allowances from the JOINT.
191
 All sources agreed that Jews in eastern Slovakia 
were in the direst economic situation.  
This data shows that two-thirds of Slovak Jews found employment as early as 
1945. Since then, rates of self-support only increased. Fragmentary sources suggest that 
Slovak Jews returned to prewar patterns of employment to a greater extent than Polish 
Jews. According to JOINT reports, “a considerable number of Jews” successfully 
reestablished themselves in the textile trade after the war.
192
 They succeeded thanks to 
relatively less stringent controls in the Slovak economy, independence from the Czech 
authorities, and the absence of an over-all rationing system in Slovakia.
193
 In contrast to 
postwar Poland, Jewish tradesmen in Slovakia were the powerhouses of the local Jewish 
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Private business owners panicked when the nationalization loomed large. In 
January 1947, the government reduced the allotment of goods to the retail textile trade, 
forcing many Jewish entrepreneurs to shut down their businesses.
195
 In general, 
nationalized industry received preference in allocations, leaving “private initiative” in a 
problematic position. Starting a new business – re-qualification – was equally difficult 
since the authorities were unwilling to grant new trade licenses to individuals in 
accordance with the policy of restricting private enterprises. Cooperatives, being in line 
with the official economic ideology, had better chances of securing a license.
196
 
Overall, Slovak Jews seemed less willing to join the socialist economy than 
Polish Jews. In the end of 1945, a JOINT correspondent wrote,  
 
The social, national, and economic revolution, so far bloodless… will increase the 
difficulties of economic re-adjustment of the Jews who have survived. The Jews 
may have to think less of the restitution of their property, the panacea for their 
recovery, and think more of the complete restitution of all local rights for all Jews. 





Jews in Slovakia were not in any peculiar way “naturally” anti-cooperative or anti-
socialist. They merely had to work with the available resources. Between 1945 and 1947, 
trade and light textile industry had optimum conditions for growth and profit in Slovakia. 
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Heavy industry was mainly concentrated in the Czech lands. At the same time, in contrast 
to Poland, neither the Jewish community leaders nor the Slovak government advocated 
“the productivization” of Slovak Jews. For example, the government did not facilitate the 
supply of raw materials to Jewish cooperatives in contrast to the Polish government, 
which did so regularly.  
At first, there were even concerns that the government would not allow the 
establishment of Jewish cooperatives in Czechoslovakia. 
 
It is necessary to proceed cautiously with the organization of workers’ production 
cooperatives, which is the most difficult and least successful type of cooperative 
action. The law also prohibits strictly sectarian-cooperatives. One of the 
difficulties which the few Workers’ Productive Societies organized and being 
organized in Czechoslovakia for joiners, tailors, spinners, and weavers, is that the 
question of admission of non-Jewish members will arise with probable 
unsatisfactory results in the long run – that is accepting non-Jews which is bound 
to cause internal dissension in Slovakia, or not accepting a sufficient number of 





Neither was it certain that the government would permit the foundation of the loan bank 
intended for Jewish rehabilitation. For the most part, however, these fears turned out to 
be ungrounded. The ban on sectarian cooperatives, if legislated, was never implemented.  
 Four exclusively Jewish producer cooperatives were established in Slovakia 
starting in 1946 – two in Bratislava (with branches across Slovakia), one in Rimavská 
Sobota (south-central Slovakia), and one in Galanta (southeastern Slovakia). The first one 
established was a weaving cooperative in Rimavská Sobota. The town had a recent 
tradition of Jewish weaving. During the war, the Hungarian authorities granted a few 
Jews permission to weave cloth, which they did until deportation. After the war, Arthur 




Enyedi – one of 150 Jewish returnees in the town – decided to organize a weavers’ group 
which, he hoped, would provide economic means for Jewish survivors.
199
 In a broken-
down warehouse where prewar Jewish property had been dumped, Enyedi found several 
working looms and spinning machines. Having received a loan from the JOINT and 
permission to operate from the commissioner of industry in Bratislava, Enyedi started the 
weaving cooperative in February 1946. Members-employees had the machines in their 
homes and visited the central office to take raw material and deliver the final product. Of 
thirty-five members, thirty-one were women, mainly widows. In the first four months of 
1947, the cooperative had to temporarily close due to lack of raw materials. By April 
1949, the new management “made known its intention of changing the purely Jewish 
character of this institution.”
200
  
Following the example of Rimavská Sobota, young women and widows 
established another weaving cooperative, Rukotex, in Bratislava in March 1947.
201
 They 
all first attended the eight-to-ten week long JOINT courses, taught by two women from 
the Rimavská Sobota’s cooperative. In the Bratislava’s course, of thirty-three 
participating women, eighteen were widows.
202
 At the time of its establishment, Rukotex 
had a hundred members – almost all women – employed in four branches in Bratislava, 
Košice, Michalovce, and Žilina. In Bratislava, there was one more Jewish cooperative of 
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joiners and auto mechanics (Všeodborové Družstvo).
203
 This cooperative of fifty 
members secured work for months ahead. In 1948, many of its Jewish experts emigrated 
and were replaced by non-Jewish skilled artisans.  
Finally, a carpenters’ cooperative in Galanta, established with JOINT funds, 
employed more than 120 workers and became the second largest furniture export 
business in Slovakia.
204
 While twenty shareholders were Jewish, the majority of the 
workers were not. Jacobson wrote that this cooperative was not “able to recruit Jewish 
carpenters as few survived the concentration camps.”
205
 By the end of 1947, it lost its 
“predominantly Jewish character.”
206
 In 1948, it was nationalized, causing concerns that 




In contrast to Poland, the ORT (Organization for Rehabilitation through Training) 
entered Slovakia late (1947) and was active for a few months only, until a change of 
regime hampered its activity in 1948. In the absence of the ORT, the JOINT and the 
Zionist youth movement (the Hachsharah) ran training courses for young Slovak Jews. 
In 1947, almost 200 young people worked as apprentices in Hachsharah groups and 
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another 300 underwent apprenticeship-training while receiving financial aid.
 208
 By 
November 1946, more than 250 Jewish women in Slovakia requested participation in 
skill-training courses, sewing, weaving, and others.
209
 In February 1947, a total of forty 
women, mainly widows, attended shirt-making courses in Dunajská Streda and another 
twenty girls attended a WIZO (Women’s International Zionist Organization) sewing 
course in Košice.
210
 The Hachsharah also organized agricultural courses, for example, in 
Verekne in western Slovakia.
211
 These groups gradually decreased due to emigration to 
Palestine. 
 Graduates of the training courses were eager to join cooperatives or create their 
own workplaces. For that they needed loans. In September 1946, the Jewish credit 
cooperative (Pomocna Pokladnica), with about 700 shareholders (merchants, artisans, 
and farmers), started in Bratislava and Košice.
212
 The Pokladnica was designed to 
provide loans to “Czechoslovak citizens of Jewish faith” both as individuals and as 
registered members of cooperatives in Slovakia. It could also loan non-Jewish citizens in 
“exceptional and singular cases.”
213
 By November 1946, the Pokladnica had benefited 
                                                 
208
 Quarterly report on Czechoslovakia (December 1, 1946-March 31, 1947), submitted by the JOINT 
director for Czechoslovakia, Israel J. Jacobson, 7 July 1947, Collection 45/54, File 200, JOINT Archives. 
Also see abstract of Jacobson’s report, received on July 10, 1947, Collection 45/54, File 200, JOINT 
Archives. 
209
 Quarterly report on Czechoslovakia (July-November 1946), submitted by the JOINT director for 
Czechoslovakia, Israel J. Jacobson, 17 January 1947, Collection 45/54, File 201, JOINT Archives. 
210
 Quarterly report on Czechoslovakia (December 1, 1946-March 31, 1947), submitted by the JOINT 
director for Czechoslovakia, Israel J. Jacobson, 7 July 1947, Collection 45/54, File 200, JOINT Archives. 
Also see abstract of Jacobson’s report, received on July 10, 1947, Collection 45/54, File 200, JOINT 
Archives. 
211
 Report on the JOINT activities in Czechoslovakia between April and June 1948, prepared by the JOINT 
Budget and Research Department, 29 September 1948, Collection 45/54, File 199, JOINT Archives. 
212
 Quarterly report on Czechoslovakia (December 1, 1946-March 31, 1947), submitted by the JOINT 
director for Czechoslovakia, Israel J. Jacobson, 7 July 1947, Collection 45/54, File 200, JOINT Archives. 
213
 Decree of the Slovak commissioner of finance regarding the resumption of the activity of the Jewish 
Credit Cooperative Pomocna Pokladnica, Bratislava, 22 August 1946, Collection 45/54, File 209, JOINT 
Archives. 
 407 
about 1,500 people, mainly private Jewish entrepreneurs.
214
 During 1948, when the 
government restricted the issuance of trade licenses, the Pokladnica had less and less 
applications. By April 1949, it still existed but had ceased most of its activities.
215
 
To sum up, in Slovakia, there was a total of five Jewish cooperatives per 30,000 
Jews – four producer-cooperatives and one credit cooperative.
216
 In comparison to 200 
Jewish cooperatives per 100,000 Jews in Poland, the Slovak Jewish cooperative system 
seemed negligible. A ratio of 6,000 people to a cooperative in Slovakia versus 500 people 
to a cooperative in Poland left no doubt that the Jewish cooperative system in Slovakia 
did not measure up to the Polish counterpart. This discrepancy had at least two sources. 
First, the Jewish organizations, supported by the Polish government, put a great effort to 
push forward the idea of productivization of Polish Jews as a remedy for antisemitism – a 
panacea for all the ills of Polish-Jewish relations. In contrast to the Czechoslovak 
authorities, the Polish government not only allowed but even encouraged the creation of 
sectarian, purely Jewish cooperatives. It also created the office of commissioner for the 
productivization of the Jewish population, solely for the purpose of integrating Jews into 
the Polish economy. Second, the unique nature of Lower Silesia, a region without an 
equivalent in Slovakia, made the perfect milieu for Jewish cooperative engagement in 
Poland. Silesia buzzed with the excitement of new settlement, “pioneering,” and the 
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novelty of everything, including new forms of economic endeavor.
217
 It was also a highly 
industrialized region with all branches of industrial production. Slovakia, by and large, 
lagged behind the Czech lands and western Poland in industrialization. Conditions 
changed in 1948, when the authorities took steps toward heavier industrialization of the 
region. By that time, however, it was too late for Jewish cooperatives to benefit since 
nationalization had erased their ethnic character.  
Although, by the end of 1947, the majority of Slovak Jews were self-supporting, 
individuals and institutions still required financial aid. In contrast to Poland, the 
Bratislava government did not participate in Jewish relief. Thus, American Jewish relief 
organizations took over organizing aid for Slovak Jews. The JOINT was the most active 
aid organization in Slovakia. Until the mid 1947, it fully sponsored an old people’s home 
and a Jewish hospital in Bratislava, orphanages in Bratislava and Nové Mesto, TB 
sanatoria, as well as a convalescent home for the rehabilitation of over sixty children in 
the Tatra mountains (Villa Vlasta). In 1948, the need for funding decreased. As a result of 
heightened emigration, some of the sponsored institutions were liquidated (Villa Vlasta) 
or nationalized (the Bratislava Jewish hospital). 
 
Family, Education, and Language 
 
As in Poland, the return to normality among Slovak Jews involved building a new 
family to replace the lost one. The search for missing loved ones continued into 1947 but 
as chances of finding relatives grew slimmer, the willingness to build a new family grew 
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 The following matrimonial ads in the Jewish newspaper Tribúna (Tribune) in 
January 1948 were symptomatic of this: “Fifty-five-year-old lady, well-to-do, will marry 
an intelligent Israelite,” or “Forty-five-year-old widow with business in the countryside 
will marry an intelligent man, businessman if possible.”
219
 In the same column of ads, 
Eva Mayerova and Rudolf Elefant invited all relatives and friends for their wedding.
220
 
Regardless of age, Jewish survivors looked for partners to beat loneliness; to move on 
and have a life as normal as they imagined “a normal life” should be. As a result, in the 
first quarter of 1948, Slovak Jews had in their midst “a large group of married people up 
to the age of forty and a large number of newly born children.”
221
 
Without any data on intermarriage, I cannot assess how widespread mixed 
marriages were in Slovakia. Testimonies left evidence of interethnic dating.
222
 How many 
of these relationships led to marriage remains an open question. Neither can I estimate 
the number of applications for name change. There is no doubt that both intermarriages 
and changes of names were not isolated incidents but assessment of their prevalence 
requires more research. In the state archives in Nitra, in the files from 1945, I found four 
applications for change of name of Maxmilian Weiner, Karol Füredy, Adriena Júlia 
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Neumanova, and Eugen Rosner.
223
 Respectively, they changed their names into the 
“Slovak sounding” Milan Vinický, Karol Fedor, Adriena Júlia Novák, and Eugen 
Kubin.
224
 The author of A Holocaust Odyssey changed his name from Jozef Kornfeld to 
Jozef Kalina – “a common Slovak surname” – in the summer of 1945. The book's 
epilogue gives a hint into Kalina’s motivations,  
  
He [Kalina] wanted to dissociate himself from its German derivation. He wanted 
nothing to do with anything German. Nor did he wish to carry a name that had 
drawn to him so much unwelcome attention. In the few months since returning to 
Prešov from his Holocaust odyssey, when an acquaintance recognized him in the 
street and called Kornfeld…; when he went to government offices on business, 
and the clerk called out “Kornfeld;”…the fear and threat he had endured for so 
long jolted him again. The war was over but Jozef Kornfeld’s wounds were still 
open and raw. The change of name would help him to begin a new identity in a 
new life. Joseph Kalina remained in Czechoslovakia until the Communists came 




If, indeed, these were the reasons that pushed Kornfeld to become Kalina, then there was 
hardly any difference between the motivations of Polish and Slovak Jews. Both wanted to 
become “invisible” in their respective societies. The assumption of “Polish” or “Slovak 
sounding” names offered illusive protection from hostility.   
Indeed, “invisibility” was helpful at public schools. There was no system of 
Jewish schools in Slovakia comparable to the one run by the CKŻP in Poland. There 
were too few Jewish children and the state reform of education allowed only public 
schools to operate.
226
 Also, like Poland, Slovakia lacked Jewish secular institutions of 
higher education; hence a relatively large number of Jewish students decided to attend 
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public high schools and colleges. At the end of November 1945, 300 students attended 
secondary schools and colleges and almost 270 received JOINT grants in the spring of 
1947.
227
 In 1945, the JOINT did not expect that the state would grant aid to Jewish 
students in Slovakia (in contrast to the Czech lands).
228
 Indeed, by the spring of 1947, 
only Jewish students “without any resources” were given governmental aid (of ninety-
seven students with JOINT funding, ten received additional aid from the government). 
“Resources,” however, were understood in a very peculiar way. For example, property 
which had not been restituted yet but belonged to parents of a student before the war was 
considered a “resource.”
229
 Nonetheless, with JOINT’s help, Jewish students attended 
non-Jewish high schools and colleges and received useful certificates. As in the Czech 
lands, Jewish students in Slovakia were mostly interested in medicine and engineering.
230
 
These students were mainly native speakers of Slovak. Similar to the CKŻP in 
Poland, the official language of the country was also the official language of the two 
major Jewish organizations in Slovakia – the neolog ÚSŽNO and the secular SRP. The 
ÚSŽNO’s weekly newspaper Tribúna was published in Slovak.
231
 By July 1948, Tribúna 
had a circulation of 4,000, of which a few hundred went for free to non-Jews as a part of 
the project to combat antisemitism in Slovak society.
232
 ÚSŽNO and SRP leaders were 
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particularly sensitive about Jews speaking Slovak “on the street.” Aware of common 
accusations against Jews – that they spoke languages other than Slovak and were disloyal 
to the state – the ÚSŽNO and the SRP attempted to caution all Slovak Jews in this matter. 
They sent out a circular to Jewish communities across the country, requesting that “their 
official bodies use the language of the state and that Jews speak Slovak in public, so as 
not to provide any grounds for complaints.”
233
  
In southern Slovakia, many Jews (some neologs and orthodox) spoke Magyar 
natively or as a second language which, as I described before, drew a lot of criticism from 
non-Jews. Some spoke Slovak with a strong “foreign” accent. Gottschalk wrote that 
many Jews did not speak Slovak at home since their parent(s), for example, knew only 
Yiddish, “as happens very often.”
234
 That may have hampered the confidence of one’s 
spoken Slovak in public. A minority also spoke German natively or as a second language. 
However, it seemed that accusers of Slovak Jews – alleged speakers of German in public 
– most often confused Yiddish with German. Overall, I speculate that, in comparison to 
Polish Jews, Slovak Jews were less linguistically assimilated. There was one more 
indication of this: the large number of Orthodox religious communities that were mainly 
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The Jews of Slovakia are… more segregated from the general population than 
their brethren in Bohemia-Moravia. They live in special districts, many of them 
use Yiddish as their language, some are dressed in the traditional garb of Eastern 





The sheer number of religious congregations in proportion to the population as well as 
the prominent position of the chief rabbi of Slovakia, Armin (Abba) Frieder, in the 
leadership of Slovak Jews, spoke to the predominantly religious orientation of Jews in 
this country, much more so than their Polish counterparts.
236
 According to data gathered 
by the Slovak government, of the 25,000 “faithful of Jewish denomination,” 15,000 
“perhaps registered Jewish denomination” (asi hlási k židovskej konfesii) by February 
1946.
237
 Orthodox leaders argued that neologs represented only ten percent of the Jewish 
faithful population.
238
 The remaining 5,000 of 30,000 were thus secular Jews. 
In March 1948, there were 126 Jewish religious congregations per 30,000 Jews in 
Slovakia while in Poland there were only eighty congregations per 100,000 Jews – more 
than one and a half as many for a population three times as small.
239
 It should be noted, 
however, that these numbers illuminate not only the higher reliance on communal 




 Vojtech Winterstein, a Zionist, was the accepted secular leader of the Jewish community Slovakia. 
237
 “Počet veriacich židovskej konfesie… po oslobodení Slovenska následkom deportácie ze slovenskej 
fašistickej éry klesnul približne na 25,000, z ktorých sa asi 15,000 hlási k židovskej konfesii….” Memo from 
the presidium of the commissioner of education in Bratislava to the Office of the Chairman of the Board of 
Commissioners in Bratislava concerning the orthodox Jewish population in Slovakia, 20 February 1946, 




 Report on Czechoslovakia between January 1 and March 31, 1948, submitted by the director for the 
JOINT in Czechoslovakia, Julius Levine, March 1948, Collection 45/54, File 199, JOINT Archives. 
Authors of a detailed report on cash relief from the beginning of 1946 counted 180 Jewish communities all 
over Czechoslovakia. See attachment (data from November 1945) to the report prepared by Harold Trobe 
and attached to the letter to Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia Zdenek Fierlinger, 16 January 1946, 
Collection 45/54, File 201, JOINT Archives. In February 1949, there were only forty-one congregations 
left in Slovakia. See Frieder, To Deliver Their Souls: The Struggle of a Young Rabbi during the Holocaust, 
256. For Poland, see Waszkiewicz, Kongregacja Wyznania Mojżeszowego na Dolnym Śląsku na Tle 
Polityki Wyznaniowej Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej 1945-1968, 52. 
 414 
institutions and the more religious needs of Slovak Jews but, more importantly, the 
greater dispersal of Slovak Jews, and thus their general sense of security. In contrast, 
fearing violence, Polish Jews tended to avoid dispersal and concentrated in larger 
numbers in fewer places.  
Bratislava and Košice were the two main Jewish religious centers in postwar 
Slovakia. In Bratislava, the orthodox Jewish community started its services shortly after 
liberation. The neologs soon followed. Five prayer houses were opened and two 
synagogues held services.
240
 The orthodox community hired a Jewish teacher for 
religious education. There were three shochtim, a chazan, and several rabbis.
241
 
Gottschalk wrote that of 150 rabbis from before the war, only fifteen were alive and 
seven were still active in Slovakia.
242
 Despite this shortage, in places like Dunajská 
Streda (known as Small Jerusalem before the war) and Nové Zámky, Jewish religious life 
apparently “flourished" after the war.
243
 
Agudat Israel opened two Beth Jacob homes in Bratislava and Košice for 
approximately 90 to 100 girls.
244
 The Beth Jacob in Bratislava organized lessons in 
Slovak, “since most of them [students] had never attended Slovak schools. In this way 
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they will be able to secure permits to re-enter the economic life of the country.”
245
 
Mizrachi (religious Zionists) opened a children’s home in Košice in September 1946. 
More than forty children between the ages of eight and fourteen lived in the home by 
November 1946.
246
 Orthodox Slovak Jews also maintained two Talmudic colleges – 
Yeshivas – in Bratislava and Košice.
247
 Both were closed by May 1948, following the 
emigration of “virtually the entire student body.”
248
 As for elementary religious education, 
every community was responsible for its own schooling. The greatest problem was a lack 
of children to teach.
249
 The congregations also struggled with a shortage of instructors in 
prayer, Hebrew, and religious subjects.
250
 The ÚSŽNO tried to help by publishing a 
monthly magazine for the youth, entitled Ha-Lapid (The Torch), which focused on one 
religious subject per month.
251
 
Religious communities across Slovakia were surprisingly self-supporting. In 
March 1948, of 126 congregations, sixteen financed their activities in full while the 
remainder relied on help only periodically.
252
 By and large, the Slovak Jewish 
congregations did relatively well, covering the costs of most religious, cultural, and 
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administrative functions (except for welfare, which was covered by the JOINT and the 
ÚSŽNO).  
 
[They derived] revenues from their kashrut programs, from shochtim, from the 
sale of kosher meats, from collections during the holidays, and from the sale of 
seats in the synagogues. Funds were also raised at weddings, births, and funerals. 




That also meant that the economic standing of the congregations gradually improved. In 
1948, the director of the JOINT, Julius Levine, wrote that ”a good percentage of our 
Slovakian Jewry were able to get back into profitable businesses shortly after the 
liberation, and Gemeinde [Jewish congregations] support was re-established…”
254
 The 
decrease in the number of public kosher kitchens also showed that more and more 
individuals ran self-sufficient households. In the spring of 1946, communities maintained 
more than fifty kosher kitchens.
255
 By June 1946, twenty of them closed down as “people 
in the communities developed their own facilities to cook for themselves.”
256
  
Conflicts were another mark of normality. As there was no danger, Jewish 
religious communities could afford disagreement. Orthodox and neolog congregations 
had been in constant conflict for the first two years after the war. This clash stemmed 
mainly from the refusal of orthodox leaders to accept the neolog ÚSŽNO and Rabbi 
Armin Frieder as the representative of Slovak Jews. Such representation would have 
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given the ÚSŽNO the right to manage the financial resources of the whole community, 
including the property of the orthodox. In the orthodox view, Neolog Judaism was first, 
in the minority and, second, it was an “a-religious group,” which disregarded orthodox 
religious laws and tended toward total assimilation.
257
 The orthodox congregation also 
refuted the idea that they were somehow obliged to join neologs due to the dramatic 
decrease in the Jewish population. The orthodox Jewish communities of Bratislava and 
Košice openly refused to accept the ÚSŽNO as their representative until its composition 
was more reflective of Slovak Jewry.
258
 Although neologs had more leverage due to 
better contacts with the Slovak government, it was orthodox Jews who constituted the 
majority of Slovak Jewry. According to Jacobson’s estimates from the end of 1946, 
seventy percent of Slovak Jews could “be classified as members of Orthodox Jewry.”
259
 
In the beginning of 1947, orthodox and neologs finally unified within the ÚSŽNO. 
The board of the ÚSŽNO now consisted of nine orthodox (Agudat Israel, Mizrachi, and 
General Orthodox) and nine neolog members.
260
 Emanuel Frieder, brother of Rabbi 
Armin Frieder, took over chairmanship in the ÚSŽNO.
261
 The Board of Orthodox Rabbis 
secured sole authority in “the matters of kashrut, personal and marital status, and 
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 From that point, the ÚSŽNO indeed came to represent all Slovak Jews. The 
unification, however, did not put an end to the quarrels. One example was the Jewish 
hospital in Bratislava. Created before the war by the orthodox Chevra Kadisha, the 
hospital was now entirely controlled by the orthodox camp.
263
 The ÚSŽNO was 
suspicious of the hospital’s practices, including the selective picking of doctors permitted 
to use the hospital for paid patients. That, apparently, stirred strong competition among 
Jewish doctors in the city. The conflict was nowhere near resolution in March 1948, 




Slovak Normality Interrupted 
  
 In the end of December 1947, AJC representative in Czechoslovakia Milton Winn 
wrote,  
  
[A]ll hands agree that the entire situation here has become more tense. This is not 
strictly speaking a Jewish matter. It is a reflex of the uneasy situation in which all 
Europe, and particularly this portion of it finds itself as a result of the tensions 
between the Great Powers. Everybody here feels insecure, and all are wondering 
what is going to happen next. In the middle and upper classes of all groups, 
religious and otherwise, there is a rather panicky feeling which rose to a rather 
high pitch after the failure of the London Conference… Now they feel that 
inevitably Czecho-Slovakia will suffer in the intensification of the polarization 
between East and West. To this overall feeling there is added the rather puzzled 
feeling that domestic problems have reached a critical stage. The food situation 
has tightened ominously… People in all walks of life are greatly concerned about 
what will happen in the elections next May. Those who have conservative 
leanings are more worried about what will happen to them and their fortunes or 
businesses in the event of a decisive victory for the Communist Party. A 
substantial portion of these express a desire to leave the country.
265
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In February 1948, the Communist Party indeed took power in a non-violent coup d’état in 
Prague. The event marked a radical change for all, Jews and non-Jews alike. But Jews 
seemed particularly worried. Levine reported a month after the February events, 
 
It is interesting here to note that daily during the recent political events, we had 
people express themselves in effect – “This is so like what happened to us before 
the German invasion, and it is so frightening.” And there was an overwhelming 
feeling of vital changes taking place over which the individual had no control. 
While the fear of general antisemitism has lessened considerably, this has been 
exchanged for a fear of imminent war, and the result is an intensified desire on the 
part of the Jewish population, and considerable of the non-Jewish population, to 
leave Europe. Everywhere the conversation turns quickly to the possibility of 
emigrating – where and under what conditions becomes less important than 





 “Hysteria” was a term often used to describe the mood among Slovak Jews after 
February 1948 – like “panic” came to define Polish Jews after the Kielce pogrom. 
“Hysterical fear of war” and “anxiety that seems to run rampant” were to describe the 
“reality” of the Slovak Jews. If indeed Slovak Jews experienced these feelings, it was not 
merely from fear of the Third World War, although admittedly this fear was not alien to 
East Europeans at the time. More importantly, Slovak Jews responded to a complex 
political as well as social and economic change, or the potential thereof. The fear of 
borders closing was not ungrounded. Indeed, passports were more and more difficult to 
secure, a heavy taxation on the resources of emigrants was imposed, as well as tighter 
restrictions on property allowed out of the country. Rumors spread that the government 
had started punishing retroactively for actions which a year or two before had not been 
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 Levine wrote that even those Jews who “succeeded in getting key 
positions in the public administrative set-up” were “overly-conscientious in their political 
acceptance due to their own insecurity,” fearful of what the near future might bring.
268
 
Nationalization, growing food shortages, tightening government control over 
economic endeavors, prices, and distribution of commodities, and government plans to 
make work compulsory did not encourage staying either.
269
 Especially those who lost 
their businesses – their sources of income – were eager to leave. These ex-entrepreneurs 
were not keen to adjust to the industrial nationalized world – to a new socialist normality. 
Their departure meant the weakening of the small Jewish religious congregations which 
depended on their wealth and interest. As Levine reported, “Rapidly community interest 
is disintegrating, and this is more evident daily. A visit to community leaders these days 
will find the conversation directed almost invariably to emigration planning. The 
situation has reached a fairly hysterical pitch…”
270
  
Finally, the “traditional” pushes for Jewish emigration – anti-Jewish violence in 
Bratislava in August 1948 and the overwhelming popularity of Zionism – were also 
present. Gottschalk claimed that ninety-five percent of Slovak Jews were Zionists.
271
 
Although possibly exaggerated, his claim illustrated the overwhelming political tendency 
among Slovak Jews. When Communist activists purged and replaced Zionists in Prague 
after the coup d’état of 1948, Zionist leaders in Slovakia remained relatively unaffected. 
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There were simply not enough Jewish Communists “to act and to take over” after the 
Zionists.
272
 As in Poland after the war, Zionists became the most powerful, the most 
popular, and the best organized political movement among both religious and secular 
Jews in Slovakia. Jewish leaders Rabbi Armin Frieder, his brother Emanuel, and Vojtech 
Winterstein were all ardent Zionists. After the establishment of the State of Israel, the 
ÚSŽNO worked hand in hand with the Zionist Organization in Bratislava to organize 
mass aliyah from Slovakia.
273
 The Czechoslovak and Slovak governments viewed these 
activities favorably and did not interfere.  
In the first half of 1948, Czech Jews were particularly anxious to leave and, in 
fact, emigrated; “Unpredictability and tension prevailed.”
274
 Between January and March 
1948, 1,893 new passport applications were submitted in Prague and about 700 people 
left the Czech lands. In Bratislava, in the same period, 466 applications came in and 142 
people left. Between April and June 1948, 1,238 emigrated from the Czech lands and 
more than 300 left Slovakia.
275
 The trend was definitely the same in both regions but the 
absolute numbers were four to five times greater in the Czech lands than in Slovakia. 
Overall, between January and September 1948, more than 6,000 new applications came 
in and a total of 3,600 left Czechoslovakia.
276
 In April 1949, about 20,000 Jews were 
expected to leave Czechoslovakia within a few months.
277
 By July 1949, of 126 Jewish 
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communities in Slovakia, only twenty-five were left.
278
 At the time, of the Jewish 
population of 33,000, 14,000 were left and another 10,000 were registered to leave.
279
 At 
a rate of 2,500 people per month, it seemed that the Czechoslovak Jewish community 
would cease to exist within three months.
280
 And, indeed, in the end of 1949 only a few 
thousand Jews remained in the country. 
The year 1948 also marked heightened anxiety among Polish Jews. At the end of 
1948, they became more and more eager to leave when the elimination of “private 
initiative” – nationalization – seemed inescapable.
281
 Shop-owners and artisans, who 
were not registered in cooperatives, were the most eager to leave, as they were “…not 
able, from a psychological point of view, to get used to the new order and new social 
conditions which are now in Poland.”
282
 There was also fear that the borders would close 
for good soon. Of the community of 100,000, about 80,000 Polish Jews were still in the 
country by May 1949 and 60,000 by the mid 1950.
283
 Despite this apparent similarity, the 
post-1948 emigration did much more damage and marked much more radical change for 
Jews in Slovakia than in Poland. The Slovak Jewish population almost ceased to exist, 
losing eighty percent of its members, whereas the Polish Jewish community decreased 
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 In all of Czechoslovakia, there was the total of 20,000 Jews left (14,000 in Slovakia and 6,000 in the 












In the aftermath of the war, the desire to emigrate was common and Zionism was 
the most popular political and social movement among both Polish and Slovak Jews. This 
common longing to leave could be explained not only by antisemitism and political 
change, but also by the ubiquity of ruins – reminders of the trauma. After eighteen 
months in Poland, the JOINT director for Poland, Bein, wrote in March 1948, 
  
When I look out of my window in Warszawa I see only ruins. I have become so 
accustomed to that sight in Poland that it would be unusual to see something else. 
Every Jew looking out of his mental window sees a graveyard, a cemetery, ruins. 
For example, I am now working on the visa of a lady. Although she does not 
know it, her husband tells me that she awakens every night and screams. This 
woman was actually five times at the Gestapo headquarters in Poland and if they 
would have discovered that she was a Jew she would have been shot on the spot. 
She must leave Poland because she will never be a normal person until she leaves 
the country. There are some musts like that. Other people want to join relatives 
abroad. Other people want to leave an area which they feel they might not be able 




Similarly, in Slovakia, Gottschalk estimated (based on questionnaires sent by the JOINT 
to all Jewish communities) that seventy-five percent of Slovak Jews wanted to emigrate 
and sixty percent wanted to go to Palestine in April 1946.
285
 A year earlier, a JOINT 
correspondent Viteles wrote,  
 
A considerable proportion of the youth (under thirty) wished to emigrate, 
preferably to Palestine, because there was no future in Czechoslovakia. And there 
are also an appreciable number of the older groups (over thirty) who for 
psychological reasons, pride [?], that is a feeling that they are no longer welcome 
in Czechoslovakia and in Europe, also wish to emigrate. It would be too simple 
and probably not entirely accurate to attribute this to over-sensitiveness or to an 
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intensification of the inferiority complex. The desire to live and the ability to 
accommodate … is strong among those who survived. … The effects of the Nazi 
regime on the Jews are deep and difficult to analyze and understand. The replies 
recorded from the same people to the same questions but on different dates vary 
and are influenced by the external conditions on the day when the questions were 
asked. For the above reasons it is impossible to estimate the number of Jews who 




Although other correspondents agreed that “most of the people one spoke to in Slovakia 
stated [that] they would like to emigrate” and that eastern Slovakia presented the direst 
conditions, hundreds of Slovak Jews applied for “reconstruction loans” at JOINT offices 
in 1946.
287
 An explanation was that while emigration facilities were not yet available, 
future émigrés wanted to earn a living instead of relying on welfare. Perhaps, however, 
some of them were not entirely sure if they would, in fact, leave the country.  
In March 1948, Bein gave insight into the motivations of those Jews who decided 
to remain in Poland,  
  
Who wants to remain in Poland? First of all, those who feel that the only regime 
that protected the Jews as such was the regime of democratic forces, so that they 
would not have to suffer as Jews. Second, there are some people who are 
established in Poland and who have a small apartment and are working and they 
do not want to go off on another emigration. Then there are some like a boy I 
know who was twice in Siberia and who is tired and wants to stay. There are 
others whose age is a handicap; others who feel that it is impossible to get 
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In 1947, violent antisemitism was no longer a push for emigration. In August 1947, 
Ezekiel, a consultant of the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds in New 
York, speculated that only “a distinct minority among Polish Jews as a whole” still felt 
insecure and wanted to leave.
289
 A year later, a JOINT correspondent wrote,  
 
I met many Jews who are feeling strongly Jewish and who are not Communists. 
They are decided to stay in Poland. They are fatalists from one side and tired from 
the second one. They are settled here, know the language, have good jobs 
[“comfortable life”], and what is most important are already too tired to begin a 





Importantly, those Jews who decided to stay imagined the possibility of normality; that 
one could build a normal life in Poland as well as in Slovakia – of course, within the 
paradigm of normality of those days.  
For Polish Jews, in comparison to Slovak Jews, normality began later, lasted 
longer, and consisted of “abnormal” highs and lows. Between liberation and the post-
Kielce panic in the summer of 1946, migrations and ongoing repatriation from the USSR, 
insecurity caused by persistent anti-Jewish violence and civil war, administrative chaos, 
and the general persistence of material and psychological damage permeated daily life 
and hampered attempts to build stability. Nothing in the environment reflected a 
peacetime normality; it was as if the war had not yet ended. In the spring of 1947, when 
panic after the Kielce pogrom subsided and the state clamped down on antisemitism, 
those Polish Jews who stayed slowly balanced their lives. Places like Kraków ceased to 
be mere transit-points between the USSR and the west of Poland or Europe. Nineteen 
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forty seven was possibly the most “stable” year, especially in western Poland. In places 
like Lower Silesia, it seemed that Jews not only built individual lives, but flourished as a 
cultural and social community.  
Upon his return to the United States in 1948, Bein declared, “The Jewish 
population of Poland has made ‘amazing strides’ towards re-establishment, self-support 
and cultural expression in the past year and a half [1946 and the first half of 1947].”
291
 
The AJC representative, Shuster, was impressed with Polish Jewry’s “tremendous vitality, 
their genuine and deep-rooted Jewishness… [Polish Jews being] a reservoir of Jewish 
energy [my emphasis].”
292
 After a brief tour in Poland, the director of the Central 
European Information Bureau JOINT in Paris, Charles Malamuth, said,  
 
In the field of social welfare and rural economy more has been accomplished in 
Poland than in any other country occupied by the Hitlerites. Welfare institutions 
here have higher standards and practices than that of similar institutions in other 
countries…. On the whole… the Jews in Poland are better off than those in 




JOINT Director for America Moses Leavitt and Director for Europe Joseph Schwartz 
both praised Polish Jews’ achievements, especially in Lower Silesia. Schwartz said, “In 
none of the European countries have I seen such progress in work after two postwar years 
as in Poland – economy, social welfare, children’s care, cultural work…”
294
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In Slovakia, there was no place like Lower Silesia where Jews would be 
“enthusiastic” about the possibility of establishing normal life in the country. For 
example, a JOINT correspondent wrote about Prešov in eastern Slovakia in April 1946,  
 
A visit to Prešov was made on April 29, various communal buildings; synagogue, 
mikve, kitchen, etc. were visited. Later that afternoon a meeting was held with the 
leaders of the Jewish community and a general discussion was held regarding the 
various needs and problems of the community. It was the consensus of opinion 
that only about half the people had received their polit. spolahlivost (political 
reliability) and that antisemitism was current and that the future position of Jews 
was untenable. It appeared that most of them felt that young people would leave 
and that the older ones would stay on. They did not feel it was necessary to repair 




This sentiment was widespread among Jewish communities in eastern and central Poland. 
Despite that, the term “return to normality” seemed more applicable for Slovak Jews who 
perhaps never reached the highs of Lower Silesian Jews, but neither did they reach the 
lows of pre-July 1946 in Poland.  
For Slovak Jews, the return to normality began earlier but also ended earlier. 
While Polish Jews struggled until late 1946, Slovak Jews seemed to have had enough 
stability to gradually build their lives from the end of 1945 onwards. Jewish migration 
and repatriation never reached the magnitude of 120,000 Polish Jewish repatriates from 
the USSR, and there was no civil war imbuing daily life with a constant sense of 
insecurity. Antisemitism in Slovakia and related violence never became sufficient 
motivation for Slovak Jews to emigrate because the intimidation never reached a tipping 
point similar to the Kielce pogrom in Poland. Kielce was the last anti-Jewish outbreak of 
the 1940s – a watershed moment which caused massive Jewish emigration and catalyzed 
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the government crackdown on antisemitism, effectively halting anti-Jewish attacks. In 
Slovakia, anti-Jewish riots did not stop until 1948 and yet, since these were mainly 
isolated events, they did not affect daily life to a degree that would warrant panicked 
emigration. Only after the political coup d’état in February 1948, did Slovak Jews enter a 
phase of intense fright, comparable to the mood among Polish Jews after Kielce. The fear 
of terrorization and nationalization pushed thousands of Jews to leave Slovakia, 
decisively ending the Jewish presence in this country. By that time, the majority of Polish 
Jews were settled enough and integrated enough into the Polish economy, culture, and 
politics to stay despite the political transformation.  
What did normality mean for Jews after the war in the two countries? What was a 
normal life for a Jew in postwar Poland and Slovakia? It was mainly a city life (with the 
exception of a few hundred Jewish farmers in western Poland). In central and eastern 
Poland, there were hardly any Jewish residents in villages and small towns although there 
were locations like Niepołomice (Kraków province) where five Jews lived, Chocznia 
near Wadowice with one Jew, or Sanki near Chrzanów with two old sisters.
296
 Jews 
mainly concentrated in big cities, still constituting only a small part of the entire city 
population – 6,000 in Kraków or 17,000 in Łodź.297 Considering that fifty percent of 
Polish Jews lived in Lower Silesia, Polish Jews were Lower Silesian Jews. In Slovakia, 
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considering the larger number of Jewish communities, the concentration in a few 
localities was smaller. Still, Jacobson reported in July 1947, “The influx into the cities of 
Jews from the Slovakian villages where but a few Jewish families lived before the war 
and now the survivors either do not wish or are afraid to remain, has further aggravated 
the housing shortage in the larger communities.”
298
 
Normal life after the war was the life of a person suffering from tuberculosis or 
other disease contracted during the war. It was a life in which individuals had to come to 
terms with recent traumatic experiences, with personal and material loss. Normal life was 
a life without extended family but, perhaps, with a new spouse (sometimes non-Jewish), 
and perhaps, if age allowed, a new baby on the way.
299
 Normal postwar life focused on 
new friendships (old friends most certainly perished) and communal bonding – a 
replacement for the families lost. Spouses and friends were mainly Jewish or mixed, 
rarely exclusively non-Jewish. Both in Poland and Slovakia, there was a drive to create a 
Jewish community in friendly cooperation with non-Jews but separate nonetheless. 
Radical assimilation was not a popular solution yet; instead a double life – Jewish 
socially and “non-Jewish” at work – was the norm. Normal life was lived in the language 
of the country, although Yiddish sustained a significant presence in both Poland and 
Slovakia. Normal life after the war was also marked by making a living with the means 
available. Black marketeering and street peddling were one extreme while employment in 
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heavy industry was the other. The majority found employment in cooperatives or state 
institutions (Poland) and trade or small textile business (Slovakia). 
In the two countries, increased political intervention into private life became 
normal as well. A reading of the memoirs of Maria Dąbrowska, a renowned Polish writer, 
gives the impression that politics crept into her home relatively late, in January 1947, but 
did so nonetheless.
300
 Until then, Dąbrowska’s thoughts were mostly detached from high 
politics. She was concerned with Warszawa’s ruins, loss of loved ones, and 
reestablishment of her professional life. This capacity to ignore politics in the first two 
years after the war was not only restricted to the literati. Indeed, in that period, an average 
citizen who was not involved in state administration or political opposition could forget 
about the higher echelons and focus on the day-to-day struggles. In the late spring of 
1946, before the referendum, the first signs of the invasion of politics into the private 
sphere, so notorious in the coming decade, were seen. From the elections of January 1947, 
politics became impossible to ignore; its ubiquity became normality. By 1948, both the 
Polish and Slovak governments significantly expanded the sphere of their intervention 
into citizens’ lives, making it normality and routine. The nationalization of production, 
education, and culture, all seemed to have become “natural” and “normal.” 
 To sum up, the Jewish return to normality was exceptionally hard, even in 
comparison with other peoples of Eastern Europe. Jews could not rely on the assistance 
of better situated relatives in Poland nor Slovakia. Neither could they reach to reserves in 
cash or property. But despite that and thanks to an institutional network of aid and 
individual resourcefulness they managed to rebuild normal lives within the available 
frameworks of normality. They managed to find partners, make friendships, get jobs, and 
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build communities. At times, they did that in cooperation with non-Jewish spouses, 
neighbors, strangers and friends, but more often without them. The government was more 
helpful in these endeavors in Poland than in Slovakia. But even in Slovakia, Jews 
managed to succeed as professionals and members of the larger community. In other 















After a war, ethnic minorities seem to rely on the state more than usual. The 
Talmudic rule – dina de malchuta dina (the law of the land is the law) – never seems 
more vital for Jews than in the face of destruction and endangerment. State protection 
becomes a necessity and loyalty seems the best way of ensuring it. After the Second 
World War, the two Jewish communities in Poland and Slovakia pledged loyalty to their 
respective governments, manifesting their willingness to oblige the powers-that-be. In 
this, they carried on the long tradition of Jewish communal reliance on the state as the 
sole protector against a hostile environment. 
However, the benefits of this tradition depend on government reciprocity. The 
Slovak government refused to view Jews as a distinct subject – a special victim of the 
Nazi regime. In contrast, the Polish government defined Jews as a group of particular 
interest immediately after liberation. As discussed elsewhere, the different attitudes of the 
two central administrations stemmed mainly from the different legacies of the war and 
the different political stances they shaped. Also, since the interwar period, Jewishness 
had been a stronger category of identity in Poland than in Slovakia. In Poland, for 
example, a significant segment of society considered the Jews – as Jews – a “threatening 
other” of the nation. In Slovakia, this role was ascribed to the Magyars. In addition, the 
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Slovak administration (like the Czechoslovak government before the war) used language 
as an important criterion for the determination of nationality. As a result, Magyar-
speaking Jews were categorized as Magyars (as before the war).   
These two different approaches had far-reaching consequences for the overall 
postwar experience of Jews in the two countries. The Polish state was much more 
protective of Jews than the Slovak. In Slovakia, the flexible categorization of Jews as 
Magyars and lack of a definitive government stance on Jewish survivors made them 
vulnerable to anti-Magyar discrimination. Although German-speaking Jews in the 
Recovered Territories also suffered discrimination, they could count on state protection 
and, usually, a positive outcome in a conflict. For example, the notorious confiscation of 
landed property endured by the Magyar-speaking Jews in Slovakia did not happen to 
German-speaking Jews in Poland. The authors of an annual report of the JOINT noted in 
1947, 
 
With respect to the restitution of property, it is worthy of note that the Polish 
Government authorities make no distinctions whatsoever with regard to Jewish 
claims. On the contrary, as regards property of former German citizens, which 
ordinarily is taken over by the Government, an exception is made in the case of 
former German citizens belonging to those groups who were persecuted by the 






Due to the fact that the treatment of Jews in Slovakia was not regulated, their fate 
depended more on the whims of low rank officials than the fate of their counterparts in 
Poland. From the Jewish perspective, the seemingly omnipotent national committees 
made the most vital decisions concerning citizenship and property. As indicated 
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elsewhere, material interests seemed to have been a primary motivation for these 
officials. Sources suggest that bribery worked. Restitution in Slovakia offers a case study 
for this kind of behavior. Having said that, ethnic prejudices of bureaucrats should not be 
underestimated. One of the main complaints of Slovak Jewish organizations was that the 
cadres hardly changed after the collapse of the fascist regime. It happened (though 
difficult to assess how often) that wartime administrators remained in their posts after the 
war. I also speculate that proportionally fewer Jews were employed in public offices in 
Slovakia than in Poland. 
Since the central government in Bratislava was much less accommodating of 
Jews, Jewish leaders in Slovakia had to engage in “negotiating justice” on a scale 
incomparable to Polish Jews. They had to fiercely negotiate their standing vis-à-vis the 
state administration, without legal protection from the central government. Restitution 
law, for example, was not merely top-down legislation in Slovakia. Frequent letters and 
reports from Jewish leadership to appropriate authorities suggest active Jewish 
participation in political debate surrounding the legislation and its implementation. They 
requested, appealed, protested, and recommended with regard to restitution and fought 
against confiscation of their property. They remained in constant, and often tense, 
dialogue with the legislative and executive power in Bratislava, as well as with the 
National Assembly and the relevant ministers in Prague. However, the extent to which 
Slovak Jews affected the final decision-making and the content of law remains debatable. 
These bureaucratic struggles also showed that “proper” ethnicity played a 
paramount role in public life. Ethnicity became a central lens through which a dominant 
national community strove to recreate its shattered inner hierarchy and outer boundaries. 
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Interestingly, the state administrations revised criteria of ethnicity by adding an 
experiential factor: behavior during the war. The fight against fascism and loyalty made 
“Poles” and “Slovaks” while betrayal made ”Germans” and “Magyars.” Classification as 
Polish or Slovak (and Czech) meant admittance to the national community. All other 
classifications carried the threat of potential expropriation and expulsion. This social and 
ethnic engineering deeply disintegrated communities, already devastated by the war. Not 
surprisingly, “elbowing” one’s place in the newly rearranged society added to the 
experiences of the war and postwar violence in intensifying ethnic resentment.  
Struggling for their place in a reconstructed society and for the opportunity to 
rebuild their lives, Polish and Slovak Jews were so entangled with the rest of the country 
that their experience becomes unintelligible outside its context. Some experiences are 
incomprehensible even outside of a regional context, proving that large national 
narratives can be deceptive in the way they homogenize experience. The postwar “return 
to normality” depended on the opportunities to have a family, to find employment, and to 
pursue communal activities. In other words, Jewish survivors depended on ongoing 
economic, political, social, and cultural processes, including daily violence, mass 
migrations, pressing shortages, economic quick fixes and long-term reforms, political 
maneuvers, and so forth.   
In the chaos of the transitional period, Jewish emigration and integration were not 
inevitable outcomes. Thousands chose neither. There was nothing inevitable in the mass 
emigration of Polish and Slovak Jews and in their ultimate radical assimilation in later 
decades. Comparative analysis undermines easy insights such as that as Jews suffered 
pogroms, they realized the impossibility of rebuilding a Jewish life and emigrated en 
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masse. Those who did not emigrate assimilated, having no other option. Close 
examination of the two histories shows that, despite intense violence in Poland, Polish 
Jews succeeded in building relatively normal lives in selected parts of the country. 
Moreover, they could do so as Jews, without the need to radically assimilate. Half the 
Jewish population after the war chose life in western Poland which offered a conducive 
milieu. True, more than 100,000 Jews emigrated after the pogrom in Kielce, but, at the 
same time, 100,000 stayed, 50,000 in Lower Silesia.   
In Slovakia, there were anti-Jewish pogroms and there was emigration as well. 
But, again, closer examination shows that there was no easy and direct link between the 
two. Slovak Jews left en masse not after the pogroms in Topoľčany in 1945 or Bratislava 
in 1946 and 1948, but after the political coup d’état in February 1948 when fear of the 
consequences of political change, including nationalization and terror, stirred panic. The 
establishment of Israel created the possibility. (Interestingly, preliminary study reveals 
that the majority of Slovak Jews immigrated to Israel while the Polish Jews dispersed 
across the West and Israel.) It should be noted that, by emigrating after change of regime, 
Slovak Jews voted “with their feet” against the new government and thus broke with the 
tradition of minority loyalty to the authority. They did so in much greater proportions 
than Polish Jews – eighty percent of Slovak Jews left at the time in comparison to forty 
percent of Polish Jewish survivors.  
Also, in striking contrast to Polish Jews and despite, or perhaps because of the 
government’s indifference, Slovak Jews reestablished a community which was in 
continuity with its interwar predecessor. An analysis of Jewish economic and religious 
patterns in the two countries after the war shows that they changed more dramatically in 
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Poland than in Slovakia. After the war, the majority of Slovak Jews remained active in 
orthodox congregations and occupied stereotypical “Jewish” occupational niches – 
private trade. Polish Jews radically shifted their prewar economic and religious patterns 
by finding employment outside private business and liberal professions and by leaving 
religious communities.  
This apparent Slovak continuity and Polish break resulted not only from the 
distinct histories of the two Jewish populations but also from the distinct environments 
that the two states and societies created after the war. In Poland, the government and the 
Jewish leadership were set on making a change, a break from the past. They were all 
involved in this project, trying desperatly to change the face of Jewish postwar 
community. In Slovakia, the government did not put forward any idea concerning the life 
of Slovak Jews, and were conspicuously uninvolved. Neither did the Jewish leadership in 
Slovakia champion the idea of productivization.  
These two opposing approaches stemmed not only from varying policies on Jews, 
but, more importantly, from practical considerations. Violence against Jews on the Polish 
street had no parallel in Slovakia. True, Slovak Jews suffered pogroms, but, as I argued 
elsewhere, none reached the Polish intensity. The numbers of Jewish casualties in Poland 
and Slovakia were also telling. Religious Jews in Slovakia did not have to hide or cut 
their beards in fear of backlash like their Polish counterparts. Slovak Jews could also 
rebuild their lives in villages and small towns to a degree unparalleled in Poland. Anti-
Jewish violence in Slovakia, although present, was not widespread enough to divert Jews’ 
religious and professional choices. In Poland, on the other hand, antisemitism and related 
violence were central obstacles in the rebuilding of Jewish lives. The government and 
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Jewish leaders believed that if Polish Jews changed, rebuilding would be possible: non-
Jews would correct their opinions about Jews and both would be able to live peacefully 
ever after.  
In the aftermath of the war, common issues of modern Jewish history – choice 
between “hereness” and “thereness,” acculturation and radical assimilation, building 
relationships with the powers-that-be and the majority population – were present. But, in 
contrast to the times of peace, these issues were heightened and individualized to a much 
greater degree. In the wake of the Shoah, individual Jewish returnees had to make life 
decisions within a short period of time and in extreme circumstances. Homelessness and 
loneliness on a personal level and enormous destruction and chaos on the street was the 
context, in which survivors had to make life choices. Especially immediately after 
liberation, when communities only started to rebuild, individuals were left by themselves. 
Only later on, when the political and professional communities revived, could survivors 
rely on an institutionalized advisory network. 
Importantly, the study presented in this dissertation suggests that Jews and non-
Jews “shared” these experiences only partially. Yes, everybody suffered war related 
human and material losses. Everybody struggled with shortages, devastation, and 
administrative chaos. Everybody was scared of violence on the street and many Jews and 
non-Jews alike fell victim to murder. Yet, Jews had a sense of absolute homelessness, 
loneliness, and victimization which was not shared by non-Jews. Poles and Slovaks knew 
the extent of destruction the war had brought to their Jewish neighbors but were too 
preoccupied with their own losses to acknowledge the tragedy of the others. Caring about 
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their own material survival, they often refused to return property or grant help. By the 
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